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In May-June 2005, the Ninth East-West Philosophers Conference was con-
vened in Honolulu, jointly sponsored by the University of Hawai'i and the
East-West Center. The theme of this iteration of the continuing conference
series was "Educations and Their Purposes: A Conversation among Cul-
tures," and the title of this volume has been taken therefrom. On that occa-
sion, some two hundred scholars from over thirty countries arrived on the
shores of Hawai'i to participate in a sustained reflection on the nature and
purpose of educations-intentionally plural-and how the interventions
they provide in our established cultural habits can serve the pressing issues
of our day.
The tradition of the East-West Philosophers Conferences began in
the 1930S when three University of Hawai'i visionaries-Charles Moore,
Wing-tsit Chan, and Gregg Sinclair-determined that the Philosophy
Department at this institution was going to be of a unique cast within
the world of professional philosophy. Indeed, the mission they set for the
department was to challenge the discipline of philosophy to be more inclu-
sive by reflecting in the faculty and in the curriculum of the department the
rich multi-ethnic and multicultural makeup of our own community. For
nearly three-quarters of a century, the Philosophy Department has aspired
to teach a global understanding of philosophy and has over time emerged
as a world center for what has come to be called the "comparative philos-
ophy" movement. Students matriculated from the University of Hawai'i
must meet all of the demanding requirements of a representative profes-
sional philosophy curriculum, and at the same time, through the careful
study of the languages and the textual corpus, they have the opportunity
to develop real credibility in South Asian, Chinese, Japanese, Buddhist, or
Islamic traditions of philosophy. It is the pride of the department and of
the University of Hawai'i that today scores of our graduates, each of them
unique and distinctive, have gone on to become distinguished scholars in
philosophy programs across the United States and in universities around
the world.
This continuing East-West Philosophers' tradition-important as it
is to the self-understanding of our institution and our community-has
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been maintained since its inception in the mid-I930S by the generous sup-
port of the local community and by our business leaders. For more than a
generation, the late Dr. Hung Wo Ching took a personal role in assuring
that the conference would be appropriately supported, and in recent years,
the Hung Wo and Elizabeth Lau Ching Foundation established by Hung
Wo's family has continued this commitment with their generous assistance
and encouragement. The conference was also underwritten by the gener-
ous support of ABC Stores; Sidney K. and Gloria Doo Ayabe; the Diamond
Head Memorial Fund; the First Hawaiian Foundation; the Kosasa Family
Fund; the K. J. Luke Foundation; Warren and Carolyn Luke; Moanalua
Terrace Shopping, Inc.; Professor Barbara Smith; the University of Hawai'i
College of Education; the University of Hawai'i Press; the Watumull Foun-
dation; the James and Juanita Wo Foundation; and the Robert and Betty
Wo Foundation.
The planning, organization, and execution of a conference of this size
is a formidable undertaking. Fortunately we had the guidance of the Inter-
national Advisory Committee chaired by former conference director Mar-
ietta Stepaniants of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Working with her
was a most distinguished company: Khaled Abou EI Fadl (Kuwait), Zhores
Alferov (Nobel Laureate, Russia), Chen Lai (China), Ashis Nandy (India),
Richard Rorty (USA), Gayatri Spivak (India), Tu Wei-ming (China), Des-
mond Tutu (Archbishop Emeritus, South Africa), and Federico Mayor
(Spain).
At home, the Philosophy Department of the University of Hawai'i
loaned its full measure of resources and support to the event, including an
incredible team of graduate students organized by Conference Assistant
Benjamin Lukey. Ben worked closely throughout the long months of plan-
ning and administration under the supervision of Program Officer Helen
Griffin, about whom anything we might say would fall far short. Helen is
the consummate professional, and it was her tireless energy that kept the
conference moving forward. And daughter Maili returned from abroad to
help her mother when the conference got under way in earnest.
The conference sessions occurred on the adjacent campus of the East-
West Center-a federally supported institution dedicated to promoting a
peaceful and prosperous Asia Pacific community. A key part of the inter-
national education landscape of Hawai'i since its inception in 1960, the
East-West Center generously made available its unique Imin Conference
Center for all sessions of the 2005 East-West Philosophers Conference,
along with lodging for the participants in its international faculty guest-
house, Lincoln Hall. In addition, many of the members of the EWC com-
munity participated in the program by chairing individual sessions, pre-
senting papers, and supporting the publication of the essays included here.
The ongoing partnerships between the East-West Center and the University
of Hawai'i-representing an alliance of federal and state resources-are
gratifying testimony of the creative potential of differences.
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Regular organizational meetings with business leaders Sonny and Han
Ching and Warren Luke enabled us to continue important traditions while
at the same time introducing productive innovations. The generous sup-
port of the donors, for example, allowed us to again open up the confer-
ence to the local community, continuing a tradition that has made these
conferences a much-anticipated local cultural event. Along with a worId-
class academic program, we were able to plan several special evening
events specifically for the benefit of our community. Jon Osorio, director
of the Hawaiian Studies Center, organized a magical evening of Hawai-
ian music and chant, allowing us to celebrate the host culture and Hawai'i
as a special place as a major theme of the conference. Tamara Albertini,
Robert Joseph, and Carlos Andrade developed an extraordinary presenta-
tion called "Recovering the Sky: Astronomy as Inspiration for the World's
Cultures." The standing-room-only crowd that attended the opening cere-
mony continued daily without respite for the two weeks of panels and con-
current sessions. The general community came to see what was going on
and decided to stay. Everyone was made to feel welcome.
There were many highlights at the conference: the opening ceremony
with the Board of Regents bestowing on Eliot Deutsch the Regent's Medal
of Distinction for his service to the university and the international acad-
emy, the sumptuous reception for the national and international partici-
pants and the donors hosted by President David McClain at College Hill,
the sunset reception "Manoa Thanks the Donors" at the Waiklki Aquarium
hosted by Chancellor Peter Englert and Honolulu Mayor Mufi Hannemann,
and the quintessentially Hawaiian closing banquet at the Wai'alae Coun-
try Club to name but a few.
Those social and cultural events punctuated the hard work in the two
weeks of world-class plenaries and concurrent panels. Together the aca-
demic and social events reinforced the singular importance of the confer-
ence tradition in providing both vision and self-understanding for our uni-
versity and our community in its contribution to world culture. There was
a generosity of spirit-aloha-that became pervasive even among estab-
lished scholars and the up-and-coming younger participants.
And it is this same aloha that celebrates the success of the Ninth East-
West Philosophers Conference and, at the same time, anticipates the Tenth
III 2010.
Roger T. Ames
University of Hawai'i
Peter D. Hershock
East- West Center

ROGER T. AMES AND PETER D. HERSHOCK
Introduction
Education is the point of departure for the cultivation of human culture
in all of its various forms. While there are many contested conceptions of
what is meant by a "good" education, not many would challenge the prem-
ise that education is a good thing and that we should invest heavily in it. In
this volume, representatives of different cultures and with alternative con-
ceptions of human realization explore themes at the intersection between a
changing world and the values we would choose to promote and embody
in the ways in which we educate the next generation.
Not long ago, a human being could live and die in a world that remained
relatively constant and familiar, and in which the means and meaning of
education likewise remained familiar. But no more. The past century has
witnessed an explosive acceleration in the pace of change, an intensify-
ing propulsion into increasingly global circulation of novel goods, services,
and technologies, but also of ideas, ideals, and, indeed, populations. The
accelerating pace at which familiarities are now being forged, fragmented,
and forgotten is affecting every aspect of the human experience-health,
economics, environment, communication, politics, and security. None of
the world's cultures has remained unchallenged as the half-life of famil-
iarity in these varied and interlocking domains has grown shorter. None
has entered the twenty-first century-and, sadly, many have not, especially
those of indigenous or first peoples-without being forced to respond to
the changing dynamics of change itself.
In some cases, the result has been a conservative championing of tra-
dition; in other instances, creativity and innovation have emerged as cul-
tural values; and in yet others the result has been to embrace the nomadic,
the dyasporic, and the hybridic. In all cases, however, education has come
to be seen as a crucial factor in successfully engaging the global realities of
increasingly rapid and complex change.
Within the context of this accelerating juggernaut, a collective and
overruling responsibility has arisen for humanity to sustain both natural
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and social ecologies, and to both conserve and open possibilities for the
meaningful participation of children yet unborn in appreciating-that is,
both sympathetically understanding and enriching or enhancing the value
of-our planetary inheritance. In our historical moment, more than ever
before, this prime directive means that increased technological capabilities
for initiating change must be accompanied by deepened capacities for con-
sidered wisdom in engaging issues of how best to orient change-a union
that at once requires and establishes the ultimate ambit of a sound edu-
cation. We need both the/capacities for and commitments to sustaining a
planetary and diversity-enriching conversation that will enable us, with
deliberation, to address our shared obligation to those yet to come, ensur-
ing that the Chinese proverb- "May you live in interesting times" -is
ever a blessing, and never a curse.
The need for education to address the critical issues of the day is not
a new story. Indeed, education is among the earliest sites of philosophi-
cal reflection. Concerns about the means and meaning of acquiring, defin-
ing, validating, and transmitting knowledge have been-and continue to
be-central to the practice of philosophy. Issues of how best to translate
knowledge into specific cognitive capabilities and embodied skills relevant
to realizing flourishing societies are inseparable from the philosophical
quest for the proper conception and concrete expression of the good life.
And, indeed, the centrally defining goal of philosophy itself-the trans-
lation of knowledge and experience into wisdom-is a critical celebra-
tion of situated and systematically pursued "learning-about" and "learn-
ing-from."
These ties between education and philosophy are particularly evident
in early Greek thought, Plato's Republic being paradigmatic in its explicit
weaving together of epistemological, ethical, metaphysical, and political
threads in depicting how a wise society prepares itself to meet the com-
plementary (and sometimes contrary) demands for stability and creativity.
For Plato, writing in the middle of the first millennium B.C.E., education
is foundational for both personal and social flourishing. In fact, the very
term "education" -literally, "leading forth" -gestures both toward Pla-
to's theory of learning as a form of recollection and toward his superlative
commendation of the inseparability of knowledge and virtue in the restor-
ative ascent toward ultimate Good.
This linking of education and philosophy is by no means limited to
the traditions of the West, however. In China, a century before Plato, Con-
fucius accorded himself a single, distinctive excellence: the love of learn-
ing (haoxue fjf~) (Analects 5.28). Confucius understood learning to be
a project of personal, familial, and communal cultivation-an educative
process that entails a reflectively enriching situational responsiveness and
that aspires to the realization of relational virtuosity. Indeed, Confucian
education involves at once the transmission and the situationally appro-
priate transformation of a shared, living culture. Confucius took such
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learning to be inseparable from the responsibilities of mentoring and mod-
eling as knowledge is transformed in practice into a productive communal
wisdom.
In India at roughly the same time, Siddhartha Gautama-the Bud-
dha-was similarly involved in celebrating practices for enhancing aware-
ness. He took as his challenge the skillful dissolution of the basic condi-
tions of errant interdependence, trouble, and suffering through practices
that directed learning toward the compassionate embodiment of knowl-
edge in wisdom (Pali: panna; Sanskrit: prajna). Tellingly, the earliest strata
of recorded discourses of the Buddha, rehearsed and discussed by his stu-
dents for the purpose of fully realizing their intent, all begin with the affir-
mation iti me sutan, or "thus have I heard/learned." The Pali term, suta,
explicitly connotes progress toward wisdom stimulated by learning/teach-
ing relationships, and indeed, the association of Buddhist practice with
education has been perennial. By the seventh century, Buddhist monas-
tic universities in north India and central Asia supported student bodies of
up to ten thousand, with teaching faculties in excess of a thousand spread
across a remarkable array of disciplines, including both Buddhist and non-
Buddhist philosophy.
Associating the love and pursuit of wisdom (philosophia) with edu-
cation is, perhaps, not at all surprising. Wisdom arguably connotes, at a
minimum, capacities for mature engagement with one's situation and, as
appropriate, enriching expressions of virtuosity therein. This would seem
to imply, as is so evident in Confucian thought, the functional insepara-
bility of wisdom and the appreciation of culture. Insofar as appreciation
implies both sympathetic understanding and heightened value, the pursuit
of wisdom would seem to be intrinsically related to the considered conser-
vation and creative extension of culture-an endeavor that i~, in the most
basic sense, educational in nature.
Plausibly, it is to the interrelatedness of the pursuit of wisdom with
strategies for education that we can trace the continuing controversies
within the contemporary discipline of professional philosophy regard-
ing whether any and all expressions of the strategies for actively pursu-
ing and enabling wisdom are entitled to the designation of "philosophy."
The potential conceptual gains that might accrue from critically engaging
such controversies should not be discounted. The fact that debates about
whether "non-Western traditions" are inherently philosophical exhibit
considerable cultural and ethnocentric biases should not distract attention
from the signal possibilities these debates open for critically dissociating
the pursuit of knowledge and wisdom from the value of unanimity, and
for participating in a conversation that offers as one of its more important
consequences a shared appreciation of diversity. This would imply, in turn,
engaging in both education and the conservation and creative extension
of culture as diversity-enhancing endeavors-a shift of considerable grav-
ity in the context of the ineluctable globalizing processes that are at once
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bringing about increasing economic, social, political, and cultural homog-
enization as well as fragmentation.
Indeed, the complex interdependencies that are arising both within and
among societies as a result of the contemporary scales and depths of these
globalizing processes set a more useful framework for considering the mutual
implications among philosophy, education, and culture than do issues of
how the discipline of professional philosophy disciplines itself. The original
and perennial constitution of education as a crucial forum for philosoph-
ical reflection expresses a general-but by no means, generic - intuition
that the pursuit of wisdom involves alloying considerations of the prospects
for shaping the self and for shaping society. In other words, philosophical
reflection on education constitutes a primary site for envisioning practices
and institutions by means of which the personally and socially realized and
the ideals aspired to might be interfused and critically tempered.
Granted that the shaping of one's person is always the making of
person-in-society, it follows that different conceptions or constructions of
personhood would be correlated with differing conceptions of education
and its cultural import. From this, it follows as well that revising educa-
tional aims and practices can be seen as a principal means of changing the
existing complexion of culture and society, whether in response to "exter-
nal" exigencies or "internal" impulses. And, in fact, there is ample histori-
cal evidence of education being utilized in precisely this manner as a means
to realizing particular theological, nationalist, modernist, or professional
ideals. At the same time, however, the interdependence of education and
the processes of cultural and social transmission and transformation sug-
gest that periods of cultural or social disruption or disequilibrium will tend
to subject educational aims and practices to considerable stresses. The cul-
tural and societal specificity of education implies as well a specific correla-
tion among cultural, social and educational patterns of change and inno-
vation.
It is significant, then, that formal education systems worldwide are in
crisis. Asking parents, politicians, policy makers, social critics, and edu-
cators themselves whether current educational aims and institutions are
attuned to and effectively addressing present and emerging educational
needs, the answer is almost invariably "No, they are not." This is true
whether the question is posed in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, or
Australia and the Pacific. It would appear that the dynamics of contem-
porary globalizing processes are bringing about such acutely stressful and
accelerating patterns of change in societies that education is now almost
universally experienced as both inadequate and errant. Most remarkable
perhaps, is the very ubiquity with which education is being perceived as
critically afflicted-the degree to which a sense of crisis characterizes the
full spectrum of educational systems and scales. To be sure, the specifics
of crisis differ greatly from locale to locale, from country to country, and
from region to region. But there is a common and deepening recognition
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that the limitations of existing educational models can no longer be denied
or discounted.
To the extent that education serves both conservative and creative ends,
it can be argued that education most fully and vibrantly takes place on
the margins of cultural and social equilibrium-at their growing or lead-
ing edge. The natural "ecology" within which education evolves most rap-
idly is one that is itself undergoing significant transformation. Thus, where
social, political, and economic conditions remain relatively stable, educa-
tional change is liable to be minimal. Conversely, where such conditions
undergo rapid alteration-as they did, for example, during the Renaissance
or the Industrial Revolution-the challenges of cultural continuity and
transmission increase, as do needs for change in educational practices and
aims. Implicitly, this also means increasing imperatives and opportunities
for revising the meaning of philosophy as the pursuit of wisdom.
The present moment is one in which particularly profound changes are
taking place at an unprecedented rate. As such, it is a moment in which
imperatives and opportunities for critical engagement between philoso-
phy and education are especially commanding. In addition, because these
scales of change are associated with the global emergence of truly com-
plex systems of interdependence and interpenetration-both among soci-
eties and cultures, and across the entire spectrum of both private and pub-
lic domains-this first decade of the twenty-first century is also a period in
which it is imperative to cultivate an appreciation of the diversity of philo-
sophical resources available globally for revising the meaning of education.
The Ninth East-West Philosophers Conference, jointly sponsored by
the University of Hawai'i and the East-West Center, brought together a
congress of over two hundred philosophers and scholars from some thirty-
five countries to reflect on the theme "Educations and Their Purposes: A
Philosophical Dialogue among Cultures." This meeting convened for two
weeks, from May 29 to June 10, 2005, and was dedicated to the role and
importance of "educations" - purposely plural- in the shaping of the
human experience. This volume represents an attempt to demonstrate the
value of philosophical diversity in thinking through the meaning of edu-
cation, and in discussing both the real and the ideal implications of edu-
cational innovation in an increasingly interdependent world. The essays
included here have been selected from presentations made at this historic
event.
The unifying theme in the first part of this volume, "Education,
Relationality, and Diversity," is the growing intellectual awareness of a
pervasive interdependence amid diversity in all aspects of the human
experience brought on by the unrelenting processes of globalization. Peter
D. Hershock, in his "Relating Freely: The Meaning of Educating for Equity
and Diversity," argues that, in spite of this seeming awareness, the glob-
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ally dominant educational paradigm continues to evidence a metacurric-
ulum shaped by values and ontological commitments that are increas-
ingly at odds with the realities of complex interdependence. Deepening
world poverty and heartrending destitution among vast populations are a
fair demonstration of the yawning gap between persisting values and any
insight humanity may have gleaned into the interdependent nature of our
reality so far. In Hershock's essay, Buddhist conceptual resources are mar-
shalled to the task of understanding and responding to this ontological dis-
sonance, orienting educating strategies toward the lifelong cultivation of
relational virtuosity. Thus reoriented, education will seek to build personal
and communal capacities that will be able to inflect the dynamics of com-
plex interdependence toward increasing equity and diversity.
In "Philosophy and the Hybridization of Culture," Richard Rorty
contests the perhaps uncritical assumption that interdependence will
promote an increased appreciation and accommodation of different ways
of living and thinking-that is, a respect for "cultural difference." Rorty
suggests that "cultural difference," a term often used to assert the intrinsic
worth of all cultures, is a contemporary preoccupation that might well
disappear as progress in transportation and communication ultimately
makes individual human beings citizens of an integrated world rather than
representatives of some particular, local "culture." Under these evolving
conditions, which indeed threaten local languages and cultures, persons will
be free to pick and choose from what is available in the cultural bazaar in
order to live better lives. As he sees it, the role of philosophy-comparative
philosophy as well-is not a grand, metaphysical quest for understanding
and certainty, but rather the modest goal of promoting those practical
measures necessary to achieve a happier and more egalitarian society-in
fact, a goal of social reform that has been well established over the past
few centuries by prominent Western thinkers such as Herder, the Romantic
poets, and Dewey. The end of metaphysics for Rorty is not Heidegger's
story of escaping an oppressive technological tyranny that is generally
associated with Western science, but rather the full use of whatever tools
we have available to us as a society-indeed, our technologies-to better
our lot in our specific time and place.
Tze-wan Kwan, taking language as one repository of "cultural
difference," weighs in on what could be lost if cultural diversity ceases to
make a difference. Over the past century the English language has become
the dominant international language in our increasingly globalized world.
Peoples in the world today, in whatever walk of life, ignore the impor-
tance of English-language proficiency at the risk of being marginalized by
the global community. While linguistic dominance might be an externally
imposed challenge, overdominance is a largely self-inflicted endangerment
of the mother tongue by the peoples of the respective linguistic communi-
ties. Kwan reflects on the various backgrounds and consequences of this
sociolinguistic phenomenon and proposes a number of measures to be
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taken if such overdominance is to be avoided. In addition to the widely dis-
cussed issues of language policies and language planning, Kwan retrieves
the notion of "language care" that was proposed by Leibniz at a time when
the prospect of German as an academic language was being eclipsed by the
overdominance of French.
Gwen Griffith-Dickson, in "Teaching Philosophy of Religion 'Multicul-
turally': A 'Lokiihi' Approach?" turns to the Hawaiian word lokiihi-an
achieved harmony among a manifold of insistent particulars-as a
model of how cultural diversity can be respected and sustained while at
the same time allowing for a productive accommodation among cultural
perspectives. In her essay she explores the possibility of a multicultural
approach to education in philosophy of religion, attempting to deal with
the question of the "incommensurability" of interpretive frameworks.
Abjuring any universalizable instrument for achieving comprehensibility in
making comparisons, Griffith-Dickson insists that interculturality can only
be achieved through entertaining a multiplicity of irreducible factors that
allow us, with imagination, to explore philosophical and religious ques-
tions from the vantage points of more than one tradition. Empathy and
an open appreciation of difference are indispensable in marshalling mod-
els for epistemology, hermeneutics, and pedagogy that are most conducive
to a responsible way of educating students in multicultural philosophy and
religion.
Sor-hoon Tan's contribution to this volume addresses perhaps the
most pressing political question of our new millennium: what kind of
educational reform must China-containing fully 22.5 percent of the
world's population-undergo to achieve a viable democracy? Tan accepts
Dewey's understanding of democracy as not one political form among
many, but as a moral, social, and even religious ideal. Appealing to a
broad Deweyan understanding of education as a desirable "reconstruction
or reorganization of experience," Tan uses the example of the putative
complementarity of science and democracy to make the case that recent
history has shown that democracy cannot be achieved by relying upon
some impositional and wholesale formula for reform. Science is neither
intrinsically democratic nor antidemocratic, and is not the answer. Rather,
democracy must emerge pragmatically through a "bottom-up approach"
that transforms habits of thinking, feeling, and acting. The only way that
democracy can be guaranteed is by its being embraced as a way of life.
While the discipline of philosophy has moved over recent years to
reconsider the important role of affect and physicality in the project of
philosophizing, these two long neglected aspects of the human experience
have taken on new life within philosophies of education. In the second part
of this volume, Robert C. Solomon, perhaps the most distinguished voice in
the, philosophy of the emotions, offers a sustained reflection on "Educating
Emotions: The Phenomenology of Feelings." Solomon rehearses the history
of emotions by tracing a discussion of the role of emotions back to Plato
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and Aristotle, who disagreed, in some basic ways, about how the emo-
tions should be educated. More recently important figures like William
James and Jean-Paul Sartre also wrote about the emotions and, in very
different ways, tried to come to grips with their peculiar phenomenology.
Although for the past fifty years, the importance of the emotions has been
buried under the twin scientistic errors known as positivism and behavior-
ism, recently interest in emotions has exploded in both philosophy and psy-
chology as well as in the neurosciences. Solomon's own view is closer to
Aristotle and Sartre than to James, using the phenomenology of the emo-
tions and emotional experience to understand what sort of thing the edu-
cation of emotions must be. In particular, he stands opposed to the divorce
between reason and the emotions and the many misunderstandings gener-
ated by this unfortunate, impoverishing antagonism.
Nel Noddings, like Solomon, begins from the inseparability of reason
and feeling in the moral life. In her essay, "Caring and Critical Thinking
in Relational Ethics," she insists that educators committed to produc-
ing moral people must work on both. We must both cultivate the moral
sentiments and, at the same time, encourage critical thinking. Caring, as
described in contemporary care ethics, begins with an attitude of recep-
tivity toward the cared-for and his or her needs, where the carer is hesi-
tant to infer needs that come from his or her own culture or background.
This receptivity ensures that expressed needs will be heard. But conscien-
tious carers must be able to assess the needs expressed and decide how to
respond. Using the distinction between expressed needs (those arising in
the one needing) and inferred needs (those externally imposed on the one
said to have them), Noddings tries to show how education infused with
caring and critical thinking can work to balance these needs.
Thomas P. Kasulis, in "Cultivating the Mindful Heart: What We
May Learn from the Japanese Philosophy of Kokoro," takes the role of
educating the emotions to East Asia. In traditional Japanese culture, kokoro
is the seat of both knowing and feeling, as well as the source of responsive
action. Therefore, it plays a crucial role in Japanese epistemology, aesthet-
ics, and ethics alike. Kasulis begins by explaining how the indigenous idea
of kokoro acquired important Buddhist overtones. Then, drawing mainly
on the theories of the Shinto philosopher Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801),
he discusses some basic strategies that have been posited in this tradition
for nurturing kokoro within the aesthetic community. The objective of this
discussion is to reconsider the importance of emotions, not only generally
in one's daily life in modern society, but also more specifically in one's
cognitive experience, as a way of enhancing our ability to relate and be
responsive to the complex world in which we live.
The final essay in this part on reinstating the emotions is Tao Jiang's
"The Dilemma of Skillful Means as a Buddhist Pedagogy: Desire and Edu-
cation in the Lotus Sidra." In Buddhism, the removal of ignorance is the
key to reaching awakening and to ending suffering. Hence, knowledge is
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crucial. What is at issue in Jiang's contribution is a unique pedagogy by
which the Buddha imparts knowledge to his disciples and others, namely
upaya, usually translated as "skillful means." Upaya is the link between
wisdom and oompassion, arising from the idea that wisdom is to be found
in one's capacity to respond to others rather than in some an abstract
understanding of the world around us. There are several potential prob-
lems with interpretations of upaya as a pedagogical method, the most seri-
ous being that it entails means that would normally be regarded as lies,
misinformation, or misdirection. Some would claim that there is a clear
dilemma between the soteriological effectiveness and the truthfulness of a
particular teaching in the pedagogy of skillful means. Jiang takes issue with
this understanding of upaya, arguing that truthfulness and efficacy cannot
be severed in the Buddha's teachings. Jiang explores a line of interpretation
that can accommodate the concerns of both the effectiveness and the truth-
fulness of the Buddha's teaching, and proposes a solution to the dilemma
of skillful means as a Buddhist pedagogy.
Like emotions, human somaticity has been a much neglected area of
philosophical reflection in the important business of education. In the third
part of this volume, East Asian traditions of thought that have never com-
mitted to the familiar mind-body dualism are appealed to as a resource for
rethinking the role of the body in education. Nikki Bado-Fralick, in her
essay, "With This Very Body: Or What Kiikai Has to Teach Us about Rit-
ual Pedagogy," begins from the perception that our Western philosophi-
cal worldview has largely privileged mind and text over body and prac-
tice, and in so doing, has overlooked the somatic nature of religious praxis
and has lost sight of ritual as a pedagogy that engages the whole person.
The Japanese philosopher Kiikai offers one concept of particular interest in
understanding ritual as pedagogy: sokushin jobutsu, or "attaining enlight-
enment with this very body." Kiikai emphasizes direct religious experience
through cultivation of one's total being-the bodymind-as opposed to
the intellect alone. Kiikai's ritual as pedagogy captures somatic modes of
attentiveness that includes sensory engagement with the embodied pres-
ence of others. Bado-Fralick insists that such ritual pedagogy is essential to
the core of the kind of disciplined praxis that would make successful ritual
innovation possible.
In "The Confucian Body and Virtue Education: On the Balance between
Inner Authenticity and Outer Expression," Seung-Hwan Lee observes that,
from the beginning of the modern era with the growing importance of
reason, the ancient wisdom of body as an embodiment of virtue has been
largely forgotten. In this essay, Lee attempts to reilluminate the impor-
tance of body in virtue education and human communication. He argues
that, in the Confucian tradition, mind and body have not been regarded
as separated entities. According to Confucian understanding, human con-
sciousness and emotions are deeply rooted in our physical body. Accord-
ingly, virtue education includes, at one and the same time, a cultivating of
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the heart-mind and of the body. In Confucianism, body is a field of expres-
sion that mediates the self and the outer world. Through virtue educa-
tion and self-cultivation, the body is elevated from a physical to a social
plane. In other words, through education, body itself becomes a medium
for effective communication.
IJ;1 the final contribution to this part, Joel W. Krueger's "Ethical Edu-
cation as Bodily Training: Kitar6 Nishida's Moral Phenomenology of 'Act-
ing-Intuition,''' he explores the Japanese Kyoto School philosopher Kitar6
Nishida's account of ethical education. For Nishida, such education entails
a kind of bodily training, or noncognitive somatic attunement. More pre-
cisely, Krueger argues that Nishida, with his account of moral maturity as
a mode of nonconceptual "acting-intuition," lays the foundation for a rev-
olutionary phenomenological account of ethical education as bodily train-
ing: a program for an embodied ethics of progressive skill cultivation. Put
differently, Nishida offers an account of ethical education which stresses
that authentic moral experience springs from a synthesis of intuitive moral
perception coupled with spontaneous moral (re)action. Nishida thus offers
a model of ethical education very much at odds with the cognitivist para-
digms framing most current debates in Western moral philosophy that tend
to prioritize a detached, critical-rational principled approach concerned
with determining a priori justifications of the "rightness" of subsequent
actions. Nishida inverts this classical cognitivist paradigm. In place of a
detached critical-rational morality, Nishida offers what Krueger calls an
embodied ethics of involvement.
In Part 4 of the volume, we address the tension between personal
authenticity and indoctrination existent in the role that education plays in
preparing any particular person for a successful life in the world. John Hope
Mason, building on his earlier work on the historical development of the
concept of creativity, brings his analysis up to date by surveying the most
recent understandings of this term. In his essay, "What's Wrong with Being
'Creative'?" Hope Mason brings a critical eye to the recent and seemingly
ubiquitous celebration of human "creativity" that has emerged within our
contemporary Western culture. This trend was interestingly marked in the
late nineteenth century by the transformation of the festival May Day from
"a thanksgiving for the divine gifts of sun, rain, and the earth's fertility"
to "a celebration of human labor and productivity." The emphasis on
"creativity" as a personal property of all individuals has spilled over to
become the humanistic and artistic expectations we associate with the
developmental educational theorizing of Jean Piaget and its applications in
such practical strategies as those of Froebel and Montessori. Hope Mason,
having defined "creativity" as "to act in the world, or on the world, in a
new and significant way," takes Richard Rorty as a quintessential example
of a postmodern thinker who would endorse the disparate and fragmentary
projects of "private self-creators" without sufficient concern for the kind
of communal responsibility necessary for these indulgences to warrant the
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prize of being called "significant." In fact, the essence of Hope Mason's
critique is that much of what is being called "creative" today is "either
merely 'new' or 'novel', or else just 'particular' or 'personal'" without
being of sufficient consequence to pass the significance bar.
Corollary to Hope Mason's claim that contemporary Western culture
takes "creativity" as an unalloyed good, the same culture would perceive
indoctrination as anathema to "good" education. Gay Garland Reed, in
"Constructing Identities: The Shifting Role of Indoctrination in Chinese
and American Education," explores historical and contemporary attitudes
toward indoctrination in China and the United States and discusses the
power of indoctrination in constructing identity. "Indoctrination" is a
term that is almost always associated with political ideology, moral edu-
cation, or religion. It resides primarily in text, media, and pedagogy. But it
also resides in perceptions and in the way we conceptualize the educational
process. For people in the United States, it evokes an image of education
with a collectivist texture and a coercive pedagogy. In China, on the other
hand, indoctrination does not evoke such negative connotations. Rather,
it is viewed as a natural and appropriate educational practice particularly
well suited to political socialization. This exploration into the nature of
indoctrination is initiated by the telling of two stories-one by a Chinese
mother whose child attended school in the United States, and the other by
an American woman whose children attended school in China. Their sto-
ries reveal their ambivalence as they see their children gradually becom-
ing absorbed into the political cultures of their schools, and thus help us
critically to assess the process of indoctrination from more than one per-
spective.
Geir Sigurdsson takes concern over indoctrination another step further
by questioning whether or not such dogmatic attitudes toward education
found in contemporary China are even consistent with its own tradition.
In "'Initiating But Not Proceeding to the End': A Confucian Response to
Indoctrination," Sigurdsson observes that the allegedly "Confucian" teach-
ing methods of the late imperial Hanlin Academy have, not without some
justification, been criticized for inhibiting creative thought and contribut-
ing to an attitude of deferential acceptance of authority and excessive uni-
formity among students-in short, for being methods of "indoctrination."
Despite increasing openness to alternative methods among Chinese teachers
and pedagogicians, it appears that these Hanlin methods, characterized by
passive listening and rote learning, are still predominant in the present edu-
cational system in the Peoples' Republic of China. Sigurdsson argues that
these unfortunate teaching methods are in fact antithetical to the methods
proposed by the early Confucian thinkers, and are therefore really "anti-
Confucian" in nature. Early texts like the Analects and the Book of Rites
reveal that early thinkers in the tradition were quite aware of the prob-
lem of indoctrination and consequently designed methods that were meant
to circumscribe it. Sigurdsson identifies two of these methods- "verbal
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incitement" and "performative discernment" -and assesses their potential
significance for the state of education today.
In "Either Self-Realization or Transmission of Received Wisdom
in Confucian Education? An Inquiry into Ui Zuqian's and Zhu Xi's
Constructions for Student Learning," Hoyt Cleveland Tillman explores
education at Zhu Xi's academies from the perspective of the experiences
of the students themselves. What was their daily routine and program of
study? What did Zhu Xi's approach to pedagogy mean in concrete terms
for learning at these academies? How was the palpable tension between
individual self-realization and the doctrinaire transmission of the authority
of teacher and text resolved? Although it is of course difficult to retrieve the
experiences and perspectives of students in the twelfth century, Tillman's
exploration not only sheds additional light on Zhu Xi's educational theory
but, more importantly, provides a more nuanced and balanced appreciation
of its praxis. Idealizations of selected aspects of Zhu Xi's philosophy of
education certainly need to be tempered with his strategies of enhancing
his own authority over both students and text.
The fifth part of this volume focuses on the mutual accommodation of
different approaches to education. Workineh Kelbessa's essay, "Oral Tra-
ditions, African Philosophical Methods, and Their Contributions to Edu-
cation and Our Global Knowledge," examines the arguments of those who
would claim that oral traditions are not hospitable to philosophy because
they are incapable of sustaining critical thought and dialectical exchange.
Kelbessa contests such arguments, insisting that literacy is not a necessary
condition for philosophical reflection and exposition. Indeed, oral tradi-
tions developed over countless generations are pivotal sources of social,
economic, environmental, and philosophical knowledge in nonliterate cul-
tures. Given that proverbs, aphorisms, beliefs, customs, stories, folktales,
rituals, folk songs, and sOclal institutions have been the main sources of
African philosophic sagacity in the past and are still functioning today,
they can be seen as resources for introducing and defending the importance
of oral and nonacademic sources of global wisdom. Kelbessa argues that
it is important to combine both rich oral and written intellectual heritages
and to subject them to critical philosophical reflection and analyses with
the goal of powerfully integrating such wisdom into global discourses and
debates concerning the central issues we are confronting at the beginning
of the twenty-first century.
Another dimension of "Education and Otherness" is the perceived
relationship between students and their teachers in different traditions of
thought. Chen Lai, in "The Ideas of 'Educating' and 'Learning' in Confucian
Thought," draws a contrast between learning as simply the acquisition
of knowledge in its narrow sense and the Confucian commitment to
the spiritual maturation of the whole person as it is expressed in a life
of excellence. Such education cannot be achieved through training in any
particular skill, nor can its objective be realized through educating persons
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to become specialists in any particular field. The task of the educator is
to communicate to the learner the meaning of a magnanimous spirit and
consummate character in order to stimulate the cultivation of such moral
excellence. The most fundamental goal of education in Confucianism-a
tradition in which philosophy is resolutely philosophy of education-is
the cultivation of persons who take personal excellence as their ultimate
value, and in so doing, are able to rise above all that is vulgar and common
inhuman conduct.
John J. Thatamanil, in "Spiritual Transformation and Transethical
Life: Thinking from Advaita," asks: What if anything can we learn about
the character of education by considering specific traditions of spiritual
transformation that depend on concentrated engagement between teacher
and disciple? His essay takes up this question by considering the relation-
ship between guru and sisya within Advaita Vedanta. Of special concern
is the comparative problem of "education and otherness." Are practices
of paideia transferable across religious terrains given the intimate connec-
tion between practices of formation and specific worldviews? Thatamanil
defends the hypothesis that, although disciplines of spiritual transforma-
tion are highly specific to their primary religious contexts (as the example
of learning within Advaita demonstrates), they can inform reflection about
the character of education well beyond their cultural locations. The con-
tent-specificity of spiritual disciplines does not altogether constrain the form
in which those spiritual disciplines are inculcated in students and thereby
transmitted across generations. Prima facie evidence for this claim can be
found in the striking similarities that exist in pedagogical practices for spir-
itual transformation across very different religious traditions. Thatamanil
explores some of these spiritualities by briefly consulting non-Indic prac-
tices of spiritual transformation from a comparative perspective.
In "Education and Responsiveness: On the Agency of Irrtersubjectiv-
ity," Brian J. Bruya begins from Fran~ois Jullien's claim that readers of
Chinese poetry are not led to see, but rather move as they please. The
crux of this claim, according to Jullien, lies in the nature of Chinese poet-
ics. Bruya attempts to show that such an assumption on the part of a Chi-
nese poet-namely, that a reader can be trusted to respond appropriately
without the poet's direct guidance-assumes a unique view of responsive-
ness that is immediately relevant to the interactions that occur in educa-
tion. Bruya introduces a new category of syntactic transitivity that signals
the core of intersubjectivity. While standard syntactic monotransitivity pre-
sumes an agent manipulating an object, it does not speak to the case of
the object itself being an agent. Bruya addresses the issue of the object as
agent and identifies this kind of semantic transitivity as intertransitivity.
He then goes on to analyze the component parts of intertransitivity. Philo-
sophically, it is not enough to say that intertransitivity involves an agent as
object, because it presupposes the question of what distinguishes an agent
object from a non-agent object. The result of this analysis is an under-
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standing of the responsiveness of the agent object. Finally, Bruya applies
this new understanding of agent-object responsiveness to the case of edu-
cation, suggesting that effective education presumes at heart a spontane-
ous responsiveness on the part of the learner that is indeed identical to the
responsiveness that Chinese poets assume in their readers.
Daniel Raveh, in "Different Encounter between Teacher and Student
in Sailkara's Upadesa-Sahasri and in the Teaching of Jiddu Krishnamurti,"
continues the discussion of the teacher-student relationship. He examines
the educational approach of two great Indian thinkers: Sailkara, the famous
Advaitin of the eighth century, and Jiddu Krishnamurti, a twentieth-cen-
tury reluctant "world teacher." While the latter explicitly talks of educa-
tion, the former discusses the interlacement of teacher and student, as well
as the process of teaching leading to ultimate knowledge (bramavidya).
The main argument of this essay is that both Sailkara and Krishnamurti,
despite being separated by more than a thousand years, espouse pedagog-
ical approaches that reject the conventional model of teaching according
to which the teacher knows, the student does not know, and the former
conveys knowledge to the latter. Instead, they both maintain that knowl-
edge takes place only within an intimate encounter between teacher and
student. Such an encounter brings forth a special kind of knowledge-or
rather awareness-that lies in each of them waiting to be 'invited' out.
They are equal partners in the enterprise of recovering this interawareness,
to the extent that it is often impossible to determine who teaches and who
is taught. Neither Sailkara nor Krishnamurti are much concerned with the
transmission of information, but rather give first priority to an innertrans-
formation that has consequences for community and world. For both of
them, then, this is the purpose of education.
Having first rehabilitated affectivity and somaticity for the philosophy
of education, in the final part of this collection of essays the discussion turns
to the role of aesthetic sensibilities in moral development with the theme
of "Education and the Aesthetics of Moral Cultivation." Fred Dallmayr,
in "Beautiful Freedom: Schiller on the 'Aesthetic Education' of Human-
ity," addresses the question of whether or not global education can be
entrusted to a global elite relying on the dictates of (Western-style) reason,
or alternatively, whether or not global education can draw on the latent
impulses and motivations of peoples in local settings. In his three Critiques,
Kant had erected a strict dichotomy between universal reason and nonra-
tional sensibility or inclinations. In his "Letters on the Aesthetic Educa-
tion of Humankind," Friedrich Schiller attempted to overcome this dichot-
omy by exploring the potential of an aesthetic sensibility (or "Spieltrieb")
that would reconcile reason and contingency, moral duty and inclination.
Partly continuing the work of Herder, Schiller in these "Letters" intimated
at the possibility of a pluralistic learning process among cultures bypass-
ing both bland (rationalist) cosmopolitanism and a cultural parochialism
that would engender a clash of civilizations. Dallmayr's essay examines the
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implications of Schiller's "Letters" in a global setting. As a first step, he
explores some parallels between the "Letters" on the one hand, and Con-
fucian "heart-mind learning" and Islamic 'adab on the other. His essay
concludes with an allusion to possible affinities between the "Letters" and
Heideggerian "poetic" education, and Freire's "pedagogy of the heart."
Like Fred Dallmayr, Kathleen Marie Higgins' essay, "Musical Educa-
tion for Peace," takes its beginning from Friedrich Schiller, who argues that
the arts contribute to moral education by convincing those who experience
such education that satisfaction is not a zero-sum game, but instead can
be achieved in harmony with others. Higgins, insisting that Schiller's claim
has particular force with respect to music, argues that in fact music has a
role to play in efforts to make the world a more peaceful place. Modern
political events make evident the desire of people to express their political
demands aesthetically. Music is a valuable means for political expression,
as political authorities from ancient China to contemporary Latin Amer-
ica have recognized.
There are important reasons why music is such an effective vehicle
for political expression. Music is participatory, even for audience mem-
bers. We find ourselves in relation with those who make the music as well
as with others in the audience. Human beings are geared toward respond-
ing to music in social terms and as reflecting social possibilities. Music is an
art of tension, and it enables multiple independent voices to express them-
selves simultaneously, even in harmony. It thereby reveals the possibility
for distinct identities to be manifest and for these identities to pursue their
goals without the others being obstacles. It thus provides a demonstration
of the sort that Schiller defends and that is reminiscent of the Hawaiian
word lokiihi alluded to in the Griffith-Dickson essay (Chap. 4), meaning,
the manifestation of simultaneous gratification to elements without inter-
ference from each other. In this respect, music can present our ideal for
robustly diverse social interaction, offering prospects for people to experi-
ence themselves as part of the human community and to take satisfaction
in that experience. Accordingly, music can be a force for peace.
In "Fact and Value in the Analects: Education and Logic," Joel J.
Kupperman argues that the philosophy of Confucius centers on two ide-
als-that of sagacity and that of a virtuous and harmonious society-and
on his recommendations for how these ideals can be approached. Both ide-
als are justified in terms of an examination of what human beings will find
fulfilling. The recommendations also reflect a model of human develop-
ment in which people can make substantial progress. In short, there is an
intricate psychology mixed with philosophy in the Analects. Kupperman
suggests that Confucius is not unique in this: there is a similar mixture in
the work of David Hume and of Friedrich Nietzsche. None of the three
could be termed, by modern standards, a "scientific" psychologist, and yet
in each case one may well think that there are brilliant insights. The ques-
tions Kupperman addresses are: "How can these ideals be justified?" and
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"How can they provide support (if they do) to the philosopher's normative
conclusions?" What emerges is a portrait of Confucius as one of the many
philosophers in the long history of philosophy who somehow arrived at the
"ought" on the basis of the "is."
Western aesthetics, since Kant and Hegel, has found its value in a dis-
interested pleasure or cognition free from other practical purposes, where
the true value of the aesthetic experience is considered to be internal to
its occurrence, and not integrally related to issues of moral cultivation,
development, and worldly pleasure. Aesthetic experience is evoked, in the
standard case, by an object (an artwork) and is an experience of a sub-
ject that is felt as removed from daily concerns, uses, and meanings. Scott
R. Stroud's contribution, "Xunzi and the Role of Aesthetic Experience in
Moral Cultivation," argues that aesthetic experience is a key part of Xun-
zi's (Hsiin Tzu's) explication of Confucius' initial description of music and
ritual in moral self-cultivation. Of interest to Western aestheticians, how-
ever, is the emphasis that Xunzi places on the actual doing of something
in aesthetic experience. This "doing" is both a bodily enactment of some
form, such as ritual (Ii) or music (yue), and an action that accomplishes
something outside of its merely being performed. Thus, the sharp sepa-
ration of intrinsic and instrumental uses of aesthetic experience is con-
founded by the use given to it by Xunzi. Such an account is of interest to
Western aestheticians because it highlights an alternative conception of aes-
thetic experience and its role in the moral development of the individual, as
well as correcting an overly cognitive account of Xunzi that tends to mini-
mize issues of bodily experience.
Yong Huang, in "How Is Weakness of the Will Not Possible? Cheng
Yi's Neo-Confucian Conception of Moral Knowledge," advances the
discussion of moral cultivation to the neo-Confucian period. It is generally
agreed that the Cheng brothers (Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi) were the true
initiators of what in the West is called "neo-Confucianism," or what in
Chinese is variously called "learning of Ii (principle)," "learning of dao,"
"learning of xin (heart-mind)," or simply "learning of the Song dynasty."
Although the very word "learning" in all these terms indicates its scholastic
tendencies (and it is not surprising that it is often compared with the Western
scholasticism of the Middle Ages), the main focus for the Cheng brothers is
a moral knowledge that is inseparable from moral practice.
Huang focuses on another, and perhaps more controversial, aspect of
the Cheng brothers' discussion of moral knowledge and practice: "No one
knows without being able to act; and one does not act simply because one
does not know." Huang claims that this is a controversial position because
we are used to the distinction between "knowing" and "willing": a person
may know it is wrong to steal but still steals things anyway. In the view of
the Cheng brothers, however, the act of stealing means that a person does
not really know it is wrong to steal, just as a person who keeps putting his
finger in the fire cannot claim that he knows fire will hurt his finger. Since
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we usually think it is not right to punish anyone who unknowingly did
something wrong, the claim of the Cheng brothers that all wrongs are done
unknowingly has important implications for moral (and legal) punishment
as commonly conceived.
As is demonstrated by the essays comprised here, education takes place
at a singularly dynamic nexus of intersecting, and indeed interdependent,
concerns, processes, and forces. Education conjoins, at once conservatively
and creatively, the utterly personal and the political; the economic, the aes-
thetic, and the moral; the secular, the sacred, and the sublime; the realm of
sentience and that of sentiment; the very young and the fully matured; the
historical and the visionary. Education is itself, then, a conversation-a
conversation of unique complexity that is voiced distinctively by each of
the world's cultures, and through which each engages in expressing itself
ever anew. It is with the intent of enhancing the quality of this conversation
and its potentials for skillfully orienting the global realities of increasingly
complex change and interdependence that these papers and their diverse
perspectives have been selected and offered in print in this volume.

Part I
Education, Relationality,
and Diversity

PETER D. HERSHOCK
1 Relating Freely
The Meaning of Educating for Equity and Diversity
According to Buddhist teachings, although it is true that all things arise
interdependently, the fruit of interdependence is not predetermined. Inter-
dependence can be directed toward continued and ever more complicated
troub!e and suffering (samsara), or it can be directed toward meaning-
fully and sustainably resolving them (nirvana). Put somewhat differently,
trouble and suffering are indices of errant interdependence or relationships
gone awry; resolving our troubles and suffering means truing, or properly
aligning, interdependence.
Contemporary patterns of global interdependence are in substantial
need of truing. Even a cursory review of the past quarter-century makes bit-
terly apparent, for example, that globalization processes have not resulted
in growing equity. Today, roughly 25 percent of the world's people are only
barely able to meet their most rudimentary material needs, while another
20 percent live in conditions so abject that they afford no hope whatever of
living even minimally dignified lives-a 50 percent increase since the late
1970S.1 For far too many, the impossibility of making a meaningful differ-
ence in the quality of their own lives provides daily and deadening testi-
mony to the compounding miseries that arise as interdependence goes fur-
ther and further awry.
In what follows, I want to make the case that the tragedies of global
poverty are intimately related to the global spread and deepening of edu-
cational crisis. This will entail telling a complex story relating the struc-
tures and direction of twenty-first-century global interdependence; deepen-
ing poverty and inequity both within and among societies; and mounting
evidence that serious educational shortfalls are emerging at rates and inten-
sities that outstrip any conceivable pace of educational reform. Far from
being a story of hopeless capitulation, however, it is a story centered on
locating what David Harvey has termed "spaces of hope" within the very
pattern of conditions that now serve as engines of inequity.2 As I hope to
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make evident, the same realities that globally are driving education into cri-
sis are also opening opportunity spaces for education to serve as a driver
for reorienting global interdependence toward a coordinative achievement
of ever greater equity and diversity.
Education and Poverty Alleviation
Poverty alleviation and education are widely viewed as related, in the spe-
cific sense that there is simply not enough education available to the poor,
who are thus blocked from fully participating in and benefiting from eco-
nomic development. This mainstay of governmental and nongovernmental
agendas for addressing poverty contains an indisputable measure of truth.
At present, hundreds of millions of people have yet to be reached by for-
mal education of any sort and lack even basic literacy and numeracy. The
more critically relevant truths, however, are: first, that while any amount of
education will undoubtedly improve the ability of individual poor to relate
effectively with their situation, the primary causes of poverty do not lie
within the poor themselves; and, second, that education along now glob-
ally standard lines will do little to true the patterns of local and global inter-
dependence that do lie at the roots of poverty and that are sustaining eco-
nomic growth and development by opening ever-widening beneficiary gaps
both within and among societies. Education's lack of traction in address-
ing these wider conditions is not primarily a function of inadequate fund-
ing and access. Rather, it is an emergent function of genealogically shared
values between the globally standard educational paradigm and the system
of free-market economics that is a principal driver of global inequity.
We can begin fleshing out this claim by first considering briefly the link-
ages identified among poverty, development, and education by the Nobel
laureate Amartya Sen, and then reframing them in more strategically criti-
cal terms. According to Sen, while development is rightly regarded as cru-
cial to alleviating poverty and its associated tragedies, expansion of indi-
vidual agency or freedoms of choice, not economic growth, should be
regarded as "the primary end and principal means of development."3 Bas-
ing his conclusion on comparative historical evidence, Sen identifies educa-
tion as the single most effective means of directly expanding the range and
depth of agency individuals can exercise "to lead lives they have reason to
value and to enhance the real choices they have."4 Though education pos-
itively affects productivity and helps spur and sustain economic growth,
Sen regards these as indirect benefits. The primary impact of education is
increasing freedoms ofchoice: the direct alleviation of what he refers to as
capability (as opposed to income) poverty. Economic growth is a happy but
indirect consequence.
There is much that is appealing in Sen's analysis and his effort to sub-
ordinate the market values of productivity and growth to the human val-
ues of freedom and enhanced agency. The distinction between capability
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poverty and income poverty, in particular, affords a very useful point of
departure for rethinking poverty alleviation in more qualitative terms. But
Sen's approach to linking poverty alleviation and education sheds scant
explanatory or strategic light on the fact that, while contemporary patterns
of global interdependence have been able to foster both remarkable eco-
nomic growth and the rapid expansion of educational opportunities, these
same patterns of interdependence have generated both globally increasing
inequity and locally intensifying conditions for educational crisis. That is,
his approach falls short of explaining the irony that sustained economic
growth and market integration leaves the increasingly 'better educated'
global poor both absolutely better off in terms of income and access to
market goods and services and relatively worse off with respect to their
share of global wealth.
This lack of critical traction reflects, in part, the global nature of Sen's
overall argument and his inattention to the details of educational prac-
tice. But more important, it also reflects an insufficiently relational under-
standing of both poverty and freedom, and a failure to see how the inter-
play of market economics and education has come to express a relationally
impoverishing codependency centered on the values of choice and control.
In effect, to the extent that market-driven economic growth, development,
and deepening interdependence leave the poor worse and worse off in rel-
ative terms, they are being left less and less favorably or valuably situated.
In relational terms, they are worse off than in the past even if they are capa-
ble of exercising a wider range of choices. Bluntly stated, being relatively
worse off is equivalent to being relationally disadvantaged. Heightened
freedoms of choice do not guarantee becoming relatively better off and are
indeed quite compatible with becoming less capable of relating freely.
Especially in the context of contemporary realities, the values of indi-
vidual agency, choice, and control not only may do little to enhance the
quality of our interdependence, they may be counterproductive to sustain-
ably reducing inequity. The intimate linkage between rising inequity and
deepening crises in education is ultimately axiological, depending much
less on insufficient investment in education for the poor than on the fact
that continued market growth requires a steady erosion of contributory
capacities-a process in which education along globally standard lines has
come ironically to playa progressively pivotal role. To engage critically the
codependency of market economics and education, we must first develop
the rudiments of a fully relational understanding of the interplay of pov-
erty, capability, and freedom.
Poverty as the Erosion of Relational Quality
The early Buddhist canon contains substantial resources for developing
a relational conception of poverty. In the Ina Sutta,5 poverty is initially
depicted as an increasingly constraining relational dynamic afflicting those
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who demonstrate a lack of conviction, conscience, concern, persistence, or
discernment with respect to wholesome or skillful (kusala) mental quali-
ties. As is made clear by the contrast of the poor, who are dalidda (literally,
vagrant or without a place in the web of social interrelatedness) and monks
and nuns who, while also "homeless" and dependent on begging for their
subsistence, are termed appicchatii or "content with little," the relational
breakdowns characteristic of poverty are not primarily a function of mate-
rial lack. Instead, poverty is ultimately rooted in deficient and/or misdi-
rected (akusala) patterns of attention that both result from and result in
ignorance and errant patterns of relationship. Material deprivation is one
possible effect of poverty, but not its cause.
The critical force of identifying poverty with errant (akusala) patterns
of awareness or attention is powerfully drawn out in the Sakkapaizha Sutta,6
where the causes of conflict and malignity are traced back through jealousy
and greed to fixed likes and dislikes, craving desires, dwelling persistently
on things, and finally papaiica or the mental proliferation of impediments.
The key to liberation from samsara or the resolution of all suffering and
trouble, including poverty, is "cutting through papaiica" by carefully con-
sidering the relational eventualities resulting from any given pursuit, be it
mental, emotional, social or physical. If a pursuit leads to both decreasing
akusala eventualities and increasing kusala eventualities, papaiica, or the
mental proliferation of impediments, ceases: the roots of conflict are cut
through. But should a pursuit lead to akusala eventualities persisting or
increasing, even if kusala eventualities also obtain, the grounds for conflict
continue to be well seeded: suffering will persist.
Importantly, the term kusala functions as a superlative. It does not
designate things that are done "well enough," but only those being car-
ried out in a manner conducive to virtuosity. Kusala and akusala patterns
of awareness and eventuality thus differ in terms of their qualitative direc-
tion-the former involving movement toward increasingly refined and cre-
atively enriching presence, the latter toward increasingly crude and situa-
tionally impoverishing presence. In short, kusala conduct and eventualities
express appreciative and contributory virtuosity-a capacity for enriching
differences or differing in ways that make a valuable difference.
Poverty can be seen, then, as ultimately a function of situational block-
ages or mounting impediments (papaiica) to making a meaningful differ-
ence and relating freely. In terminology drawn from the early Buddhist
tradition, these blockages and impediments function as iisava: draining
outflows of attention-energy into akusala or polluting and wasteful activ-
ity. Not only do they distract us from entering into truly enriching patterns
of relationship, they habitually deplete us of the resources needed to orient
our interdependence as a whole toward the liberating resolution of trou-
ble and suffering.!
Poverty, in short, is a mark of ignorance or deficient attunement-a
measure of incapacity for responding or being responded to as needed. Pov-
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erty means not having anything relevant to offer, being in no position to
appreciate or add value to one's situation. Yet, as the Cakkavatti-Szhanada
Sutta makes clear, 8 while poverty arises with failures to discern how we
can concretely contribute, in ways that are kusala, to the patterns of rela-
tionship constituting who we are as persons and communities-failures of
both insight and imagination-alleviating poverty cannot be accomplished
simply by giving more to "the poor." Poverty ultimately indexes a situa-
tional failure to appreciate the distinctive differences of all beings-a pat-
tern of interdependence that fails to draw out each being's enriching capac-
ities and that ultimately affects and afflicts all who are present.
In sum, poverty can be seen as an index of compromised or collapsed
diversity, where diversity consists of self-sustaining and difference-enriching
patterns of mutual contribution to meaningfully shared welfare. Strategies
for poverty alleviation which are not ecological in the sense of addressing
the meaning or direction of an impoverishing situation as a whole-strat-
egies that identify poverty with people who are poor rather than with rela-
tional impediments and inequities-are doomed to failure. Yet, this is
precisely the type of poverty alleviation that is afforded by the globally
dominant educational paradigm-a paradigm that focuses on inculcating
market-relevant competencies rather than appreciative and contributory
virtuosity.
Curriculum and the Karma of Control
Over the last two hundred years, formal (especially public) education has
come to be carried out globally as the sequentially structured transfer/
acquisition of information and knowledge; as a systematic means of incul-
cating circumstantially relevant competencies; and as a fo~um for princi-
ple- or rule-based character development and socialization.9 This educa-
tional paradigm did not develop independently, but rather took shape as a
function of sustained convergences, across a wide range of domains, on the
values of control, universalism, autonomy, and equality-a legacy of what
Stephen Toulmin has termed the second phase of modernity.lO
These convergences evidence a distinctive karma or pattern of values-
intentions-actions and associated outcomes and opportunities that began
developing in the late sixteenth century and that crossed an important
threshold in the turbulent decades of the early- to mid-seventeenth cen-
tury as religious, political, and social conflict in Europe reached devastat-
ing intensities. At the same time, innovations in science and engineering
were ushering in what has been referred to as a "control revolution"l1 that
has radically affected societal structures and been a factor in the growth of
both global market economics and standardized education to the present
day. The result was a distinctive interweaving of political, socioeconomic,
scientific, and technological ideals, institutions and practices expressing the
legitimacy of segregating reason, mind, and theory from emotion, body,
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and practice; of asserting the inherent danger or irrelevance of difference;
and of seeking an isomorphism of cosmic, political, social, and epistemic
orders.
The ubiquitous association of education with curriculum neatly illus-
trates the modernist heritage of the dominant educational paradigm. "Cur-
riculum" was first used in an educational context in the late sixteenth cen-
tury by Peter Ramus. 12 Prior to this, education was associated with the
activities of a studio-hence the word student-in which a master of a
particular knowledge domain engaged in sustained dialogue with individual
apprentices. Education was not presumed to be a programmed affair lim-
ited by fixed procedures or set timetables, but rather a lifelong, highly indi-
vidualized, and largely improvised endeavor. Ramus innovatively claimed
that knowledge could be mapped, that its transmission could be logically
and universally ordered or methodized, and that education not only could
but also should follow a particular and explicitly terminal course. The term
curriculum captures this perfectly, originally denoting a circular racecourse
of standard length used to order the competitive movement of charioteers.
With the notion of a curriculum, Ramus forwarded an understanding
of knowledge as a quantifiable and deliverable good most efficiently and
effectively transferred by means of standard instructional sequences build-
ing up from epistemic simples to culminate in predetermined ends. Stu-
dents came to be seen as travelers coursing through generic curricula and
acquiring specific bodies of knowledge and competence by methods at once
expressing and transferring their deep structure.
The emergence of control as a key value against a background of inten-
sifying international competition intimately informed the emerging para-
digm of education based on the disciplined completion (that is, consump-
tion) of methodically delivered, standard curricula. 13 Shaped as well by
the modern values of universality, autonomy, and equality, this paradigm
matured in interdependence with other distinctively modern institutions,
including the nation-state and the global commodity, labor, and consumer
markets.
Not surprisingly, as colonial and industrial expansions began to fal-
ter with the onset of diminishing returns on investment in the early- to
mid-twentieth century, education was explicitly drafted into the training
of market-ready labor forces. The industrialization of education reached
such intensity, especially in the United States, that influential educational
theorists frankly advocated reorganizing schools in keeping with the new
science of efficiency that was then being used to rationally restructure fac-
tories and management organization. Students were identified as "raw
material," which schools were to transform into uniform "finished prod-
ucts" over set periods of time: workers with market-relevant competencies
and a high tolerance for discipline.
In spite of theoretical challenges to control-biased modern curricula
from a variety of perspectives-and in spite of widespread postmodern
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dissolutions of modern political, economic, and social institutions-for-
mal educational institutions have changed remarkably little since the early
twentieth century. Indeed, biases toward controlled progress and standards
are now undergoing a remarkable resurgence wherever they had been tem-
porarily eclipsed-a resurgence tied to growing convictions that education
has become both seriously decoupled from patterns of global change and
institutionally inefficient. Worldwide, public school systems are being seen
as categorically entrenched failures unresponsive to rapidly shifting market
needs. Unfortunately, what truth there is in seeing educational institutions
as out of step with contemporary realities is being ironically overwritten
with default reaffirmations of controlled, standard curricula and intensify-
ing assertions of the market values of competition and choice as avenues
for substantive educational innovation. In the context of contemporary
patterns of complex change, reforming education to better deliver popula-
tions that embody market-determined competencies is a blind step back-
ward on a path that is steadily and, in all likelihood, irreversibly eroding.
Complex Change: Emergence, Convergence, & the Centrality of Values
Present-day rates, scales, and patterns of change are bringing about global
systems of interdependence that are not merely complicated but com-
plex.14 Distinctively, complex systems are both autopoetic (self-creating or
self-organizing) and novogenous (or innovation-generating)-recursively
structured systems that not only take place in history, but for which history
makes a difference. Developing in ways that are at once typical and respon-
sive to the effects on their environment of their own behaviors, complex
systems are manifestly dispositional in nature, expressing ongoing negoti-
ations between relatively abiding value sets and relatively <;:hangeable fac-
tual conditions-negotiations that invariably demonstrate the interplay of
both "upward" and "downward" causalities. IS Finally, and perhaps most
important, complex systems are prone to nonlinear development, chang-
ing in ways that in retrospect will appear consistent with their own values
and histories, but that in principle could not have been anticipatedY The
dynamics of complex realities cannot be exhaustively accounted for on the
basis of so-called initial conditions and the operations of natural laws.
The emergence of truly complex realities across the full spectrum
of human endeavor is thus synonymous with increasing indeterminacies
regarding the meaning or direction of change. Moreover, as complex sys-
tems evolve and become interdependent, so do their informing values. In
effect, the growth or evolution of complex systems is inseparable from gen-
erating and consolidating meaning. How well or how errantly (and con-
flictingly) complex systems evolve and interact finally turns on how mean-
ingfully their distinct value systems accord both with one another and
with changing situational dynamics. In responding to complex change, the
responsive value of control is best subordinated to commitment.
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Complexity implicates us in patterns of interdependence that are not
merely factual, but rather deeply informed by historically ramifying values.
In Buddhist terms, the dynamics of complex interdependence are karmic,
eventuating in outcomes and opportunities that reflect patterns of conso-
nance and dissonance among interactive lineages of values-intentions-prac-
tices. Thus, contemporary globalization is-surprisingly, for some-re-
sulting in a highlighting of both commonalities and differences, with global
institutional convergence, for example, being paralleled by global fragmen-
tations along linguistic, ethnic, or religious lines. The strategic shift from
control to commitment is mandated in part, then, by the need to grap-
ple with the simultaneously universalizing and pluralizing, value-driven
dynamics of global interdependence.
Unlike control, which can be shared only on the basis of limited input
by all those vested in it, commitments not only can be shared multilater-
ally and simultaneously, they allow full and mutually augmenting engage-
ment by all. Whereas the predominance of control as a strategic value in
responding to global convergence is consonant with a pluralism that valo-
rizes secure coexistence and identifies increasing plurality with increasing
variety, a strategic emphasis on commitment fosters approaches to plural-
ism that valorize coevolution as a process of jointly improvising the coor-
dination or mutual ordering of distinctly differing values and practices-a
process through which increasing plurality becomes synonymous with
enhanced diversity.
From Problems to Predicaments
But the mandate for subordinating control to commitment also derives
from a crucial paradigmatic shift in the kind of difficulties, trouble, and
suffering associated with truly complex global interdependence: an ongo-
ing, epochal transition from an era of problem solution to one of predica-
ment resolution. In brief, problems develop when changing circumstances
render existing practices ineffective for meeting continuing needs and inter-
ests. Problems signal the failure of specific means for arriving at ends we
intend to keep pursuing. Solutions thus consist of removing factual block-
ages in a given and still desirable pattern of situational development or
meaning: improved or novel means for arriving at abiding ends. Predica-
ments, on the other hand, arise as situational blockages or troubles occa-
sioned by the co-presence of contrary patterns of development or meaning.
Predicaments signal a situated (rather than theoretical or ideal) incompati-
bility of ends and interests-the emergence of dramatic impasses or value
conflicts centered on the direction of interdependence in a given situation.
Predicaments are therefore not open to solution, but rather only to reso-
lution. 17
"Resolution" is intended here to carry a dual sense. First, it is a mea-
sure of detail and refinement regarding insight into situationally relevant
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patterns of interdependence and their complex dynamics. Second, it marks
clarity of purpose or meaning combined with responsive flexibility. Reso-
lution implies, then, negotiating deep and detailed attention to the factual
dynamics of a given situation and clarity of commitment with respect to
harmonizing situationally complex flows of meaning and valuation.
A signal effect of increasingly complex global interdependence is an
accelerating conversion of problems into predicaments. To take a single
example, despite rising global wealth, global hunger is at a historical peak
and growing, with nearly one billion people now chronically hungry. The
combination of increasing global wealth and global hunger points, at the
very least, to the inequity of prevailing patterns in the distribution of new
wealth. But inequities in the distribution of wealth reflect karma or pat-
terns of value-intention-action that are ramifying in complexly interdepen-
dent ways politically, socially, and culturally, not just economically. It is to
our global karma that we must look in order to explain how global hunger
continues to rise even as there is a rise in global food surpluses. People do
not go hungry because of food shortages, but because their suffering is con-
sidered a lesser "cost" than that of restructuring the production and distri-
bution of food. Global hunger is not a problem; it is a predicament.
Advances in science and technology have yielded such extensive and
precise capacities for control that very little other than insufficient time,
money, and commitment blocks us from solving whatever factual problems
lie between us and the living of decent lives by all. Given this, mounting
global inequities and the persistent elusiveness of a decent life for all must
be seen as rooted ultimately in the complexion of our abiding values and
priorities. We have crossed a threshold beyond which it is no longer possi-
ble seriously to question whether we can address these conditions, but only
whether we will resolutely affirm that it is worth doing so. and then how
well we follow through to that end.
In transiting from an era of problem solution to one of predicament
resolution, we are compelled to recognize the primacy of relationality and
the irreducibly directed or meaning-laden nature of interdependence. But
we are also compelled to recognize the crippling incompleteness of any
body of knowledge restricted to knowing-that and knowing-how. Epis-
temic wholeness depends on the inclusion of knowing-to or the exercise of
wisdom. Yet at the same time, because complex interdependence is condu-
cive both to the emergence of novel or unanticipated outcomes and oppor-
tunities, and to the convergence of distinctive systems of values and ends,
the unsettling reality is that predicament resolution cannot be effectively
undertaken from any fixed position. Skillfully responding to complex, pre-
dicament-generating change requires virtuosity in innovatively improvising
shared pathways for revising relational qualities and coordinating interests
across ever-escalating numbers of domains and scales.
Taken altogether, the concrete ramifications of complex interdepen-
dence, nonlinear change, and the transition from an era of problem solu-
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tion to predicament resolution constitute a forceful imperative for decisively
turning away from the modernist conception of education as a controlled
delivery of specific, predetermined and standardized bodies of knowledge
and skills. The emerging realities of the twenty-first century demand a con-
certed shift toward education focused on innovatively fostering capabili-
ties for ,responsive virtuosity and commitments to shared meaning-making.
Doing so, however, in any sustainable and effective manner will require
breaking the codependency of market economics and education.
Market Dynamics and the Educational Challenge of Alleviating Poverty
The global market economy has come to be the single most important com-
plex system affecting the direction deepening interdependence is taking,
and one that strikingly brings to light the importance of subordinating
problem solution to predicament resolution. It is also the single greatest
threat to the personal and communal resources needed to critically assess
and skillfully orient global interdependence away from increasing inequi-
ty-a threat with considerable implications for educational change.
Over the past four hundred years, market dynamics have evolved in
parallel with a series of paradigmatic shifts in global politics and econom-
ics. These major transitions in the meaning of power, production, and con-
sumption, and their pattern of interrelatedness, can be described as modal-
ity shifts from the feudal to the colonial; the colonial to the developmental;
the developmental to the informational or epistemic; and the informational
to the attentional. 18 Enabling and orienting these transitions has been a
compounding lineage of technologically triggered efficiencies, based on the
value of control, that removed geographic and temporal constraints on
the expansion of markets, decisively affected their content, and strongly
linked market growth to materializing the ordinal values of convenience
and choice.
For present purposes, the most salient points in the history of mar-
ket economics center on the relationships among market growth, mar-
ket content, and the contributory capacity of the consuming public. At
once stimulated by and sustaining the control revolution in technology and
competition among newly consolidating nation-states, resource and com-
modity markets have grown with remarkable rapidity. With the attain-
ment of global market reach, growth dynamics have shifted away from
geographic expansion to intensifying market density through a controlled
faulting of the familiar. In effect, this meant the creation of akusala eventu-
alities through the systematic proliferation of needs, situational blockages,
and difficulty domains capable of being addressed by market-designed and
-delivered commodities. Most visibly through direct and indirect advertis-
ing, the resultant economy of dissatisfaction has institutionalized deepen-
ing disenchantment with the ordinary-the normalization of living cir-
cumstances that are not only subject to remarkable control but also in
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increasing need of it. Economic growth came to depend on generating novel
needs or problems open to market solutions-a process involving the mas-
sive conversion of productive and contributory diversity into increasingly
various opportunity arrays for consuming market commodities. 19
Consuming market-delivered commodities to meet virtually every
basic human need has undeniable advantages in terms of convenience and
choice. But convenience and choice come at considerable cost in terms of
relational depth. This is most readily illustrated in connection with the
temporal compression of the production-consumption-waste cycle that is
a part of the dynamics of global market growth. In short, the intensity of
consumption that is needed to continue fueling overall market growth sys-
tematically undermines the conditions for kusala or virtuosity-enhancing
patterns of engagement with our own immediate situations and develop-
ment. The undeniable freedoms associated with living under contemporary
global regimes of market economics literally compel further freedoms to
conveniently control or manage the content of our individual experiences
by choosing-as continuously as possible-among market-designed and
-delivered commodities, which are then as quickly as possible relegated to
either real or metaphorical landfills, recycling plants, and combustion sites.
Consumers produce waste.
This is not innocent employment. The compulsive exercise of conve-
nient freedoms of choice is not a linear process, but rather a cycle that ram-
ifies karmically. Market growth at present scales and densities necessar-
ily diminishes diversity-immediately eroding self-sustaining relations of
meaningful contribution to shared welfare, because markets not only pro-
duce goods and services for global circulation, they also produce people in
need of such goods and services. Karmically, getting good at getting what
we want necessarily entails also getting good at wanting-being left unful-
filled by having gotten what we wanted. The cycle is vicious, in spite of
being one through which we are enabled to exercise increasing control and
choice with respect to the content of our experience. To be able to benefit
from the solutions afforded by market commodities, we must be the kind
of people who experience our situation problematically, as often and as
intensely as possible.
In spite of generating incredible wealth, variety, and freedoms of
choice, contemporary market growth, ironically, depends on undermining
capacities for relating freely and differing in ways that truly make a differ-
ence, fostering akusala patterns of relationality or sensibilities and sensitiv-
ities ill-suited to directly enhancing the quality of our interdependence. The
single most important-indeed, indispensable-externality or by-product
of liberally and globally institutionalized market economics is relational
impoverishment.
Herein lies the tragedy of the codependence of market growth and edu-
cation. The growth of global markets has not only been driven by, but has
been a primary driver of, expanding and deepening social, political, and
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cultural interdependence and complexity. Yet, the spread and deepening
of markets depends upon undermining the very personal and communal
capacities needed for undertaking skillful improvisations of shared mean-
ing across plural domains of fact and value in the resolute achievement of
enhanced equity and diversity-the very capacities mandated by the emer-
gence of truly complex realities and nonlinear change.
The Liability of Competency
To the extent that education remains wedded to the idea of a set curricu-
lum of standardized materials delivered to effect predetermined acquisi-
tions of market-relevant competencies, education will not prove effective
in addressing relational poverty and levels of inequity that have already
reached globally scandalous levels. Neither will it prepare students appro-
priately to engage the emerging realities of truly complex interdependence.
Education must decisively break away from its modern legacy of valuing
control. But it must just as decisively refrain from undertaking purportedly
"postmodern" reforms aimed either at meeting present or anticipated mar-
ket needs or at restructuring education in market-inspired ways.
Some will immediately object that the contemporary market itself
demands innovation and creativity and is thus compatible with education
that aims at enhancing capacities for relating freely. But this objection,
while valid with respect to a very restricted global population, overlooks
the global reality that contemporary markets also demand the production
of a maximally large and variegated body of consumers that is deficient
enough in its capacity for imagination, innovation, and improvisation to be
almost continuously in need of expertly designed and delivered commodity
solutions for problems that would otherwise be experienced as effectively
intractable. This body of consumers, however, is also the basic source of
labor needed to effectively animate increasingly rationalized, global pro-
duction regimes-regimes in which the vast majority of workers contrib-
ute little other than the most qualitatively rudimentary effort and energy.
For the global majority, training for market competence amounts to a sys-
tematic erosion of potentials for situationally apt, creative engagement.20
Competence consists of the ability to engage effectively and reliably
in a given activity. Education biased toward competencies aims at a con-
trolled enabling of people to embody specific capacities relevant to meet-
ing present, context-determined needs, as well as future needs that can rea-
sonably be anticipated. Education biased toward standard competencies is,
then, education that valorizes sufficiency-an emphasis on learning what
is necessary and being enabled to perform well enough what is presently
seen as necessary to be done.
In some ways, this is a highly "democratic" biasing of education.
Methodically educating for a range of basic competencies through stan-
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dardized curricula-quite unlike the "elitist" bias of premodern studio
apprenticeships that was directed toward the pursuit of particular excel-
lences-is quite compatible with mass public education. To the degree that
a given competency marks a minimal capacity for contributing to the ful-
fillment of some present or anticipated need, a standardized curriculum
focused on a set of universally valuable competencies, open (at least ide-
ally) to all, delivers a quite clear public good. Indeed, there is no disputing
that competency-biased education historically has played an inestimable
role in global modernization and in the transition to so-called postindus-
trial modes of economic growth. By facilitating critical masses of techni-
cal and engineering expertise especially in developing societies, it has both
directly and indirectly done much to improve basic quality of life. The cor-
relation, noted by Sen, of formal education with extended average lifespan
and expanded life opportunities is not to be denied.
Yet the history of mass education aimed at raising competitive skill
levels among the general public has also been inseparable from the mass
production of a generically competent labor force. It has, in effect, been
education oriented toward institutionalizing universal standards in the ser-
vice of market needs, not toward enhancing the distinctive virtuosities of
unique students. Whatever its past merits, twenty-first-century realities are
rendering this educational bias toward competence increasingly counter-
productive-a counterproductivity most strikingly evidenced by the ris-
ing volume with which "lifelong learning" is being touted as the answer to
globally intensifying educational crises. The now dominant orientation of
schools and schooling toward broadly standardized sets of competencies
has crossed the threshold of its own utility to begin generating problems of
the sort that it is especially suited to solving.
As long as situational needs are well established or shifting in relatively
predictable ways, and as long as these needs reflect continuously abiding
values and norms, competence-biased education can prove to be both ade-
quate and efficient. But when situational needs are rapidly shifting and
reflect often quite complex confluences among distinct and frequently con-
trary sets of values and norms, this is no longer the case. A singular ramifi-
cation of deepening complex interdependence is that present needs are not
just moving targets, but targets that are moving unpredictably and unrhyth-
mically. Under such circumstances, curricula oriented toward inculcating
set competencies that must be developed over a substantial period of time
cannot avoid marginalizing the relevance of education in direct proportion
to the amount of time required to move through them.
The now almost standard answer both from the market and from
within the educational establishment-an answer very much in keeping
with initiatives to privatize education-is to move decisively to a model
of lifelong, on-demand education. Emphasizing consumer choice and keen
attunement to market demands, such a model is not incidentally analo-
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gous to on-site, on-demand fast-food delivery: education that is cheap,
convenient, concretely beneficial, and yet ultimately compromising. In
the context of complex twenty-first-century realities, merely "competent"
responses are highly liable to introduce drag into the overall pattern of sit-
uational development: whatever is now "good enough" is without warn-
ing prone to becoming "not good enough." In sum, educational systems
focused on delivering presently relevant skills and knowledge are highly
susceptible to institutionalizing competency traps that compromise respon-
sive virtuosity and that heighten frictions between available attentive and
responsive resources and actual needs.
These frictions are, of course, disastrous in their impacts upon affected
populations-those whom education fails to equip with the sensitivities
and sensibilities needed to alleviate, and perhaps even eliminate, their rela-
tive disadvantage and poverty. Yet, to the degree that education is reformed
subject to market pressures and protocols, the ensuing problems will quite
profitably extend and deepen the markets for still further education. To
paraphrase Ivan Illich, to the extent that education is commodified, it will
fare ever less well in alleviating poverty, because it will instead be insti-
tutionalizing ever-growing classes of the relationally disadvantaged or
poor-populations ever in need of further education. Lifelong learning
must be very clearly differentiated from already powerful market imper-
atives for normalizing lifelong schooling, which amounts to the lifelong
dependence of educational consumers on commodities delivered with max-
imal control and convenience in the service of compelling profitable exer-
cises of individual agency and choice.
The more effectively we "solve" our educational "problems" from
within existing patterns of education/market codependency, the greater
will be the educational and other predicaments we find ourselves facing.
Many of these predicaments will only become manifest outside of the edu-
cational sector, in the larger systems of interdependence within which edu-
cation is comprised. Indeed, as previously disparate individuals and com-
munities are brought into intimate and transformative interdependence,
meeting our needs necessarily involves confronting questions of a moral or
ethical nature, going beyond mere tolerance to improvise robustly shared
sets of values while at the same time conserving (at least some) differences
as the basic conditions for making meaningful differences to and for one
another.
Education that fails to prepare individuals and communities to engage
in such mutually enriching relationships, concretely enhancing both diver-
sity and equity, will disadvantage them relationally. The realities of glob-
ally complex interdependence compel innovating innovatively, establishing
common commitments with respect to meeting our needs in a fully coor-
dinated-rather than competitive or merely cooperative-fashion. Educa-
tion that does not foster coordinative virtuosity is, finally, impoverishing.
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From Competence to Virtuosity: Toward a Pluralistic Educational Ethos
To the extent that education remains coupled to the dominant karma of
ever-intensifying global markets, it will fail to induce and enhance the
capacities-for and 'commitments-to kusala patterns of relationality that
alone promise the elimination of poverty. Urging privatization and mar-
ket-like competition among schools as a solution to our competency-biased
education woes is (knowingly or unknowingly) to advocate for the dupli-
cation in education of disparities already strikingly manifest in the quality
of other market-delivered goods and services.
What, then, is the alternative? What, if any, are the common features
of educational paradigms that can be responsive to the complex realities of
nonlinear emergence and global convergence, and capable of orienting the
dynamics of global interdependence resolutely away from inequity?
At the very least, any such paradigm must foster education that both
demonstrates and enables innovating innovatively. Education must also be
resolutely diversity enriching. That is, it must be generative of the sensibil-
ities and sensitivities needed to appreciate difference by contributing dis-
tinctively to realizing intimately and yet concretely shared welfare under
unpredictably changing circumstances. Finally, education must embody
patterns of values-intentions-actions that will yield learning outcomes and
opportunities related to alloying wisdom and compassion. Failing to do so
is to fail systematically at extirpating the basic conditions for the increas-
ingly inequitable distribution of the benefits of global change and interde-
pendence.
More specifically, if education is to responsibly engage and thrive
within contemporary realities, a basic shift must be made from relying
almost exclusively on curriculum approaches structured in accord with the
values of control, competition, and choice, to developing a' pluralistic edu-
cational ethos that exemplifies and engenders the valorization of commit-
ment, coordination, and contributory virtuosity. The curricular mode of
associating learning with "getting it," or taking possession, must be aban-
doned in favor of a studio-inspired association of learning with ongoing,
situationally improvised and resolutely enriching relational maturation.
Such an understanding counters the modernist severance of mind/reason
and body/emotion, affirming that learning is always both bodily and social
praxis: the activity of a thinking body as a nexus of qualitatively trans-
forming social and natural relationships.
Importantly, revising education to facilitate opening up "spaces of
hope" within twenty-first-century realities is a project of relational trans-
formation that can only be initiated within present situational dynamics.
Indeed, it is a project that can only be sustained by activating and coordi-
nating potentialities within existing situational resources for meeting the
challenges posed by complex interdependence and nonlinear change. As
global as are the conditions that make new educational paradigms neces-
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sary, these paradigms cannot be universal in either origin or intent; they
can only be homegrown.
This said, it must be stressed that as contemporary patterns of glo-
balization render porous every "border" imaginable-geographic, social,
economic, and political, but also personal and cultural-the relational pat-
terns constitutive of learning, home, and community become correspond-
ingly "borderless." In a complexly interdependent world, "home" becomes
less exclusive and more explicitly ecological-a dense nexus of intimacies
shading off without natural limit. Truly being "at home" means, almost
paradoxically, being ever more radiantly concerned. Demonstrated com-
passion is a key measure of successful educational innovation.
Three important implications ensue. First, educational innovation is a
task that cannot effectively be undertaken as "mine" or "yours," but only
as "ours." Second, there can be no illusions about educational innovation
being a task to be summarily comprehended and completed-something
to "get done" once and (hopefully) for all. Successful educational change
involves establishing shared vectors for reorienting how we are interdepen-
dent-an ongoing and ever-ramifying practice. Finally, caution must be
taken in too closely associating education with heightened capacities for
individual agency or choice. While it is undoubtedly much better to have
options for exercising freedoms of choice than to lack them altogether,
choice alone is not enough to guarantee lives worth living. The power to
choose to do or get what one wants is not the same as the strength needed
to be truly unblocked by any circumstance-a strength that arises only out
of mounting relational maturation and virtuosity.
Virtuosity as Educational Aim
There is notable and yet legitimate vagueness in this vision of educational
transformation. In a context of nonlinear change, where responding from
any fixed position rapidly becomes counterproductive, resolute flexibil-
ity and underdetermined patterns of engagement are significant strengths.
Exhaustively prescriptive approaches to educational transformation-es-
pecially approaches with pretensions of universal applicability-are now
simply unrealistic and almost sure to do more harm than good.
From within the globally dominant educational paradigm, innova-
tion is generally assumed to occur as a trajectory of predetermined out-
comes-a mapping, whether simple or complicated, of controlled achieve-
ment. Whatever short-term, small-scale successes such a "curriculum"
approach to innovation might have, it is ultimately at odds with the real-
ities of complex change and interdependence-realities that commend
undertaking innovation as a continually improvised generation of rela-
tionally enriching opportunities. Innovation is not a function of sequenced
solutions and desired destinations; is a function of deepening resolution
and recursively opening directions.
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Also in this vision of educational transformation, however, is a dis-
turbing aura of elitism. Committing to alleviate poverty through educa-
tion may, as argued above, involve dissolving the codependency of market
growth and education, as well as challenging the bias toward competencies
presently or soon to be in demand. But it is impossible to imagine allevi-
ating poverty by way of any educational paradigm that is not firmly com-
mitted to education for all. Insisting that education be oriented toward vir-
tuosity, rather than the more modest aims of specific competencies, is in
apparent tension with this most rudimentary commitment.
This tension is, I think, a function of inadequately distinguishing
between being-able-to-do-whatever-one-wants - freedom as power-and
being-unblocked-by-any-circumstances-freedom as strength.21 The for-
mer expresses commitment to the ultimate reality of individually existing
beings and the centrality of choice; the latter emphasizes the irreducibly
relational nature of all things and the primacy of situationally apt, inter-
active genius.22 Freedom, in other words, is adverbial in nature: a demon-
strated capacity-for and commitment-to relating freely.
The contrast of competence and virtuosity must be understood in this
context. Virtuosity is not a function of coming into individual possession of
some set of consummate abilities. Instead, virtuosity arises as a distinctive,
resolutely appreciative quality of contribution associated with superlative
expressions of insight into relational dynamics, situational attunement,
and aptness of response. In Buddhist terms, virtuosity is the meaning or
expressed function of cultivating wisdom (prajiia), attentive mastery (sama-
dhi), and moral clarity (illa). Virtuosity implies a resolutely kusala pattern
of situational engagement-a pattern of engagement that yields continu-
ously liberating outcomes and opportunities. Virtuosity is not something
anyone possesses; it marks a qualitatively transformative heading toward
truly strengthening interdependence.
Virtuosity, understood as the demonstrated meaning of relating freely,
is not restricted to the very few or to the extramundane. It can be expressed
in even the most ordinary conversations, in cooking, in building a home,
and in carrying out daily chores or professional duties. As a relational qual-
ity, virtuosity is not a goal-an end or destination to be strived for. Nor
does it manifest as a means useful for arriving at some independent end.
Virtuosity is, instead, the situationally specific opening up of appreciative
difference.
Education, then, is not to be understood as a means to some separate
end-even that of diversity or the alleviation of poverty or greater equity.
Instead, education must directly express or demonstrate the meaning of
diversity, the alleviation of poverty, and greater equity. And, if the story I
have been telling is true in the sense of being capable of serving to help cor-
rect or realign presently prevailing patterns of global interdependence and
change, these are not ultimately separate aims. Enhancing diversity, allevi-
ating poverty, and bringing about greater equity are distinctive dimensions
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of the meaning of reorienting global interdependence away from compel-
ling freedoms of choice and ever-expanding and deepening abilities for
control toward ever more resolute commitments to relating freely while
mutually contributing to shared welfare. Virtuosity is the expression of
such commitments-commitments that are ever possible as homegrown
responses to the predicaments of complex and increasingly global contem-
porary realities.
Concluding Remarks
To invoke a Buddhist analogy, the task of those who would revise educa-
tion to respond to twenty-first-century realities is like that of the bodhi-
sattva who compassionately commits to entering into liberating relation-
ships with all beings, fully aware that this commitment has infinite scope
and that no "others" will ever "be liberated." The bodhisattva vow is ulti-
mately one of revising the meaning of our situation so that our very inter-
dependence itself continuously expresses liberating dynamics. Thus, the
seventh-century Chan master Hangren stated that "the true body of the
Buddha is all sentient beings"-a "body" that consists of enlightening
or liberating patterns of relationality. A century later, Chan master Mazu
declared the reciprocal truth that "the wondrous functioning of the myriad
things are all one's true body." It is this fully extended conception of the
body as a nexus of horizonless interdependencies that must be appealed to
in ultimately thinking through the educational implications of rapidly com-
pounding and markedly errant global interdependence. In non-Buddhist
terms, the "educated body" must ultimately be understood as a "body
politic" -not as the body of anyone human, but of the human in its most
holistic sense. It is to the enrichment and maturation of the totality of rela-
tionships through which humanity is expressed that educational change
must be addressed.
The realities of accelerating, nonlinear change and complex interde-
pendence can be seen as threatening or as opportune. They clearly threaten
the positive outcomes of continuing to valorize self-interested action, con-
trol, and competition; disclosing their manifest liabilities as predicaments
increasingly displace problems as the primary structures of trouble and suf-
fering. But they are also realities that very clearly pose the question of how
most skillfully and appreciatively to differ. We are now witnessing the birth
of a world that commends-even commands-expanding concerns about
qualities of relationship, continuously generating opportunities for enhanc-
ing diversity in the achievement of more equitable and sustainable interde-
pendence. Our present situation affords considerable opportunity, then, for
opening very real "spaces for hope" in our midst.
There is, however, nothing certain about our capabilities for or our
commitments to working out from these spaces with sufficient shared wis-
dom, attentive mastery, and moral clarity to realize the kind of interdepen-
Relating Freely: The Meaning of Educating for Equity and Diversity 39
dence in which relating freely is truly possible for each of us and for all. To
paraphrase Chan master Mazu, activating this possibility will require real-
izing together a virtuosic harmony of bodies and heart-minds that expands
outward through the myriad limbs of the body politic to "benefit what can-
not be benefited and do what cannot be done." As a means to this end, edu-
cation cannot but fail. Education can, however, demonstrate the meaning
of such transformative and fully embodied virtuosity: the alleviation and
eventual elimination of relational impoverishment.
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RICHARD RORTY
2 Philosophy and the Hybridization of Culture
It is sometimes said that philosophical dialogue across cultures might
improve relations between nations-that it might help us understand the
cultural differences that divide various countries from one another. The
thought is that study of intellectual traditions, such as those that began in
China with Confucius and in the West with Plato, might help us come to
terms with what initially seems baffling in the attitudes and behavior of
people from other countries, and thus facilitate international cooperation.
I do not want to reject this possibility, but I do want to raise some
doubts about it. I shall start by suggesting that the notion of "cultural dif-
ference" may soon be obsolete. Then I shall turn to the difficulties that
scholars have experienced when they have tried to interpret Asian and
European thinkers as addressing the same issues. These difficulties suggest,
I shall argue, that we would do better to think of philosophy as a genre of
cultural politics than as the search for wisdom.
I shall conclude by taking up Heideggerian cultural politics, and in
particular Heidegger's claim that the modern West is a spiritual desert. I
think that Asian thinkers should beware of such claims. For the cultural
developments that Heidegger deplored might better be seen as laudable
attempts to realize the ideals of the great democratic revolutions-ideals
shared by Mirabeau, Jefferson, and Sun Yat-sen.
Three hundred years ago, no European language had a term that could
plausibly be translated as "cultural difference." I suspect that no Asian
language did either. On both continents, intellectuals routinely contrasted
their own advanced societies with more primitive ones. The idea that cul-
tures are created in response to specific local needs, and therefore may be
of equal utility and equal worth, had not yet been put in circulation by such
thinkers as Herder and Humboldt.
A hundred years from now, however, the term "cultural difference"
may have outlived its usefulness. If nuclear war has somehow been avoided,
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and if the sociopolitical changes we lump together under the rubric of "glo-
balization" continue, our descendants may no longer have much use for
it. They may think of both differences between cultures and differences
between currencies as inconveniences that afflicted their benighted ances-
tors. They may agree with Humboldt about "the absolute and essential
importance of human development in its richest diversity," but think of
diversity as a matter of individuals differentiating themselves from other
individuals, rather than of cultures differentiating themselves from other
cultures.
In the twenty-second century, English and Chinese may be to the edu-
cated classes of every country in the world what Greek and Latin were to
the educated classes of Europe in the eighteenth. University graduates on
every continent who cannot read these languages will nevertheless have
read translations of many books written in each of them. A cosmopolitan
culture may have arisen, one in which books like F. C. S. Northrop's The
Meeting of East and West seem merely quaint.
If these speculations seem fantastic, I think they are no more so than a
description of the present state of the world would have seemed to Northrop
and to the other participants in the first East-West Philosophy Conference.
In 1939, when that conference was held, the highest building between San
Francisco and Cairo was thirteen stories tall. The changes that have trans-
formed Asia since the Second World War have produced a continent that
would be very hard for Northrop and the others to recognize.
They would, to be sure, find contemporary Europe and North Amer-
ica much more easily recognizable. For technology has made far more of
a difference to the look of Asia than to that of Europe and North Amer-
ica. Because the visual appearance of Asia has changed in the way it has, it
has become commonplace to say that the East is, for better or worse, being
westernized. But I think that description is misleading. It would be better to
say that both West and East are in the process of creating a hybrid culture,
one that will transcend and replace all of its predecessors.
There is no reason to associate technology more closely with one hemi-
sphere than with the other. Technological innovations such as silk and
paper were imported from China to Europe without bringing Chinese cul-
ture in their wake. This was because very few people from either place
were able to visit the other. The same goes for the religious and philosoph-
ical ideas that drifted over from India into ancient Greece. The fact that
aspirin and airplanes were first produced in the West is not a good reason
for describing Asia as having recently been Europeanized, any more than
Pythagoras and Plato getting wind of the Vedas meant that ancient Greece
became Asiafied.
The sort of hybridization that I anticipate will be produced not so
much by the importation of ideas or of machines as by day-to-day con-
tact, whether electronic or face-to-face, between large numbers of peo-
ple who come from different places. Such contacts between Asia and the
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West are steadily increasing. Think of tourists and shopkeepers coping with
one another in Pnom Penh, of Canadian businessmen making deals with
their counterparts in Seoul, of thousands of Filipinas slaving away in Arab
households. Think, above all, of the billions of people who spend a portion
of their day looking at television screens or computer monitors that display
what is happening on the other side of the world.
As a precedent for such hybridization, consider some of changes that
overtook the educated classes of ancient Greece and of ancient Rome. Once
Rome began to extend its hegemony eastward, around 200 B.C.E., it took
only three centuries for the high culture of the Mediterranean basin to
become relatively homogenous. At the beginning of the second century
C.E., we find Plutarch, the emperor Hadrian's philosophy teacher, writing
his Parallel Lives, pairing off eminent Greeks with paradigmatic Romans.
Plutarch was rewarded with the procuratorship of his native country. By
the time that Marcus Aurelius decided to write his Meditations in Greek,
the line between Greek culture and Roman culture was no longer worth
drawing.
There seems every reason to expect that, thanks to superior infor-
mation technologies, the pace of hybridization in coming decades will be
much faster than it was in the period between Cicero and Plutarch. Fifty
years from now, a Chinese-American woman, sitting in the Oval Office,
may appoint her African-born philosophy teacher as U.S. ambassador to
India. In the same year, a Chinese president who was born in Indonesia
may invite his old economics professor from Moscow State University to
reform the Chinese banking system. No eyebrows will be raised at either
appointment. Neither the ambassador nor the economist will feel any need
to adapt to the ways of an unfamiliar culture. Nor will anybody be asking
whether Asian culture changed the West more or less than ~uropean cul-
ture changed Asia. To pursue the analogy, a visitor from China or India to
Plutarch's offices or Marcus Aurelius' headquarters would have seen little
point in trying to disentangle the specifically Greek from the specifically
Roman threads in the hybridized culture of the later empire.
I have deployed these historical analogies and speculations in order
to suggest that we stop thinking of globalization as producing cultural
impoverishment and sterility. There is no reason to anticipate a decrease in
human curiosity or creativity as a result of the ubiquity and pace of tech-
nological change. The global culture that will be produced by planetary
socioeconomic integration may be even more polychrome than the one that
emerged as temples of strange Eastern deities proliferated in Rome. It may
allow more room for individual diversity than is presently provided by the
cultures of most Western and Asian countries.
As Herder and Humboldt taught us, different cultures arise as a result
of different local conditions. The flattening out of the world that will be
produced by socioeconomic integration will mean that the role played by
local conditions will gradually diminish. All human communities will be
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faced with the same problems because of their reciprocal dependence. I do
not see any point in mourning the likely disappearance of many distinctive
local cultures and languages any more than in deploring the loss of those
that have already vanished. "Multiculturalism" makes sense as a political
slogan when used by persecuted and oppressed minority groups; cultural
traditions are good rallying points for protests against victimization. But
the use of this slogan in the course of these protests should not mislead us
into thinking that cultures-all cultures-are intrinsically valuable. Cul-
tures are human contrivances, invented to serve human needs. When those
needs change, new contrivances must be found.
The sense of loss we feel when we realize that a culture is probably
doomed is natural enough. But it is as impossible, and as undesirable, to try
to ensure the immortality of a culture as to ensure that of a person. If I may
be allowed an autobiographical example, my (very limited) ability to read
ancient Greek and Latin texts once meant a lot to me. But I do not think
that it would be a tragedy for humankind if Greek and Latin texts should
become as illegible as were hieroglyphic texts before the discovery of the
Rosetta Stone. Nor would it be a disaster if the culture of classical learn-
ing initiated at the time of the Renaissance should come to seem as point-
less as the ancient Egyptian practice of mummifying crocodiles and ibises.
Perhaps, a few centuries from now, nobody will have much sense of what
it was like to take sides between Pascal and Hobbes, or Luther and the
papacy, or Confucianism and Daoism, or opposing Vedantic schools. But
human creativity and diversity may flourish nonetheless. The human imag-
ination may burn even brighter, even though many of the fuels that fed it
are no longer available.
Hegel, writing in the wake of Herder and Humboldt, said that human
history is a slaughter bench. He might have done better to call it a sau-
sage grinder. Old cultures are fed into the maw of this grinder as a result of
socioeconomic upheavals. Think of Egypt when Alexander's generals took
over, of Peru after Pizzaro landed, and of what is presently happening to
the Tibetans and the Uighurs. The relatively homogeneous cultural sausage
that emerges from the other end of the grinder may be better or worse than
the ensemble of cultures that were ground up to produce it. It will be worse
if it leaves less room for "human development in its richest diversity." But
that result is not inevitable. It may also produce more tolerance for such
diversity than was previously available.
So much for futurology. I turn now to the role of philosophy in intellec-
tuallife. I have argued in the past that the works of the Western philosoph-
ical canon are best read as reactions to political, economic, social, artis-
tic, scientific, or literary novelties. The important Western philosophers, I
claim, are those who responded to novel stimuli, in the way that Aquinas
responded to the rediscovery of the Aristotelian corpus, Descartes to Gali-
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leo's mechanization of the world picture, Hegel to the French Revolution,
and Emerson and Nietzsche to the Romantic Movement.
We should not read these Western philosophers as grappling with the
same problems regardless of their historical situation. I am pitifully ill
acquainted with Asian thought, but I suspect that the same may be true
of the great figures of Indian and of Chinese philosophical thought. In
both East and West, it seems likely that disjoining these texts from the
local exigencies to which their authors were responding will reduce debates
between philosophers to an arid scholasticism.
We might avoid the familiar tedium of the standard textbook histories
of philosophy if we heed John Dewey's advice. In a passage I have quoted
frequently in the past, Dewey said:
When it is remembered that under disguise of dealing with ultimate
reality, philosophy has been occupied with the precious values embod-
ied in social traditions, that it has sprung from a clash of social ends
and from a conflict of inherited institutions with incompatible contem-
porary tendencies, it will be seen that the task of future philosophy is
to clarify men's ideas as to the social and moral strifes of their own
day. Its aim is to become so far as humanly possible an organ for deal-
ing with those conflicts.... Philosophy which surrenders its somewhat
barren monopoly of dealings with Ultimate and Absolute Reality will
find a compensation in enlightening the moral forces which move man-
kind and in contributing to the aspirations of men to attain to a more
ordered and intelligent happiness.1
We should be as dubious about such topics as Human Nature or the
Human Situation as Dewey was about Ultimate and Absolute Reality.
Dewey wanted us to see human history as the process of the self-creation
of humanity-the process that he hoped might culminate in a democratic,
egalitarian utopia.
This Deweyan conception of the nature and function of philosophy
Contrasts sharply with two other ways of thinking about it. The first is
characteristic of contemporary analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophers
typically think they can ignore history for the same reason that natural sci-
entists ignore it. They are, they say, addressing deep-lying problems that
remain unaffected by historical change. The second way is the one implicit
in Heidegger's "History of Being." Admirers of Heidegger obviously have
a more vivid sense of history than do most analytic philosophers. Unfortu-
nately, however, his disciples often accept the master's ludicrous claim that
understanding the history of Western philosophy is the key to understand-
ing the nature of the West and of evaluating its likely future. Attempts to
treat philosophy either as autonomous or as hegemonic seem to me equally
misguided.
The hyper-professionalization of contemporary analytic philosophy
has made it possible for many Anglophone philosophers to believe that
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philosophy can define itself by reference to lists of such puzzles as "the
relation between language and reality" or "the cognitive status of moral
judgments." But this is no more plausible than defining philosophy as the
study of alternative methods of achieving nirvana. Only someone who sim-
ply assumes that Confucius, Plato, Radhakrishnan, and Heidegger must
necessarily have spoken to the same issues could believe that compara-
tive philosophy is a matter of inspecting alternative solutions to shared
problems-problems that arise wherever human beings have the leisure
to reflect.
As far as I can see, few people who actually work in comparative phi-
losophy are under any such illusions. At the conference on "Interpreting
across Boundaries," held at the East-West Center in 1984, speaker after
speaker repudiated just that sort of parochialism. Gerald Larson deplored
what he called "a tendency to favor philosophical boundaries of European
thought since Descartes for identifying conceptual problems in general."
Karl Potter generalized Larson's point when he said "the boundaries across
which we think we must interpret are the creations of our own categories
of interpretation."2 Fritz Staal, in a paper called "Is There Philosophy in
Asia?" asked whether commentary on ritual among Indian philosophers
belonged in the same box as commentary by Locke and Kant on the materi-
alist world-picture offered by the New Science of the seventeenth century.
Both Larson and Potter warned against the notion that there are enti-
ties called "conceptual schemes" that can be isolated, inspected, and either
commensurated or discovered to be incommensurable. Raimundo Panik-
kar urged his audience to put aside the idea of "comparing philosophies
from an objective, neutral, and transcendent standpoint." "What compar-
ative philosophy tries to compare," Panikkar wrote, "are the final myths
on which certain cultures have constructed their worlds.... But there can-
not be a neutral comparison of myths, because we all stand in a myth, and
we cannot eliminate the ultimate horizon where we situate ourselves in
order to understand."
Panikkar's metaphor brings to mind the Gadamerian suggestion that
we should attempt to do our best to fuse our horizons with those of many
other traditions. But I think Dewey would have been right to insist that
unless such attempts at fusion are driven by practical concerns they result
only in dilettantish sophistication. Nobody would throw herself into the
comparative study of Western and non-Western intellectual traditions
simply because she wants a synoptic vision of all the different myths that
human beings have, at one time or another, found useful. Rather, as Nin-
ian Smart suggested at the 1984 conference, what we want out of compar-
ative philosophy is "a new global reflection on the history of the human
race." But the point of studying history is to avoid repeating it. We study it
in order to profit from the successes and failures of past experiments. His-
tory is not a tool for acquiring wisdom, but for making the human future
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different from its past. On the view common to Marx and Dewey, the same
is true of philosophy.
This means that a profitable fusion of intellectual horizons will only
occur as a result of a yearning for sociopolitical change. You will only be
motivated to undertake such fusion if you aspire to change the life of a
community. Nowadays our sociopolitical aspirations are dominated by the
hope that the nation-states into which the world is presently divided will
cooperate with one another to keep the peace, and will join together to
improve the lives of their citizens.
The best expression of these utopian aspirations that I have come
across is found in Timothy Garton Ash's recent book, Free World. Ash asks
us to "abandon this muddled vainglorious talk of Western values or uni-
versal values, American, European or, for that matter, Asian values. Instead
we should say what we actually mean-modestly, plainly, concretely."3
We should, Ash thinks, start from our shared hope for what Isaiah Berlin
called "negative liberty" -from the need to remove what Ash calls "the
most obviously acute and burdensome restraints-those that no normal
man or woman, in any known culture, would gladly endure if he or she had
the chance to get rid of them." "The more modest and precise our defini-
tion of this freedom we want for others," Ash continues, "the more likely
it is to be accepted by them, rather than being rejected as arrogant West-
ern imperialism."4
Ash's point is that we can mobilize support for free access to the Inter-
net, or secret ballots, or free analgesic drugs, without worrying about
whether there are such things as universal human values or universal
human rights. We can substitute the question "Would any normal man or
woman do without these things if given the chance to have them?" for the
question "Does a right to these things follow from universally accepted
moral principles?" We can forget about attaining consensus on principles
and values if we can reach consensus on concrete goals.
Adopting Ash's "free world" as the horizon within which we read his-
tory, and being insouciant about the question of whether values or rights
are grounded in something universally human, means that comparative
philosophy blends into comparative sociopolitical history. For the ques-
tion about Plato, Confucius, Radhakrishnan, and Heidegger now becomes
"What, if anything, can their ideas do for utopian sociopolitical projects
such as feminism, nuclear disarmament, and the relinquishment of national
sovereignty?" That question should replace such questions as "How close
did they come to the essential truth about the human condition?" and
"How can we synthesize their thoughts with those of the other canonically
great philosophers?" Instead of asking how the writings of these thinkers
can make us wiser as individuals, we need to ask whether and how they
can be used as tools to free people from unnecessary social and political
restraints.
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Philosophy in the West started off its career as an answer to the ques-
tion "What is the good life for a human being?" To gain wisdom was to
have learned the answer to that question. But in the last two hundred years
that question has begun to sound quaint. So has the term "wisdom." The
conviction has grown that the task of intellectuals is the creation of a more
egalitarian society rather than the care of the individual soul. Most West-
ern philosophers no longer try to be sages, and they are rightly suspicious
of Eastern philosophers who suggest that wisdom is still the goal of philo-
sophical study.
As I said earlier, Western philosophers who take Frege and Russell as their
point of departure assume that the alternative to being a sage is to be a sci-
entist-to engage with problems specific to an autonomous, highly profes-
sionalized discipline, one that has no tighter a connection with history or
with politics than does physics or biology.
But those who are discouraged by the marginalization that philoso-
phy brings upon itself when it turns its back on history are often tempted
to jump from the analytic frying pan into the Heideggerian fire. It is a great
pity that a political reactionary, a man who had no interest in the creation
of Ash's "free world," should have convinced so many people around the
world that the West has turned itself into a technocratic wasteland. There
is some danger that Heidegger's story about the West's forgetting of Being
will be taken seriously in Asia and used to dismiss Western achievements
that might well serve as models. Too much reading of Heidegger (not to
mention Foucault) can convince a young Asian student that the West has
exhausted its potentialities.
Heidegger described the mindless gigantism of technology as the inev-
itable outcome of Western metaphysics-an intellectual tradition that
finally revealed its own inner nature when Nietzsche proclaimed the pri-
macy of the will to power. The story Heidegger told is nicely summarized
by Gianni Vattimo in a passage from his book The Transparent Society:
Metaphysics is a violent response to a situation that is itself fraught with
danger and violence. It seeks to master reality at a stroke, grasping (or
so it thinks) the first principle on which all things depend (and thus giv-
ing itself an empty guarantee of power over events) .... All things are
reduced to the level of pure presences that can be measured, manipu-
lated, replaced and therefore easily dominated and organized-and in
the end man, his interiority and historicity are all reduced to the same
level.s
I think that it is useful to construct a counternarrative about the rise and
fall of metaphysics-one that tells a story about the gradual spread of
negative freedoms rather than about the spread of technological rational-
ity. This upbeat story would show how clever the West was to abandon
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the search for interiority, and to stop wondering about humanity's rela-
tion to Being. The secularization of political life, followed by the replace-
ment of philosophy by art and literature as a reservoir of moral and spir-
itual energy, has helped make people in the West much freer and happier
than they had been before. It is simply not the case that westerners treat all
things as "pure presence that can be measured, replaced and therefore eas-
ily dominated and organized"; Western science does that, but Western art
and literature do not.
In the spirit of Ash's suggestion that we think about "modest and con-
crete" improvements in life, I suggest that we see technology in terms of
the benefits of clean water and cheap analgesics on the one hand, and the
dangers of global warming and nuclear warfare on the other, rather than
in terms of domination, homogenization, and loss of interiority. We should
stop using "technology" in the fancy philosophical sense that Heidegger
gave that word, and instead use it as an abbreviation for a rapidly expand-
ing repertoire of sociopolitical options.
The story that should replace Heidegger's would recount how intellec-
tuals in the West learned how to forget about interiority in order to attend
to the lessons of history. By giving up the quest for wisdom and the perfec-
tion of the individual soul, they came to repudiate the idea that we can ever
be more than children of a specific time and place-the idea that there is
something universally human to which we can appeal. The turn from God
or Nature to History among the intellectuals of the West that began around
the end of the eighteenth century rejected the theoretical question "What
is the relation of human beings to the rest of the universe?" in favor of the
practical question "How can human beings make themselves different by
taking matters into their own hands?"
Among the many reasons why Western intellectuals took thi~ turn, three
seem to me particularly important. The first is one to which I referred earli-
er-the gradual realization by westerners like Herder that Western culture
was a response to Western needs, and that societies with other needs have
different ways of doing things. This way of looking at cultural diversity
helped undermine the idea that there was such a thing as "life lived accord-
ing to the dictate of reason." Herder's brand of cultural relativism made
it easier for Hegel to propose that philosophers should have a story to tell
about a sequence of historical events. This led naturally to Marx's pro-
posal that intellectuals devote themselves to changing things rather than to
understanding them. It paved the way for a Darwinian account of human
beings as clever animals who have found ingenious ways of bettering their
lot. It separated the aspiration for social justice from its association with
the Platonic and religious doctrine that such aspirations are possible only
because human beings have one foot in an immaterial world.
Herderian proto-anthropology, however, would not have had the effect
that it did without the inspiration that historically minded philosophers
like Hegel drew from the success of what Marx called "the bourgeois revo-
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lutions." This success was the second reason why the attention of Western
intellectuals shifted from the opposition between science and Christian the-
ology to the possibility of revolutionary social change. What happened in
America in 1776 and in France between 1789 and 1792 had demonstrated
that the sociopolitical conditions of human life were far more mutable than
previous thinkers had realized. Those events made philosophers wonder if
more might be learned from imagining a possible future than from study-
ing the past. If nations could change their political and social institutions
almost overnight, then perhaps everything could be changed, including the
intuitions that philosophers had hoped to synthesize and systematize. Per-
haps neither the nature of human life nor the data of philosophical reflec-
tion were as stable as the Greeks had assumed them to be.
The third source for the narrative turn in philosophy was the claim
of Romantic poets such as Schiller and Shelley that the poetic imagina-
tion, rather than rational reflection, is the chief engine of human progress.
Shelley's claim that poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world
amounted to revoking the charter that Plato had written for philosophy.
For the Romantics urged that what mattered was the novel, rather than the
eternal-that the changeless did not have priority over the changing. The
search for eternal truths, though appropriate for natural science, was irrel-
evant to politics. What mattered for politics was having utopian dreams
and making daring proposals rather than looking for well-grounded prin-
ciples.
These three influences gradually led thinkers like Dewey away from the
model of philosophizing common to Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant. Unfor-
tunately, however, the two most influential critics of this model-Nietz-
sche and Heidegger-focused their attention on the situation of the indi-
vidual human being rather than on the future of human society. Nietzsche's
story about how about we might put Plato, Christianity, and Kant behind
us-how we might see "the true world" as a fable-ends with the words
"Incipit Zarathustra." Nietzsche thought that repudiating the attempt to
see things under the aspect of eternity would make possible a new and
extraordinary sort of human being. He was not interested in creating a
society in which ordinary human beings would be freer and happier.
Heidegger, early and late, had no more interest in ordinary people or
in social justice than did Nietzsche. Instead of the romance of a new social
world-the romance that Shelley shared with the early Wordsworth, and
that Whitman and Tennyson shared with Marx, Mill, and Dewey-Nietz-
sche and Heidegger celebrated Byronic isolation and singularity. "The high-
est form of the existence of Dasein," Heidegger wrote, "can be reduced to
only a few rare moments ... between life and death ... man exists at the
peak of his potentialities at only a very few moments."6 This is a blinkered,
because exclusively individualist, version of romanticism. So is Heidegger's
attempt, in his later work, to replace the heroism of authentic Dasein with
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the heroism of the Denker-the figure who has the courage to ask "what
Being now is."
It is, I think, very unfortunate that so much recent discussion of tech-
nology has been dominated by Heidegger's pejorative descriptions of it. Per-
haps the only point at which Gianni Vattimo and I have a significant phil-
osophical difference is that he goes along with much more of Heidegger's
account of the relation between technology and the development of West-
ern metaphysics than I do. I shall close by turning to this disagreement.
Heidegger argues that a decisive turn was taken when philosophers aban-
doned the question "What is Being?" in favor of the question "Of what
can I be certain?" The obvious answer to the latter question-namely, that
I can be certain only of my own subjectivity-put Western thought on the
path that led to pragmatism. It produced what Heidegger thinks of as a
delusion: the idea that "man everywhere and always encounters only him-
self."7 If we want certainty, it will eventually turn out that the only things
we can be certain of are our own needs and purposes, and so we shall come
to believe that, as Heidegger puts it, "everything man encounters exists
only insofar as it is his construct.,,8
Heidegger never took seriously the possibility that around 1800 the
West, deliberately, and wisely, turned its back on the notions of "a more
original revealing" and "a more primal truth." He does not consider that
what he thinks of as the increasing "rootlessness" of modern Europe might
be a consequence of a mature decision-a decision to tear oneself away
from the past in order to create a better future. Instead he thinks of the
movement of thought that links Shelley's praise of the poetic imagination
with the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach as part of the gradual l and fated,
transition from the Cartesian desire for certainty to a Nietzschean desire
for power. Nietzsche's conception of the will to power as the basic charac-
ter of beings, he says, "became possible only on the basis of Descartes' fun-
damental metaphysical position."9
Because he sees the celebration of the will to power, rather than the
hope for shared happiness, as the destined upshot of post-Cartesian think-
ing, Heidegger interprets what I am calling "romanticism" as continuous
with the epistemological turn taken by certainty seekers like Descartes,
Locke, and Leibniz. On the alternative account I am suggesting, we should
see the epistemological problematic that dominated philosophy in the
period between Descartes and Kant as the last gasp of the idea that the
unchanging has precedence over the changing, the universal over the novel,
and contemplation over imaginative daring.
The idea that technology will necessarily degrade human beings has,
among many leftist Western intellectuals, taken over the role once played
by Marx's claim that capitalism inevitably commodifies and immiserates
labor. Heideggerian ideas have been extraordinarily influential, and their
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popularity has made it easy to treat "the West," "capitalism," and "tech-
nology" as near synonyms. That way of lumping things together has been
facilitated by those who suggest that Asia may be able to avoid the fate of
the West by drawing on specifically non-Western intellectual and spiritual
resources.
If one thinks of the West as an imperialistic project, of capitalism as
necessarily exploitative, and of technology as necessarily dehumanizing,
such lumping is easy. So the suggestion that both technology and capi-
talism are necessary means to building a better world seems implausible
to many people. So does the idea that the West might be as much of a
source of moral inspiration to Asia as Asia might be to the West. But I find
both suggestions entirely convincing. So I would hope that we could follow
Ash's recommendation and talk about how modern technology can be used
to achieve particular sociopolitical goals rather than about the search for
universal human values or about the great cultural divide between Euro-
pean and Asian values. That cultural divide is unlikely to prevent Chinese
racism, militarism, and consumerism from threatening human liberty and
human happiness in the same ways as the West's versions of these things
have done. The suspicion with which the world currently views Washing-
ton will, before long, begin to be directed at Beijing.
Ash reminds us that "the old Atlantic-centered West, which has been
shaping the world since about 1500, probably has no more than twenty
years left in which it will still be the main world-shapero "10 If those who live
in the countries that shaped the world in the past can discuss what needs
to be done with those who live in the countries that will shape the world
in the future, there will be at least a slim chance that civilization, and the
ideals of the democratic revolutions, will survive in both the East and the
West.
To sum up, I have been suggesting that the process of cultural homog-
enization that will, with luck, be produced by shared practical concerns
over the fate of the world may make discussion of philosophical differences
obsolete. There will still be a difference between writing footnotes to Con-
fucius and writing footnotes to Plato, just as there will be between writing
footnotes to the Koran and to the Christian Scriptures. But none of these
four activities may have much relevance to the encouragement of liberty,
equality, and fraternity.
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3 The Overdominance of English in
Global Education
Is an Alternative Scenario Thinkable?
In the course of human history, language has played a remarkably impor-
tant role. Intellectually speaking, language constitutes the core of mental
activities. It is the formative force of consciousness and culture, and the
means of individual expression and interpersonal communication. As a
social institution, language unites as well as divides, integrates as well as
segregates. Language has much to do with the identity and solidarity of
a people; it is at once the subject matter and the carrier of cultural tradi-
tions. On the other hand, languages compete with each other and can be
a source of conflict. In the age of globalization, these aspects of language
have become more complex than ever with the rise of English as a truly
global language.
Historically speaking, mankind has witnessed the coming and going of
many lingua francas. In the West, there was Greek in antiquity, Latin in the
Middle Ages, and French and to some extent German in modern times. In
the East, there was Chinese, especially in its written form. In Africa, there
was Swahili, and in South America Quechua and Spanish, to mention just
the most prominent examples. However, in terms of scope and impact, it
seems that English has become the truly first global lingua franca, "global"
not merely in a geographical sense, but in the sense that its diffusion has
become an inseparable part of what we now call globalization.! It is for this
reason that Robert Philipson and Tove Skutnabb-Kangas, two proponents
of linguistic human rights, have coined the term "englishisation," which
they define as "one dimension of globalization."2
From a pragmatic point of view, the world has always been in need
of a lingua franca. In fact the term "lingua franca," originally referring
to "language of the Franks (Europeans)," was invented in the European
Middle Ages, when there was a need for different peoples in the Mediter-
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ranean and throughout the Middle East to have a common language that
could be used "freely" to facilitate multilateral trade and diplomacy as well
as scholarly exchange. In our globalized world today, the urgency of the
need for international communication has reached an unprecedented level.
Think of the various economic summits, of organizations such as the UN
or UNESCO, of the many international academic conferences held from
day to day around the globe. Nowadays, peoples of the world can hardly
afford to disregard the importance of English, in whatever walk of life, if
they do not want to be marginalized by the global community.
Dominance versus Overdominance
Language is power. This much-expressed dictum3 takes on a new meaning
with the upsurge of English as a global language. Like many lingua fran-
cas in history, including Greek and Latin, the power of English was first
backed up by military and economic force. Now, whether we like it or
not, proficiency in English has become in many societies not only a mat-
ter of practical competence but also a yardstick of social prestige, or "cul-
tural capital" as depicted by Pierre Bourdieu.4 Finally, the power of Eng-
lish expanded greatly when it became the most important vehicle of new
knowledge.s It is also through this means that the dominance of English
poses a challenge to global education. Whoever wants to be well informed,
whoever wants to be globally heard or read, finds reading or publishing in
English a necessity.
Yet, while this dominance of English is unavoidable, the world today
is facing an additional challenge-the overdominance of English. By over-
dominance of English, I mean the danger of individual languages being self-
estranged through an overemphasis on English at the cost of. the mother
tongue. While dominance is an externally imposed challenge, overdomi-
nance is largely a self-inflicted endangerment of the mother tongue through
self-neglect and self-degradation on the part of the people of various lin-
guistic communities. In education, one serious consequence of the over-
dominance of English is the "crowding out"6 of the native tongue from
school curricula and from higher education, a scenario that is not uncom-
mon around the globe today.
One reason we need to draw a distinction between the dominance and
overdominance of English is that the two issues allow for different reac-
tions. As a result of globalization, the dominance of English is a brute fact
from which some nations benefit and others have to tolerate. It is a global
issue that is now under no nation's direct control. As a danger to native
languages, however, the overdominance of English is a matter of domestic
language policies or attitudes, which are under the control of members of
the respective linguistic communities-whether they be government policy
makers, university administrators, or the general public. This essay seeks to
stimulate reflection on, and constructive responses to, this problem.
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The Experience of Germany through Four Centuries
To exemplify how far-reaching the problem of "overdominance" can
become, let us examine the experience of the Germans. In terms of influ-
ence, the German language was at its prime during the nineteenth century,
reaching its pinnacle just before the outbreak of the First World War. Dur-
ing that period, German was the most important scholarly language for
academic disciplines ranging from astrophysics to art history, from math-
ematics to sociology, and from economics to philosophy. But before and
after this heyday, the situation was quite different.
Being a language with a traceable history, German in the time of Leib-
niz and Bach was very much neglected, even by Germans themselves. One
remarkable story tells us that Frederick the Great, when introduced to J. S.
Bach, tried to speak to him in French. Another story relates that Voltaire
felt so at home in the Prussian court that he wrote his countrymen saying,
"It is just like in France, people here just speak our language, German is
used only when they are talking to soldiers and horses." And this schwar-
merei for French was not confined to royals or nobles. Peter von Polenz,
a historian of German, tells us that, at the turn of the eighteenth century,
it was common for middle-class German families to require their children
to speak French to their parents and friends, while German was spoken
only to the helpers or maids.7 In academia, too, German had at that time
a very low status. We only need to recall that most of Leibniz's own writ-
ings were either in Latin or in French, the two leading lingua francas of
that time.
But, most interestingly, Leibniz did write a few short essays in Ger-
man, two of which dealt precisely with the future prospect of German as
an academic language, namely, (I) "Unvorgreifliche Gedanken, betreffend
die Ausiibung und Verbesserung der deutschen Sprache" (Some unantici-
pated thoughts concerning the practice and improvement of the German
language; 1697!I704/1709), and (2) "Ermahnung an die Deutschen, ihren
Verstand und ihre Sprache besser zu iiben, samt beigefiigtem Vorschlag
einer deutschgesinnten Gesellschaft" (Warning to the Germans, to better
exercise their understanding and their language, together with a proposal
for a German-minded society; 1682/83).8 In these two essays, and in some
related correspondence, Leibniz introduced two important notions related
to the use of the German language, namely Sprachpflege (language care)
and deutschgesinnte Gesellschaft (German-minded society). The concept of
language care is quite akin to that of language planning (Sprachplanung),
for both concepts suggest that we should take measures on behalf of our
native language so that it may develop in a favorable direction. The differ-
ence is that language planning is more or less a matter of governmental pol-
icy, whereas language care has to do mainly with the duty of members of
the linguistic community. And Leibniz's idea of a German-minded society9
refers precisely to this need of "caring" for the German language through
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its active use by the German people so that the strength and vitality of the
language might develop and prosper.
According to Leibniz, German exhibited its strength in having a rich
vocabulary for sensible and technical objects (metallurgy, mining, etc.), but
suffered from a shortfall in terminology in two specific areas-that of "the
expression of the emotions" and that of "abstract and subtle cognitive
expressions, including those used in logic and metaphysics." In other
words, Leibniz thought German was weak in the areas of literature and
philosophy.lO
For admirers of German culture, this "diagnosis" of Leibniz is hardly
comprehensible. A close look at the history of the German language reveals
that precisely in the two specified areas the track record of the German
language was indeed not a bad one. There was, on the one hand, a long
tradition of medieval and baroque German poetry and, on the other, an
equally remarkable tradition of German schoolmen and mystics.u In other
words, Leibniz arguably underestimated his own linguistic heritage. And
the fact that an academic as serious as Leibniz could also make such a
mistake seems to indicate clearly that the German people of his time,
with few exceptions, must have lost confidence in and esteem for their
own language and given up on its "care" to the extent that they could
even have become unaware of its previous glamour. In any case, with the
proposal of "language care" and of a "German-minded society," Leibniz
did point the direction along which the German language might experience
a resurrection.
Within a hundred years after Leibniz's "warning," German eventu-
ally did make enormous progress in both literature and philosophy. In
the hands of such literati as Goethe and Schiller and such philosophers
as Kant and Hegel, the German language experienced a kind of rebirth.
Through the work of these intellectual giants, it reclaimed all its lost ter-
ritory, becoming one of the most powerful and expressive academic lan-
guages of modern Europe.
After another century of development, the power of German reached
its climax just before World War 1. With the rise of English during the inter-
war period, however, the influence of German was significantly checked,
and during and after World War II, German suffered further due to the neg-
ative image and inhumane deeds of the Nazis. 12 Culturally and politically,
today's Germany is very similar to the Germany of Leibniz's lifetime. First,
the continual weakening of the Holy Roman Empire in the decades after
the Thirty Years' War (r6r8-r648) finds a parallel in the lingering mem-
ories felt in present-day Germany of the country's defeat in World War
II some fifty years ago. Second, while Leibniz's Germany came under the
influence of the language of France, the final winner of the Thirty Years'
War, the same "Western-influence" is felt by today's Germany, the differ-
ence being that in this case the West wind comes not from France but from
the farther shores of the United States. With the upsurge of (American)
58 Tze-wan Kwan
English, the future of the German language, which once burdened Leibniz,
seems to have become a matter for alarm again.
Out of their great concern for this issue, a group of German professors
(thirty-seven in number) wrote an open letter on June 24, 2001, addressed
to the ministers of culture, science, and education of all sixteen German
states.13 In this open letter, which bears the caption "Protection and Devel-
opment of German as the National Academic Language," the authors
called the world's attention to two noticeable trends in the use of Ger-
man on German soil. First, an increasing number of international confer-
ences in Germany use English as the only official language, even when the
main target audience is German laypeople. Second, an increasing number
of publications in Germany accept only English contributions, and many
basic university courses are offered in English rather than German. See-
ing the gravity of the issue, the authors made the alarming statement that
"[t]he three undersigned together with the 34 countersigned, coming from
the most disparate disciplines, observe with great concern how the Ger-
man language is being expelled from our country's academic enterprise by
English. We most politely ask you to take issue with this problem. We also
recognize the danger that the primordial language basis for our scientific
thinking and for the social exchange of knowledge will be lost within the
next five to ten years. This applies also to the significance of Germany as
an independent country for academic research."14
Looking back at the heyday of Goethe and Kant, when German was so
alive, it is hard to imagine that the same language now faces such a decline.
The open letter concluded, rather sadly, saying that what is aimed at is not
the "upgrading anew of German to an international language for commu-
nication," but merely its "protection and development." To put the whole
case in Leibniz's words, what the open letter was complaining about was
nothing other than the Germans' own abandonment of "language care,"
which is precisely what should again be strengthened. What if the sug-
gested measures are not followed? Of course, with so many speakers the
German language will not easily die out. But it would be bad enough, as
depicted in the open letter, if German higher education were to produce a
class of "isolated elite" cut off from the rest of society and incapable of
using German in academic writing, discussion, or even thinkingP5
How Should the Overdominance of English Be Dealt with?
The above described trajectory of the German language shows clearly how
the globalization of English might affect all other languages. With expe-
rience gained from this account, I shall proceed to reflect on a number
of topics in the hope that some key issues can be identified and clarified
so that peoples in the world may deal with the same problem in a more
deliberate manner. In presenting this case, I unavoidably have to occasion-
ally proceed from a "Chinese" perspective. This is necessary, as there are
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indications that major universities in China and Hong Kong have consid-
ered or are considering major revisions of their language policy in favor
of English. But I hope this "Chinese" perspective will not prevent us from
seeing that the challenge here is one the whole world is facing. Given the
global nature of this challenge, which will intensify in the time to come,
some generic reflections might already be timely.
English as the Indispensable Key to the Global Community
After decades of self-seclusion, the opening up of China has become an
issue of paramount importance both for the Chinese and for would-be
partners. Propelled by the enormous opportunities that lie ahead for those
who can communicate outside their own borders, it is perfectly under-
standable that a great interest has arisen among the Chinese population
in learning English, which is regarded, not unjustifiably, as the key to the
outside world. Besides economic interest, the acquisition of English is also
educationally important for contemporary China, because English is now
the most important conveyer of new knowledge. For Chinese learners of
most disciplines, the mastery of English is educationally much more cost-
effective than the mastery of any other foreign language. On the intellectual
level, the influx of English into China will in the long run benefit the Chinese
population greatly, because learning a foreign language enables the learn-
ers to realize that things can be described, formulated, or perceived from
different angles. With the correct approaches, obtaining a decent grasp of
a foreign language can help develop a more flexible and liberal mind-set,
which in turn will even help us to better appreciate our own culture, or to
be critical of it if necessary. Goethe once said, "whoever knows no foreign
language, knows not even his own."16 With the increased need for cross-
cultural communication, China's further emphasis on English should in the
first place be considered in a positive light, as it will bring about positive
"capital" for her. For any country in the world, including China, tapping
into a globalized language like English is a matter of national interest.
The Need of the World to Have an International Language
Taking a cosmopolitan point of view, having a language that is globally
understood is a matter of practical necessity. It is for this reason that I
find expressions like "hegemony" or "imperialism" too emotional, as they
might prompt us to indulge in historical animosities and distract us from
the many positive roles a global language might play, in areas such as inter-
national law and human rights, international rescues and amnesties, aca-
demic exchanges, urgent medical consultancies, cross-cultural understand-
ing, interreligious dialogues, and so on. The fact that English rather than
French or Esperanto has succeeded in assuming this dominant role should
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not prevent us from accepting this truth. Even less should it encourage us
to take a "boycotting" attitude toward English, which would be against
the interests of individual countries and of the international community.
All in all, despite the critical stance I am going to take, I do not believe that
any country should undermine the importance of English as a global lan-
guage. The question is only, given the inevitable need to strengthen the use
of English, how should individual countries cope with its dominance while
preventing its overdominance?
Treating English as OFL and Not as ENL
In language matters, a rule of thumb is to take linguistic realities seriously.
In human societies, the most basic linguistic reality is the acquisition of the
mother tongue, an iron fact that should be made the starting point of all
sensible language policies. While the learning of English is culturally and
politically inevitable, it remains debatable what educational strategy any
given nation-state should adopt. A major concern here is that a nation's
strategy for English education can only be part of a more generic language
strategy, which has to do mainly with policies regarding the native lan-
guage, so that measures concerning the former must always be discussed
with reference to those concerning the latter. It is in this light that we can
differentiate conceptually between two strategies of treating English: "opti-
mized foreign language" (OFL) on the one hand, and "emulated native lan-
guage" (ENL) on the other:
By "optimized foreign language," hereafter OFL, I mean fostering
English education as a foreign language with all possible resources and
measures while paying full attention to mother-tongue literacy (MTL). Of
course, the adoption of an OFL policy is not an easy task, especially for
nations (like China) whose language is typologically dissimilar to English.
How under such circumstances can the learning of English be optimized
is the task of research on teaching English as a second (foreign) language
(TESLrrEFL). What we need to emphasize is that, regardless of the extent
of the resources a nation might inject into the promotion of English, all this
has to be done in parallel with a solid education in the native tongue. If this
condition is not met, the whole language strategy will cease to be one of
OFL and degenerate into one of ENL.
By ENL or "emulated native language" (oxymoron), I mean the strat-
egy of treating English "as if" it were a native language, to the extent
that the true native language is severely jeopardized. ENL is so depicted
("emulated") because it looks away from the linguistic reality of the native
tongue and presumptively assumes that, with enough resources, English
can be taught and learned as well as if it were a "native language." Of
course, given unlimited resources, ENL is theoretically possible. But taking
into consideration the actual linguistic environment and the actual expo-
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sure of learners to English, the outcome of ENL is always limited while
its price can be enormously high.J7 And the highest price involved here is
not just a matter of money, but the alienation of learners from their native
tongue, which could have adverse consequences for their intellectual devel-
opment. Bearing our reference to Leibniz in mind, it is clear that the dif-
ference between OFL and ENL lies precisely in their different attitudes
toward "language care."
The distinction between OFL and ENL is meant to single out the for-
mer as the more viable and the latter as a self-delusive approach to English
education. For a successful implementation of OFL, various issues have
to be carefully considered. Besides TESL research as mentioned, we might
need to consider other issues such as the integration of an "optimized"
English curriculum into a basic scheme of mother-tongue literacy, the full
exploitation of educational technologies, and strategies for the implemen-
tation of OFL in different segments of the educational system.
Medium of Instruction of the University Curriculum
For university education in non-English-speaking countries, the holding of
more international conferences, symposia, lectures, and so forth and the
delivery of some courses in English can no doubt increase students' expo-
sure to English. But introducing more English is one thing; changing the
language of instruction to English completely or to any extent that might
jeopardize the future prospects of the native tongue as an academic lan-
guage is quite another. We must understand that the university lecture hall
is the main platform of "language care" for any nation-state. It is often
the place where the intellectual endeavors of the teacher become consoli-
dated and creative. And, most important, university teaching is the device
through which the culture, knowledge, and values of a nation are transmit-
ted from one generation to the next. In a word, as far as "language care"
is concerned, university teaching in the mother tongue is a bulwark that no
nation can afford to give up without serious cultural and educational con-
sequences.
Besides Germany, one might argue, there are many countries in Europe,
such as the Netherlands and the Nordic states, that have started much
earlier and gone much further in switching their language of university
instruction to English. But we must bear in mind that these countries have
much smaller populations than Germany or China, which might have left
them with little real choice in the matter. 18 It is well known that the peo-
ple of these countries tend to speak English extremely well as a second lan-
guage. Some even say that for these peoples English has become a "second
first language" rather than a "first second language." But this "success" in
English comes at a high price, for it is obvious that Dutch, Norwegian, or
Danish belong to those national languages that have long been "overdom-
inated" by English, at least in academia. 19 In recent years, there has been a
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strong tendency for universities in China to adopt more English, which is
understandable. But the crucial question is: how far should we go?
Language Care as an Unshirkable Duty of the Entire
Linguistic Community, and of Academics in Particular
The German philosopher Herder was of the opinion that, if a language is
to develop healthily, it has to be supported by a group of well-educated lin-
guistic users.20 For any nation-state, university teachers and students are,
so to speak, the cream of society. As intellectuals and academics, they have
a duty to learn new knowledge in their respective disciplines. But whether
the knowledge thus acquired can be successfully "retained" and transmit-
ted to the school (secondary and primary) and public sectors depends to
a large extent on whether these university people can use their native lan-
guage to recapitulate, reflect on, criticize, apply, and debate the new knowl-
edge gained. It is only thus that new knowledge from the outside world
can be assimilated and internalized into the mother tongue and eventu-
ally become a common intellectual asset of the nation and the basis for fur-
ther conceptual innovation. For academia worldwide, it would be a great
humiliation if progress in thought and scholarship could be made only in
English!
Therefore, university academics, especially those who have acquired
training abroad, should require themselves to publish at least occasionally
in their mother tongue, despite a possibly smaller and localized readership.
Here, I am referring to both the publication of advanced-level research
papers and to more basic-level educational materials such as textbooks.
This is the most important way the abstract notion of "language care" can
be realized.
The Role of Language in Natural Sciences and in the Humanities
The question of how much English and how much native language should
be used in academic research has always been a matter of dispute. Regarding
this problem, there has been much discussion on the need to treat natural-
science subjects and humanistic or social-scientific subjects differently. One
general observation is that natural sciences deal with universal phenomena
that are quite independent of the cultural identity of the researcher, and
for that reason English alone would best serve as a universal medium of
communication. On the other hand, it has been emphasized that, in the
case of research on the humanities and social sciences, the objects and
concepts of study are in fact not "objective" and "universal" in a natural-
scientific sense, but are significantly motivated by the cultural heritage
from which they derive. Thus, in handling humanistic issues, approaches
from different linguistic formulations often provide important contrasts
and nuances that lead to deeper and more genuine understanding of the
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issues,21 It is for this reason that such researches should not be confined to
or rely on one global language alone. Along this line of thought, Wolfgang
Friihwald, president of the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung of Germany,
once remarked that "all cultural and human sciences (in a broader sense
all theoretical sciences) have to do with language. Whereas the concept of
science in modern natural sciences is a result-oriented one, the concept of
science in the human sciences is always process-related. This means that the
results of the human sciences are not lying there prior to the process of their
description. They are bound to language and style and are therefore not
readily transferable to one lingua franca."22 By the same token, Maurice
Gode, a famous French Germanist, once opined that "knowledge of the
respective national languages is a basic prerequisite for meaningful study
in the humanities. "23
In short, humanities studies rely on linguistic diversity and on cultural
traditions to a much greater extent than do the natural sciences. For the
humanities in general and for philosophy in particular, proficiency in one
single lingua franca is very often a sign of inadequacy, if not of impover-
ishment. While this might not apply to Kongzi or Plato, it is certainly true
of today's humanities scholar, for whom intercultural understanding and
a global outlook have become necessary. As for researchers in the natural
sciences, although they do not need a multiplicity of languages to operate,
their countries and peoples do need them to fulfill the duty of "language
care," which should apply to all disciplines, although to varying degrees.
Bargaining Power of Various Native Languages in Face of
English Dominance
As English is "the" language of globalization, its influence will-continue to
grow in the foreseeable future. It also seems inevitable that many languages
of the world will succumb to this dominance. The question of how far and
how long individual languages can retain their identity and idiosyncra-
sies is a matter of cultural dynamics. Here, a host of factors are involved,
of which two are the most crucial: (I) the size of the linguistic commu-
nity, which accounts for the multitude of linguistically active authors; and
(2) the bulk of the cultural legacy of a language, which accounts for the
overall attraction for the recurrent use of the language.24 Taking these fac-
tors into consideration, we can give a rough approximation of the future
of some languages. Take German as an example. With 95 million speakers
in Europe, the German-speaking community is sizable compared to other
ED languages such as Dutch, Danish, or Swedish. In terms of cultural leg-
acy, contemporary German differs greatly from the German of Leibniz's
time because of the richness in literary, philosophical, and other disciplin-
ary classics accumulated over the past two centuries, and this strength or
"capital" might remain significant for many centuries to come. With this
bargaining power, will German follow the examples of Dutch or Danish
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in becoming further marginalized? Or should Germany choose to actively
resist such a path?
Take Chinese as another example. Needless to say, the bulk (over 1.3
billion in mainland China) and, to a lesser degree, the spread of Chinese
speakers in the world are strengths that no one can ignore. As with cultural
tradition, the nearly uninterrupted several-thousand-year legacy of Chi-
nese literature, philosophy, art, and so on, obviously will render the Chi-
nese language extremely competitive into the distant future. In fact, people
often speculate that while many languages will be conquered or overdom-
inated by English, Chinese is probably among the very few (with Spanish
or probably Arabic being two other such candidates) that might eventually
be able truly to withstand the onslaught of English, or in the long run even
compete with it. But is the future of Chinese really so assured, despite the
great bargaining power it possesses?
While such wild guesses might have some point, they do not represent
the complete picture. One important thing to bear in mind is that, in addi-
tion to the two main factors we have mentioned, other factors (see note
24) might complicate the picture too, and among these factors we should
never ignore two subjective but equally crucial factors: the perseverance of
the government in maintaining consistent and favorable language-planning
policies, and the readiness of members of the linguistic community to con-
tribute to "language care."
What Should We Aim at When Talking about the Future of a
Language? Defending a Native Language as "Object Language"
or as "Operative Language"
In our discussion on the likelihood of a nation defending its language in
an "englishized" globe, we left out a very important issue, namely that a
native language can be defended merely as an "object language," or also
as an "operative language." By "object language," I mean the language
in which intellectual subjects such as poetry, philosophy, and history are
recorded. By "operative language" I am referring to the language in which
we operate when dealing with whatever issues require our attention. Obvi-
ously, classical Greek, Latin, or Sanskrit were great languages, but they are
nowadays only objects of study because, except for very few users, people
no longer operate in them. A pure object language, thanks to the "jewels"
it carries, might be "safe" from immediate extinction, but as long as it does
not "operate," it is not vital. In this regard, Wilhelm von Humboldt was
perfectly correct when he said, "[l]anguage is one of the fields whence the
general mental power of man emerges in constantly active operation. "25
Of course, when we talk about operating in a language, we might
understand operation loosely as everyday usage. But if it is the academic
status of a language that we care about, then we should note that a lan-
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guage might remain in use by a sizable population, but lose its esteem as
an intellectually operable academic language. So we have to know what
we are defending!
All of these reckonings are important insofar as they have much to
do with the language policies of universities in Germany and elsewhere,
including China and Hong Kong. Let me explain this, taking German
again as an example. Up to the present moment, German is obviously still
both an object language and an operative language, because Kant, Schiller,
Weber, or Simmel are still being discussed in German by scholars in Ger-
many and elsewhere. But suppose the Germans themselves were to decide
to stop using German to lecture or publish, what would happen, say, in
fifty years, or even ten? The truth is very simple: if an academic language
stops operating vigorously, it will quickly degenerate into a mere academic
object. And this was exactly the warning expressed in the open letter to the
German politicians.
Language Not Merely as a Tool of Expression But as the Key to
Intellectual Development: The Relevance of the Mother Tongue
Advocates of English-only policies often adopt a biased, instrumentalis-
tic conception of language, or the view that language is nothing more than
an instrument for the expression of what one already clearly has in mind.
But a closer look at the development of modern general linguistics shows
that, contrary to this "instrumental" view, linguists are readily adopt-
ing a "Bildung conception" of language, or the view that language is not
merely an instrument for the expression of clear, ready-made ideas, but a
formative medium through which human intelligence and consciousness
can take shape and develop at all. In other words, for many· modern lin-
guists, including Humboldt, Saussure, and ]akobson, language competence
and intellectual capacity are equiprimordial and inseparable. If language
indeed has such an important role in the development of human intelli-
gence, then the part played by the mother tongue should also be accorded
special importance, because the mother tongue is precisely "the" language
medium through which all human individuals actually acquire their basic
intelligence. Since the acquisition of the mother tongue is a process that
is irreversible and inevitable, fostering the learning of English at the cost
of the mother tongue (as in the case of ENL) is like building an edifice on
a sand dune or developing a view from nowhere, which is pedagogically
problematic and intellectually against the best interests of the learner. This
explains why the overdominance of English is such an important issue. It is
along this line of thought that some Neo-Humboldtian researchers on lan-
guage have studied the role of the mother tongue, which they think is the
very basis for human intellectual existence as well as the very link to our
social life-world and to our cultural heritage.26
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Multilingualism
Having underlined the importance of the mother tongue for the cultiva-
tion of human intelligence, nevertheless it is also important for us to limit
this emphasis to prevent this position from degenerating into provincialism
or ethnocentrism. In fact, we should note that the philosophical justifica-
tions that confirm the primary importance of the mother tongue also lend
support to the advantage of supplementing mother-tongue learning with
the learning of foreign languages. As suggested at the outset, the learning
of a foreign language is beneficial because it helps to broaden the linguis-
tic-intellectual horizons of learners by providing contrasts in perspectives,
formulation strategies, conceptual networks, and so forth. In general lin-
guistics and in philosophy of language, many major theoretical positions
are in fact closely related to this issue- for instance, the concept of lin-
guistic value, lexical field theory (Wortfeldtheorie), world-picture (Welt-
ansicht), the fusion of horizons (Horizontverschmelzung), and so on. All
of these add up to suggest that, as far as education is concerned, the more
languages one learns, the better. Emperor Charles V's dictum, "How many
languages one speaks, so many times is he a man," is a most drastic formu-
lation of this positionY Naturally, with limited time and resources, there
are limits to what can be achieved in multilingualism in education. In order
to strike a balance, I would suggest that, while bilingualism should be a
minimum for preuniversity education, education from the undergraduate
program onward should at least aim at trilingualism, which should even be
made a requirement at the graduate level. Just one word on the concept of
"trilingualism." Instead of being a mere numerical compromise, many lin-
guistic and philosophical studies have pointed out that the learning of at
least three languages entails the intellectual advantage of "triangulation,"
that is, the prevention of premature antagonism or bipolarity in conceptual
comparisons, enabling the learner thus to be more receptive to the com-
plexities of our world and better prepared for multilateral discourses.28
Toward a Glocal Language Policy in the Age of Globalization
Having underlined the importance of English as a global language, but
warned of its overdominance, one general position we arrive at is the adop-
tion of a language policy that is "glocal" in nature. What is a glocallan-
guage policy? In brief, it is a language policy that is locally rooted but glob-
ally perspectivized. In practical terms, it is the combination of the MTL
(mother-tongue literacy) and OFL (optimized foreign language). While the
significance of MTL is programmatically self-explanatory and pedagogi-
cally fundamental, we must note that OFL should not be confined to mere
TESL or English learning, but should include the teaching and learning of
any "foreign" language relevant to one's respective disciplines. With the
dominance of English, it is certain that English will remain globally the
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most popular "foreign language," but this dominance should not lead to
monopolization in the world linguistic arena, especially not in academia.
Given available resources, foreign languages other than English should not
be excluded, for they do make contributions of their own to global civi-
lization, and are valuable cultural "capital" awaiting fruitful investment
by every global citizen. If this "glocal" language policy is adopted con-
sistently by a considerable number of nations with the support of their
major universities, then every individual language will have a better future,
both locally and globally. How popular individual languages can become
depends naturally on their "bargaining power." So why shouldn't Chinese
scholars, out of disciplinary needs, learn alongside English some Sanskrit,
Greek, Latin, German, French, Tibetan, Japanese, or even Tokharian in
order to derive the most intellectual benefit? Alternatively, Chinese is obvi-
ously a good candidate for peoples in the world.29 Wilhelm von Humboldt
once underlined the idiosyncrasies of the Chinese language with the won-
derful remarks that Chinese and Sanskrit, despite their antipodal struc-
tures, represent the two "fixed extremes" or "end points" of linguistic per-
fection,30 and that the Chinese script has "in a certain manner embraced
philosophical work within itself."3!
Educationally speaking, as long as one learns a foreign language seri-
ously enough, whether English or another language, one will be able to
get a great deal from the effort. But whatever the combinations, the most
important thing is that in any glocallanguage program the native tongue
should always be in place, for without a solid educational foundation in
one's native tongue, which is the fountainhead of human intelligence and
thus the "true" key to the outside world, all other linguistic maneuvers will
become pointless and ineffective. For any country, any attempt to achieve
a "better" standard in a foreign language (say, English) at the expense of
the native tongue is intellectual-pedagogically unwise and cultural-politi-
cally suicidal.
Conclusion
The dominance of the English language is the result of a long historical
process that can hardly be reversed: it is a basic fact that no nation or gov-
ernment can ignore. Unless a nation does not want to connect economi-
cally, politically, intellectually, and culturally with the world, strengthening
its use of English is unavoidable. Yet, coming to terms with the domi-
nance of English as an international language is one thing; tolerating its
overdominance or allowing it to intrude into domestic language matters
is quite another. As we have explained, such overdominance amounts to
the encroachment upon and endangerment of other native tongues, but
whether or not this scenario should be allowed to prevail is to a large extent
in the hands of members of individual linguistic communities, be they gov-
ernment policy makers, university administrators, professors, students, or
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the general public. What we are dealing with here is our very linguistic
human rights, which we might all-too-easily forsake if the overdominance
of English is accepted without reflection. In this regard, Leibniz's notions
of "language care" and of the establishment of a "[mother-tongue]-minded
society" are obviously of great heuristic value.
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"weil die dort entwickelte Schreibweise schon in sich in gewisser Weise eine philoso-
phische Arbeit beweist."
GWEN GRIFFITH-DICKSON
4 Teaching Philosophy of Religion HMulticulturally"
AL6kahi Approach?
E nihi ka he/e,
mai ha'apa,
mai pulale i ka "ike a ka maka;
ha'akahi na makamaka "a ke alaha.
This was the advice that Hawai'i's King Kalakaua gave to his queen,
Kapiolani, when she was about to embark on a journey to the alien culture
of Great Britain. Mary Kawena Pukui translates it: "Go carefully; do not
transgress; do not rush headlong to understand; the only friend is compas-
sion." This was doubtless sound advice for a Hawaiian explorer encoun-
tering the strange, potentially hostile natives of London.
The word lokiihi is a Hawaiian word; it means a harmony or balance,
but one in particular that arises out of many diverse, and even conflict-
ing, elements; one in which those elements are not eliminated or reduced
to one another, so much as contained and supported within an overall con-
text in which they can playa creative role together. A typical example in
the Hawaiian context would be an ecosystem. Verses inHawaiian chant
speak of the lava gnawing its way across the land, "making it beautiful."
This may seem counterintuitive to everyday notions of volcanic activity as
destructive, but once the wind and water break down the hardened lava,
turning it to soil, it becomes recolonized by the ferns and the trees and
grows into a lush rain forest. What this Hawaiian concept of [okiihi encap-
sulates is that these diverse elements do not turn into one another or lose
their specific identity in a larger new melting-pot identity, but remain them-
selves. Nevertheless they work together to create something new-new
territory, for example, in the case of lava. And this they do even when they
are hostile, or mutually destructive. That does not prevent the creative pro-
cess going forward when they are taken up into a larger IOkiihi.
What it suggests is an approach that sees diversity as not merely instru-
mentally but also intrinsically desirable. Diversity is not merely a means
to some end, that can be transcended or abandoned once some kind of
unity has been achieved. This approach prefers plenitude to the more usual
philosophical value of parsimony, and is tempted to replace the Principle
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of Simplicity with the Principle of Requisite Variety. This principle asserts
that the more diversity of options a system contains, the greater number
of responses are possible and the more effectively a system can respond to
any given problem or challenge. As two Hawaiian proverbs have it: "The
mountain has many paths," and "Not all knowledge is contained in one
halau or school."
One could suggest, on the contrary, that one could select features or
insights knowledge from different schools, philosophies, or cultures and
homogenize them into a single global thing. Diversity might have been use-
ful in the past, or it might have a short-term and purely instrumental value.
To maintain that one should preserve the cultures that gave birth to these
insights is a much more ambitious claim. Why preserve the various cultures
that one can simply use as sources? Why not argue that increasing travel
and dissemination of cultures means that we will eventually end up with
one homogenized culture?
A [okiihi approach suggests that the more desirable result of increas-
ing contact and familiarity is not sameness, but intimacy. Not homogeni-
zation, but intimate diversity is its aim. By analogy, many cuisines around
the world have noodles-Chinese, Japanese, Italian, German spaetzle, and
so on. Given "globalization" or the spread of cuisines around the planet,
we could predict that these various cuisines will merge into one homoge-
nized "global" cuisine. "Global noodles" would have a sauce consisting of
tomato passata, soy sauce, German cream, miso, and American ketchup.
The lokiihi approach would not consider this the best of all possible sauces.
"Global noodles" is not a dish with which everyone would feel at home;
rather, it is a dish that no one would want to eat. "Intimate diversity"
means that I would rather feel at home in each of those different restau-
rants than be confronted with the same inedible global sauce everywhere
I went.
What is clear is that to take a stance on cultural diversity ultimate-
ly-if only implicitly or unconsciously-is to take a stance on tradition:
its role, its value, or its pointlessness. Persistence on the question of why
cultural diversity is a good thing and why it should be allowed to persist
yields justifications that likely rest ultimately on the value of traditions
in themselves, not just for the occasional successful solutions or winsome
ideas that they have produced that can be borrowed and used in something
quite unlike their home.
This might suggest an attitude to tradition not as an encrustation of
notions, old problems and solutions that are past their use-by date. Rather,
it views some of the products of tradition (like language, for example,
which Johann Georg Hamann, Herder, Humboldt, and others tell is insep-
arable from tradition) in this way: as the Rigveda says, it is sifted over
time. Time and the hands of many forerunners help to separate the wheat
from the chaff. Or you can use a mineral water analogy-water that has
trickled down through decades purified through rock and earth, until you
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get Evian. Tradition and its longevity can be seen as an ongoing process of
refinement and perfecting ~hat is just not possible in a single lifetime or fea-
sible for a single imagination. Of course, wells can be poisoned and streams
polluted. So partaking of a tradition brings with it the responsibility of dis-
cernment, careful attention to the sources of what you're taking in, and
their likely effects, good or ill. All of that is not an argument against doing
it; it is an argument against doing it badly. Moreover, new and unprece-
dented needs for liquid do not need to be met by the invention of new liq-
uids. Water can be used for new uses, like dishwashers. We do not have
to invent water anew. Water is eternally recycled. This does not mean that
we are eternally condemned to drink dirty water that other people have
used for centuries and that, moreover, this water is now outdated. Dealing
with used water intelligently is not only a necessity; it itself-understood
as careful recycling-is precisely the answer to one of the new unprece-
dented environmental problems we face. So too with traditions. They may
have emerged in very different conditions, and they may have been around
a long time; yet they may also contain resources and possibilities for con-
structing creative responses to new needs and challenges.
Let us briefly consider the issue as it affects religions today. True, there
are some that have completely dispensed with respect for ongoing tradi-
tion, are uninterested in their histories of interpretation, only address con-
temporary problems, and dream up their answers purely from their own
imaginations. Those are the ones that casual speakers tend to call funda-
mentalist. The rest are the ones that casual speakers call "cults."
These two contributions from Hawaiian thought: Kalakaua's advice
and the idea of [okiihi, are the answer; now for the question. The question
amounts to the familiar, even tired, one of whether or how far it is possi-
ble to understand radically different cultures. An "East-West Philosophy"
conference seems to imply a cheerful optimism that we can understand one
another, and not be condemned to a quagmire of incommensurability. As
many of us are interested not merely in observation of other philosophical
cultures, but in participation and inculcation (that is, in education or teach-
ing more than one philosophical geography), the question does seem worth
revisiting with this new objective and agenda.
No Escape
Often multicultural or comparative philosophy is seen as a possible but
questionable discipline, as an option, but one that faces difficult method-
ological or epistemological barriers. If so, who, and what, are they teach-
ing? This ivory tower nail-biting over whether we can understand "other"
cultures is remote from the seminar rooms in many parts of the world, in
which the question of multicultural education is the experience of students
newly arrived from other continents, joining an existing diverse racial and
cultural mix. "Multiculturality" is not only a question of those who arrive
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into a new culture. British-born Muslims engage in the study of Islam dif-
ferently from non-Muslims or recent converts.
Another question to put to the multiculturally squeamish is: even if
one claims to be teaching in a single culture, or on a single topic, whose
scholarship within that culture are you teaching? When I created an MA in
Islamic Studies in the University of London five years ago, we had to con-
front the political question of the reading list. "Islamic Studies" contains
Western scholars-and Islamic scholars. Muslim students reading Goldzi-
her on law have a "clash of scholarly civilizations" to negotiate in study-
ing a single "civilization. "1 In fact, the core foundation course of that post-
graduate degree really consisted of this question: what is, what counts as
"scholarship" of Islam, and what are the scholarly virtues and values we
are trying to develop? In the mind of the course's creator, the answer was
up for grabs.
In short, there is no avoiding the issue. Today, anyone who thinks
that they are not engaging in multicultural teaching maintains that belief
by ignoring who their students really are, ignoring some peoples' scholar-
ship, and ignoring the cultural or religious "otherness" of familiar schol-
ars like Plato.
The question of the possibility of understanding other cultures has
leaped outside its traditional home in departments of philosophy, anthro-
pology, sociology, or indeed linguistics. It has raised its head in Western
political discourse, especially since 2001, but still earlier with the publi-
cation of Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations.2 It features, promi-
nently or tacitly, in the speeches of Anglophone politicians, especially when
they want to justify going to war. Here we see in a usefully simplistic form
the problems that beset the binary opposition between "universalism" and
"relativism," when the United States wants to make war in the post-91r I
situation. Are "democracy" and "freedom" universal values, or are they
uniquely Western? If you say they are unique to the West, then what jus-
tifies you in imposing your values with violence on other cultures? On the
other hand, if you say they are universal values, why do you need to impose
them?
The politicians apparently had some difficulty in speaking about these
values in relation to the rest of the world, in particular the incompatibility
of their deployment of the opposing notions of "universal" and "unique."
For it is clear they wanted both descriptions to be true of their values, per-
haps believing something like this: "These values are part of our self-con-
cept; we continually defend them or at least talk about them a lot; and in
that sense they are characteristically Western. But these values are right,
and other people ought to believe in them, and in that sense they are uni-
versal: universal in the validity we claim for them."
The political rhetoriticians' difficulties in negotiating this dilemma are
instructive for the broader question of whether intercultural understand-
ing is possible, and thereafter teachable. This seems to me to be a critical
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issue for comparative or multicultural philosophy; but many of the debates
that have taken place over the last few decades have not actually engaged
with the "comparative philosophy" angle. Generally the debates have been
contained in sociological or anthropological seminar rooms. Philosophers
may have joined in the social scientists' debates, as did Peter Winch and
Alasdair MacIntyre, or in the following decades, Donald Davidson, Hil-
ary Putnam, or Richard Rorty. But the tacit paradigm case around which
philosophers philosophized was of a disbelieving but well-meaning white
anthropologist trying to be polite about Azande magic. The problems of
an English-speaking analytical philosopher seeking to understand different
categories of "possibility" in Arabic logic, or Buddhist theories of meaning
on the relation of language to whatever one can say it relates to in Buddhist
metaphysical etiquette, do not seem to have come to the fore.
Anthropologist Stanley ]eyaraja Tambiah claims that the academics
dealing with this question can be shuffled into two broad groups, which he
cheerfully names "lumpers" and "splitters," with reference to how they see
different cultures.3 (Botanists use these labels about themselves; I assume
Tambiah has borrowed the designations.) Splitters use words like "incom-
mensurate" to describe the relation (or lack of relation) between different
cultures, "conceptual schemes," or "frameworks." They may be called rel-
ativists, by commentators or by their enemies. They think that cultural dif-
ferences, if not quite absolute, cannot be transcended. It may be claimed
that other cultures cannot be understood or other languages cannot be
perfectly translated; or the claim may be, more modestly, that it is just
very difficult to do so. At their most pessimistic, they may say that I have
more hope of understanding my dog's view of the world than the view of a
human being from a radically different culture.
The Scruples of the Splitters
The challenges that have been raised to the possibility of the enterprise
tend to come from the "splitters." The core, if tacit, claim of the splitters
is that peoples' thinking is wholly contained by something else: language,
conceptual scheme, culture, religion, worldview, whatever. Let us for now
call this container a Bubble. For the splitter, there is no overarching Some-
thing Else that transcends the Bubble to make communication or trans-
lation between Bubbles possible (or at least unproblematic). This Bubble
determines thought, beliefs, actions. One can only truly understand other
people and their thinking, beliefs, actions from within their Bubble.
Bubbliness surely had its first stirrings in a Kantian conscience over
how much responsibility we may bear for our perceptions; but it certainly
dates from the birth of the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, whose lin-
guistic determinism held that language to a greater or lesser extent deter-
mines the way a people think and see things. "The fact of the matter is that
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the 'real world' is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language
habits of the group" (5apir).4 Or, as Whorf wrote, "We dissect nature along
lines laid down py our native languages. The categories and types that we
isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they
stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented
in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our
minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds. We
cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we
do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this
way-an agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is
codified in the patterns of our language."5
Uses and abuses of Wittgenstein's musing on language games, their
relative autonomy, and their relation to forms of life, fuelled this growing
tendency. Kuhn's suggestions about the nature of progress in science gave
common currency to the spicy idea that systems may be incommensura-
ble,6 and the combined effects of Kuhn and Wittgenstein, perhaps above
all others, made this a sexy topic for philosophers to debate. Peter Winch's
The Idea of a Social Science 7 took the argument from the hard sciences
to the heart of the social sciences, and the critical response from Alasdair
MacIntyre raised it to the status of an eponymous "Debate" that ensured
longevity on undergraduate reading lists. Winch argues that there is no
reality independent of the language-games and forms of life of a given lan-
guage community. The social scientist who attempts to understand them
(from the outside, as it were), should do so in terms of the culture's own
concepts and beliefs, and not from one's own. He suggests the possibility
that there might be different logics, different rationalities; there is the dan-
ger therefore of making "category mistakes" in comparing phenomena.
So features we frequently find in splitters' thought are:
1. Cultures can only be understood "from within."
2. A doctrine we can call "outsidelessness," which maintains that Bub-
bles have nothing outside them. For example, the British theologian
Don Cupitt maintains that there is no reality outside our language to
which our language refers; it is a closed system from which there is no
escape.
3. Fierce, as opposed to mild, splitters also maintain that there is incom-
mensurability between Bubbles.
The problems with the splitter position are equally familiar. Where they
can be called relativist, they suffer the embarassments of the self-refuting
nature of relativism. Winch's demand is admirable, but puzzling. It is all
very well to understand a culture on its own terms, but if internalism (1.),
outsidelessness (2.), and incommensurability (3.) are all true, quite simply
we can't. We cannot enter a Bubble to understand it from within. We are
then condemned to perpetual failures to understand people who are differ-
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ent from us. If these things are really incommensurable, not only can you
not translate them; you can't understand them in the first place.
MacIntyre's contention in response to Winch was that there must be
some "shared space" of intelligibility and rationality between two cultures.8
MacIntyre nevertheless insisted that it is only possible for the anthropol-
ogist to approach the alien concepts on the basis of his or her own. One
necessarily invokes one's own standards and criteria, for example, of ratio-
nality. (But that's just what a lumper would say.) Donald Davidson has
devoted considerable energy to these issues, including questioning the very
idea that we have "conceptual schemes" that might not be commensurate.
Even Jacques Lacan-who may look like a postmodernist splitter because
of his slippery views on language that so influenced Derrida-resists out-
sidelessness, as far as language is concerned: "When you understand what
is expressed in the signs of the language, it is always, in the end, on account
of light coming to you from outside of the signs....The truth is outside of
the signs, elsewhere."9 "All speech always possesses a beyond."JO "We are
talking about things, and not about some eternally unidentifiable I know
not what." 11
Winch maintained that it is desirable that this understanding be a two-
way street; that we let our own conceptions, e.g. of rationality, be chal-
lenged, altered, or stretched by the culture we seek to understand. Tambiah
suggests that with this notion of extending our own conception, Winch
was, after all, striving for a kind of universal reasonY Here we see, per-
haps, the paradox of splitters-to be a successful splitter (one who finds a
way to understand another culture on its own terms), you have to be a bit
of a lumper.
The Optimism of the Lumpers
The lumpers, if they are sophisticated, are generally very happy with cul-
tural difference and are not necessarily guilty of rampant imperialism and
autocratic absolutism. They are happy with many different currencies in
operation around the globe, each country having their own, which is inter-
nally justified; they like, however, to see it backed up by something like the
old gold standard. I can trade in pounds sterling and you can deal in rupees
or renminbi, so long as there is something like gold backing it to give us
a Macintyrian "shared space" of comparability to generate an exchange
rate. Others may be willing to do without the gold, provided there is an
exchange rate; even if that exchange rate is similar to those forms of inter-
subjectivity known as "market forces" or "consumer confidence."
For philosophical "lumpers," what is often felt to provide the gold against
which all the different currencies can be measured is "rationality" - how-
ever this is conceived. Charles Taylor, Donald Davidson, Jon Elster, and
others all put their finger on this nerve, at its minimum defined as coher-
Teaching Philosophy of Religion "Multiculturally": A Uikahi Approach? 79
ence and consistency; more ambitiously, as the confidence that the subject
at hand, if rational, can survive translation into propositions.
Slightly less familiar territory, perhaps, for philosophers is the Sahlins-
Obeyesekere debate in anthropology, which ostensibly dealt with the inter-
pretation of events in Hawaiian history. The debate arose from the detailed
construction that Marshall Sahlins put forward arguing that, when Cap-
tain Cook arrived in Hawai'i in the late eighteenth century, the Hawaiians
assumed he was their god Lono.13 A Sri Lankan anthropologist, Gananath
Obeyesekere, mounted an equally intricate and aggressive counterattack;
not, however, on the basis of a track record in Hawaiian studies, but from
more ideological motivations. 14 How could it be that the Hawaiians would
take a European for a god? They, like all peoples of the world, possess what
he calls "practical rationality," which would surely preclude such a crude
cognitive error. It is really the Europeans who take themselves for gods in
relation to the "natives." "To put it bluntly, I doubt that the natives created
their European god; the Europeans created him for them."15
Sahlins, in his self-defence, made a countercharge interesting for our
purposes: he took aim at Obeyesekere's own presuppositions about ratio-
nality in attributing his own conception of "practical rationality" to the
Hawaiians and using it to decree (from two centuries' distance) what
Hawaiians could or could not have thought. Sahlins identifies Obeye-
sekere's "practical rationality" as none other than Western epistemolo-
gy's picture of the mind as a mirror of nature. Obeyesekere attributes this
notion of rationality to the Hawaiians as being superior to the "mythical"
way of thinking that racist anthropologists attribute to "natives." Far from
championing the Hawaiians' cognitive sophistication, Obeyesekere is actu-
ally subjugating them to European philosophical prejudices about ratio-
nality.16
A certain pseudo-politics of anthropological interpretation manages
to express its solidarity with indigenous peoples by endowing them
with the highest Western bourgeois values.... Not many have dared to
ascribe to Polynesians such a bourgeois relation to reality-in the guise
of a universal human disposition to rational cum practical action. Yet
Obeyesekere then doubles the compliment by reversing the usual prej-
udices: the "natives" are practical and the Westerners mythological.
Moreover, he knows this to be true of Hawaiians because he is a Sri
Lankan himselfY
Obeyesekere's "practical rationality" is "the process whereby human beings
reflectively assess the implications of a problem in terms of practical crite-
ria. "18 He bases this on Max Weber's notion of rationality, which Obeye-
sekere enunciates as: "the systematic thinker's mastery over the world by
means of his use of increasingly sophisticated concepts." (If he attributes
this desire to have "mastery over the world" to Hawaiian thought of the
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late eighteenth century, he has understood little of Hawaiian religious sen-
sibility.) "This form of 'rationality' can exist in many cultures. In the West,
rational systematization of thought was articulated to a 'pragmatic ratio-
nality' where goals are achieved through technically efficient means, cul-
minating in modern capitalism. Weber believed that this latter process was
unique to the West. I take the position that 'practical rationality,' if not the
systematization of conceptual thought, must exist in most, if not all, soci-
eties, admittedly in varying degrees of importance. "19 Obeyesekere wants
to expand the notion to include all reflective decision making, more rea-
soned and reflective than "common sense," although the distinction is eas-
ily blurred.20 It is no great act of intercultural generosity to attribute to all
cultures the capacity for problem solving and decision making. The asser-
tion is almost banal. How could any community survive without it?
Sahlins' rebuttal is that Hawaiian ways of thinking "require a disci-
plined empirical disposition. They entail sustained, intensive, and imagi-
native reflection on experience, on the properties and relations of things.
But for all that, they do not everywhere constitute experience in the same
way, according to the dictates of a universal practical rationality."21 "What
guides my response is a concern to show that commonsense bourgeois real-
ism, when taken as a historiographic conceit, is a kind of symbolic violence
done to other times and other customs. I want to suggest that one cannot
do good history, not even contemporary history, without regard for ideas,
actions, and ontologies that are not and never were our own. Different cul-
tures, different rationalities."22 (For Sahlins the lesson is: "how in speaking
for 'native' others, one could deprive them of their own voice; how giving
them our 'practical rationality' left them with a pidgin anthropology; how
spinning their history of our morality ends up doing no one a favor.")23
One doesn't need to be a relativist to feel a little queasy at the notion
that the Western world purveys a model of cognitive activity that deserves
to set the standard for all others. There are legitimate problems about artic-
ulating what the Esperanto of rationality should be. One solution would be
to abandon rationality as the gold standard. One such approach comes from
the French sociologist Alain Touraine. In his view, imposing an Enlighten-
ment fantasy of reason on the rest of the world to create a shared basis for
social inclusion is "a principle of domination and exclusion, rather than of
integration." Nor, sadly, will "tolerance" work as a panacea, in his view.
He writes:
Interpersonal and inter-cultural communication are possible only if we
cease to define ourselves in terms of our possession of a particular iden-
tity, or by referring to a reason that is so abstract as to make it insepa-
rable from a ruling class made up of property-owners or citizens. They
presuppose that the contradiction between a domineering universalism
and an intolerant particularism can be transcended by having recourse
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to something that is neither general nor particular, but unique: the indi-
viduation of every personal and collective existence.24
Instead of claiming an ethnic or community identity, we must cultivate our
own individual, free selfhood and become what he calls a Subject. Indeed,
"Inter-cultural communication is possible only if the Subject has already
succeeded in escaping from its community';25 "only the idea of the Sub-
ject can create not only a field of personal action but, above all, a space
fo~ public freedom.... We can live together only if the primary objective of
our laws, institutions and forms of social organization is to safeguard our
demand to live as the Subjects of our own experience. "26 We can reconcile
equality and diversity only by a combination of political democracy and
cultural diversity: "Both are based upon the freedom of the Subject. "27
No multi-cultural society is possible unless we can turn to a universal-
ist principle that allows socially and culturally different individuals and
groups to communicate with one another. But neither is a multi-cul-
tural society possible if that universalist principle defines one concep-
tion of social organization and personal life that is judged to be both
normal and better than others. The call for the freedom to build a per-
sonal life is the only universalist principle that does not impose one
form of social organization and cultural practices.... it demands respect
for the freedom of all individuals and therefore a rejection of exclusion,
and secondly because it demands that any reference to a cultural iden-
tity be legitimized in terms of the freedom and equality of all, and not
by an appeal to a social order, a tradition or the requirements of pub-
lic order.28
Unfortunately for Touraine's argument, his notion of the free, independent
Subject who is cut loose from their community identity is far from a uni-
versal principle; it is one of the most "Western" notions there is, and indeed
one most firmly repudiated by other cultures-not least the Native Hawai-
ian. Indeed, it is not merely Western but identifiably French; it is visible in
Sartre and his milieu, while the notion of the subject (which he spells with
a capital S) owes a lot to Jacques Lacan.
The Native American Vine Deloria comments that the notion of self-
development and change, and, for example, the idea that religion involves
a radical change in the person, is something strikingly Western. It certainly
isn't Native American. In fact, he writes: "Is there such an individual? Does
the individual exist apart from his or her nation, language, family, cul-
ture, wealth, knowledge of the world, secular beliefs, and immediate situ-
ation?"29 Indeed, "The concept of an individual alone in a tribal religious
sense is ridiculous. The very complexity of tribal life and the interdepen-
dence of people on one another makes this concept improbable at best, a
terrifying loss of identity at worst. "30
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Perhaps, then, there is also a paradox of the lumpers. Not all cultures
do (equally) exhibit the overarching feature that is asserted; so how do
we explain that? Being a lumper of this kind in reality has an aspirational
air; as if being lump-worthy is the condition to which all cultures ought
to aspire, even if in practice they don't all qualify. Given that they don't,
some splitty account needs to be given to explain the fact. Indigenous peo-
ples who prescind from individualism have to be kept on communitar-
ian reservations within the larger nation of Individualist Subjecthood; and
well-meaning Westerners must continue to fret over the rationality of the
Azande belief system.
Perhaps, then, the politicians' confusion over the universality versus
the uniqueness of "democracy" mirrors a problem for the lumpers and the
splitters on rationality. Perhaps this binary opposition that has character-
ized several decades generates more dilemmas than it resolves. Let us look
at this question through a little historical example.
AVisit to Hawai'i
Captain James Cook, with his two ships HMS Resolution and HMS Dis-
covery, at the end of the eighteenth century found the Hawaiian islands
quite by accident-the Europeans had no idea of the existence of these
islands or their people; nor had Hawaiians seen white men before.
As we can see from journals written at the time by Lieutenant King
and by the sailor Samwell, the nature of the sailors' encounters could dif-
fer dramatically:
The Hawaiian questions about the British departure had made [Lieu-
tenant] King curious to know "what opinion this people had formed
of us." He took some pains to find out, but all he could learn was they
thought the British had come from some country where provisions had
failed and they came to Hawaii to fill their bellies. Stroking the sides and
stomachs of the now-fattened sailors, the Hawaiians told them "partly
by signs, and partly by words, that it was time for them to go; but if they
would come again next breadfruit season, they should be better able to
supply their wants."31
Shortly after Cook's death:
A Canoe came to the Resolution ... in which were three men, they came
almost within pistol shot of the Ship, then one of them stood up with
Capt" Cook's Hat on his head, he threw Stones at us, smacked his back-
side in Contempt of us, shewed us the Hat & in an insulting manner
waved it over his head; we fired several muskets at him but they all got
ashore unhurt. 32
Lieutenant King had long conversations with Kae'o, the husband of the
queen of Kaua'i:
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He was very inquisitive about our Manners & Customs; the Questions
that he ask'd would alone be proof that these people have a great Vari-
ety of Ideas, he ask'd after our King, our Numbers, how our Shipping
was built, & our houses, the Produce of the Country, if we ever fought,
Who was our God, & such like.33
This is Lieutenant King's description of a religious ceremony in which he
and Captain Cook found themselves playing a liturgical role that was clearly
major but totally inexplicable to the two Englishmen, as they couldn't
understand a word of the ritual, which went on for about four hours:
These two now insist'd upon Cramming us with hog, but not till after
the Kava; I had no objection to have the hog handled by Pareea, but the
Capt" recollecting what offices Koah had officiated when he handled the
Putrid hog could not get a Morsel down, not even when the old fellow
very Politely chew'd it for him.34
What we see here in these four moments is not a simple question either
of understanding or failure to understand, such as would answer our lump-
ing versus splitting issue. What we see is a mixture of comprehension and
incomprehension-and on each occasion. In the first scene, we have an
almost comic difference in perspective: the Hawaiians seeing the Britons
as incompetent refugees, asylum seekers from starvation. This looks like
a pathetic misunderstanding. But there is a shrewd insight to be found in
the Hawaiians' perception that is revealing: actually, the sailors were needy
and dependent and seeking asylum and support.
In the second scene, we observe an interesting phenomenon: even
when members of two cultures to a murderous degree cannot see eye to eye
or understand each other's worldview at all, they nevertheless understand
each other all too well. The British perfectly understand the human realities
of emotion, anger, mockery, and the (perhaps near-universal?) semiotics of
buttocks. But-pace the lumpers-I am not sure if this ability to compre-
hend rests on the basis of a shared rationality so much as a shared set of
associations to anal affairs.
In the third scene, early in the Britons' time in Hawai'i, the two cul-
tures are frighteningly alien to one another, with virtually no word under-
stood in each others' languages. Yet complex conceptual matters such as
political arrangements, warfare, shipping and commerce, and agriculture
could be discussed and apparently understood with astonishing ease.
Meanwhile, in the fourth scene, we find that theologically, or litur-
gically, there was utter incomprehension. And on that point there is still
incomprehension today; the religious significance of the Hawaiians'
encounter with Captain Cook is disputed by contemporary anthropolo-
gists like Sahlins or Obeyesekere, neither of whom have privileged insider
knowledge. And it is no good asking contemporary native Hawaiians for
the truth, or for their cultural self-understanding. There has been wholesale
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cultural dislocation. No one has access now to the understanding of Koah
and Pareea. Indeed, few Hawaiians may have theologically understood the
event at the time. What Koah and Pareea understood, theologically, was
likely to be unavailable to the common person within their culture; above
all, it may itself have resisted speech.
The first lesson to be drawn from this is that it is simplistic or even self-
deceptive to imagine that there is a single, all-purpose answer to the ques-
tion of intercultural understanding. The question must be answered with a
lokahi, a plurality of responses.
A Lakah; Approach
Features of a lokahi approach:
1. All of the points below render the lumper!splitter controversy point-
less, though I agree with Tambiah that it is a useful way to sum up the
points of view that existed heretofore.
2. The unity or harmony in the word [okiihi does not mean working
toward homogenization or hybridization. We should not merely
acknowledge but also strive to preserve diversity, many different
paths.
3. We should also set aside the falsehood of a monolithic culture or reli-
gion-there is internal diversity or [okiihi within religions!cultures!
traditions, often with their own internal conflicts.
4. "Incommensurability" ("splitter") stances ignore the actual historical
interaction and mutual influence of cultures throughout time. They
have become what they are by engaging with other traditions.
5. Comprehension/commensuration/translation questions cannot be
addressed as a single theoretical question that will apply in the same
measure to all cultures. The question must be addressed afresh for
each pair (or more) of relating cultures. Historically, not least, they
have quite different relationships and reciprocal influence (or not).
6. In each such study, one needs to map out the different terrains of
commonality, on a spectrum ranging from total transparency to total
obscurity.
7. The things that are hardest for the outsider to understand are the
things that are hardest for the insider to understand; the "outside-
ness" is likely the least of the problems that challenge comprehension
of beliefs, ideas, and practices.
8. There is (probably) no single point of unity that unites all cul-
tures-rationality, individualism, etc. There are many different areas
that cultures or religions have in common, each factor having some-
thing between merely local to near-global applicability.
9. That makes cross-cultural understanding, or still more excitingly,
cross-cultural cooperation and alliances possible. You can find the
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like-minded person in the other culture with whom to form an alli-
ance.
10. So no one method will work, and diverse strategies, "faculties" etc.
are needed. But guidelines are needed too. Why not use "Kaliikaua's
Code"?
I would like to unpack points 3,4, and 5 above with a little example. Who
wrote this-and if you cannot guess the philosopher, what is the century
and the country?
The essence of the Necessary Being is Its existence, in the sense that It
has no quiddity besides Its particular existence; for were it to have a
quiddity besides its particular existence, its existence would be acciden-
tal to Its essence. Since everything accidental is necessarily caused, Its
existence too would be something caused, its cause being either Its quid-
dityor something e1se.35
If you guessed Thomas Aquinas, good guess. Unfortunately, you're wrong.
It is the Iranian Shi'a Muslim philosopher Tabii~aba'lwriting in the twen-
tieth century. And who wrote this?
First there is the one who is God, whose essence is his very existence.
Indeed, because his essence is not different from his existence, some phi-
losophers maintain that God has no quiddity or essence.36
If you guessed Taba~aba'l this time, you would be wrong again.
This degree of shared intellectual framework, concepts, and even opin-
ions about God is breathtaking, bridging nearly a millennium in time, two
different continents, two different languages, two different religions. But
not, perhaps, two different "conceptual frameworks." If one had to speak
of "civilizations," I could be persuaded by this that Aquinas and Taba~aba'l
are children of the same civilization. Aquinas and Taba~aba'l are clearly
heirs to a shared intellectual (and spiritual) heritage-one that embodies
the response of Semitic monotheism to the challenges of Aristotle's Meta-
physics and Book 9 of Peri Hermeneias, sees itself as the heir to Aristo-
tle (with Platonic and Neoplatonic motifs), all the while answerable to the
demands of a sacred, revealed text that is not related to or influenced in
any way by Greek philosophy. But on this reading of a civilization, George
W. Bush the white Western Christian clearly inhabits a different "civiliza-
tion" from the white Western Christian Thomas Aquinas; and perhaps that
is counterintuitive.
One of the frustrations a historian of ideas has with the lump or split
debates as they have been conducted is that they neglect the fact that these
different cultures and civilizations in fact often do have elements of a shared
intellectual heritage, or indeed a history of contact and mutual interac-
tion and influence. The boundaries between the cultures whose thought we
study are less like chasms and more like the boundary between the sea and
86 Gwen Griffith-Dickson
the shore:37 in constant, intimate contact at certain points though remote
at others; constantly rearranging each other; continually and cyclically tak-
ing each other in and spitting each other out. In other words, perhaps we
ought to see these cultures, not as rival blocks, but as themselves forming
a lokiihi of difference but mutual interaction, even when hostile. We need
to remember that multicultural philosophy is not a New Age or postmod-
ernist fashion made possible by jet engines. The Egyptian Neoplatonist Plo-
tinus in the third century joined the army because he wanted to travel to
India to study the Upanisads. Sadly for Neoplatonism, though happily for
the Indians, he did not get that far before peace broke out.
On points 5 and 6 I would elaborate as follows. The strategy a lokiihi
advocate would take would be to map out, in a given intercultural relation-
ship-not for all cultures at once-where the different terrains of com-
mon ground lie:
1. There are areas of meaning or thought that are easy to understand
interculturally, like buttocks or quiddity.
2. There are areas where a little explanation or translation is required,
and perhaps the odd useful analogy; like the Christians' belief in
"one God" as compared to what the Jews or Muslims mean by "one
God."
3. Then there are parts that require more interpretative work, some con-
ceptual translation, like explaining Advaita Vedanta's Brahman or
Buddhist theories of no-self to Western Christians. Here one might
need lots of analogies from shared experience, like space inside the
pot not being distinct from the space outside it, or the salience of salt
dissolved in water. But it must be observed that these analogies stem
from the Vedantin writers themselves, explaining these concepts to
their own people, not to "cultural outsiders." Clearly understanding
the concept was a/ready a potential challenge for people of their time,
place, religion, and fluency in Sanskrit. That is in part because the
notion of Brahman resists speech (as well as Brahman being speech
itself, according to some).
4. And finally, there are those areas or things which defy any such treat-
ment and are, for the moment, intractable. For you, it might be the
Hawaiians' notion of kino/au; that their god Lana could, for exam-
ple, have the body-form of a sweet potato. (On the other hand, if
you are a Roman Catholic, you might have no difficulty at all start-
ing from the premise that the divine can be edible given certain spe-
cial conditions.)
Each of these four areas will be multilayered. For example, in the Hawai-
ian hat and buttocks incident, the sailors understood the backside-slapping
immediately and intuitively, but likely had no comprehension of why Cook
was killed. Had the political reasons been explained to them, they might
well have understood. However, no matter how many attempts were made
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to "translate," they probably would not have understood any theological
significance of what Cook was asked to do at the religious ceremony, nor
been able to replicate Koah's consciousness or understanding.
Language is not the most serious barrier here. Where you are talking
about rabbits, gavagais notwithstanding, there is no real problem. Where
the situation mimics the world of logical positivism or the Tractatus, prob-
lems of understanding don't in fact arise-shipping, agriculture, scatologi-
cal insults can all leap the language gap with simple translations. Where the
visitor has the worst problems of understanding, it is not so much a point
where language has heavily determined the concept. Rather, it is where the
matter at hand is something that resists speech in any language-some-
thing, in other words, where the concepts are a challenge even for native
speakers.
The interesting corollary of this is that the intercultural linguistic prob-
lem is only a minor subset of the more profound question of the ineffabil-
ity or effability of some of humanity's most exciting thinking-religious
and theological, philosophical. The linguistic "barrier" comes out in the
wash; and the lumping and splitting debate is a tempest in a teapot, a non-
problem, by comparison. It is the more ancient enigma shared by philos-
ophers and mystics that is the real intellectual challenge to address: how
to eff the ineffable, how to communicate to anyone from any culture that
which resists capture in speech.
The foundations for similarity in these patterns of likeness and differ-
ence between cultures that confer comprehensibility are not necessarily a
universal "rationality"; one might almost follow the example of Johann
Georg Hamann and abandon the term. Hamann's critique suggested that
there is no such thing as reason, only reasoning. To treat it like a noun gives
it ideas above its station. Once it is a noun, we have to start arguing about
its properties, and its ownership. You have to say what its characteristics
and criteria are, and then you have to say which peoples meet these crite-
ria. You will never get agreement on that.
Better then to say there is a lokiihi of different styles of systematic,
cognitive activity. But still, this is not the single unifying factor that unites
humanity. The patterns of similarity and difference between peoples are in
part created by areas of shared history-intellectual and otherwise-by
shared "species being," or the "givens" of bodies and brains. A boy raped
in Abu Ghraib prison feels pain like the pain an American teenager would
feel. Our bodily "givens," though, are more than merely physical; and it
is not imperialist universalism to start from the assumption that both the
Iraqi and the American boy would experience psychological as well as
physical trauma, and comparable social shame as well.
Where the lokiihi approach differs from the usual lumping is that no
single answer can be given, either, to the question of "wherein" we find
the commonality of human experience and understanding. The basis for
human understanding or intercultural translation is not anyone thing,
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because we are not anyone thing. What we seek to understand are systems
of thought; religious practices; social structures; emotions; conflicts; prac-
tices, rituals, and customs. Each of these requires different methodologies,
different modes of engagement. The basis of interculturality is a lokiihi, a
multiplicity of irreducible factors: the many features of humanity-cogni-
tive, physical, emotional; typical responses to the environment or features
of human experience like pain and death; and shared or overlapping histo-
ries and ideas. This means there is no gold standard to form the single basis
of exchange or translation between cultural "currencies." However, the
absence of a gold standard does not mean that no translation is possible.
It means there are instead a number of exchange-rate mechanisms, some
with global validity or relevance and some with only regional applicability,
to make interchange possible between any two systems.
The answer to understanding and then to teaching is not a single solu-
tion to account for understanding, but a guideline to regulate these multi-
ple faculties and strategies. What we need to teach, then is not just method-
ology or epistemology but an etiquette, an ethics, how to behave.
Conclusion and Summary
To summarize and conclude: Neither "lumping" nor "splitting" hold up
well against the complexity of real-life practice (including real-life phil-
osophical and theological praxis). Still less does a single answer suffice
for the "how" or "wherein" of intercultural understanding and education;
shared patterns of reasoning, common needs, capacity for empathy are just
some of the elements. Therefore we are more likely to succeed in practice,
particularly when teaching, with an approach that puts up front the inter-
nal diversity of traditions and communities, the complexity of persons in
all their aspects, and the different bilateral relationships that already exist
between cultures and communities. These should find their point of har-
mony not in some single universal thing like rationality, but rather in a con-
sistent ethical compass with which we operate-a set of guidelines per-
haps.
That is why I invoked the Hawaiian intercultural ethic at the beginning
of this essay, with its useful ethical formula for how to step into another
culture, meet its people, and understand them. I propose for your con-
sideration and adoption Kalakaua's code, given now in my loose transla-
tion: "Tread carefully, don't overstep the boundaries, don't be too hasty to
assume you understand, let empathy be your closest companion."
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5 Democracy and Science in Education
Lacuna in China's Modernization
This essay begins with an exposition of how education is related to democ-
racy and science in John Dewey's philosophy. I then employ the Deweyan
framework to examine China's modernization. When China entered the
twentieth century, the enthusiasm for science was allied with an aspira-
tion to democracy. Early Republican era reformers believed that educa-
tional reforms would bring about a scientific and democratic civilization
in China. Nearly a century later, enthusiasm for science has not abated,
Chinese education has been through several reforms and, like scientific
research, is making significant gains after the devastation of the Cultural
Revolution; but democracy in China remains a dream. A better understand-
ing of Dewey's philosophy will show that sweeping generalizations about
whether educational reforms or science can or cannot bring about democ-
racy are unhelpful in the quest for democracy. The relationships involved
are much more complex and the Chinese struggle for democracy remains
precarious and perilous.
I will try to show that the close relationship between education, sci-
ence, and democracy in Dewey's philosophy is not about linear causalities,
and does not make simplistic claims about education and science being the
means of democracy. The failure of democracy despite laudatory efforts in
education reforms and an enduring enthusiasm for science in China since
the beginning of the twentieth century is quite comprehensible within Dew-
ey's philosophical framework; China's experience does not prove that the
pragmatic method is not applicable to Chinese society. The challenge for
Dewey's pragmatism is whether a pragmatic diagnosis of what went wrong
(and is still going wrong) will yield some plan of action that will have a bet-
ter chance of success in actualizing a Chinese democracy than past exper-
iments.
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John Dewey's Philosophy of Education and Democracy
Education is a key theme in Dewey's philosophy. He even suggests defining
philosophy "as the general theory of education" (M7.303).1 Education is
necessary to social continuity: society survives beyond the life span of any
single member through the education of its next generation, in the com-
munication of ideals, hopes, expectations, standards, opinions, and hab-
its of doing, thinking, and feeling passed from the older members to the
younger members (M9.6). For Dewey, education is more than the teaching
and learning that take place in schools. It occurs whenever and wherever
communication enlarges or enriches experience. Education is "reconstruc-
tion or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of expe-
rience, and which increases the ability to direct the course of subsequent
experience" (M9.82). Formal education came about when the resources
and achievements of society became too complex to be transmitted by sim-
ply having children share in the daily activities of adults. Schools are set
up to provide a simplified and regulated environment in which the young
act, think, and feel in order to direct their acquisition of mental and moral
dispositions needed to participate in and to renew the common life of the
community (M9.22-26).
Formal education is a deliberate attempt to direct not only the future of
the younger members of a society but also the future of the society itself. It
aims to reproduce what are considered worthy features of that society and,
insofar as the adult members, or at least those responsible for education,
are capable of social and self-criticism, it also aims to improve the future by
striving to call forth better dispositions and abilities in the younger mem-
bers through the regulated environments of educational institutions. Dis-
positions and abilities are better in terms of effectiveness in solving actual
problems. Like other concepts in Dewey's social philosophy, education has
both de jure and de facto meanings, with the former meaning uppermost
(M9.88). Since education is a social function, its de jure meaning depends
on what society or community should be. Dewey's philosophy of education
is also a philosophy of democracy.
Dewey approaches the problem of constructing a social ideal by
"extract[ing] the desirable traits or forms of community life which actu-
ally exist, and employ[ing] them to criticize undesirable features and sug-
gest improvement" (M9.89). This yields two criteria for an ideal society:
(I) How numerous and varied are the interests that are consciously shared?
(2) How full and free is the interplay with other forms of association?
(M9.89). Democracy meets both criteria. The democratic ideal of equal-
ity in the context of community, meaning "the unhampered share which
the individual member of the community has in the consequences of asso-
ciated action" (L2.3 29), fulfills the first criterion, which also implies that
social order will depend more on the recognition of mutual interests than
coercive control. The ideal of liberty in democracy as the idea of commu-
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nity, being "the power to secure release and fulfillment of personal poten-
tialities which take place only in rich and manifold association with oth-
ers" (L2'328), fulfills the second criterion, which will cause "a change in
social habit, its continuous readjustment through meeting new situations
produced by varied discourse" (M9.90).
Dewey never tires of reiterating that democracy is more than politi-
cal democracy, a set of institutions governing how some are authorized to
rule and wield power, governing the distribution of power and its oper-
ation. For Dewey, democracy is a moral and social ideal. It is a way of
life. One of his most valuable insights is that, until democracy becomes a
way of life, political democracy is often inadequate for human welfare and
progress and may even be perverted into government by a phantom pub-
lic.2 Defending democracy-government of the people, by the people, for
the people-against such criticism, Dewey clarifies that a public is consti-
tuted by "all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of trans-
actions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those conse-
quences systematically cared for" (L2.245). Democratic politics involves
the organization of such publics "by means of officials and material agen-
cies to care for the extensive and enduring indirect consequences of trans-
actions" (L2.246).
Dewey understands democracy as inherently participative. Political
democracy rests on the idea that government is legitimized only by con-
sent of the governed, which means "that all those who are affected by
social institutions must have a share in producing and managing them"
(LII.218). The "idea of democracy as opposed to any conception of aris-
tocracy is that every individual must be consulted in such a way, actively
not passively, that he himself becomes a part of the process of authority,
of the process of social control; that his needs and wants have a chance
to be registered in a way where they count in determining social policy"
(LI3 .29 5). A democratic public does not merely organize itself by electing
officials through a simple majority vote and leaving them to speak for those
they represent, nor is democratic government a matter of following "pub-
lic opinion" in the sense of an aggregate of the arbitrarily formed views
of the majority (or worse, views manipulated by special interests). A pub-
lic organizes itself democratically through social inquiry, where efficacious
communication allows every member the opportunity to change his or her
mind after thinking through the issue with other participants in the inquiry
(L2.345-350). A member of a democracy not only has a right, but a duty
to participate in social inquiry.
At one level, Dewey premises the desirability of democratic education
on the acceptance of democracy as a social ideal. Democracy is justified as
the social ideal in terms of what social life is, what makes social life desir-
able; since education is a social function, what it should be depends on
what kind of social life is ideal, therefore education should also be demo-
cratic. Working out the implications of democracy for education yields a
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normative conception of education. In this democratic conception of edu-
cation, educators do not direct learners by fixing habits of acting through
repeated responses to recurrent stimuli (that is training, as distinct from
education), but by guiding learners through participating in cooperative
activity wherein a learner "views the consequences of his own act as hav-
ing a bearing upon what others are doing and takes into account the con-
sequences of their behavior upon himself" (M9.3S). Democratic education
does not attempt to reproduce past customs by imposing cultural products
of the past as subject matter; nor does it try to develop supposedly preexist-
ing capacities or lead students to some fixed end. Instead, it provides envi-
ronments that call forth certain responses. In responding, a student grows
physically and mentally: he learns to use physical and intellectual tools in
solving different problems with increasing effectiveness and proficiency; he
gains greater abilities to direct and control his environment. He learns to
be a participant in cooperative inquiries that enable better control of the
environment and direction of events. In democratic education, one learns
the ways of social inquiry so that one can grow to become an effective par-
ticipant in democracy.
Dewey argues that the qualities of democracy are dependent on edu-
cation (MIO.I38). It is a common belief that education is important, even
necessary to democracy because it gives people knowledge and good judg-
ment to choose competent officials and to hold the latter accountable for
their actions. The socializing effect of public education also fosters a cer-
tain degree of social consensus that stabilizes a democratic system wherein
everyone is supposed to have an equal say. However, Dewey considers this
common understanding too superficial. Democracy as a way of life requires
education because education as growth liberates the powers of individu-
als to participate in a greater variety of interests, including some that are
remote in time and space, by referring his own action to that of others and
considering the action of others to give point and direction to his own.
Dewey describes the relationship between democracy and education as
"a reciprocal one, a mutual one, and vitally so" (L!3.294). While educa-
tion contributes to democracy by engaging teachers and learners in social
inquiry in simplified and regulated environments so that intelligence may
grow, it would be a mistake to think that democracy must wait for peo-
ple to become "educated." Any social inquiry, wherever it is conducted, is
itself educative (L2.364-36S), which means that democracy itself is edu-
cative. Any experience is educative that enables reconstruction of experi-
ence to increase control over consequences. The democratic way of life is
more educative than the undemocratic life because it allows and requires
its participants to take on the responsibilities of solving public problems,
and "only by sharing in some responsible task does there come a fitness
to share in it" (M3.233). Democracy is "the educational process without
which individuals cannot come into the full expression of themselves nor
make a contribution, if they have it in them to make, to the social well-
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being of others" (LI3.296). Democracy is desirable because it is educative
in fostering rather than hindering growth, even as education is desirable
because it contributes to democracy.
According to Dewey, "life is growth" and "growth itself is the only
moral 'end'" (M9.S6; MI2.18I). Dewey's concept of growth is a contin-
uous process that has no end beyond itself, nor is it a fixed end in itself.
To understand that life means growth is to recognize that every stage of
a living creature has its own intrinsic quality. The "business of educa-
tion" is with the intrinsic quality of living (M9'S6). This means that, rather
than aiming at some fixed end external to the process that determines the
method and content of education, "education means the enterprise of sup-
plying conditions which insure growth, or adequacy of life, irrespective of
age" (M9'S6). In other words, "the object and reward of learning is con-
tinued capacity for growth" (M9.107). To ensure growth for every mem-
ber of society, social intercourse must be free to ensure everyone access to
the instrumentalities of growth; every member must be given opportunity
to grow in ways most appropriate to himself or herself. A community that
ensures the growth of all its members shares numerous and varied interests
and relies on recognition of mutual interests for social order; it provides
adequately for "reconstruction of social habits and institutions by means
of wide stimulation arising from equitably distributed interests" (M9.I07).
Such a community is democratic.
Democratic education is not one among many alternative conceptions
of education; it is the very idea of education. It is the desirable qualities of
actual experience of teaching and learning extended to its limits and used
to criticize what is unsatisfactory in experience. For education to fulfill
its function of social renewal in a continually changing environment well,
it must ensure growth, and therefore it must be democratic. It is not just
those who accept democracy who conceive of education democratically.
Insofar as education is necessary and valuable to human life, democracy
is also valuable. Rather than a linear relationship of democracy being first
justified, then justifying a democratic conception of education, the relation-
ship is reciprocal: the acceptance of democracy provides the premise for
democratic education, and education as a necessity of life and growth pro-
vides the premise for democratic community. To be perfect, each requires
the other.
Writing within a democracy (however imperfect), most of Dewey's
writings on democracy and education take the acceptance of democracy
as premise and focus on "making explicit the implications of democratic
ideas in education" (M9.94). Hence he argues for more democratic organi-
zation of the educational system: greater autonomy and responsibility for
teachers in directing educational methods and subject matter, reform to
give greater play to children's individuality and to connect knowledge and
skills in schools to social action; academic freedom, which he prefers to call
freedom of education; freedom of teachers and students; and more atten-
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tion to industrial education that should put a premium on "initiative, intel-
lectual independence, and inventiveness," and that should "secure pow-
ers which will enable individuals to adapt themselves to inevitable change"
(M10.140-q1).3 In those instances, Dewey shows that more democracy
is necessary to improve education. However, insofar as American democ-
racy was still imperfect, Dewey's effort at reforming education was also an
effort toward improving the democratic character of society beyond the
school walls.
Instead of merely meeting the needs set by a given social arrange-
ment or passively reflecting social changes, education plays a key role in
directing social transformation (L1I.233-235, 4°8-417). One of the most
important challenges to education lies in responding to the recognition that
"the very idea of democracy, the meaning of democracy, must be continu-
ally explored afresh; it has to be constantly discovered, and rediscovered,
remade and reorganized" (L1I.182). During the depression years of the
1930S, Dewey proposes that, as the problem of democracy has changed
from being political to being economic, "education must take on new
responsibilities" (L6.96) in exploring how social forces are changing and
working, and what democracy means in concrete terms, in the changing
structures and workings of family, workplace, church, and government.
Only by giving "social direction" to the educational system would it be
possible to maintain the democratic ideal of America's founding fathers.
He argues that it is important that learning in schools, while suited to the
growing intelligence of the young, must be connected to the social forces
actually operating in the more complex world outside. As growth, educa-
tion must foster learners' abilities to direct their own futures and the future
of their society, for only then can they be assured of continued growth. To
fulfill its function of social continuity and renewal, education must pro-
vide the instrumentalities that foster growth of an intelligence that would
effectively direct social forces. Only then will the next generation be able to
safeguard the democratic ideals.
If it seems vague whether democracy causes education to be demo-
cratic or democratic education causes democracy, it is because social real-
ity is much too complex to be reduced to simplistic linear causalities. Polit-
ical democracy can, though not necessarily will, democratize education,
while successful education of the democratic kind will democratize a soci-
ety more profoundly and enduringly than will political democracy alone.
As ideals, democracy and education converge into a unity. Neither could
be fully realized without also realizing the other. However, one should not
see their unity as meaning that without democracy in the larger society
there can be no democratic education, and without democratic education,
democracy will be nonexistent. To interpret the relationship thus would
prevent the process of mutual improvement from ever beginning. As ide-
als, both democracy and education have not been achieved. In imperfect
situations, democracy and education have a mutually enhancing relation-
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ship, so that incremental achievements in democratizing education, though
still falling short of perfect education, will improve an imperfect democ-
racy, and other social improvements in a democratic direction, even with-
out fully realizing the ideal, will help to democratize education. While each
can contribute to the other, neither depends exclusively on the other for
improvement. Some historically contingent external factor can start the
process of mutual improvement by improving either or both democracy
and education.
Science, Democracy, and Education
Dewey notices "a coincidence in the development of modern experimen-
tal science and of democracy. Philosophy has no more important question
than a consideration of how far this may be mere coincidence, and how far
it marks a genuine correspondence" (MI1.48). Dewey himself undoubt-
edly considers the correspondence to be more than mere coincidence. He
acknowledges that, historically, democracy is the product not of deliber-
ation and conscious effort but of the scientific and industrial revolutions
(M9.93). However, socioeconomic and political changes were among the
preconditions for the Industrial Revolution that eventually enabled sci-
ence to have widespread impact on the life of ordinary people (MI2.IOI-
106). One could argue that these socioeconomic and political changes had
democratic tendencies in terms of redistribution of resources and power
to different groups in society besides the old aristocracy. If that is the case,
then democratization may have contributed to the rise of modern science,
even as modern science helped democratization through its challenge to
old authorities and transformation of people's way of thinking and know-
ing. Here again, it is not linear causality that we should be lo?king for, but
a matter of one factor reinforcing certain tendencies that, when realized,
enhance the contributing factor itself.
While science through the Industrial Revolution had contributed pos-
itively to the earlier development of political democracy, in a later phase
of American history, the economic exploitation of science, facilitated
by unchecked liberties of the political system, undermined democracy
(MIO.I37). Both liberty and equality suffered when industrialization kept
the masses slaving away in factories for pitifully low wages while a few
became obscenely rich. There could be no community when society was
split into unequal and hostile classes, and people were trapped in their pri-
vate struggles for survival or enjoyment of wealth; there were few interests
shared with other members of society beyond the immediate family, and
sometimes not even within the family; there was no full and free interplay
among groups.
Economic and other applications of science are neither intrinsically
democratic nor intrinsically antidemocratic. It was the partnership between
science and the motive of private profit that undermined democracy. This
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resulted in a society wherein "chronic insecurity" was the chief motive
driving people to work and acquisitive motives were accepted as human
nature (L8.6o-;64). "Science came to be prized mainly for its use in money-
making applications and was correspondingly disregarded in its contribu-
tion to an enrichment in experience and to the method to be adopted in all
matters subject to intellectual inquiry and test" (L8.62). It is precisely this
disregarded dimension that renders science educative and crucial to democ-
racy. Dewey blames the unbalanced, distorted use of science on the" inher-
ited customs, legalized institutions, and generally unquestioned traditions
which developed before the rise of modern industrial society" (L8.65)'
These have survived because, even though science has affected every area
of human life and in its effects is "by far the most potent social factor in
the modern world" (M6.78), the scientific method has not penetrated into
the study of human beings and society, and we do not use science with suf-
ficient intelligence to deliberately and systematically control its own social
operations and consequences for the common good.
In trying to make the ideal of democracy less arbitrary by deriving it
from our inherent discrimination of the qualities of experience, in partic-
ular the qualities of social life, and in arguing that every generation must
explore anew the meaning of democracy through inquiry into concrete
details of human relations and institutions, Dewey grounds the democratic
ideal on the scientific method of observing and testing as he understands it.
While it may have undermined democracy in some circumstances, science
also offers solutions to the problems of democracy. Attempts to realize the
ideal of democracy, as deliberate actions, are ongoing experiments with
the world to see what it will stand for, what it will promote, and what it
will frustrate (M 11.49). Science would render attempts to improve human
life, to realize democracy, more realistic, less arbitrary and blind. For sci-
ence to contribute to democracy and not detract from it, we need "to take
the method of science home into our own controlling attitudes and dispo-
sitions, to employ the new techniques as means of directing our thoughts
and efforts to a planned control of social forces" (L6.56).
However, Dewey does not advocate a simplistic borrowing from the
physical sciences to improve the study of human beings and society. Intro-
ducing quantitative techniques and measurements, or imitating the pro-
cesses of "fact finding" in the physical sciences will not render an area of
study "scientific." "The assimilation of human science to physical science
represents, in other words, only another form of absolutist logic, a kind of
physical absolutism" (L2.359-36o). In its general application, the scientific
method is the method of discovery, observation, and testing. However, how
to discover, to observe, and to test effectively differs according to the area
of study. Dewey believes that a thorough and comprehensive application
of the scientific method will put science at the service of public and shared
interests instead of private interests. The scientific method applied to social
problems will ensure that science is used for democratic ends insofar as
Democracy and Science in Education: Lacuna in China's Modernization 99
democracy is government for the people. The scientific method must be put
in the hands of publics engaged in social inquiry, or if wielded by experts,
it must serve the publics, for only then is there government by the people.
Democracy will make science more humane and its applications more ben-
eficial to more people. Once science is thus awakened to its "social respon-
sibilities" via the extension of scientific method into social planning and
control, it will provide us with the means to use natural resources "to save
all from dire want, from paralyzing insecurity, and to guarantee the essen-
tial conditions of a life devoted to higher things than the mere struggle to
escape destitution for one's self and one's dependents" (L8.69).
Dewey is convinced that "the scientific method is not just a method
which it has been found profitable to pursue in this or that abstruse subject
for pure technical reason. It represents the only method of thinking that
has proved fruitful in any subject" (M6.78). Solving the actual problems of
society in order to remove the obstacles to democratic ideals is not only a
matter for specialists or experts. For a participative democracy as Dewey
conceives it, the method of observation and experiment, of investigation
and verification, must "become the organ of everyday ways of thinking in
formation of beliefs ... , part of the popular mind" (L8.66). This requires
a major social transformation in which education can be expected to play
a major part. Before education can fulfill this role, educators themselves
must apply the scientific method to their activities, in understanding what
education is and how it should be conducted to foster growth of learners
and society. If everyone in society is to become more scientific in attitude
and capable of employing the scientific method in social inquiry as mem-
bers of democratic publics, education needs to be more scientific.
Education does not become scientific merely by introducing physical-
science subject matter into the school curriculum. In Dewey's view, the
hard-won inclusion of science in formal education has been disappointing
because "science has been so frequently presented just as so much ready-
made knowledge, so much subject matter of fact and law, rather than as the
effective method of inquiry into any subject matter" (M6.74). In Dewey's
conception of education, learners should not passively inherit a "science"
as an "acquisition from the past," they should be "learning the scientific
way of treating the familiar material of ordinary experience" (M9.228). He
expects schools to provide environments wherein the young, and in some
cases adults, will grow to "have some idea of the kind of evidence required
to substantiate given types of belief" (M6.77). When confronted with a
problem, with anything that does not make sense or does not work, they
should learn how to observe and gather facts, to organize and reorganize
the elements of a confused and chaotic situation, to come up with possible
solutions through giving some order to the problem, to think through the
implications of each alternative solution, and to select the best alternative
in the circumstances. Education benefits people when they become able,
not only to work out hypothetical solutions to problems, but to imple-
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ment them and, in the course of implementation, to continue observing and
gathering facts to see if the consequences are as expected, whether the pre-
viously problematic situation has been satisfactorily improved, or whether
further inquiry is necessary. In learning the scientific method, students are
learning how to engage in social inquiry. In becoming scientific, education
will also become democratic.
To learn science not merely as perfected subject matter but as a method,
students must participate in the making of knowledge, "by transferring
guess and opinion into belief authorized by inquiry" (M6.75) instead of
copying "at long range and second hand the results which scientific men
have reached" (M9.229). Dewey refers to education that applies the scien-
tific method and fosters scientific attitude of mind as "laboratory" educa-
tion. Contact with things and events at first hand and laboratory exercises,
in the sense of experiments in controlled environments, are indispensable
to this type of education but not sufficient, as they do not in themselves
constitute scientific method (M9.229). Laboratory exercises do more harm
than good if students conduct them by following set instructions to obtain
a specific result. What is important about "laboratory" education is that
it avoids delivery of known "facts" and "theories" to students for absorp-
tion and reproduction; it puts much more responsibility upon the learn-
ers themselves. "The processes of experiment, of discovery through search,
through testing, through observation and reflection" require "activity of
mind rather than merely powers of absorption and reproduction" (L6.109).
Laboratory education is experimental in requiring learners to arrive at con-
clusions about how a particular part of the world works by using intellec-
tual and physical tools to connect events with relevant consequences. In
order to foster the scientific attitude, education must be democratic, learn-
ers must engage in social inquiry, they themselves must take on the respon-
sibility of creating knowledge, with guidance and the aid of instruments
modified for their use. In learning to think scientifically, learners partici-
pate in social inquiry, they learn to solve problems intelligently. In educa-
tion, democracy and science are reciprocally related.
Dewey and Chinese Education Reforms
The importance of science, democracy, and education in Dewey's philos-
ophy was among the reasons for Dewey's popularity during his visit to
China in 1919-1921. Cai Yuanpei, who became education minister in
1912 and transformed Beijing University into a vibrant intellectual cen-
ter between the two World Wars, was among the first to introduce Dewey's
education philosophy to China, which had been engaged in modernizing
its educational system since 1842.4 In 1919, some prominent Chinese intel-
lectuals who had studied with Dewey at Columbia mobilized a few educa-
tional organizations to invite Dewey to China for a lecture tour, initially
for a few weeks but eventually extended to more than two years.S Dur-
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ing his visit, Dewey taught courses at Beijing University and other tertiary
institutions, traveled to thirteen provinces, and gave more than two hun-
dred public lectures. He was written about in the newspapers, translations
of his lectures were published in popular periodicals and collected in best-
selling editions. Students and admirers published works on pragmatism or
applying the pragmatist method to various issues in China. During his visit,
probably no educated person in any large city was unacquainted with his
name. 6 According to a recent Chinese study of the spread and influence of
Dewey's education thought in China, "it is not an exaggeration" to say that
"people from all walks of life throughout China had heard of Pragmatist
educational thought."7
Dewey attended the fifth Convention of the National Federation of
Educational Organization in China in October 1919. His students and fol-
lowers played key roles in the process that led to the 1922 decree on edu-
cation reforms, and many education organizations active in the discussions
were promoting pragmatist education.s This 1922 decree begins with the
aim of "the cultivation of perfect personality and the development of the
republican spirit," which resonates strongly with Dewey's teachings on the
development of individuality and the democratic conception of education.9
It assimilates Dewey's view that education is its own end and has no aims
beyond itself by emphasizing the need for flexibility and refraining from
imposing anyone "ism" on those being educated. Instead of specifying
aims, education philosophy and policy should establish only general prin-
ciples to govern schools. The decree adopts seven principles emphasizing
adaptation of education to the needs of social evolution and enhancement
of citizens' economic capacity. It also upholds the importance of devel-
oping individuality, life education, democratic spirit in education, univer-
salization of education, and flexibility in all areas. According to a Chi-
nese scholar, "Dewey's education theory is the soul of the new education
reforms." 10
Chinese intellectuals who advocated educational reforms in the early
Chinese republic saw them as means of cultural renewal. They attributed
the very serious domestic as well as international problems China had
encountered since the Opium War (1839-1842) to the backwardness of
the Chinese civilization mired in superstition, ignorance, and submissive-
ness. After the Opium War, some efforts were made to train some Chinese
to operate foreign machineries, and to manufacture modern guns and other
products of Western technology, but schools offering Western science cur-
riculum were few. The new educational system modeled on the Japanese
system implemented in 1903 included three grades of industrial schools
aimed at developing human resources for the new industries. After the fall
of the Qing dynasty, the study of science became even more important in
schools. Enthusiastic promoters of Western science talked about "saving
the nation through science (kexue jiuguO)."11 Chen Duxiu (1919) and oth-
ers attacked Confucianism and traditional Chinese culture in the name of
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"De xiansheng" (Mr Democracy) "Sai xiansheng" (Mr Science). In their
view, China needed a new culture of science and democracy. Democracy
would liberate them from the despotism that had produced a population
that remained passive and submissive even in the face of grave provoca-
tion. Science would alleviate the material backwardness that condemned
Chinese people to lives little better than those of beasts of burden, epito-
mized in Hu Shih's comparison of the rickshaws pulled by men in China
to the motorcars of the West. 12 Science education was a major emphasis
of New Culture reformers, many of whom shared Wu Zhihui's view that
"The only education that deserves the name is in the physical, chemical,
and mechanical sciences and industries, for these pursuits can constantly
press for new theories and inventions, creating the happiness of mankind
and bringing about the progress of the world."13
Such scientism is very different from Dewey's own emphasis on sci-
ence. Dewey does not reduce scientific education to the teaching of "phys-
ical, chemical, and mechanical sciences and industries." He requires sci-
entists to engage the imagination of the public, to explore the moral and
social implications of scientific work and communicate their findings to
the public. He requires governments to nurture community involvement
in scientific undertakings. Scientific education must equip average citizens
with enough scientific literacy to understand the periodic communications
of the scientists and contribute to public discussions regarding the social
and moral implications of scientific projects that affect their interests. Sci-
entism, based on Enlightenment science that promises certainty and prog-
ress, works against rather than for the scientific habits that Dewey believes
are necessary to democracy.14 Moreover, "as long as the sciences are set
over against the humanities, they certainly can never aspire to the posi-
tion they deserve" (M7.123). Regarded as subject matter, "knowledge of
human affairs couched in personal terms seems more important and more
intimately appealing than knowledge of physical things conveyed in imper-
sonal terms" (M6.70). The central role of scientific method in Dewey's
philosophy of education is based on and brings out the interdependence
between the sciences and the humanities in education. A democratic edu-
cation needs to combine scientific and humanistic education (M9.294-298;
also MIO.I8I). Dualistic opposition between the sciences and the human-
ities remains a problem in education both in China and elsewhere even
today. Chinese educational reforms of the Republican era did not succeed
in making education in China scientific in the Deweyan sense any more
than they realized democratic education.
The "Dewey experiment" in China did not create a democracy. Some
scholars see this as a failure of the pragmatic method advocating educa-
tion reforms but excluding political action as the means to democracy.J5
Dewey himself did not see education as the sole or even primary means of
social change. Their rhetoric notwithstanding, Chinese pragmatists such as
Hu Shih did not and could not in practice totally exclude political action
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in their experiment of democracy. Given the complex relationship between
democracy and education Dewey advocates, there can be no simple answer
to what will bring about democracy. Nor is democracy in education an
easy achievement; education reforms that simply change the structure of
the educational system and subjects taught in schools will not suffice. In the
case of China, the good intentions in the 1922 decree were not fully car-
ried out in any sustained manner, although some saw "the definite begin-
nings of a scientific spirit in old China," and others maintained that there
were "democratic tendencies" in various developments in the Chinese edu-
cational system during the 19 20S.1 6 Whatever democratic developments
there might have been were lost in the chaos of war and revolution. The
chaotic social environment undermined Republican education reforms. To
make education democratic and scientific enough to contribute to cultural
renewal requires more time and a more conducive environment than were
available in China between the two World Wars.
Science and Education in China's Modernization
From Dewey's comments on Western democracies, we note that, although
education is necessary to sustain, improve, and complete democracy, it was
not the initial cause of democratization. In the early stage of its historical
development, the intellectual and social impact of science played a greater
role. Might we look for a similar pattern in China? China first encountered
modern science in the seventeenth century with the arrival of the Jesuits.
The scientific knowledge brought by these westerners interested only a very
small minority, and most Chinese viewed them as barbaric curiosities or
even sorcery. The introduction of modern science into China did not occur
until the nineteenth century, when superior technology enabled Western
imperialistic powers to inflict several humiliating military defeats upon the
Qing government. Since then, Chinese interest in catching up with the West
in science has been very much bound up with nationalistic pride and the
desire for strength in the international realpolitik of the day. The dawn of
the twentieth century saw many Chinese agreeing with Wu Zhihui that
only science can provide an adequate guide to solving human problems.
Some even believe in "the omnipotence of science."l? Liu Qingfeng argues
that scientism is the driving force behind the" intellectual liberation" of the
post-Mao reform period; however, Chinese scientism, in which "no one
dares to criticize science," also misunderstands the cultural function of sci-
ence, and a more "truly scientific spirit" is required to redirect it for Chi-
na's cultural reconstruction. 18
When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power in 1949,
the government took a direct interest in developing science and technol-
ogy, as the Marxist tradition regards science as critical to social progress. 19
Under Mao Zedong, science did not suffer from neglect; scientific prog-
ress was rather obstructed by misguided attempts to realize party doctrines
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about science and its role, by the politicization that not only demanded
that "experts" should be "reds" but in extreme cases interfered with the
conduct of scientific research to the extent of dictating answers to scien-
tific questions by'political fiat. 20 Deng Xiaoping was not saying anything
new to the Chinese when he declared in 1978 that modernization of sci-
ence and technology is the key to the Four Modernizations necessary "to
transform China into a modern and powerful Socialist state. "21 What was
new was his use of this long-standing belief in the power and value of
science to ground his reform proposals. In the area of scientific research,
reforms were based on a "de-politicization," a recognition that the truths
or outcomes pursued in scientific research are best pursued independently
of political considerations.22
Among the changes required for more effective scientific research mea-
sured by international standards are several that grant scientists more free-
dom, at least in their professional life. Furthermore, the importance of sci-
ence in the drive toward modernization has raised the social status and
political influence of scientists since the 1980s. Greater professional free-
dom in some cases has led to a public bid for greater political freedom.
Astrophysicist Fang Lizhi is one of the most famous Chinese political dis-
sidents and had a direct influence on the student demonstrations of 1986.
During the Democracy Movement of 1989, Fang and other senior Chi-
nese scientists wrote open letters to the CCP leadership urging political
reforms.23 Their intellectual training inclined them to question and resist
political dogmas and ideological deceptions. The professional need for
Chinese scientists to interact with scientists in an international commu-
nity also exposes them to other social norms and structures that appear to
work better for the conduct of science as well as more general human wel-
fare. Continued political interference and defects in the political system
have been blamed for a perceived underperformance of Chinese science
even recently.24 Many people believe that "science is afforded opportunity
for development in a democratic order which is integrated with the ethos
of science. "25 The outcome of the 1989 Democracy Movement notwith-
standing, some scholars remain hopeful that the CCP regime's continuing
need for scientists to contribute to development will have a positive effect
on democratization, as "some in the scientific community will continue to
find inevitable connections between the ideals that motivate them as scien-
tists and those that inspire their politicallives."26
The desire for greater achievements in science and technology and the
belief in their importance for economic development did not prevent the
brutal end to the Democracy Movement. However, what happened in and
around Tiananmen Square on June 4,1989, did not halt scientific research
programs and economic development in China for good. The CCP regime
has survived the international outrage of 1989 and engineered two peaceful
changes of top leadership. After a brief slowdown and a hard-fought bat-
tle between reformers and conservatives, economic reforms continued and
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picked up pace after Deng's tour of the southern provinces in 1992. China
has continued and even expanded its open-door policy. A year-long study
group of China experts convened by RAND reported in 1999, "the human
condition of most Chinese has continued to improve, as it had done from
the end of the Mao era in 1976 until 1989."27 However, political reform
continlles to lag behind economic reform. Moreover, some observers notice
in post-Tiananmen China a "disenchantment with democracy." A political
withdrawal in response to the undemocratic environment is further rein-
forced by a turn to professionalism in the "new national studies," and con-
cerns with "academic norms" signify a retreat to professional elitism that is
irrelevant to the ordinary people's everyday lives and to neglect of the dem-
ocratic responsibility of intellectual discourse.28 Instead of developments in
science and technology aiding the forces working for democracy, it is pos-
sible that the CCP policy on science and technology as the key to its Four
Modernizations will produce a scientific elite that is politically apathetic,
or even willing to support an undemocratic political system that guarantees
the group a higher share of national resources and social prestige.29
Dewey's commentaries on the social problems of 1930S America show
us that science could have profoundly undemocratic consequences. Where
democracy is concerned, Deweyan understanding of science, democracy,
and education gives us little reason to be optimistic about the pursuit of
wealth and power through science and technology sanctioned by the Chi-
nese Communist state. Resources are poured into a few areas of specializa-
tion that are not selected through democratic processes and do not appar-
ently benefit the majority of the people in aspects of life that need the most
urgent improvement. While it has become the third country after the United
States and the former Soviet Union.to launch a successful manned space
flight, and "has developed nuclear weapons and reasonably ~ophisticated
rockets and space satellites ... [even in the eighties] China has made little
progress in developing an integrated national electric-power network, an
integrated telecommunications network.... "30 Considerable progress has
been made in infrastructure development in the last decade, but China is
still a long way from putting science and technology to the service of pub-
lic problems as understood by Dewey. Allowing private capital more room
to exploit science and technology will probably exacerbate the divorce of
science from the welfare of most Chinese people. In fact, Chinese scholars
argue that the "marketization of power" or accumulation of "power capi-
tal" has resulted in a new concentration of wealth and power in the hands
of a minority and prevented the widespread devolution of power to indi-
vidual citizens.3] Corrupt and undemocratic "money politics" is unlikely to
enlist science to the service of democratic ends. While it may have increased
the gross national product, science still fails for the most part to serve
"public and shared interests" in China.
Mun C. Tsang's review of PRC education policies in the five decades
following 1949 argues that major shifts and reversals in education have
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been directly linked to factional struggles over which path to follow in
national development. While the party radicals insist on politicizing every-
thing, including education and science, the moderates in the party have
always maintained that education has a key role in developing human
resources required for economic development and scientific and techno-
logical advances. In the post-Mao reform period, when Deng Xiaoping
emphasized the need to improve education as well as science and technol-
ogy, it was always in connection with "socialist construction" and "revi-
talizing the nation," ultimate goals that must be understood in terms of
socialism with Chinese characteristics-a combination of high economic
growth and a stable socialist political system.32 Emphasis on science in edu-
cation focuses on training high-level technicians to operate and maintain
new plants, to evaluate, adapt designs, and duplicate imported technology,
to carry out research and development to replace imported technology.33
Such education often falls into the trap of merely fitting students "into
some narrow groove of later trade and business life" (L6.I09). It encour-
ages narrow specialization that contributes to the separation of science
from social life and deprives it of democratic benefits. This is reinforced
by the assertion that it is only because science is purely "technical," and
therefore apolitical, that it may be allowed a degree of autonomy denied
to other activities. Science education is not seen as an exercise in "liberat-
ing the mind"; the political authorities and others continue to "make use of
appeals to authority, prejudice, emotion and ignorance to serve their pur-
poses in political and economic affairs" and thereby obstruct the develop-
ment of a scientific popular habit of mind.34 China is still a long way from
systematically providing environments either in or outside schools that will
foster the employment of scientific method in handling the materials of
daily life, which, in Dewey's view, is the crucial link between science and
democracy.
While one should not give in to unwarranted optimism, there is no rea-
son to surrender to despair. Things have changed dramatically in China.
Social changes associated with the greater openness that is both result
and precondition of further economic growth and greater integration into
world society are conducive to democratic aspirations. Open confronta-
tion with the government has not been an efficacious means of bringing
about democracy in China. Personal interest of political leaders in clinging
to power aside, attempts to change the political system overnight raise the
specter of political collapse and social chaos. Even if put in place, a dem-
ocratic political system is unlikely to function well or survive for long if
democracy is not a way of life. The quest for democracy in China is proba-
bly more viable if it adopts a "bottom-up approach" and focuses on chang-
ing the daily habits of thinking, feeling, and acting. Educators could and
should take the lead, or at least play an important part, but their success
depends on others also fostering the habits that promote democratic life
in the family, the workplace, and the state. This has to begin with a care-
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ful study of what is unsatisfactory in current experience and a reflection on
what democracy means in terms of improving the status quo.
The turn to more pragmatic attitudes during the reform years, the com-
mitment to "seek truth from facts" and "let practice be the criterion for
judging truth," could be strengthened into a scientific attitude of mind that
will support democracy, if they are not debased into shortsighted oppor-
tunism but instead acquire a deeper understanding as found in Dewey's
pragmatism. The questions being asked about democracy, including the
doubts about its value, need not be a form of "disenchantment"; if pos-
itively handled and transformed into an inquiry about what democracy
would require in concrete terms of social arrangements and associations,
and their consequences in the lives of the Chinese people, such discussions
could become a new exploration of the meaning of democracy in and for
China, and a prelude to creating a Chinese democracy.
Notes
1. All in-text citations give volume and page number from Dewey's Early Works
(E), Middle Works (M), and Later Works (L), inJo Ann Boydston, ed., Collected Works
ofJohn Dewey (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969-1990).
2. See Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public (New York: MacMillan, 1927).
3. Besides Democracy and Education, Dewey works out the implications of
democratic ideas for education in other writings such as "Democracy in Educa-
tion" (M3.229-239); "The Need of an Industrial Education in an Industrial Democ-
racy" (Mlo.I37-143); "The Challenge of Democracy to Education" (LI1.181-190);
"Democracy and Educational Administration" (LI1.217-225); and "The Social Sig-
nificance of Academic Freedom" (LI1.376-379).
4. Cai Yuanpei ~5tJl'l', Cai Yuanpei jiaoyu lunzhu xuan ~5tJl'l'~1'fit:'im, ed.
Gao Pingshu il'Ii1JLf~ (Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe, 1991), pp..1-7, 154-156.
For an account of the efforts to build a modern education system, see Pingwen Kuo,
The Chinese System of Public Education (New York: Teachers College, Columbia
University, 1915), chapters 4-6.
5. For an excellent detailed account of Dewey's visit and his influence on educa-
tional reforms in the early Chinese republic, see Barry Keenan, The Dewey Experi-
ment in China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977).
6. John Dewey, Lectures in China, 1919-1920, trans. and ed. Robert W. Clopton
and Tsuin-ehen Ou (Honolulu: University Press of Hawai'i, 1973), p. 3.
7. Zhou Hongyu WHIt¥: and Xiang Zongping rPJ*1JL, "Duwei jiaoyu sixiang zai
Zhongguo de chuanbo ji qi yingxiang *±~~l'f}(N,;tt(:tE!=fOOi¥JfH&l~JtJl'~QtoJ,"Hebei
shifan daxue xuebao, jiaoke ban 1iiJ~~J1iPm:::k$$1It ~f4!l& 3 (ZOOI): 61.
8. Jerome Grieder, Hu Shih and the Chinese Renaissance (Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press, 1970), p. 275; Zhou and Xiang, "Duwei jiaoyu sixiang," pp.
62-63; Yuan Qing 5t1f, "Duwei de Zhongguo zhi xing ji qi yingxiang tt~i¥J!=fOOZ
lT1UtJ;'~QIuJ," Jindaishi yanjiu Jli:ft~lilfJt 2 (ZOOI): 168-169.
9. Mao Lirui et aI., Zhongguo jiaoyu shi !=f OO~l'f~ (Taipei: Wunan Press,
1989), p. 547·
108 Sor-hoon Tan
10. Yuan, "Duwei de Zhongguo zhi xing," p. 164. For less positive evaluations
of Dewey's influence, see Nancy Sizer, "John Dewey's Ideas in China, 1919-1921,"
Comparative Education Review 10.3 (October 1966): 390-4°4. According to Keenan,
"Among professional educators, the effect of his ideas was lasting but even these
educators had little success practicing them outside academic institutions" (Dewey
Experiment, p. 5). More recent reevaluation, mostly positive, of Dewey's influence
on Chinese education has been undertaken by Zhixin Su, "A Critical Evaluation of
John Dewey's Influence on Chinese Education," American Journal ofEducation 1°3.3
(1995): 302-3 2 5.
II. Zuoyue Wang, "Saving China through Science: The Science Society of China,
Scientific Nationalism, and Civil Society in Republican China," Osiris 17 (2002):
291-322; Daniel Kwok, Scientism in Chinese Thought 1900-1950 (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1965).
12. Hu Shih, "The Civilizations of the East and the West," in Whither Mankind:
A Panorama ofModern Civilization, ed. Charles Beard (New York: Longmans, Green
& Co., 1928), p. 28.
13. Wu Zhihui, Wu Zhihui xueshu lunzhu ~mllJj:'7=*i1:;1t (Shanghai: Chuban
hezuoshe, 1925), p. 237, translated in Kwok, Scientism in Chinese Thought, p. 37.
14. For details of difference between Dewey's "post-Enlightenment" science and
Enlightenment science, see Larry Hickman, "Science Education for a Life Curricu-
lum," Studies in Education 13 (1994-45): 379-391, also collected in New Scholar-
ship on Dewey, ed. Jim Garrison (Boston: Kluwer, 1995).
15. Keenan, Dewey Experiment; d. Sor-hoon Tan, "China's Pragmatist Exper-
iment: Hu Shih's Pragmatism and Dewey's Influence in China," in special issue on
"The Range of Pragmatism and the Limits of Philosophy," ed. Richard Shusterman,
Metaphilosophy 35 (January 2004): 44-64.
16. Sizer, "Dewey's Ideas"; d. Theodore E. Hsiao, The History of Modern Edu-
cation in China (Peiping [Beijing]: Peking University Press, 1932), p. 139; Lu-Dzai
Djung, A History of Democratic Education in Modern China (Shanghai: Commercial
Press, 1934).
17. Kwok, Scientism in Chinese Thought, p. 58. Kwok defines scientism as "the
view which places all reality within a natural order and deems all aspects of this order,
be they biological, social, physical, or psychological, to be knowable only by the meth-
ods of science" (ibid., p. 21).
18. Liu Qingfeng XiJ1f*, "Ershi shiji Zhongguo kexue zhuyi de liangci xingqi =
+tltffit:pOOf4~:±)(B<Jjjj;jiJ.:~&," Ershiyi shiji =+-tltffi 4 (199 1): 32-47.
19. One also should not underestimate the influence of May Fourth thought about
the relation between science and a new culture on the CCP cadres; the CCP commem-
orates the May Fourth Movement as a "patriotic movement" that gave birth to Chi-
nese communism. See also the possible influence of pragmatism on Mao Zedong him-
self, in Sun Youzhong, "John Dewey in China: Yesterday and Today," Transactions
of the Charles S. Peirce Society 35 (1999): 69-88. On the relationship between science
and technology-while others, such as Chinese policy makers, think of technology as
applied science, Dewey considers science a kind of technology (LI5.98).
20. There was an initial period in the early 1950S when the CCP made some con-
cessions to the autonomy of the scientific community, which had developed some insti-
tutional strength before 1949. See Yeu-Farn Wang, China's Science and Technology
Policy: 1949-1989 (Aldershot: Avebury, 1993), chap. 3.
Democracy and Science in Education: Lacuna in China's Modernization 109
21. Deng Xiaoping, Speeches and Writings, "Leaders of the World" series, ed.
Robert Maxwell (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1984), pp. 40, 41.
22. Modernization in science and technology, like other reforms, has been a case
of "two steps forward, one step back." For some details of the achievements and
obstacles, see contributions by Erick Baark, Richard Suttmeier, Marcia Smith, Mary
Bullock, and Leo A. Orleans in China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s, ed. Joint
Economic Committee, Congress of the United States (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1993),
pp. 52 7-643.
23. Cong Cao, China's Scientific Elite (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon,
2004), pp. 191-193.
24. Wang, China's Science and Technology Policy, pp. 148-152; Cong Cao, Kejiao
Xingguo II: China's Science and Education Policy in Perspective, EAI Background
Brief no. 125 (Singapore: East Asia Institute, 2002); Cao, China's Scientific Elite, pp.
199-2°3.
25. Robert Merton, The Sociology of Science: The Theoretical and Empirical
Investigations, first published 1942 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p.
269. On the conflict between the ethos of science and totalitarian political codes,
see ibid., p. 258. Merton identifies the "ethos of science" as comprising four sets of
institutional imperatives: universalism, communism, disinterestedness, and organized
skepticism (ibid., pp. 270-278).
26. H. Lyman Miller, Science and Dissent in Post-Mao China: The Politics of
Knowledge (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996), p. 283.
27. Orville Schell and David Shambaugh, eds., The China Reform Reader (New
York: Vintage Books, 1999), p. 513.
28. Ben Xu, Disenchanted Democracy: Chinese Cultural Criticism after 1989
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), pp. 74-80; see also Chen Xiaoming
1¥t1!;'t1lJ3, "Wenhua minzu zhuyi xingqi JtitR;~.:E5<.~~," Ershiyi shiji =+-1!tre
39 (1997): 38.
29. Cao, China's Scientific Elite, p. 196.
30. Richard Suttmeier, "Science, Technology, and China's Political Future," in Sci-
ence and Technology in Post-Mao China, ed. Denis Fred Simon and Merle Goldman
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 376.
31. Yang Fan thrJ!R, Zhongguo zou xiang xuanze 9=t~;Er'!J:i1i;:ff (Beijing: Shiyou
gongye chubanshe, 2000), pp. 35-43; He Qinglian Wi'ff7.i!, Xiandaihua de xianjing ~
{-titi¥Jlli§m (Beijing: Jinri Zhongguo chubanshe, 1998), p. 134.
32. Deng, Speeches and Writings, p. 54. See also Deng Xiaoping, Building Social-
ism with Chinese Characteristics (Beijing: The Bureau for Compilation and Transla-
tion of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin under the Central Committee of the
CCP, 1985).
33. Jon Sigurdson, Technology and Science in the People's Republic of China
(Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1980), p. 81; Robert Taylor, China's Intellectual Dilemmas
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1981), pp. 169-172.
34. These words were used by Dewey to describe those in leadership positions
who had "deliberately cultivated resort to bitter intolerance and to coercive suppres-
sion of disliked opinions during the war [World War I]," and thereby obstructed sci-
entific method and attitude from becoming a popular habit of mind (MI5.50). Sadly,
as we enter a new millennium, the United States and probably other Western societies
also have not yet achieved that scientific popular habit of mind. See Hickman, "Edu-
cation for a Life Curriculum."

Part II
Education and Affectivity

ROBERT C. SOLOMON
6 Educating Emotions
The Phenomenology of Feelings
How can we educate the emotions? This question goes back at least to
Plato and Aristotle, who disagreed in some basic ways about how we
should think of the emotions and how the emotions should be educated.
For Plato, reason's control of the emotions was the important thing. For
Aristotle, the relationship between reason and the "passions" (as he called
them) was much more subtle and complex. The emotions, for him, were an
essential ingredient in the good life and were to be cultivated rather than
simply controlled. We find much the same sort of view at the other end of
the world, in Confucius. So, too, in ancient Hindu philosophy, the crude
bhavas and klesas of everyday life were to be educated and refined into the
stylish aesthetic rasas evoked by art; music, and theater. There, too, emo-
tions are to be educated, not simply controlled.
Today, the issues might seem a bit more complicated. We know a lot
more about the science of emotions, and in particular the science of the
brain. William James, at the end of the nineteenth century, identified emo-
tion as a bodily feeling consequent to the activation of the autonomic ner-
vous system. That, however, would seem to leave the question of emo-
tion education in the lurch. What would it mean to educate or cultivate a
bodily feeling, a more or less automatic response of the sympathetic ner-
vous system? But James also talked about the causal relationships between
the emotions and behavior, and there the topic becomes much more prom-
ising. Behaving in different ways, he said, can lead to emotional learning
and reform. Today in psychology, the focus has turned to facial expres-
sions, and Paul Ekman, for one, has taken very seriously James' admoni-
tion that altering our facial expression, say, to a smile from a frown, actu-
ally alters our emotional outlook and with it our emotional experience.
Jean-Paul Sartre, in a classic essay on the emotions written some seventy
years ago, presents us with a different and even more intriguing set of com-
plexities. Sartre tells us that an emotion is, among other things, a strategy.
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And that would make the education of emotions a very different kind of
learning indeed.
My own view is closer to Sartre's than to James', so I want to use the
phenomenology of the emotions and emotional experience (a.k.a. "feel-
ings") to understand what sort of thing the education of emotions might
be. To just sketch out the big picture I want to promote, I reject the his-
torical divorce between. reason and the emotions and the many misunder-
standings generated by this unfortunate and mistaken antagonism. So the
education of the emotions will also be the education of our reason, bring-
ing it more in line with our emotions. This idea is supported by a surpris-
ing source. The neurobiologist Antony Damasio has shown, in his best-
selling book Descartes' Error, that deficiencies in emotion result in serious
deficiencies in rational decision making. Emotions are not opposed to but
are necessary for rationality. The larger project in which I am engaged is
devoted to showing the various ways in which this interdependence man-
ifests itself in human life. But here I mainly want to talk about emotional
experience and how it serves as the monitor of our emotions and as a tool
for education.
The question about education leads to another. If emotions are learned
in a culture and are to some extent particular to that culture, how can
we humans understand one another? Not only do we speak different lan-
guages, grow up in different cultures, practice different rituals, but it seems
that we have different emotions too. Not entirely different, of course. We
recognize the laughter of children no matter what the culture. We recog-
nize the pain of grief anywhere. But when it comes to the more subtle,
social emotions, universality cannot be assumed. An act enrages people in
Jakarta that is simply amusing in London. A scandal brings a French fam-
ily shame that would have been embarrassing in Latin America but would
cause crushing guilt in Iowa. A samurai expresses his shame by commit-
ting seppuku, a Wall Street felon by establishing a foundation for kids. But
if emotions and emotional expressions are so different, how do we learn to
recognize other people's emotions? That question is not unrelated to: How
do we learn to have and to understand emotions ourselves?
I cannot fully explore this tantalizing set of questions in this one essay,
but I would like to make a beginning by raising some issues that infect vir-
tually all discussion of emotion, starting with the commonsense idea that
emotions are feelings. What we instill when we educate emotions are not
just patterns of expression and behavior. What we teach is how to have a
certain sort of emotional experience. But how we understand this makes
all the difference in the world. If an emotional experience were simply a
sensation or set of sensations, then it would be hard to see what difference
it would make, except, perhaps, insofar as the sensations in question were
pleasant or unpleasant. But emotional experience is not just this. Emo-
tional experience has significance. It tells us something about the world.
And it also, obviously, tells us something possibly very profound about
Educating Emotions: The Phenomenology of Feelings 115
ourselves. Educating our emotions is nothing less than establishing our
proper (or improper) place in the world.
The Significance of Emotional Experience
Emotions, whatever else they may be, are feelings, or at least involve feel-
ings. I would not want to say simply that an emotion is a feeling, unless the
word "feeling" is just being used as a synonym for "emotion." Many years
ago, with William James on my mind, I denied that emotions were feel-
ings because I thought that the feelings James pointed to-the bodily sen-
sations that accompany the physiological symptoms of emotional excite-
ment, including rapid pulse, heavy breathing, sweating, and such-were
not as essential to emotion as judgments about the world, intentionality,
in traditional philosophical jargon. But having made that point, I have
pulled back from my earlier insistence that emotions are not feelings. I now
want to seriously question and look at what kinds of feelings are involved
in emotion. I do not deny that bodily feelings of the sort James described
are incorporated into emotion (although I no longer have a strong opin-
ion about whether these are strictly essential or not), but I think that there
is much more going on by way of feeling than just these. I have often
pointed out that the word "feelings" covers a wide range of phenomena,
from Jamesian sensations to very sophisticated intuitions and emotions in
all of their complexity and intelligence. But I do not want to get trapped in
the peculiarities of the word "feeling" here, so I will talk rather about emo-
tional experience.
The first thing to say is that even though we are in some sense "imme-
diately aware" of our own emotional experience we are, for the most part,
oblivious to it and largely ignorant of its nature. Emotional experiences,
like the emotions themselves, are rich, complex, and multilayered. Emo-
tional experience is incredibly fascinating in its own right, and it gives us a
good foothold in the education of our emotions. Learning to recognize and
deal with one's own emotions does not come "naturally" but is learned and
developed over many years. Many people (who are not "in touch with their
feelings") never learn, or never learn very well. Some unfortunate people,
suffering from autism or other not yet understood neurological disorders,
never learn at all. They may be in the strange position of having to learn to
monitor their own feelings as if they were dealing theoretically with a piece
of new technology. Other people, however, especially many Buddhists who
spend years studying and mastering meditation and other forms of mind
mastery, may display incredible awareness and control, including control
over many of those Jamesian feelings and their physiological causes. So the
fact that we seem to be "immediately aware" of our own emotional expe-
rience does not mean that it is not a major demand on education. In fact, if
Damasio, Daniel Goleman, and many child psychologists are right, it is the
most basic form of education. It is nothing less than learning to be human.
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Too often, however, the emphasis on education is misplaced from the
education of emotional experience to problems of emotional behavior. But
we do not just want to change our conduct or alter our students' behavior,
much less just teach ourselves or our students to restrain or control emo-
tions. We want to teach ourselves and them to cultivate the right emotions
and enjoy their emotional experience. Thus I want to employ an Aristote-
lian conception of the virtues in discussing the emotions, where I under-
stand the enjoyment of emotional experience and enjoyable emotional
experiences as essential accompaniments to cultivating the virtues and the
right emotions. Among the emotions most worth mentioning in this regard
are love, respect, admiration, a sense of duty, a sense of mutual depen-
dency, pride of independence (these are not incompatible), and a Spino-
zan-Buddhist sense of spiritual "bliss." I do not mean here to overly sepa-
rate emotional experience from emotional behavior, for I would argue that
emotional behavior is nothing less than an extension of emotional experi-
ence. (Even to say that it is the "outward" extension of emotional expe-
rience is, I think, to overly separate the two.) But with all of the attention
being paid to emotional behavior, emotional experience has too often been
ignored.
Sociologist Arlie Hochschild has emphasized the importance of "feel-
ing rules," the side of ideology that deals with emotions and feeling. 1 Such
"emotional ideology" serves the purpose of social coherence, mutual under-
standing, and group identification. We try to make ourselves feel as our
culture dictates that we should, and in working on our feelings we trans-
form our behavior as well. It is worth noting that Hochschild did her own
ground-breaking sociological research on Delta Airlines stewardesses, who
were required to be cheerful in spite of air turbulence, cranky and sometimes
impossible customers, and increasingly difficult working conditions. It was
not enough, the stewardesses found, to act cheerful. Bad moods and hos-
tile emotions too readily came to the surface. Rather, the stewardesses had
to be cheerful, and this meant transforming their affect and not merely their
behavior. The change in affect in turn transformed how they acted in the
face of adversity, which in their job, as we all know, can be considerable.
It is often said that both emotion and experience are too evasive to
be analyzed. For almost half a century, as I noted, behaviorism ridiculed
any reference to experience of any kind as "unscientific," "merely subjec-
tive," and "ineffable," even if it allowed that there might be such a mys-
terious thing. And it followed that if emotions are experiences, then one
should not, at least in science, talk about emotions. But even when behav-
iorism is denied and the fact that we have emotional experience is acknowl-
edged it is no easy matter to describe an experience as opposed to describ-
ing what it is an experience of. I said that all emotions have intentionality,
and the description of what an emotion is about is an essential part-in-
deed the major part-of the description of our emotional experience. But
what an emotion is about must also be understood as subjectively per-
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ceived from a first-person point of view. So I follow some of my philosoph-
ical colleagues, Thomas Nagel in particular, by taking subjectivity seriously
and the description of emotional experience to be a description of "what it
is like" to have a certain emotion. A description of what it is like, in turn,
necessarily includes a description of the world as experienced-as threat-
ening, offensive, lovely, or depressing. Because an emotion is intentional we
can describe in considerable detail with considerable articulateness (more,
if we are good at poetry) what it is about, where the ingredients of our
experience refer to items in our public world, as experienced by us. But
what is so complicated here is that we are not just describing the items of
our public world but how those items strike us, how we experience them.
So emotional experience has to be understood in terms of the meaning of
emotion, or rather, the meaning of the things of the world insofar as they
are part of our emotional experience.
The Education of Emotions: Learning to Read One's Body
William James sometimes suggests that an emotional experience was like
seeing green, that is, a sensation or a set of sensations. And what is missing
from his account of emotion in terms of sensations is precisely their mean-
ing to us. (Jean-Paul Sartre makes this point in his 1938 essay on the emo-
tions.2) James firmly tied the sensations to physiology, which takes a good
deal of the supposedly unscientific mystery out of them. We can precisely
specify the sensations as those that one has when one's heart beats faster,
one's face flushes, and so on. Thus, for James and that tradition, emotional
experience may be ineffable but it is nevertheless not mysterious. One can
easily imagine someone who has never blushed wondering what blushing
would be like. So, too, many people do not comprehend what is. happening
to them physiologically, but nevertheless we can understand what they are
feeling on the basis of measurable physiological symptoms. We also embel-
lish the physiological vocabulary with metaphors- "feeling as if my heart
is about to burst," "feeling as if a heavy weight is on my chest," having "a
sinking feeling," and the like. But such sensations do not have a meaning
as such, whether or not they enter into larger experiences that may have
significance. Nevertheless, emotional experience is far from "ineffable," as
the behaviorists charged. Indeed, it is what many people talk about most of
the time, whether or not they conceive of themselves as doing anything like
phenomenology. But what they talk about are the meanings of their emo-
tions, not just their feelings.
James' primary examples of emotional experience involve the acti-
vation of the autonomic nervous system, that is, the more or less "auto-
matic" system that causes hormone secretion and then increased pulse and
heartbeat, harder breathing, sweating, muscular tension, and increased
sensitivity of our skin. (At least some of these may be voluntary as well,
for instance breathing, which we can control. Nevertheless, when we are
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asleep, we still breathe "automatically.) Today's proponents of "basic emo-
tions," or what they call "affect programs," tend to stress the importance
of these basic phy'siological processes. So, too, the ancient Stoics referred
to "first movements," physiologically based feelings that (they said) pre-
ceded our emotions-that sinking feeling in the chest when one is sad-
dened or disappointed, that energized aggressive feeling when one is made
angry. The early Hindus, and later the Buddhists, distinguished between
the raw bhavas and klesas experienced by the vulgar and the refined rasas
that could be cultivated through the arts and education. So Jamesian sensa-
tions are certainly familiar and perhaps even universal feelings in emotion,
but they are not the only kinds of feelings, much less the essential aspects
of emotional experience.
It is important that the Stoics insisted that these "first movements"
are not the emotion itself, which is to be identified with the judgment of
"assent" that follows them, and the Buddhist as well as Aristotelian sense
that the emotions are to be cultivated, not simply "suffered." The feelings,
Stoic "first movements," lack meaning, but the judgments that ensue are
quite meaningful. Hindu and Buddhist klesas may be mere "agitations,"
but the rasas that can be distilled from them are both noble and significant.
In fact, for the Stoics and Buddhists these determine one's moral character
and the value of one's life, one's eudaimonia or "happiness," one's overall
sense of well-being, and consequently one's karma.
The bodily sensations involved in emotional experience are by no
means all of a kind. James mixes together a number of very different sorts
of feelings. He highlights those experiences that are caused by the activa-
tion of the autonomic nervous system, but he also talks at some length
about voluntary muscle movements and overt actions. Since our focus is
usually riveted on the object of the emotion, we usually do not notice any
of these sensations or muscle movements at the time. A good part of the
education of the emotions is getting us to be aware of these feelings and
movements and the emotions that bring them about. Normally, it is only
after the emotion that we become keenly aware of them. After a close call
on the highway we pull off to the side of the road and then notice our fast
breathing, our heart pounding, the sweat on our palms and the damp on
our shirt. We might also look back with some marvel (and gratitude) at
what a quick and complicated maneuver we made, completely without
thinking about it. (It all happened much too fast to think at all.)
So, too, when we are getting angry, it is often only in a brief lag in the
anger, in a moment of reflection, that we notice how tense we are, how
our fists are clenched, how aroused we are, and if we are near a mirror we
notice (uncomfortably) the contortions in our face. So, too, in the leisure of
love one might notice the warm feelings that one enjoys in the presence of
the beloved, but even so, our focus will be on the beloved and not on our
feelings. However, the education of the emotions directs us not just to the
warm feelings but, as the Stoics insisted, to the meaning of the emotion. (I
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should note, however, that the Stoics were not great fans of erotic love or
of emotional attachments in general.)
I would hesitate to say anything that would make us painfully self-con-
scious people even more self-conscious, but we are only occasionally aware
of our own facial expressions. We tend to be keenly aware of those of other
people, however, and it is worth noting that our own facial expressions are
much more in evidence when we are engaged with other people, precisely
when we are least likely to pay attention to them. We also mimic other peo-
ple a lot more than we think we do, picking up their emotional expressions
and their emotions without even noticing that we are doing so. Psycholo-
gists call this "emotional contagion," an interestingly pathological meta-
phor. Indeed, people who exhibit elaborate or dramatic facial expressions
when they think they are alone tend to make us consider them extremely
odd or eccentric.
While we are engaged with other people, we are typically attentive
only to what is being said or done, to the other people and their facial
expressions and what they signify, but not to our own. But every emotional
facial expression has its own distinct "feel," whether or not we notice or
pay attention to it. A frown feels very different from a smile, as James sug-
gested, and a phony smile feels quite different from a real, spontaneous
("Duchenne") smile. Crying (because one is sad) feels quite different from
crying because one is peeling onions. Making a face in disgust feels very
different from making a face out of annoyance. All of this is very subtle,
but it all goes into what we vaguely refer to as the "feeling" we have when
we have a certain emotion, so paying attention to these feelings tells us a
lot about what is going on.
There has been a great deal of fascinating research on the face and
facial expression, but we should not lose sight of the rest of th~ body. It is
not just the facial muscles that tense in characteristic ways; so do the mus-
cles of the body. Thus, in anger one clenches one's fists, and in love one
reaches out to caress or embrace one's beloved. In shame one hides one's
face, and in sadness one withdraws. Again, we are often not aware of what
we are doing with our body, but it is an essential ingredient in our emo-
tional experience. When we are told as children to "stand up straight," this
is not just a matter of how we present ourselves to the world, our "pos-
ture." It has a direct effect on how we feel, and how we feel about our-
selves. "Hold your head up high" is a bit of good Jamesian advice. It will
indeed make you feel a little bit better about your place in the world.
But if we are usually not aware of our own bodily comportment, think
of how quickly (and often accurately) we "size up" someone else on the
basis of their way of holding themselves. A man who is stoop-shouldered
already gives us something of a psychological portrait, a confession of sorts.
A woman who is ashamed of her body and uncomfortable about her sexu-
ality holds herself in certain ways (and, of course, dresses in certain ways).
A person who holds his or her head too high gives a clear admission of his
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or her sense of superiority or perhaps of his or her defensiveness (probably
both). So learning to pay attention to one's posture is not just a matter of
"good manners" or "self-presentation." It is, again, part of our emotional
education, and surprisingly hard for many people to learn.
So, too, the various expressions of emotion and the feelings that are
caused by them have to do not only with how we hold ourselves but with
how we move. Thus the kinesthetics of one's shifting and moving body, the
dynamics of movement, one's gait, the rhythm of one's walk, all are reveal-
ing and contribute to the overall fabric of our emotional experience. In
joy we skip alone merrily. A brisk walk is a mark of someone "in a good
mood," and taking a brisk walk may indeed make one feel good, and not
just because it is exercise (or because one feels righteous about doing exer-
cise). By contrast, a slow, aimless shuffle is a critical dimension of sadness
and depression. This is not to say, of course, that a slow, aimless shuffle
is always a sign of sadness or depression. It may be merely an expression
of relaxation or lethargy. But this is only to state the obvious, that there
is usually no one-to-one correlation between virtually any complex bit of
behavior-including facial expressions-and emotions. Still, it is only by
paying attention to our feelings, paradoxically, that we come to "see our-
selves as others see us."
The experience one has in having an emotion is not, as I used to think,
just a value-drenched perception of the world; it also involves the body in
its various dimensions. The Dutch psychologist Nico Frijda has famously
pointed our attention to the "action tendencies" in emotion, which he takes
to be definitive. An action tendency is not just a muscle movement or mus-
cular tension; it is itself directed toward an action. It would be too much to
say"directed toward a goal," but one might think of such a movement as a
truncated version of goal-directed behavior. Thus when one clenches one's
fist in anger it is not difficult to read this as the first step in getting ready
to punch someone, and the various gestures of shrinking away and with-
drawing, even if never quite coming to actual withdrawal, are obviously
the first step toward getting ready to do so. But what this means is that the
bodily movements in emotion are not just movements, muscle tensings, and
the like. They also have meaning, since goal-directedness is the meaning of
action. Learning to read one's body is thus an exercise in meaningfulness,
not just in body awareness.
Learning What Emotions Are About: The Role of Pleasure and Pain
It is often said, by a great many very good philosophers and psycholo-
gists, that every emotion is defined by the experience of pleasure or pain.
This was central to David Hume's analysis of emotion, for instance, and
it remains central to a great many philosophers and psychologists today,
for instance, Nico Frijda and Andrew Ortony, to name but two. I do not
deny at all that some emotions are pleasant and others are painful and that
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this is an important aspect of emotional experience, but I think that this
is a complex resultant aspect of experience and not, as in traditional (e.g.,
Hume's) analyses, a simple ingredient or dimension of emotion. The plea-
sure or pain of an emotional experience for the most part refers to its reflec-
tive significance. It is not so much in the emotion as it is the way we inter-
pret our emotions, often after the fact.
We deem the experience of love to be pleasant because it plays such an
important role in our lives, and we often deem the experience of anger to
be unpleasant because of the dangers it poses. But pleasure and unpleas-
antness are not ingredients of those emotions; they are resultants. In gen-
eral, we tend to enjoy those emotions that further our projects and our
image in the world. Thus we enjoy fear, to answer Aristotle's question,
because by voluntarily putting ourselves in fearful situations we prove
something about ourselves. So, too, perhaps, for horror-even grief-in-
sofar as these emotions prove something desirable about ourselves. Admit-
tedly, this would be an unusual case for grief, where it would more likely
be indicative of a deep narcissism. Most often, grief would be considered
a most unpleasant experience, but, again, not because we suffer from the
grief itself but rather from what it is about, namely the loss of a loved one.
But this in turn refers us to other investments we have made in (with) our
lives, and it is the overall evaluation of these investments and (in this case)
our loss that make the emotion so unpleasant.
What all of this suggests is that an emotional experience is not just a
feeling but much more. Thus we need to avoid a too limited or impover-
ished phenomenology that does not capture the meaning of emotional expe-
rience. Moreover, every emotion also has what various authors (some of
them following Heidegger) have called the background, aspects of the emo-
tion that are not in focus or conscious but nevertheless must be understood
as a necessary ingredient for determining the intelligibility and'meaning of
the emotion. Thus it makes no sense to speak of grief in the absence of a
love that has been lost, and it makes no sense to talk about anger in a situ-
ation in which no one has any interest or investment, minimally an interest
in not being insulted or having one's self-respect challenged. One gets angry,
as I said, because his or her intentions have been thwarted or frustrated or
he or she has been offended, and those intentions and one's historical sense
of self provide the background against which the emotion is intelligible.
One should not, for example, expect similar reactions to an offense on the
part of a member of the ruling elite and a member of an oppressed class. It
is possible, of course, to have an emotional reaction (and thus an emotional
experience) in the absence of any background of emotional investments and
such: artificially stimulating affect programs would no doubt give rise to
such an experience, real enough, but utterly meaningless.
The Schachter-Singer experiments of 1962 provide a good illustration
of such meaningless emotions. That experiment, in which subjects were
injected with a stimulant (and were told that it was just vitamins), was
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widely taken to show that people interpreted their emotional experience
on the basis of the circumstances in which they found themselves. But the
experiment also involved a control group that received an injection and
was told what it was. They reported discomfort but no emotion. I have no
doubt that they had an experience (agitation and arousal), but it was not
an emotional experience. It had no meaning. But all emotions are meaning-
ful, and almost any emotion of any significance will involve a background
of other emotions. So when we talk abut meaningless emotions, it looks as
if we are not really talking about emotions at all.
An extreme but telling set of examples involve traumata. After a seri-
ous trauma-a wartime experience, rape, or having lived through sexual
abuse, or a terrible accident-one may not remember the actual experi-
ence at all, or one may have vivid repeating and confusing flashbacks, but
few emotions of a once traumatized person can be adequately understood
without taking into account his or her traumatic background. Or to put
it another way, more optimistically, no emotion can be said to have any
depth without reference to a rich background of emotional experiences.
This is what we mean, I think, when we say that someone has "soul," that
their emotions are deep and rich in background. There is no presump-
tion of pleasantness here. "Soul" usually refers to a tragic or challenging
background, not a happy one. But to think of such feelings as themselves
unpleasant instead of appreciating that it is their meaning that is what
defines them is to grossly misunderstand what our emotions are about.
Our tendency to and sometimes insistence on viewing emotions as sim-
ply "positive" or "negative" attitudes toward the world leads not only to
bad theory but to pathology. It is exemplified in the strange phenomenon
of American "cheerfulness," for example, which is just now receiving seri-
ous attention and study. Indeed, we can start to appreciate this, which most
of us Americans take pretty much for granted, only when we examine our
culture from the perspective of and in contrast to other cultures (including
our own history before the twentieth century.) Most of the world has never
been under the illusion that the world is a happy place, and American tour-
ists are often rightly seen as smiling idiots as they grin their way around the
world. But it is not just a matter of phoniness or even self-deception that is
operating here. It has often been pointed out that this forced self-image of
happiness is responsible for depression in near epidemic proportions, espe-
cially among teenagers, who are the cultural sponges and so, too, the vic-
tims of a society's pathological self-images. Arlie Hochschild not surpris-
ingly found a tendency to depression among the stewardesses who were
forced to "manage" their emotions to fit a certain stereotype. And just to
be clear, I am not at all arguing against either "positive" emotions or culti-
vating a "positive" view of the world and one's life. But I am arguing that
an oversimplification of our understanding of emotions has effects that
extend far beyond matters of mere theory and penetrate deeply into the
fabric of our lives.
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Finally, I think that the traditional dichotomy between feelings and
thoughts, which defines feelings as the bearers of pleasure and pain
("valence") and thoughts as purely epistemic and neutral with reference to
pleasure and pain (which may, of course, accompany thoughts by way of
feelings) is also mistaken. Thoughts are not opposed to feelings, and they
are not in themselves hedonically neutral. Thoughts are essential ingre-
dients in human emotional experience and not distinct from feelings. To
state the obvious, most (if not all) thoughts are experienced, and they are
not experienced as something apart from or other than the emotions, but
often as the most obvious manifestation of them. Angry thoughts, ten-
der thoughts, humiliating thoughts, are often the most palpable manifesta-
tions of anger, love, and shame, respectively. And it is the meaning of the
thought that makes it (often) pleasurable or painful, but, again, it is no sim-
ple meaning, and most of our emotions are "mixed feelings," in the sense
that a simple "positive" or "negative" characterization is often naIve or
out of place.
Anger, for instance, is not simply a "negative" emotion (its unenviable
status as one of the seven deadly sins notwithstanding). Righteous anger
can be extremely pleasurable. So, too, I have already pointed out (after
Aristotle) that people often enjoy their fear, especially if it is self-chosen
and sufficiently insulated from real danger. But my point is not just that
thinking of emotions as "positive" and "negative" is simpleminded. It is
also a matter of simplifying our emotions themselves, and not appreciating
the degree to which thoughtfulness ("mindfulness") is an essential part of
the emotions and emotional experience.
Thus, I want to insist that reflection, too, is not something other than
or opposed to emotional experience but is part of our emotional experi-
ence. This is not to insist that all emotions are reflective or self-conscious,
nor is it to suggest that only creatures who can have thoughts can have
emotions. But it is to say that our emotional experience is rich and complex
and often involves the sophistication and intelligence that can only come
with language and some semblance of self-knowledge, even if mistaken or
self-deceiving. It is, to drag back a good old metaphor, a symphony of dif-
ferent kinds of experience, all blended together in what is typically experi-
enced as a meaningful piece of chamber music.
The Purpose(s) and Strategies of Emotions
One of the more exciting theses about emotion to (re)emerge in the twen-
tieth century is the insistence that emotions are purposive. They have what
Jean-Paul Sartre called "finalite."3 That is to say, they are not only func-
tional and occasionally advantageous, and they are not just the fortuitous
residue of fickle evolution, but are in themselves strategic and political.
And to say that emotions are purposive is, in yet a different way, to say that
they have meaning-meaning as teleology. To put it differently and some-
124 Robert C. Solomon
what controversially, emotions do not just "happen" to us, as the whole
language of "passion" and "being struck by" would suggest. They are,
with some contentious stretching of the term, activities that we "do," strat-
egies that work for us, both individually and collectively.
Or, to put it another way, there is a sense in which the emotions can
be said to be rational (or irrational) despite the fact that "rationality" is
often restricted to those contexts involving articulate thought and calcula-
tion. To be sure, emotions may involve considerable articulation, thought,
and calculation. (Vengeance born of anger is exemplary here.) But ratio-
nality is often used in an "instrumental" way as well, to refer to the choice
of means employed to reach some end. Insofar as emotions are purpo-
sive, they have ends. It is not just a matter of their happening (and how
to get rid of or enjoy them); there are also questions about what will sat-
isfy them. As strategies, emotions seek their own forms of satisfaction-in
anger, through vengeance; in hatred, through vanquishing; in love, through
"possessing." This is not to say that all emotions can be satisfied or have
conditions of satisfaction. (Grief, for example, is an emotion with no such
conditions, except per impossible, the resurrection of the lost loved one.)
Nevertheless, even such emotions may have a purpose or purposes-for
example, to mend a suddenly broken life-not only for the individual but
for the group together.
No doubt much of this can be explained by both biological and cul-
tural evolution, but that is not the critical point. Of course, one can readily
surmise, the energizing supplied by both anger and fear prepares an organ-
ism for extraordinary bursts of aggression or retreat, as the case may be.
Such an account of emotions requires nothing whatsoever in the way of
self-awareness or voluntariness. In evolutionary theory, an individual or a
species need not "figure out" its adaptive advantages. It simply lucks into
them. It turns out that frogs and butterflies that resemble poisonous mem-
bers of their classes have a competitive advantage; they are not so often
eaten. It turns out that certain male birds with more tail plumage are more
likely to attract a mate and thus have a reproductive advantage. So, too,
it will turn out that creatures with a certain temperament, who react emo-
tionally and express certain emotions in appropriate situations, may have a
competitive or reproductive advantage. A dog that growls and attacks may
be better suited to survive in certain environments. Dogs that run, hide, or
cuddle may have competitive or reproductive advantages in others. (Dog
breeders thus supplement nature with marketing considerations.) I take it
that none of this, as such, is all that controversial.
But much of what passes for evolutionary explanations of emotion
in both psychology and philosophy these days is no more enlightening
than Moliere's famous explanation of the powers of a sleeping potion. To
show that something serves a purpose or a function says no more and no
less about the evolutionary process than the crudest creationist or con-
tingency theories. Evolution is the new magic wand, which with a wave
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changes something inexplicable into something only seemingly explained.
As Nietzsche famously noted, we always prefer bad explanations to no
explanation at all.
But evolutionary theory is only background and does not play the cen-
tral role in what I am arguing here. Emotions, according to the evolution-
ary hypothesis, turn out to be strategic or functional because they happen
to contribute to "fitness," with all of the ambiguities and objections that
term has inspired in the past century or so. A person (or creature) who has
an emotion, according to the evolutionary line, does not have it because
he, she, or it has a purpose (or because anyone, including "Nature," has a
purpose), but because it has proved to be useful and alternative strategies
have proved to be fatal. In such cases, the emotional responses themselves
may be what used to be called "instinctual," or, in current computer-based
jargon, "hardwired."
An overly simple example (because it isn't really an emotion) would
be the so-called startle reaction. Much more complicated are various forms
of maternal affection and protectiveness, territorial jealousy, fear at the
sight of certain shapes or in the presence of certain smells. But what I am
arguing is that, however biologically based our emotions may be, whether
"hardwired" or not, indeed, whether voluntary or not, our understand-
ing of emotion gains a great deal when we shift from thinking about emo-
tions and emotional responses as mere products and think of them instead
as strategies-strategies for dealing with others, and strategies for dealing
with ourselves.
The idea that emotions are purposive and functional can be found in
ancient and medieval philosophy, and of course some of the world's great
philosophers and religions have endorsed love and compassion in partic-
ular as divine strategies. But the thesis emerges with particular power, not
only in evolutionary accounts of emotion and their development, but, more
controversially, in the anti-Jamesian theories of William James' contempo-
rary and fellow pragmatist John Dewey and, more recently and more radi-
cally, in the writings of the French existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre. Sartre tells
us that emotions are "magical transformations of the world," by which he
means that they are intentional and strategic ways of coping with "diffi-
cult" situations. We choose them, and we choose them for a purpose.
This Sartrian view of the ~trategic nature of emotions will, no doubt,
strain the credulity of most contemporary emotion theorists, although sim-
ilar if more modest evolutionary-functionalist theses have been argued by
many psychological investigators. Paul Griffiths, for instance, now defends
what he calls "Machiavellian" emotions, which evolve because of their
obvious strategic benefit to the creatures who have them. Perhaps I could
ease some doubts by noting that there is nothing in this voluntaristic the-
ory that requires emotional strategies to be recognized, articulated, or even
articulatable as such. In other words, they do not have to be conscious,
in the usual sense of that term, and the "choices" we make need not be
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explicit, deliberative choices. Nevertheless, an emotion may be a strategy,
a way of coping-in particular, a way of coping with other people. Espe-
cially when that way of coping involves power, I believe that we might be
justified in calling it "politics," the politics of emotion. It is the politics of
emotion, accordingly, that defines a good deal of our emotional experience
and circumscribes a good deal of our emotional education.
What Emotions Do for Us: How We Manipulate Other People
Emotions are political, most obviously, in that we use them to move and
manipulate other people or other creatures. Dogs respond rather quickly to
a shout or a scowl, even if it is disciplinary and feigned rather than genuine
emotion. This, of course, raises a problematic point about this conception
of the politics of emotion: that it is the convincing expression of emotion,
rather than emotional experience, that is doing the work. But I have already
expressed some doubt about the distinction between emotional experience
and its expression to argue-as William James did-that a "convincing"
display of emotion either presupposes or tends to create the very emotion
being expressed. Could one gain the same ends by pretending, by acting as
if he or she has the emotion in question, without in fact having it at all? In
theory perhaps, but I think that the practical answer is that few of us are
such accomplished actors that we could bring off such a performance, so
that actually having the emotion seems necessary. Thus Hochschild's stew-
ardesses saw quite clearly that if they were to do a convincing job of acting
cheerful they would have to make themselves cheerful.
But if this is so, then it seems to follow that one has the emotion pre-
cisely in order to bring about the desired results. Whether or not this is
so (and certainly the range of cases is far richer than James' simple for-
mula would suggest), it is clear that emotions are not just and not usually
self-contained but are more or less continuous with their expression. This
means that the lines between authenticity, self-deception, and bad faith
become enormously complicated here, but I want to remark, rather baldly,
on just one piece of this intricately human puzzle. And that is to say, to
have an emotion for a purpose does not entail "not really having" the
emotion. That statement, of course, would undermine everything else I've
said here. Nico Frijda puts the idea rather innocently but, I think, cor-
rectly, when he says: "Emotions are elicited by significant events. Events
are significant when they touch upon one or more of the concerns of the
subject. Emotions thus result from the interaction of an event's actual or
anticipated consequences and the subject's concerns."4 Emotions, in other
words, are strategies, and there is little reason to doubt that our emotional
expressions evolved in part because of their effectiveness in communicat-
ing our emotions to others.
Sometimes our emotions and emotional displays involve solicitude, a
cry for help, an expression of n;-ed. Expressions of submissiveness, shrieks
Educating Emotions: The Phenomenology of Feelings 127
of terror, a baby's cries of distress, are all directed (which is not to say,
consciously or intentionally) to getting the attention and directing the
actions of others. Because they work so well, they can also be learned, cul-
tivated, practiced, and thus employed in an intentional (which is not to say
"feigned") way. A young female soon learns to win favors by being sub-
missive, which involves feeling submissive, and so she learns to feel submis-
sive. At least once, a clever young monkey learns to scatter the troop and
get the food for himself by overreacting to a sign of merely modest danger.
Babies, children, and even adults learn to cry to gain the sympathies of oth-
ers, and, again, they are not"faking it," but rather just being particularly
alert about finding things to cry about. (A young woman on Seinfeld bursts
into genuine tears when her hotdog slips out of its bun, but later shows no
sign of sadness at all when her grandmother dies. She may be despicable,
but she is not a fraud.)
Many emotions are about power, persuasion, manipulation, and intim-
idation. We use anger, for example, not only to pump up the energy and
boldness needed for a confrontation but to intimidate the opposition as
well. One of the more unpleasant members of my academic department
had the habit of highlighting every meeting in which there was a contro-
versial issue by standing up (he was very tall), leaning menacingly over the
conference table, and shouting quite threateningly at whomever was oppos-
ing his position. Since most of the controversial issues discussed were also
quite trivial, the opposition virtually always gave in, and he got his way.
What was telling was that these cheap victories rarely had any correlation
to the merits of the case, and, more telling still, there was no reason what-
ever to suppose that his angry displays would ever lead to actual violence.
(In fact, the fellow was a coward who would most probably have backed
away from any real fight.) But, for most of us, our fear and foreboding of
anger are so profound that the mere display of anger leads us to act as if
there were a real threat of harm behind it, even if we know it isn't so.
So, too, of the seductive emotions. How many of us have been taken
in by appeals that we even knew at the time were insincere, misleading, or
disasters-in-waiting? Advertising and salesmanship depend on such vul-
nerabilities. Our responses to emotions, as well as the emotions and the
expressions themselves, are also inbred, habituated, cultivated, and possi-
bly sometimes "hardwired." It is no surprise, then, that emotions have this
obvious political element, that their existence is not a neutral social or psy-
chological fact but a political force, moving us and influencing our actions
in any number of ways.
What Emotions Do for Us: How We Cultivate Our Characters
There is an internal politics of emotion, the ways in which we position and
(one might even say) manipulate ourselves in relation to the world, quite
apart from the effects of our emotions or expressions on other people.
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When Nico Frijda writes about emotion politics, he observes, "how emo-
tional events are consciously experienced is not isomorphic to what elicits
emotion,"5 there is an important ambiguity embodied in that word "expe-
rienced." What we experience certainly influences or even determines our
attitudes and our behavior, which in turn influences, moves, or coerces
other people. But we can sometimes see a truncated version of the process
in which the effects are unexpressed or unrecognized, in which they are
even intended to remain so.
Anger is a hostile emotion that adopts a familiar stance in the world, if
only in one's own perspective. But that perspective-whether or not it has
expression or results in action, indeed, even if the subject goes off by him-
self and avoids all possible detection or prompting to action-is a judg-
mental stance, one that resembles a courtroom scenario. It is a scenario
that has been succinctly captured by Lewis Carroll in Alice in Wonderland
(in "the Mouse's Tale"). It goes: "I'll be judge, I'll be jury / Said cunning
old fury." The strategic advantage, I think, should be obvious. Emerging
from a situation in which one has been hurt, offended, or humiliated, one
positions oneself as nevertheless superior, even as righteous. It is a power-
ful psychological position. It is emotional politics at its most profound and
subtle, whether or not effective in the world.
A similar example is developed at length by Nietzsche in his On the
Genealogy of Morals, where he suggests that ressentiment, by its very
nature, is an emotion that evades direct expression and confrontation but
prefers to alter the world as perceived to suit its own particular vulnera-
bilities and weaknesses. Thus, one might talk about these "internal poli-
tics" as the "strategic rearrangement of one's own attitudes," or what Sar-
tre more poetically called "magical transformations of the world." This
internal politics of emotion fits in very well with what I have often referred
to as the judgmental role of emotion, following certain Stoics, who argued
a similar thesis two thousand years ago. The question, for the Stoics, was
not how our emotional behavior affects the world (negatively or negligibly,
most of them argued) but rather how our emotional judgments affect our
own outlook on the world and, consequently, our chances for happiness. A
somewhat more public version of the same idea has been nicely character-
ized by Ronald de Sousa in his Rationality of Emotion (1987), who intro-
duced the notion of "paradigm scenarios," in which one learns not only the
"appropriateness" of certain emotions and emotional behaviors but also
their power and significance.
What one learns, presumably, is not only the effect of one's emotional
responses upon others (and their approval or disapproval and responses in
return) but the wayan emotion makes one "feel," where the "feeling" in
question is by no means to be confused with the sensations caused by the
concurrent physiology or that inchoate sense of "affect" that is so often
alluded to by authors who lack the facility to pin the "felt" emotion down.6
One could (and de Sousa encourages this) provide an evolutionary back-
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ground story for such scenarios. But for my purposes here, it is important
to insist that these scenarios are not and need not be, as such, public or
physically situated. No doubt originally they always are public and phys-
ically situated. But once one has "internalized" the paradigm of an emo-
tion, one can, as it were, play it back privately, rehearse and instantiate a
strategy as if it were public, and, in so doing, achieve a sort of competitive
advantage, even if only in one's own eyes.
Thus we use our emotional experience to guide our cultivation of our
emotions, and with this the cultivation of our character. Unfortunately,
many of us cultivate our characters badly, enhancing and encouraging vices
instead of virtues. But worse, perhaps, is the fact that most of us never
appreciate that we are cultivating our characters, and so we do so blindly.
It is an old observation among the disciplinarians in our society that no
one starts out a criminal. People steal, or rob, or cheat, until they start to
get good at it, until they start to gain confidence, until they lose the qualms
they once had, and then they become the bad characters they have long
been practicing to become. Or, alternatively, they commit small kindnesses
until they become a matter of habit and personal satisfaction. Understand-
ing this and how we cultivate our characters is an important step toward
virtue.
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NEL NODDINGS
7 Caring and Critical Thinking in Relational Ethics
An ethic of care requires its adherents to develop capacities for both emo-
tional connection and critical thinking, and I hope to show how its use
might contribute to international understanding and global education.
Because there are so many misunderstandings about "caring" and its cor-
relates, I'll start with some distinctions. Then I'll try to show how an ethic
of care suggests a promising approach to human affairs.
Two Concepts of Caring
The word "caring" is an everyday word, and that creates a problem for
those of us who use it in a theoretically specific way. Philosophy is loaded
with examples of this difficulty-for example, Kant's use of "duty" and
Dewey's use of "experience," "habit," and "occupation." I think it is obvi-
ous in care ethics that we are not talking about care as burden, worry, trou-
ble, or mere concern. Moreover, "caring" is not synonymous with "care-
giving," although ideally a caregiver should care in the sense described by
care ethics.
The main problem for those espousing a relational ethic of care is that
there is a strong (but different) concept of caring as a virtue. This is tricky
because relational ethicists also recognize caring as a virtue, but we start
with the relation and define the virtue in terms of the relation, whereas vir-
tue ethicists begin with caring as a virtue-a characteristic belonging to
a moral agent. This difference creates two very different approaches to
describing and interpreting caring. I
In the ethics of caring, we are primarily interested in caring relations.
In such relations-which range from brief encounters to multiple and sta-
ble encounters over time-both parties, carer and cared-for, make distinct
contributions. The consciousness of the carer (or one-caring) is character-
ized by a receptive attention; that is, the carer listens and watches in an
open, nonselective way. This is not the sort of attention we usually give to
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a teacher or lecturer when we are busily trying to fit what is being said into
our own thought structures or struggling to file the material in our minds
for easy retrieval. Rather, this attention is almost passive; it opens us to the
needs and feelings of the other and makes us emotionally vulnerable.2 We
may feel what the other feels.
The second aspect of a caring state is motivational displacement. As
we hear and feel what the other is going through, our motive energy begins
to flow toward the needs of the other. This is not, of course, a perma-
nent displacement; we return to our own needs and concerns. But the dis-
placement is real; we can feel it, and sometimes we resist it. Sometimes the
expressed need is too great for us; sometimes we have ethical reasons for
disapproving of it; sometimes we are just too tired, cranky, or self-con-
cerned to maintain the displacement. Assuming that attention and motiva-
tional displacement are maintained, the carer has to decide what to do. An
essentially sympathetic state is converted to, or supplemented by, empathy,
and thinking is required.
The cared-for also makes a distinctive contribution. He or she receives
the caring and responds in a way that signals its reception. A crying infant
stops crying and smiles. A suffering patient sighs with relief and sleeps. A
student perks up and pursues a project with some energy. Examples are
easy to find and plentiful. With the positive response of the cared-for, the
relation is complete, and we can rightly call it a caring relation.
Some critics have had difficulty with this description of a caring rela-
tion. After all, the caring relation is a moral or ethical relation, is it not?
And care ethicists claim that both parties contribute to the relation. Well,
then, should we give moral credit to the cared-for for such a puny con-
tribution-just showing that he or she has received the care? Should an
infant, for example, get moral credit for its smiles? There are two impor-
tant responses to this concern. First, a relational ethic is not much con-
cerned with moral credit; our attention is not entirely fixed on the moral
agent or carer. It is focused on moral life and what contributes to it. Sec-
ond, it recognizes-along with David Hume-that acts and attributes that
are not themselves usually categorized as moral may contribute strongly to
moral relations. It is far easier to respond morally to a pleasant, responsive
person than to a grumpy, aloof one. In concert with our interests at this
conference, it suggests that philosophers give more attention to the emo-
tions associated with moral life and that educators do more to cultivate the
moral sentiments.
But, surely, even if we deemphasize moral credit, we cannot be com-
pletely uninterested in it. If a person tries very hard to care (in the way we
have described caring), shouldn't he or she receive some credit even if the
cared-for denies the caring? I'll put this off for a bit but acknowledge that
the question should be addressed.
It is easier to move to a virtue sense of caring when caring relations
are frequently completed. We can consistently say of a person who regu-
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larly forms caring relations, "She is a caring person." This mode of identi-
fication makes the assessment of virtue dependent on the establishment of
caring relations. It is not without difficulties, but it has the merit of recog-
nizing the contributions of both parties to the relation. It also draws our
attention to moral interdependence. It admits explicitly that, in contrast to
Kant's demand for individual moral integrity and courage, we have some
responsibility for the moral growth of others. How good I can be depends
at least in part on how you treat me.
Now let's look at an alternative view of caring from the perspective of
virtue ethics. From this perspective, caring is interpreted as a trait of char-
acter that leads the carer to make a conscientious endeavor to bring about
the best result for the cared-for. Certainly a positive result is also desired
by a relational carer but, from this alternative view, the carer may decide a
priori what is in the best interest of the cared-for. She mayor may not lis-
ten to the cared-for or may listen only for purposes of diagnosis. The pur-
pose is not to establish a caring relation but to prove one's caring by bring-
ing about the desired result. Almost all of us have encountered teachers (or
parents) who fit this description of caring as a virtue. These people often
work very hard, even lovingly, but the goals and ends are determined by
them, not by the interests and expressed needs of the cared-for.
Collectives as well as individuals exercise virtue caring. The United
States today, with perhaps the best caring intentions, is determined to
spread democracy and freedom over the whole world, whether or not the
recipients of its care want them. Many communal peoples, for example,
are not so enthusiastic about individual freedom as we Americans are, and
there have been-and still are-highly civilized societies that have doubts
about democracy. Relational carers are, at least theoretically, less likely to
make such frightening political errors, but I hasten to add that virtue ethi-
cists may also block these undesirable results by invoking othe~ virtues and
bringing them into balance.
Sometimes the virtue carer is appreciatively received by the cared-for,
and a caring relation seems to have been established. An ideal observer
would notice that the criteria of nonselective attention and motivational
displacement have not been met, but ordinary day-to-day observers might
not see this and would base their judgment on the cared-for's affirmation
that the relation is one of caring. (This situation, by the way, underscores
the everyday recognition of the importance of the cared-for's contribution
to the relation. We always take it that something is amiss when a poten-
tial cared-for says, "She doesn't care," or when a whole class of potential
cared-fors-a school population, for example-insists, "Nobody cares!")
There are instances, indeed, when such relations are satisfying, and the end
results prove satisfactory. However, there are also cases marked by psy-
chological pain, guilt, and masked unhappiness. In some cases, the cared-
for accepts caring treatment that is not really in his best interest- "I'm
glad that my father made me stick with studies I hated" -and then, as
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an adult, he emulates his carer's conduct in his own parenting or teach-
ing. This result is so common that it has become a characteristic feature of
the human condition.3 The human being who has undergone such caring
often becomes what Abraham Maslow has described as a "human imper-
sonator," one who has failed to actualize his own talents and interests and
is unaware of the failure. 4
Although I think the distinction between caring as relation and car-
ing as virtue holds up, there are many complications and sub-distinctions
to be worked out, and they can't all be handled here. However, some will
arise as the discussion proceeds, and those will be addressed. One very
important distinction centers on the concept of needs, and that one must
be treated next.
Two Concepts of Needs
The ethic of care is a needs-based ethic. A carer responds to the needs
expressed by the cared-for. In many cases, the response will satisfy the
need. In some cases, it will not (for reasons mentioned earlier), but the
mode of response will still convey to the cared-for that he or she is the
recipient of care; there will be an attempt to "stay with," explain, and seek
a mutually satisfying solution.
It is useful to make a distinction between expressed needs and inferred
needs. Expressed (or felt) needs arise in the one who expresses them; they
may be expressed in words or body language. Inferred (or imposed) needs
arise externally and are imposed on the one said to have them. Many of the
goals of socialization and schooling represent inferred needs. Basic biolog-
ical needs are of the first sort; the body expresses its need for food, cloth-
ing, shelter, water, sex, and safety. In contrast, the need for children to learn
algebra is (usually) of the second kind.
However, there are again difficulties. At least a low level of inference is
often required in accurately assessing expressed needs, and sometimes the
one in need even requires help in understanding what she is feeling-what
her real felt needs are. When they are uncovered, however, they are claimed
unequivocally. In contrast, inferred needs are predetermined, not judgments
resulting from an interactive process. However, inferred needs can be nego-
tiated so sensitively that they become expressed needs. This is what par-
ents and teachers hope will happen when they infer a need for children to
read; the children will eventually express a need to read. It would be a mis-
take, then, to associate expressed needs with relational caring and inferred
needs with virtue caring, although a difference in emphasis can be made
along these lines.
Because I want to use the distinctions already made in a discussion of
global awareness and education, it might be good to offer another example
in advance of that discussion. In responding to the Indian Ocean tsunami
disaster of 2004, carers, for the most part, pr"operly addressed basic needs.
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But some well-intentioned responses were directed at inferred needs, and
the inferences were simply wrong. Huge stocks of clothing, toys, books,
and other materials have accumulated, and aid workers have to figure out
what to do with such unneeded supplies. Similarly, some years ago, the
world responded to an earthquake by deluging its victims with clothing
when they desperately needed building supplies and still, some years later,
have not received the materials needed to rebuild.
It seems right to say that relational caring is more likely than virtue
caring to direct us to expressed needs, because it requires us to listen, to
ask the cared-for, "What are you going through?"5 But the response to
expressed needs can also miscarry. Our attention and motivation may be
properly attuned, and the cared-for may be (temporarily) delighted with
our response, but the whole episode may be superficial, responding to mere
wants instead of genuine needs. Our effort may be misdirected. It is obvi-
ous that this sort of thing happens often in permissive parenting.
Relational carers, like virtue carers, also come into encounters with
some preconceived ideas about needs. Parents posit inferred needs for their
children-vaccinations, dental work, learning to read, good manners, a
reasonable bedtime-and a long list of other assumed needs. Teachers,
too, have such lists. They begin their teaching with a syllabus or course of
study-surely a paradigm case of inferred needs. Relational carers do not
abandon their values when they care for others. However, those incalcula-
bly important moments of complete openness, of vulnerability, may shake
them into reflection. When we feel what the other is feeling, we may step
back and begin the hard work of critical reflection on our own position.
A process of negotiation may follow. Sometimes the carer-parent,
teacher, diplomat-may back off entirely. The inferred need at question
is not that important after all. This particular student does n<.>t need a for-
mal course in algebra; this child does not need "lights-out" at eight p.m.;
this cultural group does not need to be converted to capitalism. In giving
way, we realize that the student without algebra will not be an engineer, the
child who resists early bedtime may never be any good at morning activi-
ties, and the group rejecting capitalism will probably never be financially
rich. In other cases, reflection may lead us to conclude that the original
inferred need is truly important. It is then our task to bargain, persuade,
and gently push the cared-for to give it a try; in doing this, we commit our-
selves to help and to sympathize, and we stand ready to renegotiate, to
enter a new phase of critical thinking.
In Caring, I stressed the need for turning points. We must, of course,
think carefully about how we will respond to others, and we must reflect
critically on our own position, but we should not get stuck in the ratio-
nal-objective mode: "At times we must suspend it in favor of subjective
thinking and reflection, allowing time and space for seeing and feeling.
The rational-objective mode must be continually re-established and redi-
rected from a fresh base of commitment."6 There are, or should be, turn-
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ing points: "As we convert what we have received from the other into a
problem, ... we move away from the other. We clean up his reality, strip it
of complex and bothersome qualities, in order to think it. The other's real-
ity becomes data, stuff to be analyzed, studied, interpreted. All this is to
be expected and is entirely appropriate, provided that we see the essen-
tial turning points and move back to the concrete and personal. Thus we
keep our objective thinking tied to a relational stake at the heart of car-
ing."7 If relational caring is to be realized, an appropriate level of continu-
ity must be achieved. Contact time has to be consonant with the decisions
to be made. If virtue caring is susceptible to self-righteousness, relational
caring may miscarry through superficiality. For this reason, I have recom-
mended that teachers and students stay together (by mutual consent) for
three years, rather than the typical one year. Care theorists and those sym-
pathetic to that approach use the words "holding" and "staying with."8 It
takes time to develop relations of care and trust.
Dialogue across Differences
When working with other cultures, the approach advocated by relational
caring has a definite advantage over the usual Western justice approach.
Contrary to the notion that one wise and fully rational person might legis-
late well for a whole culture or even for the entire world,9 an ethic of care
counsels that we must participate in the world and listen before making
decisions. Not all peoples embrace the same concept of justice,10 and exter-
nal imposition of a particular view can be deeply resented. Isaiah Berlin did
not use the language of expressed and inferred needs, but he made a simi-
lar, and vital, point. He noted that powerful individuals and groups often
use words-for example, "higher," "true self," "freedom," -to "coerce
men in the name of some goal,"l1 and he commented that this coercion is
sometimes justifiable-just as I have admitted that there are times when
we are right to insist on the goals named in inferred needs. But the dan-
gers are great. Berlin wrote: "This renders it easy for me to conceive of
myself as coercing others for their own sake, in their, not my, interest. I am
then claiming that I know what they truly need better than they know it
themselves.... But I may go on to claim a good deal more than this. I may
declare that they are actually aiming at what in their benighted state they
consciously resist.... " 12 When we go this far, we are assuming a universal
"true self" that agrees in large part with the self we have identified. Once
this view is taken, Berlin warned: "I am in a position to ignore the actual
wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, torture th~m in the name, and
on behalf, of their real selves.... "13
It is common for parents to treat children this way and more com-
mon than it should be for teachers to treat their students thus. A rela-
tional approach suggests that parents and teachers should engage in criti-
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cal reflection and negotiation when either inferred or expressed needs are
contested. 14
On the international level, the imposition of needs and goals is highly
questionable, an approach to be avoided. A decade or so ago, Harold Saun-
ders, a former Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
in the State Department, recommended a thoroughly relational approach
to international affairs. He wrote: "As nations face problems that no one
nation can resolve by itself, we must widen our focus to include the rela-
tionships necessary for dealing with those problems. Sometimes, focusing
on relationships causes the concept of a narrow national interest to give
way partially to the broader interests of the relationship itself."15 Saunders
wanted nations to develop a comprehensive network of relationships. He
wrote of the relational approach:
In addition to the political scientist, the specialist in international rela-
tions and security, the historian, and the economist, it invites the per-
spectives of the practicing politician and diplomat; the psychoanalyst,
psychiatrist, and psychologist; the physicist, biologist, and philosopher;
the theologian and ethicist; the anthropologist and sociologist; and the
student and practitioner of conflict management and resolution, media-
tion, and negotiation. It suggests that human beings as well as states are
integral to studying how nations relate. 16
I would add to Saunders' list engineers, carpenters, musicians, teachers,
artists, and any groups that share interests beyond the political.
A relational approach strongly suggests educating the emotions as well
as reason. In his discussion of moral life, David Hume emphasized the social
virtues, among them, "a manner, a grace, an ease, a genteelness ... which
catches our affection."I? He also praised "a relish for pleasu!e, if accom-
panied with temperance and decency,"18 and he had nothing good to say
about the ascetic virtues, which, from his perspective and the one I am tak-
ing here, do little to make one "a more valuable member of society. "19 This
last could be argued, of course. Did not Gandhi's asceticism contribute to
his effectiveness as a politicaVsocial reformer? Some argue that it did not,
and many would agree that Hume's point is well taken; we often resent
those who exhibit ascetic virtues and prefer to avoid them. Agreeable man-
ners, a receptive attitude, and willingness to share decent pleasures are
widely appreciated. However, it is not only the social emotions o( affects
that need educating. We also need to help students understand the more
elemental emotions such as fear and anger and how the political atmo-
sphere can manipulate these. I'll return to that topic. The main point for
now is that there is a substantial social dimension in the project of develop-
ing a network of relationships.
The most important networks should include people who disagree on
some issues. Some years ago, a group of women in the United States started
an organization called Common Ground to promote dialogue on the issue
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of abortion. The group deliberately recruited both pro-choice and pro-life
women. The object was not to convert people from one set of beliefs to the
other, but rather to find a way to talk to one another without venom and
bluster. The goal was to "reject the war model of the abortion argument
and fully recognize that human beings, not cardboard cutouts, make up the
'other side.' "20 So far as I know, none of the members changed her mind
about the basic issue. What changed dramatically was that they were no
longer tempted to use hurtful language and methods to condemn the other
side. They also began to work on common goals such as providing aid to
needy children, supporting poor mothers, and defending women who had
been deserted or abused. Today, we can hope that a powerful lesson has
been learned and that, as the political debate heats up again, women will
not return to abusive methods to make their points.
The establishment of networks for dialogue and common purposes
across substantial disagreements is a powerful way of reducing violence,
and, in some cases, understanding may even lead to solution of the basic
problem. Young people are easily moved to zealous action for causes to
which they are committed. They sometimes use violent methods to oppose
logging in old forests, the exploitation of third world peoples in "sweat-
shops," and the use of sentient nonhuman animals in experiments. The
dialogue advised by an ethic of care might help some to see the position
of those who depend on logging for their livelihood, of exploited work-
ers who insist that they are now better off, and of scientists who use ani-
mals to relieve disease and pain in humans. Influence can move in the other
direction as well. Perhaps a solution can be found to the loggers' need for
employment that will preserve the old forests; perhaps employers can con-
sider more humane conditions for their workers and still make money;
and perhaps some scientists will admit that many animal experiments are
cruel and unnecessary. But the opposing parties must be invited into dia-
logue, and this too rarely happens. Instead we prepare the barricades for
the expected onslaught of protest. Moreover, we continue to educate more
effectively for the "war model" of dialogue than for listening and negoti-
ating.
Relations and Situations
Now we should return to the situation in which someone tries to
care-meets the criteria for one-caring-and yet fails to establish a caring
relation. The failure is not necessarily the fault of either carer or cared-for.
One strength of an ethic of care is that, by focusing attention on the rela-
tion, it reduces the inclination to concentrate on guilt and blame. A rela-
tional ethic does not demand a level of virtue that surmounts all condi-
tions; it recognizes human frailty as well as agency. It accepts neither the
determinism of behaviorism nor the complete freedom of some forms of
existentialism. There are many situations today (many in schools) in which
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people want to care and others want to be cared for, and yet caring rela-
tions are not achieved. Something is wrong in the situation. Relations are
established in situations, and an ethic of care directs us to look at the situ-
ations and conditions in which people are meeting.
When we look at the situation in which people meet, we may find (as
we often do in schools) that there is not enough contact time between carer
and cared-for or that unhelpful rules constrain their interactions. We may
also find that there is a mismatch between the needs of the cared-for and the
capacities of the carer. In some cases, we find that neither carer nor cared-
for understands the psychological effects of the situation on their behavior.
This problem infects all sorts of relations-not just those of caring.
For example, very few young people who enter military service right
out of high school have any understanding of how combat situations may
affect them psychologically. They know that they may lose life or limb in
combat, but they do not know that they may lose their moral identity.21
The common, but mistaken, idea that virtues are the permanent posses-
sions of moral agents leads many to believe that the moral agent is entirely
responsible for the exercise of his or her virtue in every situation. If I am a
courageous person, I will always act with courage. If I am a decent, com-
passionate person, I will always act with decency and compassion. Young
men who become "berserkers" in combat feel alienated from their "true"
selves; some never recover.22 Having committed atrocious acts, some even
ask, "How could I do that? That is not me ... " The need to understand is
expressed so often after the fact that we educators should anticipate the
need and do what we can to prepare for it.
Social and emotional education should be a substantial part of every
educational program.23 We should analyze situations in which we behave
uncharacteristically. Can we avoid these situations? Can we learn how
to handle them better without getting bogged down in guilt? Can under-
standing the likely psychological effects of various situations ameliorate
the effects?
Students should become aware of how governments and political lead-
ers manipulate emotions, not just opinions. How are hate and fear aroused?
How am I affected if everyone around me seems to hate group X? Dare I
refuse to hate? And how is it that hatred for an enemy nation may disap-
pear almost entirely when a war is over? Why, then, did we hate, and what
did we fear? I do not mean by this last question that, in international crises,
there is nothing to fear. On the contrary, there is much to fear, but it may
not be the object identified by propaganda.
Martin Buber warned us that if we want to understand ourselves, we
should start with neither the individual nor the collective but, rather, with
the relation.24 The individual is necessarily defined in relation, and forget-
ting this leads to a lonely and hopeless search for that which has no reality.
The collectivity reduces relations to false abstractions and commonalities.
Buber says that the fleeting recognition of relatedness is "antic" and can-
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not be explained in psychological concepts.25 But, as educators, I think we
have to consider the psychological as we examine the power and content
of situations. As Buber describes mysterious events in which connections
take place, we see situations: eyes meeting in the opera house while Mozart
is being played, eyes meeting in the recognition of shared fear in a crowded
air-raid shelter. Surely, Buber is right that there is something deeper here
than can be entirely explained by psychological concepts. But we can start
there.. How will this situation affect me? How will it affect others? If the
answers to these questions fill us with fear and apprehension, are there
ways in which we can prevent or change the situation?
An ethic of care directs us to explore such questions. Moral life depends
not only on the virtue of individuals and the moral fiber of collectives. It
depends more on the quality of our relations and how well we understand
our own responses to the situations in which we find ourselves. We need to
see, listen, feel, and think.
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THOMAS P. KASULIS
8 Cultivating the Mindful Heart
What We May Learn from the
japanese Philosophy of Kokoro
For the past two or three decades, Western thinkers have increasingly dis-
cussed the nature of emotions and what role pedagogy should play in train-
ing or educating people's affective natures. The arenas for these discussions
have ranged widely from academic philosophical analyses, to theories of
public school education, to popular psychological advice in the mass media,
to legal debates concerning criminal culpability and rehabilitation. Pro-
grams in anger management have become so widespread that they are even
the stuff of Hollywood comedies. This contemporary emphasis on educat-
ing the emotions generally arises from two radically different agendas.
From one direction we find the continuation of the scientistic ideal of
"objectivity" so much a part of modern Western philosophy. This line of
argument is as follows. If true knowledge emerges only out of detached
observation and methodical reason, we must learn to think with the head
and not the heart or, even worse, with the viscera. Yet, human experi-
ence has time and again shown the difficulty of achieving such emotional
detachment. So we obviously must learn better how to discipline the emo-
tions, submitting the heat of the passions to the coolness of the mind. The
end of such training is to make us-emotionally at least-less that what
we were before. That is, we are trying to decrease the affective portion of
our personalities, if not to the point of elimination, at least to the level of
rational control.
The other direction for the concern about educating the emotions arises
from radically different premises. The argument in this case is that, rather
than restricting the emotions in our modern society, we need to enhance
them. That is, we need to find an appropriate role for emotions, not only in
daily life, but even to some extent in cognitive experience. Hence, there is a
growing literature about "being in touch with our feelings," and also con-
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cerning the importance of hunches, gut experiences, and acquired intuition
as a way of understanding and successfully operating in the world. l From
this point of view, to educate the emotions is to help them flourish as a con-
structive form of relating to, and responding within, the world. Yet, what
do we mean by "emotions" in this case and how can they be understood as
having cognitive value? With what educational techniques can we cultivate
such emotions while restraining mere egocentric self-indulgence or mawk-
ish sentimentality? In this essay I shall be able to explore these questions in
only a preliminary fashion. My specific objective is to open up our think-
ing about these issues by drawing on an intellectual and cultural tradition
outside the parameters of the West, in this case, the classical Japanese phi-
losophy of kokoro.
What is kokoro? For a start, we can say kokoro is the center of both
emotive and cognitive sensitivity. Translators often render the word into
English as "heart and mind." A problem with this rendering, however, is
the conjunctive "and," which might lead one to think kokoro is the com-
bined function of two separate faculties, one affective and one intellec-
tual. But this is not the case. To translate kokoro as "heart and mind" is
like translating the Japanese word for water (mizu) as "hydrogen with a
half-portion of oxygen." It is not that the translation is inaccurate exactly,
but rather that it misses the point, at least in any ordinary context; when
requesting a glass of mizu, a Japanese does not think of it as a compound
of two elements. Similarly, in ordinary Japanese contexts kokoro is a sim-
ple, not a compound. If we need to use a compound expression to translate
kokoro into English, that fact tells us more about the web of English con-
cepts than it does about the nature of kokoro in the Japanese worldview. In
modern Western philosophizing, we have driven such a wedge between the
affective and the cognitive that we too easily slip into believing the univer-
sality of the bifurcation. Hence, we assume that kokoro must have a dual
rather than singular function and we translate it as such. To sum up: the
"heart and mind" translation hides as much as it discloses. We think we
know what kokoro means only by occluding its most threatening sugges-
tion-namely, that our modern Western bifurcation between emotion and
cognition may be at best limited and at worst simply wrong.
Such concerns might have motivated the once common attempt to find
a single-word Western translation for kokoro. The most notable included
"soul," "psyche," "anima," and "spirit." Those renderings carry their
own problems, however. Such words run throughout the history of West-
ern philosophy, accruing a variety of nuances along the way. (For example,
if kokoro means "anima," are we to take that in a Thomistic sense, a Car-
tesian sense, or a Jungian sense?) Most troubling, though, is the fact that
the Western terms tend to suggest substantial entities, whereas kokoro is
not a fixed faculty or organ that relates to its objects. It is more a mode of
relating than a thing that relates. In short, neither a conjunctive nor a sin-
gle Western term fits the Japanese word all that well. When the situation
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requires an English translation, I often use the term "mindful heart" as a
way of capturing kokoro's being a cognitive form of affective sensitivity.
Yet, even that rendering might lead one to think of a faculty rather than
relation. Furthermore, it also fails to suggest another aspect of kokoro cru-
cial to the traditional japanese context: that not only humans but also an
entity like a mountain, a tree, or even a word can have or express kokoro.
Given these difficulties, it might be wisest to leave the term kokoro untrans-
lated, and for the most part, I shall do so in the rest of this essay.
In view of the historical isolation between japan and the West, it is not
surprising we have found a japanese term that does not correlate well with
any Western term. We might assume that the situation would be different
if we were looking for a parallel term from Chinese instead of English. On
the surface, this assumption seems validated by the fact that the japanese
word kokoro is commonly written with a character borrowed from China:
iL' (pronounced xin in Chinese and when in compound words taken from
Chinese, often pronounced shin in japanese). So, the correlation between
the Chinese word xin and the japanese kokoro might seem to be like that
between the Chinese shui and the japanese mizu. Both shui and mizu are
written 71< and both refer to the same thing, water. The situation with xin
and kokoro is more complicated than this, however. Kokoro, like mizu,
is an indigenous japanese word. Since they go back to preliterate times,
the japanese had no native way of writing the words. When the japanese
decided to develop a written form of their language, they adopted Chinese
characters or graphs for that purpose. In theory at least, this was similar
to Saint Cyril's using the Greek alphabet to develop Cyrillic as an alpha-
bet for Russian. Yet, the Chinese written language is not only a phonetic
system. The graphs may convey meanings as well as sounds. For example,
if the ancient japanese wanted to write the word for "three" (mitsu), they
had two options for drawing on the Chinese writing system. They could
either use two Chinese characters to render the phonetic sound of each syl-
lable, the "mi" and the "tsu," or they could use the Chinese character that
means "three" even though in Chinese it sounds nothing like mitsu, that is,
-= (pronounced "san" in Chinese). The options would be somewhat com-
parable if the ancient japanese were using our English writing system and
could write their native word for "three" as either "mitsu" or "3." The for-
mer is a transliteration of the word as sound; the latter, more like a transla-
tion that assumes English writers use 3 to refer to the same thing as mitsu
does for japanese writers.
What happens, however, if the native word does not have a perfect
correlate in the language being used as the basis for its writing system?
There are two options: to use only the phonetic rendering or to use mul-
tiple words for translating the meaning, varying them depending on the
context. The latter is a common strategy among translators between any
two languages. For example, the German word Geist might be translated
into English as "mind" or "spirit," depending on the contextual use of the
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German word. In our present case, it is noteworthy that the ancient japa-
nese commonly used not only xin IL' but also yi ~ to translate their native
word kokoro. So, as a clue to uncovering the original nuances of the term
kokoro, let us consider what semantic range is suggested by the two words
xin and yi.
Today the character for xin is the more common choice of the two
when a japanese writer uses a Chinese character to write kokoro. The
Chinese xin typically refers to the faculty for thinking and feeling. In fact,
when kokoro came to be translated into English as "heart and mind," it
is likely the translators were thinking as much of the Chinese character as
the native japanese word. An important association that xin shares with
kokoro is the reference to the faculty for constructing meaning or value.
As with kokoro, xin's constructive aspect can be both affective and intel-
lectual. The Chinese yi (pronounced "i" as well as "kokoro" in japanese)
highlights this meaning-generating activity or faculty even more explicitly
than xin. In translating yi into English, we would say it means "intention,"
"inclination," and "meaning." Combining the semantic range of the two
characters, we can surmise that in rendering kokoro into a written form,
the ancient japanese were probably looking for Chinese characters/words
suggesting an affective or cognitive openness or readiness to express mean-
ing. Depending on the emphasis at any given point, they might use either
xin or yi.
Yet, the ancient japanese must have thought that even those two
Chinese-derived characters somehow fell short in communicating all the
nuances of their native word. Once they developed a simple phonetic sys-
tem for writing words without direct reference to Chinese characters, the
hiragana phonetic rendering :.:. 0 became quite common as well. Even
today, that non-Chinese, phonetic rendering for writing kokoro is often
preferred when an author wants to highlight the indigenous (or presumed
indigenous) japanese senses of the word.2
There is one other detail concerning the Chinese character xin IL' that
further illustrates how that Chinese word/character does not mesh per-
fectly with the japanese meaning of kokoro. In China xin was sometimes
used to translate the Indian Buddhist term citta. In English this citta is usu-
ally translated "mind" or "consciousness" and it is easy to see why the
Chinese would associate it with xin. Citta, however, is a somewhat more
limited term than xin in that it is more specifically mental. There are times,
however, when the Buddhist texts did include something like an affective
dimension to the function of citta, but in those cases, citta-now rendered
with the Chinese character xin-often assumed negative connotations. In
particular, it often referred to a delusional meaning-bestowing activity per-
meated with thirst or desire. In such contexts, the term xin alone meant the
deluded mind of ordinary sentient beings as distinguished from the explic-
itly "awakened mind" ({!!t'L' foxin; japanese busshin) of a buddha. By this
roundabout route, the Chinese xin sometimes assumed negative conno-
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tations in japanese Buddhist contexts. Hence, in medieval japanese Zen
Buddhism the term mushin or "no-mind" (~IL'-literally,not having xin,
i.e., not having citta) was a positive ideal, since it meant being free of the
deluded consciousness typical of ordinary beings. That is to say, no-mind
(mushin ~IL') acted as a virtual synonym for buddha-mind (busshin jilt
IL')' Yet, at the same time in medieval japanese aesthetic terminology, the
term mushin was often used negatively. It contrasted with ushin ifIL" lit-
erally, "having xin." In this case, the xin that one has is not the delusional
citta, but instead the responsiveness of kokoro. Hence, in the medieval aes-
thetic context, mushin meant something like "insensitivity" or "heartless-
ness" but in the contemporaneous Zen Buddhist context, the same word
meant being "devoid of delusional consciousness." To my knowledge, the
term kokoro ::.::. 6, unlike shin IL" seems to have been uniformly posi-
tive in value.
Let us now try to penetrate the concept a little more deeply by going
beyond the simple issue of translation. In many contexts a key character-
istic of kokoro is that it involves a propensity for engagement, a sensitiv-
ity expressed as either being in touch with something else or being touched
by it. Through such engagement, meaning-whether factual or valuation-
al-comes into being. Hence, kokoro is what makes responsiveness pos-
sible. Indeed, in many if not most contexts, kokoro involves both being in
touch and being touched. That is, the responsiveness is bidirectional. In
the japanese case this mutual responsiveness undoubtedly had its historical
roots in an ancient animism, a vision of reality as a field of intersensitivi-
ties and interactions. In that ancient perspective, the world was feeling and
responding to us as much as we were responding to the world. But even if
we moderns would prefer to bracket out the metaphysics implied in such
an animistic worldview, we can still make sense of this claim to mutual
responsiveness on the experiential, phenomenological level.
I have already used the phrase "being in touch with and being touched
by." Even when we consider touching in its most mundane and limited
physicality-the experience of tactile touch-we find reciprocal respon-
siveness. When my finger is in contact with the table in front of me, my
finger puts pressure on the table while the table puts pressure on my fin-
ger. My finger is simultaneously touching the table and being touched by
it. In my touching the table, it is as if the table meets me halfway, imposing
increasing pressure as my finger moves forward. From this perspective, the
touch is in the betweenness of my finger and the table. We would not find it
strange to say the "table resists" my finger's pressure upon it. If this is still
difficult to imagine, consider pressing a lump of clay or squeezing a balloon
instead of touching a table. The action in these cases is even more obvi-
ously an interaction between the hand and its "content." So, even though
we might want to avoid animism's metaphysical claim that the table, clay,
or balloon is acting as an agent, our ordinary language suggests an expe-
riential awareness of some such interaction. We commonly use sentences
The Japanese Philosophy of Kokoro 147
~
Internal RelationExternal Relation
in which inanimate objects function as subjects of actions: "the life pre-
server kept me afloat"; "the headwind held us back"; "the thin mountain
air sapped my energy."
Of course, one might say these are only "personifications" of imper-
sonal things, but such a locution only reflects our modernist presupposition
that persons alone can be agents. Others might say the language is meta-
phorical and in speaking such things we do not really mean that nonliving
things can be agents. But that comment is divorced from the way we often
experience things. For example, suppose I was bodysurfing and described
my experience as follows: "the waves smashed my face into the coral below
and held my head down so I could not come up to breathe." That is not
a poetic metaphor or a personification, but an accurate description of my
experience. I really felt I was in a life-and-death struggle with the waves.
Admittedly, some physicist might say that the reality of the situation was
something quite different: that the hydraulic forces in the wave action set
into play vectors of energy that contravened the forces in the buoyancy of
the water that otherwise would have brought my head to the surface. That
scientific account is not false, but it is inappropriate. It would be like trans-
lating the cry "mizu!" from a Japanese man dying of thirst as "the man is
asking for a portion of hydrogen compounded with a half-portion of oxy-
gen in liquid form." The phenomenological character of things-as-agents is
the way we actually experience them. In contrast, the objectivist or scien-
tific account is an abstraction from the experience. This abstracted account
accords with a metaphysics that informs us about "what is really happen-
ing." We will never understand kokoro if we begin by saying the charac-
ter of our experience of the world is fundamentally misleading. The philos-
ophy of kokoro requires us to trust, not abstract away, the way we touch
and are touched by things. Whatever the ontic nature of kok01:0 may be,
we have to admit that the kokoro account at least tells us something about
our human experience.
This experiential being-in-the-world fits well the cultural orientation
of "intimacy" rather then "integrity."3 For example, in cultures or subcul-
tures stressing intimacy, the philosophical modes of discourse and analy-
sis favor internal rather than external relations. In an external relation the
two relatents (a and b) exist independently and are connected via some
third category or entity (R). By contrast, in an internal relation of the sort
favored by the intimacy orientation, the two relatents exist interdepen-
dently, sharing some part of themselves. In that case the relation of a to b
is itself part of what a is and b is (see Figure I).
R/"-00
Figure I. External and Internal Relations
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When the intimacy orientation is emphasized particularly strongly as a cul-
tural orientation, it affects the basic relations within various philosophical
fields in that culture. For example, knowledge will be construed as over-
lap between the knower and thing known. The knower is not an external
observer to the world, but is rather intimately engaged in it, so knowing
the world and knowing oneself cannot be sharply distinguished. In the field
of ethics, we will find an ethics not of responsibility governed by overarch-
ing rules, principles, and maxims that define the external relation between
self and others. Instead, the intimacy orientation establishes an ethics of
responsiveness arising from the shared identities of self and other. In poli-
tics, the state will be construed, not as a social contract among independent
individuals, but rather as a sensitivity and nurturing of a shared space. In
the arts, creativity will lie not in the subjectivity of the artist but in the res-
onance among artist, subject, and artistic medium. In japan the philosophy
of kokoro-as a philosophy of intersensitivity-functions in such a cul-
tural orientation of intimacy. It is no surprise, therefore, that the ideal of
kokoro influences various philosophical domains, including epistemology,
ethics, politics, and aesthetics.
To give us a feel for this intersensitivity of kokoro, we can consider
a few lines from a well-known poem from the eighth-century collection
called Man'yoshu (The Collection of Ten Thousand Leaves). The poem,
"Elegy on the Death of a Wife" (Man'yoshu: 794-799), is by Yamanoue no
Okura (66o-ca. 733). The poem begins by relating how the man's wife had
followed him on a journey to Tsukushi, but she fell ill and died. Our inter-
est here is in the lines expressing the widower's state.of grief.
Now I know not what to do or say,
Vainly I seek soothing words
From trees and stones.
~ litr9A:.-\tUTA:.9;il GI;:
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In the envoy (hanka) attached to the end of the poem, he writes:
Over Mount Onu [or Ono] the fog is rising;
Driven by my sighs of grief,
The fog is rising.4
:kif0) w3:s'L t::> bt:: 9
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Two points in the poem merit special attention. First, we must ask why
the speaker in the poem sought soothing words from trees and stones. The
speaker literally cries out (tohisake) to these natural objects for some com-
fort or understanding, seeking dialogue with them. But he receives none.
There is a distance between the speaker and the natural world, a gap where
there should be a locus of intimacy. The response may be compared to a
Christian widower's looking up at the sky and asking, "God, why did this
happen?" In both cases, the man is seeking meaning and consolation. Yet,
the Christian turns to a heavenly deity; the ancient japanese to a spiri-
tual presence in the natural world. Furthermore, whereas the westerner is
searching for the "why," the japanese poet is apparently seeking consola-
The Japanese Philosophy of Kokoro 149
tion, not explanation, from the sacred. The Japanese does not necessarily
associate the sacred with teleology, perfect rationality, or any supramun-
dane purpose. Instead the speaker in the poem is seeking resonance with
the sacred.
The poem's envoy reveals a second point about the nature-human-
ity relationship in the poem and the ancient worldview in which it was
embedded. The speaker's exclamation of grief is interfused with the natu-
ral force driving the mist upward. "Driven by my sighs of grief" translates
wa ga nageku/okiso no kaze ni literally, "by the wind (kaze) of my roar-
ing breath (okiso, i.e., oki 'breath' + usa 'blow forth') which I sigh" (wa ga
nageku: the verb nageki probably deriving from "naga" + "iki," that is, a
long breath). In short, the verbal image relates an interpenetration of the
breath and wind, a correlation found in many ancient cultures around the
world.S Perhaps the last line tells us that, in the poet's experience at least,
the natural world is magically and empathically responding to his grief
after all. It is not, though, a response from an external divine entity (the
sacred does not "answer" the poet's "prayer," nor does the fog represent a
divine "sign" like the rainbow's function in Genesis 9:12-13). Instead, the
poet discovers the natural harmony between the physical and affective, the
material and spiritual. Although silent, the natural world resonates with
the man's sighs. The lost empathy between the human and the natural has
been restored through the mutual movement of air and the affect's capac-
ity to connect the psychological and material. The human sigh and the ris-
ing mist in the wind are inseparable.
We have thus far analyzed the kokoro of the poem in terms of its sub-
ject matter. But what about the poetic creation of the poem itself? How
did it come into being and what was· the role of kokoro there? Here our
interpretation will benefit from the theories of the Japanese na~ive studies
(kokugaku 00$) philosopher, Motoori Norinaga *-,*1[* (1730-1801).
According to Norinaga, we must not limit our understanding of kokoro
to the side of the experiencer alone. There is also kokoro in things (mono
no kokoro) and events (koto no kokoro) as well as words (also koto no
kokoro).6 If a person has sensitivity (kokoro ga aru hito, a person with
heart), he or she will be aware of the kokoro of things as well as the kokoro
in words. An affective knowledge occurs when the person's kokoro some-
how merges with the kokoro of the event and of the words. Perhaps the
best way to think of this is that kokoro is a field of mutual responsive-
ness among person, world, and word. Therefore, kokoro C~) is the site of
meaning (]J:).
Following the native studies analysis, the world of which we are a
part is a web of intimately related affects. For many native studies think-
ers, this had spiritual as well as aesthetic implications. The world was born
of intimacy. We mean this not only in the sense of the physical acts of love
among the gods that led to the creation of the world, but also that creation
itself was the fortuitous expression of the gods' inner selves. According to
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Japan's ancient myths, parts of what we know as the world were originally
sometimes no more than pieces of the gods that were washed off while
bathing, for example. For Motoori, the key point is that there was no clear
rational plan for creation. Instead, out of the gods' being touched by each
other, the world spontaneously took form. This resembles the moment of
poetic creativity in which the words-things come into being through their
spontaneous expression by the poet.
Again, for modern westerners, it might be best to ignore the religious
metaphysics inherent in such a claim and to focus instead on this theory
as a phenomenological account, that is, as a description of how we expe-
rience. For example, as I am writing these sentences, words are appearing
on my computer screen. How does this happen? Ordinarily, I might say
the objects of my thought (say, the texts that discuss the Japanese theory of
kokoro) are "out there." Literally, there are books opened on my desk, laid
out in front of me. Then there is the process of my thinking about those
texts and what those Japanese graphs on the page seem to express: the eyes
sense the black splotches on the page and my mind turns them into words
that I then think about and interpret. To interpret, I bring to bear various
remembered facts about Norinaga's perspective and the meaning of partic-
ular Japanese words. I am, of course, trying to get it right, to explain what
Norinaga really said and meant. As I think through what I want to say, I
search for words and expressions in the databank of my English vocabu-
lary. I tryout these words as symbols to convey what I am thinking Nori-
naga wrote. Finally, my fingers move across the keyboard and the words
appear on my computer screen. This account follows an analysis steeped in
integrity: Norinaga's book, Norinaga as author of the book, the Japanese
language, the English language, my thoughts, my factual knowledge, my
fingers, and the computer each exists as a discrete entity with its own integ-
rity. Meaning occurs, by this analysis, when appropriate links are forged
among those distinct entities. We can say this account assumes that "to
make meaning is to make connections." Such an account is a common way
to think about this situation in terms familiar to our contemporary West-
ern philosophical context.
Now let us try to describe this meaning-event from the standpoint of
the kokoro theory. I find myself in an interdependent, interresponsive field
extending in all directions. I am writing about kokoro and do not know
how it will all turn out. A passage-some phrasing remembered from a
previous experience-comes to me and my hand reaches out. Before me
is a book with Norinaga's Japanese words imprinted on it. In focusing on
the page that beckons, the experiential field collapses its periphery at the
same time as the book's page zooms to fill the experience to its edges. In
my reading, I meet Norinaga's text halfway-my mind concentrates on his
words and his words sound in my own head in my own voice. As I inter-
pret more deeply, I bring my interests to the text and the text responds
with its interests in relation to my own. Attention shifts to hands on the
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computer keyboard and eyes fixed on the monitor. I look for the words to
express the situation being experienced, but in my seeking out the words,
the words also come to me, as if from nowhere. All the words I use I have
written before, but whenever they come to me as they do now, they bring
their own configuration, resonating with each other in ways both surpris-
ing and yet obvious. My fingers move at the periphery of my awareness
and as the words sound in my mind, they mysteriously appear on the com-
puter screen. By this account, meaning does not make connections. Instead,
meaning arises from the internal connections already there and springing
forth in the kokoro. We can diagram this as Figure 2.
Figure 2: Meaning as Kokoro
The two accounts describe the same event, but in very different ways.
The first account is given as if there were an external standpoint from
which I am watching myself and explaining what is happening. In the sec-
ond account, by contrast, the description is given as if it were arising from
inside the experience as it is happening. In fact, if the second account were
related in Japanese, because of the nature of Japanese syntax, I could have
related it without using any personal pronoun for "I," or "me,". or "my."
This would make the distance between the narrator and experiencer seem
even less in the phenomenological account.
Now we can finally turn to the question that initiated the discussion
of kokoro. How can one nurture kokoro through education or training?
Obviously, the pedagogy cannot simply involve a curriculum by which one
accumulates factual knowledge alone, because kokoro requires a response,
at least in part, to the newness and uniqueness of each situation. Nor can
the curriculum be one that tries to eradicate all emotion or affectivity, as
scientism might advocate. As we have seen, kokoro involves an engage-
ment in a field of interresponsive meaning that is affective as well as cogni-
tive. Lastly, the educational plan must also avoid the other extreme (akin to
some strands of Western romantic subjectivism) that advocates immersion
in one's own personal, ultimately egocentric feelings. In what respects has
the Japanese tradition developed a theory for cultivating kokoro such that
it avoids both coldhearted detachment and self-indulgent sentimentality?
Different schools of thought, both aesthetic and spiritual, have developed
their own particular courses of training, the details of which would take
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us far beyond the limits of this essay. For our purposes here, however, we
can consider four general points that most Japanese traditions share. These
four points are (1) apprenticeship under a master; (2) immersion in tradi-
tion; (3) elimination of ego; and (4) engagement with community.
1. Apprenticeship under a master. It is unarguably true that East Asian
traditions have often used master-student lineage narratives to buttress
claims to authority for their respective schools. Various political, social,
and economic contests for power have used lineages as cultural capital
in arguing for the superiority of one school over its competitors. Yet, we
should not let the dust kicked up by these culture wars blind us to the orig-
inal rationale for the master-apprentice relation. The cultivation of kokoro
occurs through activity, through acting in accord with a paradigm supplied
by masters. The same character ~ is used for the word manabu, which
means to study, and manebu, which means to imitate or mimic. In the cul-
tural orientation of intimacy, one learns about internal relations by accom-
panying a master who enacts the ideal mode of relating, whether that relat-
ing be to an art, to words, to nature, or to other people. The master's gift
to the student is not knowledge about something, but instead a model for
a wise course of living.
Therefore, the pedagogy for cultivating kokoro requires on the part of
the student trust in the teacher's mastery and an admiration for how the
master enacts wisdom in his or her relations. In return the teachers rec-
ognize that their authority derives not from knowledge but from exem-
plary behavior. If the masters know their students are learning by emula-
tion, every action of every day becomes part of the lesson. This is why Zen
master Dagen JiijI; (1200-1253) writes that in Zen "students and mas-
ters practice together."7 The student's practice and the master's practice are
mutually responsive and intertwined. This master-student relation in Zen
is emotionally charged, but through their interaction, the student learns by
example the proper expression of affect.
2. Immersion in tradition. Although kokoro requires engaging the par-
ticularities of each event in its uniqueness, the student's response is always
partially informed by the absorption of tradition. To express kokoro, one
must first be impressed by kokoro and its previous expressions. If this seems
paradoxical, we need only think of language. The more I study words and
see how they have been used to express the kokoro of previous events, the
more likely the "right word" will present itself to me at the moment of my
own expression. All of us have a native language, but that language can be
expanded by our steeping ourselves in the classics of the past. Those clas-
sic expressions become part of our second nature, functioning as unself-
consciously as our legs when we walk. When Motoori Norinaga told his
teacher, Kamo no Mabuchi ~a~7)Hj (r697-I769), that he wanted to
study the ancient poems of the eighth-century collection called Man'yoshu,
Mabuchi required that all future correspondence from Norinaga be written
in the syntax, orthography, and vocabulary of that work. That is, Mabuchi
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insisted that the language of Man'yoshu become so second nature to Nori-
naga that he would not have to decipher the ancient passages. Rather, they
would speak to him as naturally as his native language.
Fujiwara no Teika jiJrn'i:Jt* (II62-124I), a famous writer of tradi-
tional Japanese poems (waka flJfIfJ\), wrote extensively on the training of
poets wishing to emulate the classical style. His theory of poetics set the
standard for the ensuing centuries. Teika placed particular importance
on achieving a depth of sensitivity (the term he used was the previously
discussed ushin, that is, "having kokoro"). He explicitly discussed how
important it was for the aspiring poet to immerse himself in the traditional
classics of the great poets of antiquity. In fact, those long-dead poets them-
selves were to be the masters for the students to emulate. In the following
quotations from his Guide to the Composition of Poetry, Teika discusses
the relation between traditional words and the novelty of the sentiment
that gets expressed.
In the expression of emotions originality merits the first consideration.
(That is, one should look for sentiments unsung by others and sing
them.) The words used, however, should be the old ones.... One should
impregnate one's mind with a constant study of the forms of expression
of ancient poetry....
There are no teachers of Japanese poetry. But they who take the
old poems as their teachers, steep their minds in the old style and learn
their words from the masters of former time-who of them will fail to
write poetry?8
3. Elimination ofego. This pedagogical goal is already implied by what
has gone before. To entrust oneself completely to a master-whether that
master be living or even, as Teika suggests, dead-is an act of s.ubmission
requiring at least some degree of egolessness. To immerse oneself in the
expressions of the traditional masters means giving up the notion of one-
self as the agent of creativity. For a poet to recognize his own words as the
resonance of others is to dissolve himself in a field of kokoro where words,
events, things, and tradition all speak together with the self. One does not
refer to reality; instead one confers with it. Only then will the expression of
the kokoro ring true. In Japan both artistic and spiritual traditions advo-
cate slow breathing and meditation as ways to quiet the ego. One must
quiet the passions to allow the softer emotions of kokoro to come forth.
To be fully in touch with things, one must give up the ego; but in being in
touch with things, one is in turn touched by them. This is the reciprocity
and mutuality of cognitive affect that typifies kokoro.
4. Engagement with community. It might seem that our description of
kokoro can be a solitary affair. Perhaps after some training with a master
(who Teika suggests might be no more than a book of classic poems), one
can go off on one's own and cultivate kokoro. This is not correct, however.
Norinaga criticizes such an ideal as a "Daoist" aesthetic totally divorced
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from kokoro. According to Norinaga's essays on the Tale ofGenji, the gen-
uine kokoro (makoto no kokoro) was best exemplified not by some moun-
tain hermit but by the denizens of the Heian court. From an unsympathetic
standpoint, we might today see the Heian courtly lifestyle as permeated,
not by genuine affect, but by the phoniness of affectation. The Heian aes-
thete lived a contrived lifestyle away from the distractions of ordinary life.
Relieved of any requirement to work, the aristocrats read and wrote poetry,
celebrated each change of seasons and phase of the moon, and delighted in
arranging the colored layers of their kimonos according to the high fash-
ion color schemes dictated by "elegance" (miyabi ~). But that is not the
Heian court that Norinaga saw. For him reading and writing poetry was
immersion in tradition. The celebrations of nature were not boisterous par-
tying but quiet reflections on the evanescent here and now. The aesthetic of
miyabi was the ideal of getting it right, of using the patterns of tradition as
a vehicle for celebrating something new.
Perhaps the best way to appreciate the importance of aesthetic com-
munity for cultivating kokoro is to think of the community as the audience
for one's expression of kokoro. After all, if kokoro is a sensitivity that leads
to expression, to whom is the expression directed? In one sense, the expres-
sion is an end in itself: it is kokoro's self-expression for its own sake. But in
another sense, the performative aspect of the expressive act is a call to fur-
ther participation. The audience for the expression of kokoro is not a static
spectator who observes the expression from outside. The audience is not
in an external relation to the expression. No, the audience-at least ideal-
ly-is engaged in the expression itself. The audience is part of the kokoro
in the largest sense. Yet, for that expansion and melcing of the kokoro, the
audience too must be trained. One does not refer to an expression; one con-
fers with it. And the capacity to confer is not innate; it is acquired through
cultivation. Hence, Norinaga envisioned the Heian court as an impressive-
expressive dynamic among highly trained aesthetes who were reciprocally
both artist and audience. However naive or idealistic Norinaga's vision of
the realities of the Heian court might have been, he did see in it the possi-
bility of a communal kokoro. To be in touch with others is to know them;
to know them is to be touched by them. This reiteration of the insepara-
bility of the cognitive and affective is the core assumption of the theory of
kokoro. And therein lies its relevance to our present-day concerns about
pedagogy and the emotions.
The purpose of this essay was to analyze the Japanese theory of kokoro
as a way of provoking us into rethinking the supposed bifurcation between
the intellectual and the emotional, the cognitive and the affective. Once we
consider the possibility that at least sometimes in some ways the affective
plays a critical role in cognition, it is striking how some antiquated aspects
of Western pedagogy take on new significance. Only decades ago, teach-
ers were often called "schoolmasters." Trade schools emphasized the mas-
ter-apprentice relation. Students in grade school memorized long poems
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and passages of edifying prose. Repetitive drills on grammar, spelling, and
vocabulary were considered prerequisites to even beginning to think about
developing "one's own style." Students everywhere read the same old clas-
sics that gave them at least some shared aesthetic experience. I am not nec-
essarily suggesting we go back to the old ways. Yet, as philosophers we
should at least think about what assumptions about learning and cognition
might have been behind some of those practices. And as we continue to
update and revise our pedagogical practices, we might want to think about
what new assumptions we may be making and whether we want to stand
by them. For example, when we use cut-and-paste and hyperlinks instead
of rote memorization to evoke the texts of the past, have we only changed
the way we access them or have we also changed their purpose? When we
diversify the grade school's required reading list, have we expanded our list
of classics or have we changed how a "classic" functions? When a teacher
is no longer an exemplar but has become a facilitator, what exactly is being
facilitated? In the information age, what is the role of aesthetic sensitiv-
ity and affective responsiveness? One benefit of comparative philosophy is
that it may help us raise questions we might never have raised otherwise.
Notes
I. Malcolm Gladwell's work Blink: The Power of Thinking without Thinking
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Shinkokai Translation of One Thousand Poems (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1969), pp. 198-199.
5. See the entry on "Breath and Breathing" by Ellison Banks Findly in Mircea
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gling vines") refers to the Zen student's getting tripped up and entangled in concepts
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entangled in each other's words, so that ultimately they work through the problem
together. Thus, "entangling" becomes something more like "entwining." For a dis-
cussion of this fascicle in light of these themes, see my "The Incomparable Philoso-
pher: Dagen on How to Read the Shabagenza, " in William LaFleur, ed., Dagen Stud-
ies (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1985), pp. 83-98.
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TAO JIANG
9 The Dilemma of Skillful Means
in Buddhist Pedagogy
Desire and Education in the Lotus SOtra
Buddhism is a religion that starts with the Buddha's struggle with the fun-
damental problem of suffering in the lived experience. As a result, Bud-
dhist teachings, despite their wide variety and heterogeneity, are primarily
geared toward alleviating and overcoming suffering. The Buddha identi-
fies ignorance and desire as the sources of suffering.1 Removal of igno-
rance holds the key to reaching awakening and ending suffering. Hence,
knowledge is crucial in Buddhism. However, such knowledge is not the
result of metaphysical speculations. The Buddha is famous for refusing to
answer metaphysical questions, which he regards as irrelevant to the spir-
itual life. Rather, the knowledge the Buddha teaches comes from intense
scrutiny and analysis of the lived experience so as to gain an understand-
ing of the sources of suffering. Although such analyses carry metaphysical
implications that later Buddhists would explore, the primary concern on
how to end suffering remains the point of departure for much of the Bud-
dhist intellectual effort. Due to this primary concern, the knowledge that
is produced by the Buddhists is meant to be transformative, not just infor-
mative. It is the kind of knowledge that should be practiced, embodied,
and realized in one's experience, not just read, pondered, and memorized
in one's head. As such, it requires a wide variety of methods targeting the
specific practical needs of learners, since what is at stake is not simply the
abstract truthfulness of the teaching, but also its meaningfulness, and thus
effectiveness.
In this essay I will look into one such method by which the Buddha2
imparts appropriate knowledge to his disciples and others, namely upaya,
variously translated as "the skillful means," "skill in means," or "expedi-
ent device," and so on.3 It "refers to the different pedagogical styles, medi-
tation techniques, and religious practices that help people overcome attach-
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ment, and to the way in which Buddhism is communicated to others."4 It is
the link between wisdom and compassion, arising from the idea that "wis-
dom is embodied in how one responds to others rather than an abstract
conception of the world"5 and reflecting "an ongoing concern with the
soteriological effectiveness of the Buddhist teachings."6
There are several potential problems in such a pedagogy, the most seri-
ous of which is that it includes means we would normally regard as lies,
misinformation, or misdirection. Therein arises a clear dilemma between
the effectiveness and the truthfulness of a particular teaching as an exer-
cise of skillful means. I will look into how modern scholars have dealt with
such a dilemma and provide a possible alternative to accommodate both
the concerns for effectiveness and for truthfulness, which at times might be
at odds with each other.
I will argue that the truthfulness and efficacy of skillful means are uni-
fied in one of the most important insights in the Buddha's teaching, which
is to expose the pervasiveness of human desire? constitutive of all our activ-
ities, including our pursuit of knowledge. Put simply, skillful means is
meant to address this pervasive human desire, not human intellect. What
appears to be a white lie for the intellect actually targets desires. In other
words, human desire must be dealt with differently, not with the usual phil-
osophical formula the intellect embraces. Viewed in this way, the truthful-
ness skillful means embodies in targeting human desire is best understood
on a therapeutic model of truth that seeks to transform desire into moti-
vation toward a fruitful spiritual life. That is, in order for the teaching to
be both truthful and effective, it has to be meaningful to the desire. Such
meaningfulness is its immediate relevancy to the beneficiary in her lived
experience so that desire can be transformed into motivation toward a spir-
ituallife. Due to the prominence of the Lotus Sutra and the crucial teach-
ing of skillful means in it, I will focus on the discussion of skillful means
in this sutra.8
Upiiya and Its Modern Critiques
The official mission of the Lotus Sutra is to promulgate the teaching that
there is only one vehicle toward ultimate enlightenment or Buddhahood,
and this goal is accessible to all sentient beings: "Shariputra [SariputraJ,
the Thus Come Ones [Tathagatas] have only a single Buddha vehicle which
they employ in order to preach the Law [Dharma] to living beings. They
do not have any other vehicle, a second one or a third one."9 The other
three vehicles refer to the path of sravaka (voice-hearer) that leads to arhat-
ship, that of pratyekabuddha who seeks enlightenment by and for oneself,
and the bodhisattva path, which delivers all sentient beings to the land of
enlightenment. All three are considered inferior to the ultimate single vehi-
cle preached in the Lotus Sutra, as all of them fail to deliver sentient beings
to the ultimate state of Buddhahood. In fact, those three vehicles are meant
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to prepare the sentient beings for the teaching of the single Buddha vehi-
cle in the Lotus Sutra. As the Sutra explains, the Buddhas of past, present,
and future employ "countless numbers of expedient means, various causes
and conditions, and words of simile and parable in order to expound the
doctrines for the sake of living beings. These doctrines are all for the sake
of the one Buddha vehicle. These living beings, by listening to the doc-
trines of the Buddhas, are all eventually able to attain wisdom embracing
all species. "10 This is the teaching of the universal accessibility of Buddha-
hood through the single Buddha vehicle the Sutra preaches. The other ear-
lier vehicles lead to a lesser achievement, arhat, pratyekabuddha, or bodhi-
sattva, either for the practitioners themselves (the former two) or for all
(the latter one). The superiority of the single Buddha vehicle preached in
the Lotus Sutra lies in its promise of helping all sentient beings to reach no
less than Buddhahood.
However, what interests us in this essay is the way by which the teach-
ing is promulgated in the Sutra. This is the method of skillful means men-
tioned in the above passage. As Michael Pye acutely observes: "the very
theme of the Buddha's discourse in the Lotus Sutra is supposed to be his
skillful means, which is intimately connected with his Dharma and which
he shares in common with all the buddhas. Apart from this theme there is
indeed no particular 'content' to the teaching given. It is a sutra therefore
not so much about doctrines in an assertive sense, but rather about the
inner method of the Buddhist religion."11 This means that the Lotus Sutra
is not really advancing any new doctrinal teaching, but is rather focus-
ing on how the Buddhist doctrines should be evaluated and reformed with
respect to their value in guiding sentient beings to the spiritual awakening.
In this sense, the Lotus Sutra is really about promoting the wonder of skill-
ful means.
Pye sums up skillful means in this way:
In Mahayana Buddhism the various forms of Buddhist teaching and
practice are declared to be provisional means, all skillfully set up by the
Buddha for the benefit of the unenlightened. A Buddhist who makes
progress himself comes to recognise this provisional quality in the forms
of his religion, and though using the means provided for him he has to
learn not to be wrongly attached to them. He leaves them behind, like
a raft left lying on the bank by a man who has crossed a stream and
needs it no more. An advanced follower of Buddhism, usually named
by Mahayana Buddhists a bodhisattva, continues to use such provi-
sional means in order to lead other living things towards nirvana. A
bodhisattva is skilled in allowing the Buddhist religion to be spelled out
in all its detail, while not being ensnared by the false discriminations of
the unenlightened. 12
Accordingly, the postulation of the skillful means has at least two motiva-
tions. First, it is meant to be self-critical, making the Buddhists aware of
I
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the inherent limitations of all teachings, including even the Buddhist teach-
ings. Second, it is directed toward helping others skillfully according to
their particular circumstances without oneself being entrapped. Let us look
at the two in some detail.
First, one underlying intention for the teaching of skillful means is to
liberate committed Buddhist practitioners from their natural attachment to
various Buddhist teachings by pointing out that those teachings are provi-
sional means to help practitioners achieve enlightenment. Once enlighten-
ment is accomplished, those teachings, no matter how effective, should be
left behind. Just like a good medicine, its value is to cure a disease, which
frees a patient from depending on that very medicine. Or like a raft, it is
abandoned once a person uses it to cross over to the other side of the river.
Similarly, the effectiveness of a religious teaching lies in its ability to trans-
form a practitioner in a way that liberates her from that very teaching.
There is no point in attaching oneself to a teaching. The very schematiza-
tion of skillful means reflects a recognition by the Buddhists of the provi-
sional nature of Buddhist teachings, however invaluable they are for the
unenlightened.
Second, skillful means are effective pedagogical tools at the disposal of
an enlightened being for the purpose of helping sentient beings. It addresses
the particular circumstances of each sentient being, taking into consider-
ation her needs, inclinations, capacities, and lived experience. It does not
provide a straightjacketed abstract teaching that suits all, respecting the
genuine and vast differences among sentient beings and allowing a plural-
ity of means to deal with those differences so as to make the teaching mean-
ingful and effective.
However, at times the Lotus Sutra contains tales that seem to suggest
that the truthfulness of the teaching can be sacrificed for the sake of effec-
tiveness. The famous "burning house" parable in chapter three of the Sutra,
"Simile and Parable,"13 is a case in point. A father sees that a crumbling old
house is on fire, but his children are caught up in their games, not heeding
their father's order that they leave the house immediately. The father has to
do something quickly in order to save his kids, so he captures their atten-
tion by promising them fantastic toys outside the house. When they come
out, they find that there are no toys as promised, but do see that the house
is on fire and realize that they have been saved from a devastating disaster.
The father does give everyone of them a big cart. Clearly the father in the
parable is being compared to the Buddha, the kids to the deluded sentient
beings, the house on fire to the world permeated by the fire of desire,14 and
the big cart to the single Buddha vehicle.
Now an obvious question arises: is the father/Buddha at fault in any
way? The Sutra, through the mouth of Sariputra, rejects casting any blame
on the father on the ground of his compassionate intention and the effec-
tiveness of his action. 15 Therefore an apparent dilemma arises between the
effectiveness and the truthfulness of a particular teaching in the exercise of
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skillful means. Some scholars have come up with several ways to explain
away such an apparent problem, whereas others consider the misdirection
a lie regardless of the motivation involved. John Schroeder represents the
most recent development in the former, while Richard Garner's"Are Con-
venient Fictions Harmful to Your Health?"16 represents the latter group.
As Garner points out:
Perhaps Sariputra is confusing usefulness with truthfulness, because on
any plausible account of lying I can think of, the father was guilty of
falsehood. He produced a false statement intending for his children to
believe it. He said there were toys when in fact there were no toys. If
that isn't a lie or a falsehood, what is?
It makes more sense to admit that the father did lie to his children,
and then to say that his lie was completely justified. Then we can point
out to Sariputra that the question is not whether the father is a liar (one
lie does not make a liar), but whether the father lied. He didY
Garner represents the more critical end of the spectrum of modern
interpretations of skillful means. His bottom line is that the distinction
between truthfulness and the usefulness of a teaching must be maintained.
Even if one has to resort to lies in an urgent and justified situation, it should
nevertheless be recognized as such, hence avoiding further confusions down
the line. Garner is fully cognizant that "[t]he point of the [burning house]
parable, of course, is that what the Buddha offered (identified in the Lotus
Sutra as 'Buddhahood') would not have been attractive to people at every
level of development. So, just as with the children, it is expedient to prom-
ise less than one gives."18 Nevertheless, he is troubled by the presumptu-
ousness of the Buddhists who accept skillful means as a valid way of teach-
ing: "Buddhists were motivated by compassion ... , and their expedient
devices were introduced to help others avoid suffering and reach enlighten-
ment. They believed themselves to be in possession of a teaching that was
too deep and demanding for people scarred by ignorance and bad mental
habits, and so they devised ways to attract adherents and to help beginners
develop focused and tranquil minds." 19 He is obviously suspicious of a cer-
tain Buddhist claim that sentient beings are so blinded by their ignorance
that it is virtually impossible for them to understand the profundity of the
Buddhist teachings.20 Furthermore, noble intention alone is not adequate
in guaranteeing a desirable result: "We can agree that the Buddhists ... have
only the best motives. Nevertheless we also know that deception and the
false beliefs that result can hurt us even when the intentions of the deceiver
are good, so it is possible, even likely, that widespread acceptance of sub-
stantial false beliefs will have unanticipated bad results. "21 Garner refuses
to justify any practice of deception solely on the ground of noble motives
on the part of the deceiver. He does not wantto see any deceptive act sim-
ply in isolation; rather, it will lead to more deceptions and confusions.
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Lastly, by allowing false information to be spread for some higher pur-
pose, the teaching of skillful means does not give the sentient beings a
chance to practice courage. It has the potential of promoting some wide-
spread false information that is ultimately detrimental to the long-term
well-being of the sentient beings, any temporary, short-term gain notwith-
standing:
Any time we do not see things as they are, we are to some extent made
incapable of appropriate behavior. Further, if fanciful doctrines are
widely believed, people will become confused about what it takes to
have a true belief, and will be encouraged to indulge in many spurious
modes of cognition. A belief in karma and reincarnation, or in heaven
and hell, may make us feel better about reality if our current life isn't
turning out well; but by the same token, it may rob us of a chance to
practice courage, and may actually discourage us from improving our
lives by making us believe either that we deserve what we are getting, or
that justice will be achieved in the fullness of time.22
Therefore, Garner warns us against ignoring "bad side effects when some
presumptuous elite manipulates everyone else by promoting a version of
events they know to be inaccurate. "23
While acknowledging the potential abuse of skillful means, we need to
point out that Garner's critique does not do full justice to the teaching of
skillful means in Mahayana Buddhism in that he does not take into con-
sideration the context within which such a teaching emerges. First of all,
as I have pointed out, skillful means represents a continuing attempt by
Buddhists themselves to examine critically various Buddhist teachings and
practices in order to overcome the persistent problem of attachment-in
this case, attachment to Buddhist teachings. The teaching of skillful means
should not be taken out of such a self-critique in which Buddhists are
engaged.
Furthermore, nowhere in the Sutra does the Buddha proclaim that
there should be a programmatic and systematic deception in order to set
sentient beings on the right path. If skillful means allows deceptions on cer-
tain occasions, they are never meant to be systematic and programmatic,
unlike what Plato proposes in The Republic. The key here is that the exer-
cise of skillful means by an enlightened being to intervene in an urgent and
disastrous situation is only justified by particular circumstances. Skillful
means is never meant to be an absolute principle that is context-indepen-
dent. Garner is committing what I would call an "absolutist fallacy." That
is, skillful means can only be used under particular circumstances, and as
such it cannot be universalized as some absolute principle or even doc-
trine. Garner's critique is based on scenarios when certain practice of skill-
ful means becomes universalized and absolutized. We can clearly see the
shadow of Kant in Garner's critique. His rejection of skillful means rep-
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resents an absolutist attitude that refuses to consider any concrete situa-
tions.24
However, there is yet another important aspect in the teaching of skill-
ful means that can be very easily missed. If the attempt to sever truthfulness
and efficacy in the Buddha's teachings is troubling, we should be reminded
that skillful means ultimately leads the beneficiary to see the emptiness of
all teachings, including that very skillful means. In other words, decep-
tion alone, if it has to be recognized as such, is not enough. In fact, decep-
tion is neither the intention nor the objective of skillful means. The person
"deceived" has to be able to realize, at the end, the very empty nature of
that deceptive or misleading device.25 To this extent, the Sutra agrees with
Garner that the truthfulness of teachings must ultimately be maintained.
The most comprehensive challenge to critiques like Garner's comes
from the work of John Schroeder. Schroeder's monologue Skillful Means
represents the most recent development in the defense of skillful means.
Schroeder defends its teaching on the ground of religious metapraxis,
which is "a form of reflection devoted exclusively to problems surrounding
the nature and efficacy of religious praxis"26 and is different from "other
types of philosophical reflection-such as metaphysics-that problema-
tize what stands behind or above religious praxis. "27 By thus contextual-
izing the Buddha's teaching within metapraxis, Schroeder hopes to make
the case that the skillful "lies" in some of the Buddha's teachings should be
understood in terms of their efficacy in bringing about the spiritual trans-
formation of his listeners, not their ontological truthfulness regarding an
objective reality.
According to Schroeder, it makes more sense to understand skillful
means in the context of Buddhist pr"axis, not some disembodied intellectual
discourse on truth or reality. He adopts the theory of metapraxis, devel-
oped by Thomas Kasulis, in his ambitious effort to reinterpret 'Buddhism:
Religious praxis generally has either a participatory or transforma-
tive function. It participates in, to use Rudolf Otto's term, the "numi-
nous." It is transformative in its improving the person or community in
some spiritual way (purifying, healing, reconciling, protecting, inform-
ing, and so on). Metapractical reflection inquires into the purpose and
efficacy of the practice in terms of these participatory and transforma-
tive functions. Something happens, or at least is supposed to happen, in
and through religious praxis. Metapraxis analyzes and evaluates that
happening. What does the praxis change? Is something remembered?
Reenacted? Empowered? If so, exactly how does the praxis work? And
why should we prefer our traditional praxis as more effective than
another?28
Here metapraxis is contrasted with metaphysics. While the former attends
to the concrete religious praxis in bringing about spiritual transformations
of practitioners, the latter focuses on working out some philosophical for-
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mula that captures truth and reality in their abstraction from any particu-
lar context.
Building on Kasulis' insight, Schroeder goes on to make the case that
the teaching of skillful means in Mahayana Buddhism is
less about the creation of new philosophical doctrines or world-views
than an attempt to restate the basic message of non-attachment.... In
this regard, the Mahayanists argue from the perspective of upiiya, say-
ing there is no fixed methodology or doctrine to argue about, and that
any attempt to institute a monolithic form of praxis not only violates
the teachings of the Buddha, but destroys the ability to respond com-
passionately. In their view, the idea that one can metapractically justify
a single practice for all people in all circumstances is not just anti-Bud-
dhist and unorthodox. It is counterproductive, harmful, and ineffec-
tive.29
In other words, according to Schroeder the concern that skillful means
addresses is metapractical, not metaphysical. On this scheme, we can see
that Garner's critique of skillful means falls squarely on the side of meta-
physics in insisting that skillful means meet the criterion of truth in the
metaphysical sense irrespective of any circumstantial considerations. Such
an absolutist attitude toward doctrinal teachings, exemplified in many Bud-
dhists as well, is precisely what skillful means wants to overcome.
I am sympathetic to Schroeder's interpretation that skillful means does
not operate on an abstract, context-independent metaphysical sense of
truthfulness, but rather on the level of metapractical effectiveness. How-
ever, we still need a model of truthfulness that can better situate skillful
means. Otherwise, there is a risk of interpreting skillful means as rendering
truthfulness completely irrelevant to the Buddhist practitioners, which is as
potentially dangerous as Garner warns. Incorporating Schroeder's insights
in interpreting upaya as metapractical while preserving a place for truth in
the teaching, I would like to propose that skillful means operates on a ther-
apeutic model of truthfulness. In other words, the merit of skillful means
lies in its therapeutic values.
To characterize skillful means as therapeutic can remind us that it
addresses a concrete person in a meaningful way within a particular con-
text. Such truthfulness in the therapeutic sense is relevant and meaningful
to that person under a specific circumstance. Outside of a particular con-
text, truth becomes distant, and oftentimes meaningless. In the following
discussion, I will try to work out a therapeutic model of truth as a new way
to approach skillful means so that neither truthfulness nor effectiveness is
sacrificed in its exercise. I will argue that the truthfulness and effectiveness
of skillful means are unified in one of the most important insights of the
Buddha, that which points to the pervasiveness of desire in human exis-
tence. If we understand skillful means as therapeutic with human desire as
its target, we can accommodate both its truthfulness and its effectiveness.
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In other words, it is the skillful means that enables the Buddha to address
desire therapeutically. It will become clear to us that in the Lotus Sidra
desire is the target of skillful means, and skillful means is the most thera-
peutically effective way to deal with it.
The Problem of Desire and Its Therapy through Skillful Means
The target of the skillful means is very clear in the Lotus Sutra. In Chap-
ter II, "Expedient Means," the Buddha states very explicitly why skill-
ful means is necessary: "I know that living beings have various desires,
attachments that are deeply implanted in their minds. Taking cognizance
of this basic nature of theirs, I will therefore use various causes and condi-
tions, words of simile and parable, and the power of expedient means and
expound the Law for them. Shariputra [Sariputra], I do this so that all of
them may attain the one Buddha vehicle and wisdom embracing all spe-
cies."30 Here, it could not be more unambiguous that skillful means is tar-
geting desire. As Burton Watson observes in the introduction to his transla-
tion of the Lotus Sutra, the text appeals "not so much to the intellect as to
the emotions. "31 Such an emotional appeal obviously has a powerful reso-
nance, thus making the Lotus Sutra an extremely popular Buddhist canon
in East Asia.
The first question we need to deal with is: what is problematic about
desire? The Sutra simply assumes it is so without much elaboration. As is
well known, according to the second noble truth, desire is the cause of suf-
fering: "Dependent on eye and visible forms, eye-consciousness arises; the
coincidence of the three is contact; with contact as condition, feeling; with
feeling as condition, craving; that is how there is an origin to suffering
(and so with ear ... mind)."32 In tracing the origin of human suffering to the
aggregates that constitute the self, the Buddha is pointing to the" fundamen-
tal structure of human existence. That is, human existence is characterized
by suffering, and this suffering existence is structured by desire or craving
(ta':lha). As Walpola Rahula summarizes, "the term 'thirst' includes not
only desire for, and attachment to, sense-pleasures, wealth and power, but
also desire for, and attachment to, ideas and ideals, views, opinions, theo-
ries, conceptions and beliefs (dhamma-ta':lha). "33 Desire is all-pervading34
and cannot be escaped till the end of this world.35
But the question remains: why is desire regarded as the culprit of suf-
fering? "When a person is not without lust and desire and love and thirst
and fever and craving for these things, then with their change and alter-
ation, sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief and despair arise in him. "36
That is, the problem with desire lies in the impermanent nature of the
objects of desire. The Buddha's second sermon deals with impermanence
in some detail: "All is impermanent. And what is the all that is imper-
manent? The eye is impermanent, forms are impermanent, eye-conscious-
ness ... eye-contact, whatever is felt as pleasant, painful or neither-pain-
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ful-nor-pleasant born of eye-contact is impermanent. The ear, etc.... The
nose, etc....The tongue, etc.... The body, etc.... The mind is imperma-
nent, mental objects ... mind-consciousness ... mind-contact ... whatever is
felt ... born of mind-contact is impermanent. "37 What is impermanent is
suffering, what is suffering is not-self.38 Impermanence is one of the three
characteristics of existence, the other two being suffering and no-self. In
fact, the three terms are often used interchangeably in characterizing the
suffering nature of existence. The most painful cases of impermanence are
the impermanence of happiness, the impermanence of life, and, ultimately,
the impermanence of the self:
Before my enlightenment, while I was still only an unenlightened Bodhi-
sattva, I thought: "In the case of material form, of feeling (of pleasure,
pain or neither), of perception, of formations, of consciousness, what
is the gratification, what the danger, what the escape?" Then I thought:
"In the case of each the bodily pleasure and mental joy that arise in
dependence on these things (the five aggregates) are the gratification;
the fact that these things are all impermanent, painful, and subject to
change, is the danger; the disciplining and abandoning of desire and lust
for them is the escape.39
The Buddha, upon his enlightenment, realizes that even pleasure and
joy are conditioned states and are therefore subject to change. He recog-
nizes the impermanence of happiness as the danger and teaches discipline
and detachment as the solution. This realization clearly points to suffer-
ing as the fundamental nature of our existence since suffering qua imper-
manence underlies even our cherished pleasure and joy. Such a suffering
existence is structured by desire which constantly seeks to gratify itself.
In order to deal with impermanence, we are driven by our desire to find
comfort in permanence, hence creating various forms of attachments. This
drive to find permanence in order to deal with impermanence is precisely a
manifestation of desire. We desire permanence in order to solve the prob-
lems presented by impermanence. Therein lies the most central problem
with desire. That is, it leads to reification:
In the world I see this generation racked by craving for being
Wretched men gibbering in the face of Death,
Still craving, hoping, for some kind of being.
See how they tremble over what they claim as "mine,"
Like fishes in the puddles of a failing stream.40
This means that desire seeks to perpetuate being in the face of imperma-
nence, and this is how the object of desire-namely being-is reified and
substantialized, whereas any substantive beings that are independent of
conditions do not exist, according to Buddhism. This insight is later crys-
tallized as emptiness, sunyata, in Mahayana Buddhism.
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However, besides its nature to reify and attach to its objects, desire is
also blind and ignorant. Put bluntly, desire does not really know what it
wants. One major characteristic of desire is that any gratification is only
temporary, because once it is satisfied, it moves on to something else. Essen-
tially, desire cannot be satisfied permanently, even though it craves perma-
nence. This is the dilemma of desire; namely, desire thrives in imperma-
nence even as it craves permanence. In the world of permanence, desire
has no place. This means that what desire wants, permanence, is against its
own nature, impermanence; hence it is blind, unaware of its self-contradic-
tory character. Such blindness and ignorance of desire stand in the way of
the pursuit of true knowledge that leads to the cessation of suffering, since
desire does not really want suffering to end, as it thrives on and perpetuates
suffering. Therefore, the major problem it presents is: how can desire be
transformed in such a way that it is conducive to the pursuit of true knowl-
edge? This is the crux of the problem that confronts the Buddha, namely,
how to make desire work against itself so that it will cease to perpetuate
suffering, thus putting an end to suffering.
The Buddha in the Lotus Sidra finds the solution in skillful means so
as to deal with desire in such a way that it can be made to contribute to the
pursuit of true knowledge that leads to the ending of desire and the ces-
sation of suffering. A natural question arises: what does the Buddha find
attractive in skillful means? I would like to propose that skillful means is a
kind of therapeutic practice that unsettles and disorients the desire in such
a way that the desire finds nothing substantive to attach itself to, and trans-
forms the desire in such a way that it can contribute to the seeker's enlight-
enment. In other words, this therapeutic practice has at least two aspects:
it unsettles the desire and it transforms the desire.
First, to unsettle and disorient the desire, any attempt to s~bstantialize
and reify any object of comfort has to be guarded against, be it a concrete
physical object-for example, money-or an ideal object-for example,
the Buddha. Nagarjuna puts such a therapeutic disorientation into a more
philosophical formula. In Chapter 22 of the Mulamadhyamakakarika
(MMK), Nagarjuna seeks to refute the attempt to reify the Buddha:
One who grasps the view that the Tathagata exists,
Having seized the Buddha,
Constructs conceptual fabrication
About one who has achieved nirv:lJ.la.41
This means that our idea of the Buddha is a complete conceptual fabrica-
tion. In Chapter 23, Nagarjuna further radicalizes the message:
The pacification of all objectification
And the pacification of illusion:
No Dharma was taught by the Buddha
At any time, in any place, to any person.42
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Any attempt to reify the Buddha and his teaching is rejected. As a result,
the desire that is in the habit of grasping is disoriented, as there is nothing
to be grasped~
Second, to unsettle and disorient desire is meant to transform it in such
a way that it can contribute to the seeker's enlightenment. This is the ther-
apeutic aspect of skillful means:
[T]he Thus Come One knows that this is the Law of one form, one fla-
vor, namely the form of emancipation, the form of separation, the form
of extinction, the form of ultimate nirvana, of constant tranquility and
extinction, which in the end finds its destination in emptiness. The Bud-
dha understands all this. But because he can see the desires that are in
the minds of living beings, he guides and protects them, and for this rea-
son does not immediately preach to them the wisdom that embraces all
species.43
Here the Buddha is seen as understanding sentient beings and their
desires. He guides and protects them, and tries to comfort them in ways
that are conducive to their spiritual growth. For this purpose, the Lotus
Sidra does not resort to intellectual arguments that would have been com-
bative, like Nagarjuna's effort. Rather, it relies on stories to convey the
message skillfully and meaningfully. The heavy reliance on parables, sim-
iles, and mythologies in the Lotus Sidra is a clear sign of skillful means at
work,44 and such an exercise of skillful means is to deal with desire thera-
peutically.
However, this therapeutic treatment of desire has one specific objec-
tive. As we shall see, it is meant to facilitate the transformation of desire in
such a way that it can motivate the seeker in her spiritual quest. A peren-
nial dilemma that faces education is the issue of motivation: how to teach
someone who is not interested in learning or motivated to learn. Even a
great teacher, no less than Confucius himself, laments his inability to teach
someone who is like a rotten piece of wood that cannot be carved.45 Any
pursuit of knowledge has to presuppose the motivation to learn. Without
any motivation, any discussion of education, no matter how great, is mean-
ingless and cannot even get off the ground. Here I am arguing that skill-
ful means is a pedagogy that addresses precisely such a thorny issue. The
Lotus Sutra sees desire as a solution to the lack of motivation. In other
words, it regards desire as both the cause and the solution of suffering. The
major upaya parables in the Lotus Sutra are best seen as attempts to trans-
form essentially blind desires into goal-oriented motivational energy for
spiritual awakening that would lead to the end of suffering. In other words,
the white lie or misinformation serves to transform desire into motivation.
Hence, in the Lotus Sutra, the therapy of desire results in its transforma-
tion into motivational energy, thus contributing to the spiritual growth of
sentient beings themselves.
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There are several possible relationships between knowing the true
knowledge that leads to the end of suffering and acting on such knowl-
edge: some people neither know nor act; others know but do not act on
such knowledge; still others act, but their actions are not guided by proper
knowledge; and lastly are the rare type who both know and act on such
knowledge. The first three kinds need the Buddha's skillful intervention in
order to be motivated to embark on the spiritual journey, while the last
type of people do not require the Buddha's intervention through skillful
means.46 If we look at the various upaya stories in the Lotus Sidra, we can
clearly see the first three types of intervention at work.
The first category, neither knowing nor acting, includes the famous
burning-house parable I examined earlier. The father has to appeal to the
desire of his kids in order to interest them in his message. By promising
more and better toys outside, the father is appealing to what is imme-
diately meaningful to the kids who are engrossed in playing with toys.
Any intellectual explanation at that moment would have failed to address
the immediate context the children were in, hence leaving them in harm's
way. However, when they come out of the house, they do not find what
is promised. This is an example of using the desire to work against itself
so that the deluded sentient beings can realize its blind nature. As Mar-
jorie Suchocki observes: "The Buddha reached the children's true desires
through the means of false desires, which is to say that their deepest desire
was their deepest well-being, which is Buddhahood. Because their false
desires blinded them, the Buddha could not reach their true desires directly,
and therefore reached them indirectly through turning their false desires
into skillful means."47 Ultimately, there is nothing to be desired. This is in
reference to the Mahayana Buddhist. teaching of emptiness.
The second category, "knowing but not acting," includes parables like
the Buddha's lifespan and the phantom city. In Chapter 16, "The Life Span
of the Thus Come One," the Buddha declares that even though he appears
to have achieved extinction and to have disappeared from this world after
his final passing, he has actually never left the world. He creates such an
appearance so that people will not take him for granted and will realize
the urgency of their efforts to reach enlightenment. He compares himself
to a father who is a medical doctor trying to cure his children who are poi-
soned. But his children take him for granted, thinking that he will always
be there for them. As a result, the father declares that he is dying and
indeed dies. Suddenly, his children realize that taking the medicine he left
for them is their last chance for cure and take it immediately. After his chil-
dren are cured, he appears to them again. This is a clear example of how
the Buddha tries to motivate those sentient beings who might have some
knowledge of the Buddha's teaching but are unmotivated to act on it, to
move along the path toward enlightenment.
In Chapter 7, "The Parable of the Phantom City," the Buddha tells
the story of a leader who tries to guide a group through a long stretch of
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deserted land to find treasure. When the group becomes exhausted in the
middle of the path and wants to turn back, he magically creates a phantom
city wherein the group can rest and regroup. The next morning the city dis-
appears, and he tells them that the treasure is close by. Similarly, if the Bud-
dha preaches only one ultimate Buddha vehicle, sentient beings will be dis-
couraged, thinking it too far out of their reach. Therefore he has to preach
some less lofty goals in order to provide sentient beings with a resting place
along the path. This parable addresses the need for the Buddha to be atten-
tive to the weakness in his followers' motivation to persevere in their spir-
itual quest and help them overcome such weakness.
The third category, "acting without knowing," includes the parable of
a lost son. Chapter 4, "Belief and Understanding," tells the story of a man
who abandons his father, wanders off to other places for a long time, and
eventually falls into poverty. While seeking employment, he drifts to his
father's house. However, after so many years of separation, he no longer
recognizes his father and is actually terrified by his father's great wealth
without knowing that he himself is the heir to it. When his father recog-
nizes him, the father has to come up with ways to help his son gradually
realize who he is. The father cannot tell the son who he is directly, fearing
that he might be scared away. Instead he assigns him some manual work
and lets him work up through the ranks in the family business in order
to build his confidence gradually. At the end, before a gathering of distin-
guished guests, the father reveals that the man is actually his own son, the
heir to his wealth. This parable addresses the ignorance and weakness of
the sentient beings and the fact that they have to be guided into enlighten-
ment gradually so as to gain confidence along the way. Otherwise they may
be frightened away from the path-anxious, deluded, ignorant, and cling-
ing to lesser doctrines.
In all of the above cases, skillful means therapeutically transforms
desire into motivation. Once motivated, the seeker embarks on the spir-
itual journey that leads to the ultimate realization that all teachings are
merely skillful means, including the very teaching of skillful means in the
Lotus Sutra.48 Like a medicine with great therapeutic power, once the dis-
ease of suffering ends, the medicine, including skillful means, is discarded.
This clearly echoes the Mahayana teaching of emptiness that is itself empty.
In a sense, skillful means is a reformulation of emptiness in the realm of
Buddhist religious practices.
Conclusion
In this essay I have attempted to tread a different path in interpreting the
Mahayana Buddhist teaching of upaya in the Lotus Sutra in order to resolve
the tension of truthfulness and effectiveness perceived therein. I have pro-
posed that skillful means can be better appreciated under a therapeutic
model of truth that seeks to transform human desires into powerful moti-
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vational energy toward achieving enlightenment. As a therapy of human
desires, skillful means has to be context-specific and cannot be absolutized
and universalized into a doctrine in and of itself. The pedagogical goal of
skillful means is motivational only. Any attempt to make skillful means a
context-independent doctrine will run into the kind of problems Richard
Garner warns us against.
I have confined my study of skillful means to the Lotus Sittra only.
Some later Mahayana texts reify skillful means and make it into a doctrine
in order to justify some practices of violence. In my judgment, such prac-
tices part from the letter as well as the spirit of the skillful means promoted
in the Lotus Sittra, which is used first and foremost for motivational pur-
poses.
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Part III
Education and Somaticity

NIKKI BADO-FRALICK
10 With This Very Body
Or What Kiikai Has to Teach Us about Ritual Pedagogy
In ninth-century Japan, a rigorously trained Buddhist monk performs a
complex and elaborate Shingon ritual atop Mount Koya. Through highly
formalized actions of body, speech, and mind, the monk resonates with
Dainichi, the Dharmakaya or Cosmic Buddha. The heavy silence of stones
and trees sings the teachings of the Buddha; from the depths of mist-
shrouded forests, the mountain itself preaches the Dharma. In perfect har-
mony, the power of the Buddha flows into the monk, and his power flows
into the Buddha in stylized ritual movements of empowerment and grace.
Over a thousand years and half a world away, a group of Witches
meets in a wooded clearing at a small farm in Ohio to initiate a new priest
into their coven. Elders in their tradition, the High Priestesses begin the rit-
ual process that will perform this magical act of transformation. The moon
is waxing full, the sky a sable canopy sprinkled with stars, as the Priest-
esses begin the movements that create the magic Circle.! The Witches raise
their voices in chants to call the Gods, while one High Priestess assumes
the deeply ingrained ritual postures that bring the Goddess into manifesta-
tion within her.
These two rituals are time and worlds apart. Although they belong to
different religious traditions and are performed by people from very dif-
ferent cultures and historical contexts, I claim that there is a way of think-
ing about both rituals that enables us to understand intellectually what is
going on in each of them a little better: the use of ritual as pedagogy, a way
in which to learn what and who we truly are.
To more fully understand the first ritual example, we might reasonably
turn to Kukai (774-835), the Eighth Patriarch of Esoteric or Shingon Bud-
dhism, founder of the tradition in Japan, and creator of the ritual practices
(mikkyo) the monk performs. Known posthumously by the honorific title
Kobo Daishi, "the greatest teacher who promulgated the Dharma," Kukai
was the first great philosopher in Japanese history and a figure of legend-
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ary importance and significance in Japanese Buddhism. In fact, it has been
said that Buddhism did not really become Japanese until Kiikai developed
his esoteric practices.2
But what has Kiikai to do with our second ritual example, the Witches
in Ohio? I argue that Kiikai's teachings about religious practice, especially
his concept of sokushin j6butsu "attaining enlightenment with this very
body," can be used to more fully unpack and appreciate some of the ritual
actions among the Witches as well. Before we take a closer look at what
the Witches in Ohio are doing, it might be a good idea to first learn a bit
more about Kiikai.
Kiikai was born on the island Shikoku during the Nara period (710-
794), an era of considerable intellectual and religious interaction and cre-
ativity in Japan. At that time, three religious traditions vied for cultural and
political prominence: the indigenous or (proto-)Shinto traditions, Confu-
cianism, and Buddhism. Each of them contributed to the philosopher and
priest Kiikai would later become.
Growing up in rural Shikoku, Kiikai was undoubtedly deeply influ-
enced by the indigenous Shinto worldview, which held that all of Nature is
alive with the presence of spirits or kami, beings of tremendous, although
not necessarily benevolent, power. Kami could take practically any form:
deities, demons, ghosts, ancestors, waterfalls, stones, trees, mountains, and
even living human beings. By this you can deduce that Shinto did not rec-
ognize a clear distinction between nature and human beings, spirit and
matter, or mind and body; everything was potentially alive with spiritual
presence.
Perhaps influenced by these indigenous roots, Kiikai retained an inte-
grated or nondual vision of reality, as you can see from his later writing
about the interdependence of matter and mind: "Differences exist between
matter and mind, but in their essential nature they remain the same. Matter
is no other than mind; mind, no other than matter. Without any obstruc-
tion, they are interrelated. The subject is the object; the object, the subject.
The seeing is the seen, and the seen is the seeing. Nothing differentiates
them. Although we speak of the creating and the created, there is in reality
neither the creating nor the created."3
At the age of fifteen, Kiikai was already recognized as a promising
scholar and began to study the Chinese classics. He was admitted to uni-
versity in Japan three years later. Shortly thereafter, he became frustrated
with the Confucian classics and turned to Buddhism for inspiration. But
for him simply studying Buddhist scripture was like drinking "dregs" left
over from "men of 0Id."4 A few years later, Kiikai dropped out of school to
become a wandering ascetic searching for truth in the mountains. Expos-
ing himself to all sorts of weather, he wandered through remote valleys
or ventured onto snowy, precarious mountain cliffs, where he endlessly
recited mantras, practiced meditation, and paid respect to the kami who
lived there.
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But it was likely Kiikai's devotion to a practice of Esoteric Buddhism,
the recitation of a mantra to the bodhisattva Kokiizo, that finally restored
his sense of balance and left him determined to choose Buddhism as his
spiritual path. Thus, his commitment to Buddhism "arose not so much
from book learning as from the actual experience of meditation."5 He was
convinced that studying Buddhism intellectually without the practice of
meditation was essentially a waste of time.
Now a description of the development of Kiikai's complex system of
esoteric religious practices and philosophy is beyond the scope of this essay
and best left to another time. But we have already learned several things
from Kiikai that will help us understand what is going on in our two ritual
examples. Let's frame this discussion in terms of a question: What is real-
ity, and how do human beings figure into it?
For Kiikai, the entire cosmos preaches the Dharma. He called this
hosshin seppo, "the reality-embodiment preaches the Dharma," and it was
one of his central tenets. This principle, quite likely influenced by his expe-
riences with Shinto, was an important development of the triple-embodi-
ment theory of Mahayana Buddhism. The triple-body theory held that the
Buddha manifests in three forms: the historical Shakyamuni; celestial Bud-
dhas such as Amida or Kannon who could be reached through devotion or
meditation; and the cosmos itself, typically understood as an impersonal or
abstract principle.
What sets hosshin seppo apart from the ordinary way of understand-
ing the triple-body theory is the idea that the cosmos, Dharmakaya or
Dainichi, is a personal Buddha who is constantly preaching the Dharma.
By "preaching," Kiikai means all acts of communication, including such
things as silence, gesture, color, or form. In fact, all phenomena are the
Dharmakaya's expressions. Dainichi is reality constantly revt:aling itself
through "all objects of sense and thought."6
This understanding of reality bears directly on Kiikai's conceptualiza-
tion of the human and his teaching of sokushin jobutsu, "attaining enlight-
enment with this very body." For if the whole cosmos is Buddha, and there-
fore already enlightened, then all phenomena including human beings are
somehow also intrinsically already enlightened.
If Kiikai was the first Buddhist thinker in Japan to hold that human
beings are originally enlightened (hongaku),7 he certainly would not be the
last. Kiikai was followed in hosshin seppo by the poet-monk Saigyo (1118-
II90), who declared that all things have "Buddha-nature," as well as by
Dagen (1200-1253), the founder of the Japanese Sata Zen tradition, who
asserted that it is inaccurate to say that all beings possess Buddha-nature,
rather all of being is Buddha-nature.8 Enlightenment, then, becomes a mat-
ter of knowing yourself as you really are.
But how do we go about obtaining this knowledge? Where and how
do we find our "Buddha-nature"? Kiikai tells us to look within our body-
mind, sokushin jobutsu-attain enlightenment "with this very body."
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Here we must proceed very carefully. Penetrating this teaching is a bit
tricky for those of us coming from a Western philosophical framework in
which the mind and body are typically split and assigned distinctive attri-
butes. Encountering a framework in which the mind and the body are not
dualistic can be difficult, because it is easy to fall into accustomed patterns
of thinking in which we see what we expect to rather than what is there.
And our most accustomed pattern of thinking about the "mind-body prob-
lem" is to try to reduce one to the other.
Yoshito S. Hakeda, translator of Kiikai's works, points out that it is
important to realize that "the word body (shin) does not mean body as
opposed to mind, but existence or body-mind-being."9 Yet, by choosing
"the word body over the normally expected mind," Kiikai emphasizes
"direct religious experience through cultivation of one's total being and
not merely through the intellect." 10
This is quite in keeping with what we have seen of Kiikai's personal
experiences. Kiikai does not believe that the mystery of the Dharmakaya
is apprehended solely through intellectual means. Rather, enlightenment
must be embodied as well as intellectual, and, in many respects, it is the
body that plays a leading role. Kiikai conceives the person as what we
might call bodymind, "not as mind or body, nor body and mind," and
holds that this bodymind is "grounded in the Body-Mind, the secret and
sacred living Body-Mind of all, the Dharmakaya."11 As Kiikai writes: "This
body is my body, the Buddha body, and the bodies of all sentient beings.
They are all named the 'body.' All of these bodies are interrelated horizon-
tally and vertically without end, like images in mirrors, or like the rays of
lamps. This body is no doubt, that body. That body is, no doubt, this body.
The Buddha body is no doubt the bodies of all sentient beings, and the bod-
ies of all sentient beings are no doubt the Buddha body. They are different,
but yet identical. They are not different but yet different." 12 In other words,
the true nature of the person is intimately interrelated with the true nature
of reality; person and world are intimately and somatically interconnected.
The whole and the parts reflect, reciprocate, and playoff of one another in
intimate relation. 13
Now the question becomes how do we more truly resonate with the
Dharmakaya Body-Mind? How effectively and quickly can we become
what we already truly are? What methods shall we use to transform unen-
lightened consciousness into consciousness that understands reality for
what it really is? This is the problem of praxis.
For Kiikai, the problem was answered by the grace (kaji) of the three
mysteries or intimacies (sanmitsu), cultivation of the esoteric practices of
thought, word, and deed-or meditation, mantra, and mudra. Medita-
tion-especially on the Womb (Taizokai) and Diamond (Kongokai) Man-
dalas so central to Shingon practice-clears and focuses the mind. Man-
tras enable us to harmonize or resonate (kyo) with the basic vibrations of
the Dharmakaya. And mudras, disciplined body postures and hand ges-
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tures, enable us to "act as if" our intrinsic Buddha-nature were already
realized. 14 With the principle of sokushin jobutsu, Kukai establishes reli-
gious praxis as pedagogy, a tool for teaching us to become enlightened
"with/through/by and in this very body." Ritual is the pedagogy through
which reality reveals itself. Ritualized actions of thought, word, and deed
immerse us in the actions of Dainichi, and by acting "as if" with our body-
minds, we learn to become who we truly and already are.
Armed with at least this much information, we can more readily appre-
ciate the pedagogical dimension of the ritual practices in the first exam-
ple. The Shingon monk is, of course, following the esoteric teachings of
sokushin jobutsu through disciplined practices of body, speech, and mind.
The ritual actions of mudras, mantras, and meditation establish a reso-
nance with the Dharmakaya, enabling the monk to perceive his bodymind
and the Dharma bodymind flowing into one another in mutual empower-
ment.
The second ritual example will need further investigation in order to
appreciate its pedagogical dimensions. For this particular community of
Witches, or Wiccans,15 initiation marks a significant moment in a long
and multidimensional learning process that includes training of the body
as well as the mind. They are therefore a promising group to examine
with regard to sokushin jobutsu and the notion of cultivating one's total
being through direct and embodied religious experience. While a complete
description and analysis of this community's rite of initiation is not practi-
cal within the limits of this essay, a few aspects of the rite should suffice to
illustrate my point. 16
Let us begin with timing and location: the Witches hold the ritual out-
side under the full moon. Why is the moon's phase significant? The per-
son who is about to be initiated has already learned that the Moon is an
important symbol in Wiccan theology that is often identified as 'female and
Goddess. The Witches' Lunar Goddess is a tripartite deity whose aspects of
Maiden, Mother, and Crone are theologically related to activities, to bio-
logical stages of life, and to the ever-changing cycles of the moon. The newt
waxing moon is the Maiden and marks new beginnings. The full moon is
the Mother, who sustains with her strength and determination. And the
waning/dark moon is the Crone, who brings an end to things so that new
beginnings can take root. More than any other single image, the Moon
functions to mark times of change, so it is particularly fitting that She be
manifestly visible during a critically transformative rite.
What teachings are being imparted to the new initiate by having him
wait for the right time-the right cycle of the moon-in order to perform
the ritual? Perhaps even more important than chronological stages of life,
the student learns that the triple aspects of Maiden, Mother, and Crone
represent cycles or stages in the progress of projects and events. He learns
firsthand that timing rituals to the cycles of the moon can be a significant
factor in their successful performance.
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In other wor.ds, the Moon as deity is not merely a metaphor, a way to
think about things, but a time to do things. The Lunar Goddess is impor-
tant not only on a theological or symbolic level, but on a practical level
as well. These symbolic dimensions have immediate implications on the
practical level, and this is the first of many ritual occasions when that will
become evident to the new initiate.
The location of the rite-outdoors in nature-reveals a critical ped-
agogical dimension. Since they understand their practice as a "nature reli-
gion," it makes perfect sense for the Witches to hold their ceremonies out-
doors. Not only can the natural environment be used to set the stage for the
performance of the rite, but holding the ritual outside foregrounds Nature
as a living presence, a member of the spiritual community whose atten-
dance at the rite is made apparent and engaged by the worshippers through
outdoor ritual praxis.
In other words, performing the ritual outdoors foregrounds Nature
as an active participant-a person with whom the Witches interact in an
intimate manner. Nature-as-person communicates through the chill of the
night air, the wind in the trees, the full moon peeking through branches,
or the rumbling of thunder and threatening clouds. This is not mere meta-
phor, but a realized perception of Nature as alive and present in some spe-
cial way to the participants of the ritual.
Perhaps a more expected wording in the above might be "Nature is
personified," but I feel this inadequately captures the level of intimate and
somatic interaction between Witch and Nature. In fact, developing an
increasing sensitivity to and awareness of Nature-as-person is one of the
key facets of the learning process for an initiate within this community, and
holding rituals outdoors emphasizes this important theological and prax-
ological dimension.
Spatiality and movement through the landscape also play prominent
pedagogical roles in cultivating awareness of Nature-as-person. The first
spatial action in the rite is the placement of the candidate for initiation
near a small pond that lies between the farmhouse, or "mundane space,"
and the area in the woods that will become the site of the ritual Circle, or
"sacred space. "
For the person being initiated-sitting quietly on the moist, cool
ground-every breeze, every star, every firefly, each chirp of a cricket or
throaty croak from a bullfrog reinforces the sense of communion between
person and Nature, made present in and through the senses of the body,
resonating in harmony with the presence of Nature. This is one of the crit-
ical lessons of the entire learning process of becoming a Witch. And it is
vital that the initiate learn this lesson-not just intellectually or emotion-
ally, but somatically, with and through his body.
Sitting in meditation at the pond, the candidate waits for the initiation
that will fully incorporate him into the Wiccan religious community. But
from the perspective of where he is placed-in Nature-a different inter-
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pretation of this moment is possible. From the perspective of Nature-as-
person, he is already "in community," although he may not realize it fully.
In this sense, initiation will not bring him into community or harmony with
Nature so much as it will awaken him through the experiences of what I
call his.body-in-practice to the community that is already there.
The body-in-practice is not a passive receptacle for spirit but is an active
agent through which the spirit is transformed. It is a subject, not an object.
It is active rather than static. The body-in-practice is an achieved state, not
a natural one. In other words, the body-in-practice is the body and mind
working together to achieve the whole person. Such embodied practice is
the process-the magic-through which the Witch transforms herself into
her most perfect form. As philosopher Thomas Kasulis observes, a spiritual
practice that engages both body and mind actuates a "process by which we
can gradually change what we existentially are" (italics mine)Y
During the initiation ritual, the body becomes highlighted not only as
the site or location of change, but as an active participant-even a cata-
lyst-in that change. Initiation is the means by which the natural or ordi-
nary body is ritually transformed into the body-in-practice. Essentially, the
initiation ceremony effects this transformation by ritually unmaking the
natural body and then remaking it as the body-in-practice. This is accom-
plished in large part through the initiate's symbolic death, his journey
around the perimeter of the Circle, and his encounters with the Guardians
of the elemental forces of Nature: earth, air, fire, and water, and also spir-
it-the five points of the Witch's sacred pentagram.
Transformation of person is in fact keyed to the transformation of
space; both processes begin with the use of the sword, a tool representing
the element of fire. In Circle casting, the Witches use the sword to separate
the sacred space from its ordinary location. In initiation; the Witch who
personifies Death wields the sword in a symbolic deathblow thai: separates
the initiate from his ordinary state of consciousness. This separation from
the ordinary marks both space and person as a site of transformation and
deepens the identification of sacred self and sacred space.
Ritual and somatic understanding and mastery of the elements are
essential to creating the ritual space. Witches perceive the properly cast
and consecrated Circle as a place between the ordinary world of human
beings and the world of the Gods. Again, they do not view this metaphor-
ically, but as a real place in which the Gods manifest, and both Gods and
humans meet and interact through ritual praxis. The Circle becomes an
intersubjective field in which the Gods and those persons who have devel-
oped the body-in-practice may actually engage one another in shared sub-
jectivity or "consubjectivity." The place between the worlds is the place
wherein human beings and Gods mutually interact and affect change in
one another.
The Witches cultivate through the body-in-practice what anthropolo-
gist Thomas Csordas calls "somatic modes of attention," defined as "cul-
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turally elaborated ways of attending to and with one's body in surroundings
that include the embodied presence of others."J8 In this case, the "embod-
ied presence of others" encompasses not only the Witches in the Circle, but
also those entities invoked or otherwise called into the Circle-including
the Gods, who are made manifest in and through the bodies-in-practice of
the Priests and Priestesses invoking Them.
In other words, when the Goddess is invoked by the High Priestess,
She becomes present with and through the Priestess' body-in-practice. It is
at once both Priestess and Goddess who signal that the invocation is com-
plete. The new initiate will learn not only to become increasingly aware
of or attentive to the elements, to the spirits and Guardians, to the Gods,
and to N ature-as-person, but he will also learn to sense and engage them
through his body-in-practice. Csordas helps us grasp the significance of
somatic modes of attention:
Because attention implies both sensory engagement and an object, we
must emphasize that our working definition refers both to attending
"with" and attending "to" the body. To a certain extent it must be
both. To attend to a bodily sensation is not to attend to the body as an
isolated object, but to attend to the body's situation in the world. The
sensation engages something in the world because the body is "always
already in the world." Attention to a bodily sensation can thus become
a mode of attending to the intersubjective milieu that give rise to that
sensation. Thus, one is paying attention with one's body. Attending with
one's eyes is really part of this same phenomenon, but we less often
conceptualize visual attention as a "turning toward" than as a disem-
bodied, beam-like gaze. We tend to think of it as a cognitive function
rather than as a bodily engagement. A notion of somatic mode of atten-
tion broadens the field in which we can look for phenomena of percep-
tion and attention, and suggests that attending to one's body can tell us
something about the world and others who surround US. 19
Attending to what is perceived by the body-in-practice tells the new initiate
something about the concrete reality of those who inhabit the intersubjec-
tive field of the consecrated Circle. The somatic modes of attention culti-
vated through embodied practice represent a significant achievement in the
realm of individual practice-one that ideally continues to develop long
after the initiation ceremony is over.
I want to linger for a moment on the phrase "embodied practice"
because it is pivotal to understanding Wiccan religious practice and returns
us to Kukai's teaching of sokushin jobutsu. The phrase itself consists of
two words of equal importance: "embodied" immediately foregrounds the
body; "practice" suggests training, repetition until you get it right, disci-
plined and conscious doing, and "cultivation."
Now it can be argued that "cultivation" is a term more often encoun-
tered in Eastern religions and philosophies than in the Western traditions,
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so perhaps it isn't appropriate here. But although Japanese philosopher
Yuasa Yasuo is writing about Eastern bodymind practices, he illuminates
something that is going on in this Western tradition as well. He writes,
"personal cultivation in the East takes on the meaning of a practical proj-
ect aiming at the enhancement of the personality and the training of the
spirit by means of the body" (italics mine).20 And this is precisely what
occurs through the Witches' disciplined and somatic meditative and rit-
ual practices.
This may startle people who think the body has absolutely nothing to
do with spiritual practice except as something whose temptations must be
overcome. But as Kasulis demonstrates in his article "The Body-Japa-
nese Style," this has far more to do with differences in the ways that East
and West tend to conceptualize the relationship between mind and body.21
By assuming that mind and body are distinct entities with fixed (and even
conflicting) attributes, we in the West tend to miss the ways in which mind
and body actually do become increasingly well integrated through train-
ing and practice.
But while we can perhaps more readily perceive mind/body integration
in physical practices-such as athletic prowess, or even driving a car-it
is far more difficult to apprehend cultivation of mind/body integration in
spiritual practices. Religion-as-practice, as something that involves increas-
ing development of the interconnections of mind and body-as something
you can somehow get better at doing-is not as apparent to us as driving-
as-practice.
If the students in my academic courses on world religions are any indi-
cation, religion is typically understood not as a practice but as a system or
set of beliefs. The problem with this concept is in the way the term "belief"
is frequently construed. Belief in our culture is something that goes on in
the head. It involves a strictly mental process resulting in a choice or deci-
sion that is itself markedly removed from bodily practice or engagement.
The idea that religion might be rooted in somatic experiences, that it might
be about practices, about things done with the body as well as the mind,
is often a difficult and apparently troubling concept for my students. For
most of them, religion clearly functions as an identifying label rather than
as a doing. But in everything from simple prayer and acts of kindness to
complicated ceremony and intensive ritual training, people do their reli-
gions every day.
One of the most striking things about this particular tradition of Witch-
craft is the degree to which the Witches use ritualized actions of the body
to train the spirit. It may be instructive to take a quick look at part of this
training to see the method at work in transforming religion-as-disembod-
ied-belief to religion-as-embodied-practice.
The first few classes that students have with the teaching Witch are pri-
marily informative or intellectual in nature: what Witchcraft is and is not,
historical background, structure of the particular group, and so forth. Sub-
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sequent classes increasingly focus on more creative, somatic activities, for
example, designing a "ritual tool" for one of the elements. Such activities
provide hands-on familiarity with the element, providing a satisfying cre-
ative and tangible connection between theory and practice.
Small hands-on projects then progress to very limited somatic prac-
tices such as relaxation and breathing techniques. In this particular group,
breath control is the gateway to all other ritual practices. In fact, Witches
concentrate on mastering proper breathing in order to successfully accom-
plish the visualization and concentration needed for all other ritual work,
including invocation, divination, and healing. The first step is simply to
notice the pattern of breathing in order to further accustom the student to
the idea that the Craft is about practices, and ones involving the body.
Depending on how well that goes, the Witch may then decide to intro-
duce trying to control or regulate the pattern of breathing-for example,
by having students breathe in for a count of four, hold the breath in for the
same count, breathe out for a count of four, and hold the breath out for the
same count. Students learn that controlling the breath is much more diffi-
cult than simply noticing the breath, and they also learn that even begin-
ning Wiccan practices take some work.
These few simple somatic exercises, which are not really simple at all,
are not only the beginnings of the paradigmatic change to practice but are
also often the beginnings of counteracting a lifetime of ignoring knowledge
that is rooted in the body itself. Many of us seem to be shut out of, or alien-
ated from, our own bodies. From the time we are children, we are taught to
ignore or repress their basic needs - for rest and sleep, for sex, for exercise,
for play-and their warning signals of pain and discomfort.
As children, we are taught that bodily timetables and schedules must
conform to the timetables and schedules of schools and, later, of employ-
ers. In fact, employers often reward their employees for overworking their
bodies to the point of exhaustion. When the unnoticed signals and unmet
needs of those bodies erupt into illness, some employers even punish their
employees for falling down on the job or for seeking compensation for
medical bills.
Religion may also teach us to ignore our bodies, considering them
unworthy of attention and respect. Some religions reward denigration and
punishment of the flesh, casting such practices as spiritual. The foreground-
ing of the body in Wiccan religious practice teaches the students that their
bodies deserve respect and are as much a part of the spiritual endeavor as
their minds. Students begin to learn that their bodies are not merely vessels
for spirit, unimportant in themselves, but rather are active participants in
the religious process.
This immediate (and controlled) exposure to the sensual, tactile dimen-
sion of Wiccan religious experience begins to counteract the idea that reli-
gion is only-or even primarily-about belief systems, sets of abstract
concepts, or texts. It introduces the students to a theological framework
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within which practice (i.e., practice that centrally includes the physical
body as the doer of spiritual learning) emerges as equally important to
belief or intellectual knowledge. Here is the beginning of the paradigm shift
to religion as embodied practice.
For those students who go on to initiation, the development of the
body-in-practice intensifies through successful performance of different
forms of meditation and an increasing number and variety of ritual prac-
tices. Now the student and Witch address the practice of the religion itself,
at first in limited and very controlled exercises with the body in meditation
postures or in simple rituals within the Circle. Eventually the student will
engage in more challenging and creative expressions of religious practice,
incorporating complex forms of visualization, concentration, ritual ges-
ture, and other forms of bodymind practice.
At first this somatic portion of the learning process is painfully awk-
ward. In addition to the proper gestures, movements around the Circle,
and so forth, the most important thing that the student must master is that
most difficult and esoteric of all Wiccan ritual practices-how to breathe.
Mastery of breathing in various postures and while performing other activ-
ities is the foundation of ritual practice.
Witches breathe to relax, to prepare themselves or "ground and cen-
ter" at the beginning of each ritual. It is through proper breathing that the
Witch sheds the mundane personality and engages the spiritual presence,
and it will enable her to manifest God or Goddess in the invocation. It is
through the automatic and unconscious mastery of breath that the Witch is
able to focus on divination, magic, healing, and invocation. Mastery of the
breath is the foundational somatic practice through which the Witch devel-
ops her spiritual being-the total integration of mind, body, and spirit that
is the goal of practice. .
How can something that is apparently difficult to master become auto-
matic and unconscious? Actually, we do it all the time. Take a fairly mun-
dane example: driving. Remember what it was like to learn how to drive:
the body seems to be "all thumbs," trying to recall rules of the road while
concentrating on moving your feet and hands in coordinated movement
just so, not running off the road, not hitting the rabbit that just ran in front
of you. Every bit of your concentration and effort is focused on driving.
Now, years later, get into the car to go to the store to buy a few things.
If you are anything like me, your mind is re-creating the grocery list you left
on the counter; you see a friend on the sidewalk and wave to her; you're
thinking about the paper that you have to finish for a conference. Where
is the car? Being driven gracefully, automatically, and unconsciously by the
trained and practiced body.
For Kukai, ritual praxis was the key to understanding the intima-
cies of the Dharmakaya, for understanding reality for what it really is, for
sokushin jobutsu, "attaining enlightenment with this very body." For these
Witches, ritual praxis is also the key-but for understanding and perceiv-
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ing Nature-as-person, for successful union with and manifestation of deity,
and for realization of one's true identity.
Both sokushin jobutsu and the development of the Witches' body-in-
practice counter a Western philosophical worldview that privileges mind
and text over body and practice. Freezing religion as "text" that is then
read and enacted is to miss the somatic nature of religious praxis and also
ritual as a pedagogy that engages the whole person. Ritual as pedagogy
captures somatic modes of attention that are culturally elaborated ways of
attending to and with one's body that include sensory engagement of the
embodied presence of others.
Although the particular rituals, meditations, visualizations, postures,
and exercises differ, they have in common the training and cultivation of
the bodymind or the body-in-practice, a finely tuned instrument of spiri-
tual awareness. For the Witches, as for Kiikai, ritual praxis is the means,
the pedagogy, through which reality reveals itself and we become what we
truly are.
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11 The Confucian Body and Virtue Education
On the Balance between Inner Authenticity
and Outer Expression
Linguistic Minimalism and Body Language in Confucian Tradition
Linguistic minimalism is a prominent characteristic of the linguistic tradi-
tion in the Confucian culture zone. As it is the case with all semiotic systems,
language is used to tell lies as much as to communicate truth. In this sense,
language is a blessing on the one hand and also a curse on the other. Perhaps
it is for this reason that linguistic minimalism is preferred in the Confucian
tradition to convey the greatest extent of truth in the fewest words.
Confucius fLr said, "Specious words confound virtue"! and "In lan-
guage it is simply required that it convey the meaning."2 Confucius placed
more emphasis on the full communication of meaning than on subtlety of
language. Linguistic minimalism, which seeks the highest level of truth-
ful communication with the fewest possible words, is also found in Men-
cius :dh:r. Mencius said: "In explaining an ode, one should not allow the
words to get in the way of the sentence, nor the sentence to get in the way
of the sense. The right way is to meet the intention of the poet with sym-
pathetic understanding."3 In other words, one should try to understand the
intention of the speaker rather than become distracted by characters and
words floating on the surface. The Book of Changes ~#~, another Con-
fucian scripture, borrows Confucius' words and states that the "written
characters are not the full exponent of speech, and speech is not the full
expression of ideas."4 The Confucian viewpoint, then, insists that the rela-
tive importance of language can be arranged in the order of meaning, spo-
ken language, and written language.
Distrust of language leads people to adopt nonverbal semiotic systems,
such as eye and facial expressions and body gestures, as alternative means
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of communication. This is because body language is more truthful than
spoken language.s Communication through the body is conducted by non-
verbal mediators such as the eyes, facial expressions, and body gestures in a
face-to-face situation. Body language, which is possible only if the speaker
and the listener exist within the same temporal and spatial boundary, is
more effective for sharing representations of commonly held beliefs than
for communicating information in the creation of a stronger sense of cohe-
sion in the community. In other words, body language is a more efficient
means to confirm existing value and belief systems than to transmit new
information. Ritual actions (Ii tI) in the Confucian tradition, such as com-
ing of age, marriage and funeral ceremonies, and ancestral offerings, are
prominent examples of "communication of sharing."
This essay attempts to examine the relationship between inner virtues
and the semiotic significance of bodily expression in the Confucian tradi-
tion. A proper comprehension of the meaning system of the Confucian cul-
ture zone that prefers linguistic minimalism calls for an understanding of
kinetic signs such as eye and facial expressions and body gestures, as well
as the more explicit signs of written and spoken languages. Because the
body is an everyday action point in which communicative meanings are
exchanged, studying body signs will help us to attain a better understand-
ing of traditional Confucian way of thinking.
Shen :!1f as Union of Body (xing ~) and Heart-Mind (shen 1$)
Confucianism emphasizes self-cultivation, whose Chinese characters are
translated to mean "cultivation of the body" (xiushen f~!l).Why is it cul-
tivation of the body, not cultivation of the mind? What is the significance
of the body in the Confucian tradition? In order to understand the Confu-
cian meaning of the body, we need to investigate how the body is under-
stood in the intellectual tradition outside the East. This is because "what is
Eastern" can be understood by comparing it with "what is not Eastern,"
just as one can see one's face only through a mirror.
In the dualistic tradition of the modern Western philosophy, the self is
divided into mind and body. This tendency is closely associated with meta-
physical dualism, in which the existential world is divided into the mentaU
spiritual and the physicaUmaterial world. Metaphysical dualism divides
human ability into "reason" and "sense" corresponding respectively to
mind and body, and divides the self further into the self as a thinking being
and the self as a material being. Under this dichotomy, the body is degraded
into an object of a natural scientist's experiment while the mind is fixated
as the subject of psychological investigation.
In this dualistic tradition, too, the body is conceived as something
transient, accidental, or inferior, while the mind (reason, soul, or spirit) is
viewed as infinite, essential, and valuable. Accordingly, pure reason sepa-
rated from the body ensures true knowledge, whereas the body stripped of
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reason is nothing but a collection of organs receiving uncertain, temporal,
and relative sensory data. The body, therefore, remaining outside of phil-
osophical concern, is ignored or implicitly set aside. Insofar as the self as
a thinking being and the self as a physical being are viewed separately, the
equation of "self = thinking being = Reason" is formed, and consequently
an unbridgeable rift between the self and the body is created.
How is the mind connected with the body? Is the mind as thinking
being the true self? Is the body merely "a horse carrying a jockey," or "a
boat boarding a captain," or "a prison entrapping the soul"? Is the body a
mass of corpus, serving only as an object of physical and chemical exper-
iments?
The mind-body dualism does not exist in Confucianism. In the Confu-
cian tradition, both the mind and the body are temporal entities emerging
from the same origin, qi ~. The mind is a functional property emerging
from the activity of the life force, namely the qi. Ghosts (gui *') and deities
(shen t$), like the soul and spirit, also are considered as temporal entities
arising from the activity of qi. In the Confucian understanding of the mind
and body, there may be some traces of phenomenological "property dual-
ism," however there has never existed "substance dualism" as seen in the
West.
Confucianism deals with the everyday world or experiential world as
its main subject. Moreover, the Confucian way of thinking warns against
excessive metaphysicalization or abstract speculation, which tries to sepa-
rate human experience from the living world. The dualism of body/mind
or the physical/mental does not appear in everyday life. From the Confu-
cian standpoint, consciousness devoid of the body, reason detached from
sense, or the self separated from the body, is nothing more than an insane
rationalist's monologue.
In the Confucian tradition, the self is the body in which the corporeal
and the spiritual are inseparable. The oldest semantic dictionary in ancient
China, Erya mffiE, states that "The body refers to the self." The teachings
on moral cultivation in the Great Learning (Daxue *~) emphasize culti-
vation of the body, not the mind. Confucius asked: "If a minister make his
body correct, what difficulty will he have in assisting in government? If he
cannot rectify himself, what has he to do with rectifying others?"6 Mencius
also lamented: "Anybody who wishes to cultivate the tong :fiji] or zi :f'F tree,
which may be grasped with both hands, perhaps with one, knows by what
means to nourish them. In the case of their own bodies, men do not know
by what means to nourish them. Is it to be supposed that their regard of
their own persons is inferior to their regard for a tong or zi tree?"?
Another Confucian scholar Xunzi also said: "[Performing] Rites [Ii tI]
is the right way to conduct one's body.... The teacher regards the body as
a model."8 As shown in these passages, the self is the body and the body is
the self in Confucianism.
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The Body as a Sign
Does the self exist? How can the fact that the self exists be confirmed? Des-
cartes said, "I think, therefore I am." But Confucians would say, "I am
manifested, therefore I am." In the Confucian tradition, existence is con-
firmed not by a pure consciousness separated from the body but by the
intersubjective gaze of the community. The Great Learning explains:
There is no evil to which the mean person [xiaoren IJ\A], dwelling
retired, will not proceed, but when he sees an exemplary person [junzi
~T], he instantly tries to disguise himself, concealing his evil, and dis-
playing what is good. The other beholds him, as if he saw his heart and
reins; of what use is his disguise? This is an instance of the saying "What
truly is within will be manifested without." Therefore, an exemplary
person is always watchful over himself even when he is alone.
Confucius' disciple Zengzi ~T also said, "What ten eyes behold,
what ten hands point."9 That is, the essence of existence that defines a
"self" is not in "thinking" but in "manifesting." In the same vein Mencius
said: "What belongs by his nature to the exemplary person are benevolence
[ren f.:.], righteousness [yi ~], propriety [Ii tI], and wisdom [zhi ~]. These
are rooted in his heart; their growth and manifestation are a mild harmony
appearing in the countenance, a rich fullness in the back, and the charac-
ter imparted to the four limbs. Those limbs understand [how] to arrange
themselves, without being told."IO In Confucianism, pure consciousness
alone does not guarantee truth. There is no such thing as pure internal vir-
tue hidden deep in the soul that is not revealed through actions or expres-
sions. One's internal virtue and moral sentiments confirm their existence
only when they are exposed through action and expression to the intersub-
jective gaze of the community. 11 In this sense, not only body but also mind
is exposed to that intersubjective gaze. The body is the signifie (signified)
waiting to be decoded by the community members, while internal virtue
and emotions are the significant (signifier) corresponding to the the signifie.
According to the Confucian tradition, private language outside the gram-
mar of the community cannot exist in any circumstances and has no mean-
ing. The language of bodily movement is determined by the code system of
the community in the same way that the meaning of individual language is
defined by grammar of the community.
In the Confucian tradition, which defines the body as the unity of
corpus and spirit, the body is an "incarnation of inner virtues and emo-
tions." Consciousness reveals itself through the body. In the Great Learn-
ing, Zengzi said, "The small person [xiaoren IJ\A] feels shame when ten
eyes watch him and ten fingers point to him." This is because his body and
his consciousness are exposed as signs. According to Descartes, the self (as
a thinking being) can be separated from the body, so it can be hidden from
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the gaze of others. But in Confucianism, the body and the mind are insep-
arable, so the self cannot hide. Mencius said: "Of all the parts of human
body there is none more excellent than the pupil of the eye. The pupil can-
not be used to hide his/her wickedness. If within the heart all be correct, the
pupil is bright. If within the heart all be not correct, the pupil is dull. Listen
to a person's words and look at the pupil of hislher eye. How can a person
conceal his/her character?" 12
The above passage from the Book of Mencius :ifur cannot be read as
an old man's folk psychology sermon. His statements on the relationship of
the mind and the pupil may raise doubt in the minds of people accustomed
to dualistic thinking. What is the relationship between the correct heart,
which is a mental event, and the brightness of the pupil of the eye, which is
a physical phenomenon? Dualistic thinkers might try to find the answer in
the pineal glands, a type of a currency-exchange counter where the tenders
of mental and material are exchanged, or in the preestablished harmony
between the body clock and the mind clock set right by a repair clerk called
God. Or they might convert to monism and explain the dilemma based on
the materialism that reduces mental events to physical ones. But how much
do the two solutions fit reality, judging from our life experience? Does a
human being really consist of two clocks keeping time without any trace of
error? Is a human being just a lump of materials repeating inputs and out-
puts according to electrochemical pulses?
In the everyday world, these difficult questions do not arise. Even Des-
cartes, who claims that the body and the mind are two different substances,
confesses to the interpenetrability of the two in the sense that one feels pain
and thinks about it when one is hurt. Also, a monist who tries to explain
the expression of the eyes as a physical event (e.g., brain waves flowing to
the nerve center resulting in dilation of the pupils) may notice that lovers'
passionate emotions are clearly reflected in their eyes.
Mencius' proposition on the pupil and the heart cannot be either
proved or refuted from the viewpoint of physical causation. He did not
attempt to explain the causal relationship between the two, but to say that
one's inner state can be understood only through one's body, whether it
be communicated through a glance, a facial expression, or a body gesture.
"Understanding" here refers to direct and sensual experience that occurs
before causal speculation such as analogical inference. Ontologically, one's
inner state (such as emotion and will) may precede one's external front
(such as eye and facial expressions), but understanding of the inner state
starts with expressions revealed outwardly. That is why Mencius said that
the self cannot be revealed without the body, and the inner state cannot be
understood unless it is expressed through the body. As there cannot be the
signifie without signifiant, the inner state cannot be understood without the
body. In Confucianism, as reflected in the Book of Mencius, the body is a
medium of communication connecting the self with the world.
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Facial Revelation as Expression (Ausdruck) and Action (Handlung)
If emotions and will are revealed to the outside through the body, how can
this revelation be differentiated from physiological symptoms or feigned
pretense? That is, how can the bright pupil of a right-hearted person be dis-
tinguished from the bright pupil of the feigned gaze of an evil witch?
Helmuth Plessner classifies bodily revelations into three groups: (I)
physiological or psychosomatic response without involvement of con-
sciousness (e.g., blushing, paleness, coughing, sneezing, sweat, and nausea);
(2) facial and bodily movements that involve consciousness and are con-
trollable, like words and action (Handlung); and (3) facial expressions and
bodily movements that involve consciousness and are not controllable, like
laughing and crying (Ausdruck).'3 Going back to Mencius, the bright eyes
of a righteous person are a spontaneous expression of his or her inner state,
that is, Ausdruck. The eye expression is neither a nonintentional physio-
logical symptom nor an intended voluntary action. This results when one's
emotion and will for goodness grows as fully as possible, breaks the shell
encasing one's inner world, and becomes exposed to the outside. Emotion
and will, which remain simply as a process of intentional consciousness,
are externalized or embodied through facial expression and bodily move-
ment visible to others and thus perceivable by others. In this sense, the
body is a field of expressiveness, and the eye a window to the soul.
As with Ausdruck, the bright pupil mentioned by Mencius is differ-
entiated from a physiological symptom; it is a natural manifestation of
inner state that is intentional but involuntary. The Book of Rites (Liji 1:1
~), concerning the natural manifestation of inner state and virtue through
the body, states it in this way: "What the sacrifice of a filial son should be
can be known. While he is standing (waiting for the service to commence),
he should be reverent, with his body somewhat bent; while he is engaged
in carrying forward the service, he should be reverent, with an expression
of pleasure; when he is presenting the offerings, he should be reverent,
with an expression of desire. He should then retire and stand, as if he were
about to receive orders; when he has removed the offerings and (finally)
retires, the expression of reverent gravity should continue to be worn on
his face. Such is the sacrifice of a filial son. "14
The facial expression of the filial son here described is clearly neither a
physiological symptom nor an intended action, but a natural manifestation
of internal feeling. The Book of Rites describes seven basic emotions that
are revealed spontaneously via the body, even without intention: happi-
ness, anger, grief, fear, love, hatred, and desireY Because these seven emo-
tions presume such things as the object of feeling, the situation in which
the feeling erupts, and the state of affairs, it is different from mere mood or
sentimentality, which is unintentional. These emotions are forms of judg-
ment. For instance, anger includes the judgment "worthy of blame"; love
and desire involve an estimation of high and low values; and fear arises
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from a prediction of danger and damage. While reason is composed of con-
cepts and judgments, emotions nonetheless also include somewhat ratio-
nal elements.16
In comparison to the seven basic emotions in the Book of Rites, the
four fundamental moral sentiments in the Book of Mencius that compose
human nature are more positive and value-oriented. The four fundamen-
tal moral sentiments (siduan [9!Ijffi)-compassion, shame, modesty, and the
discernment of right and wrong-involve evaluative functions for refer-
ence or rejection. Thus, the four moral sentiments of Mencius should be
viewed as rational sentiments that impregnate reason, not as irrational feel-
ings, in that judgment of high and low values are present in them. Moral
sentiments are exposed to the outside, embodied in the eye and face, and
visible and audible to members of the community.
The Social Signification of Facial Expressions and Bodily Movements
Eye and facial expressions and bodily movements are not only signs reveal-
ing one's internal state but also mediums of communication equal to a
perlocutionary act. In the Confucian tradition of linguistic minimalism,17
which shuns the loquacious smooth talker, a facial expression is more often
appropriate than the spoken word, according to the confronting situation.
Silence and facial expressions are as much signs as perlocutionary acts.
The Confucian tradition trusts more in nonlinguistic signs than linguis-
tic signs, and this tradition is not confined to the East Asian culture zone
alone. Timothy Hegstrom claims that nonlinguistic signs are trusted more
than linguistic signs in the West, as well. 18 In linguistic signs, the relation-
ship between expression and the content of signs is arbitrary. Meanwhile,
bodily signs such as facial expressions approximate the truth more than
linguistic signs because they are codes that reveal the inner state of the
mind through the body.
As Hegstrom argues, bodily gestures expressed for the purpose of
communication like yawning and arm stretching are symbolic movements
exchangeable with words. Symbolic body gestures in everyday life are com-
municative tools, and at the same time represent power relations of dom-
ination/subordination. Expressions in the eye, face, and body movements
reveal deep hidden emotions, on the one hand, and disclose "a microphys-
ics of power" in power relations on the other. Particularly, in power rela-
tions of domination and subordination, the subordinates express their sub-
mission by making macromovements like bending or lowering the body.
But more important, the inferior can also use microexpressions like eye or
facial expressions for the same purpose. The fact that Song Si-yeol *~r.!l,
a renowned Confucian scholar of the ]oseon ~f!.!f dynasty, implored King
Sukjong !ffif* to allow him a chance to look up at him in his audience dem-
onstrates succinctly the importance of microexpressions like eye expression
in power relations. 19
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Facial expressions and body gestures have two social functions: One
is a phatic function in horizontal relations and the other a social control
function in vertical relations. Actions such as looking at a superior eye to
eye or pointing at the carriage of the king can be interpreted as disrespect
of dominant power. The superior, however, has the privilege of looking into
the eyes of his subordinates or pointing fingers at them. The microphysics
of power exists in the social structure that defines the context of human
relations and helps maintain it. The microphysics of power is concealed in
trivialities of everyday life that are easily overlooked. The body is the most
concrete place where the micropower structure is embedded.
"When (a superior man) goes to war leading the army, he must wear a
courageous look with firm determination. His command should be strict,
his face solemn, and his eyes clear and sharp. "20 This passage from the
Book of Rites describes the proper facial expression of a commander at
war. The function of the facial look as a signifier of status is also mentioned
in the Book of Documents (Shujing :W#~). Of the five qualities a king must
attain to rule the state, appearance is the first. 21 Also, Yi I *m wrote in his
diary that Jeong Inhong JIlf.=iJb, an official at the Office of the Inspector-
General during the reign of King Seonjo W:t£l, looked as stern as autumn
frost, causing lower-ranking officials and local magistrates to fear him.22
Power is not exercised only through explicit verbal behavior such as
order and command, and obedience is not carried out only through the
explicit language of submission. Unforced, implicit forms of domination!
subordination relations such as eye and facial expressions are more com-
mon and more frequent than explicit ones. Yet, when Confucianism talks
about facial expressions of the dominant and the subordinate, it is not
implying the formal or pretentious facial expressions created in consider-
ation of physical power. Those in dominant positions must acquire the inter-
nal virtue suitable to their positions before wearing solemn looks. When
they fully develop internal virtue, it is naturally exposed externally through
their facial expressions. Also, people in subordinate positions should not
invent flattering looks; when their inner state is sincerely respectful, it is
naturally reflected in their faces. The Great Learning notes that "Their
hearts being rectified, their persons were cultivated";23 and Confucius also
states that "Fine words and an insinuating appearance are seldom associ-
ated with true virtue."24 The Book of Rites says that when a superior per-
son's internal virtue is manifested in his face, people see it, are admonished
by it, and voluntarily submit to it:
Therefore the sphere in which music acts is the interior of man, and that
of rites [Ii tft] is his exterior. The result of music is a perfect harmony
[he TO], and that of rites a perfect observance of propriety. When one's
inner state is (thus) harmonious, and his outer appearance thus doc-
ile, the people behold his countenance and do not strive with him; they
look to his demeanor, and no feeling of indifference or rudeness arises
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in them. Thus it is that when virtue shines and acts within (a superior),
the people are sure to accept (his rule), and hearken to him; and when
the principles (of propriety) are displayed in his conduct, the people are
sure (in the same way) to accept and obey him. Hence it is said, "Carry
out perfectly rites and music, and give them their outward manifesta-
tion and application, and under heaven nothing difficult to manage will
appear."25
The exemplary person, then, should cultivate not just his/her macroactions
but also minor eye and facial expressions, bodily movements, and even
clothes and accent. These bodily expressions are tools to transform others.
The Book of Rites states:
Hence the sage, in laying down rules for conduct, does not make him-
self the rule, but gives them his instructions so that they shall be able to
stimulate themselves to endeavor, and have the feeling of shame if they
do not put them in practice. [He enjoins] the rules of ceremony to reg-
ulate the conduct; good faith to bind it on them; right demeanor to set
it off; costume to distinguish it; and friendship to perfect it: He desires
in this way to produce a harmony of the people.... Therefore, when an
exemplary person puts on the dress [of his rank], he sets it off by the
demeanor of an exemplary person. That demeanor he sets off with the
language of an exemplary person; and that language he makes good
by the virtues of an exemplary person. Hence the exemplary person is
ashamed to wear the robes, and not have the demeanor; ashamed to
have the demeanor, and not the style of speech; ashamed to have the
style of speech, and not the virtues; ashamed to have the virtues, and not
the conduct proper to them.23
According to the Book ofRites, clothes as well as eye and facial expressions
reveal one's inner spirit. From the Confucian standpoint, clothes are not
just for protection of the body or for warmth, but are signs that reveal one's
personhood; even more than this, they are significations that reveal one's
inner state. Furthermore, it warns of wearing clothes merely for superfi-
cial appearance without moral spirit. When one wears certain clothes, one
must have the internal virtues to fit those clothes. Confucius describes the
unity between the exterior and the interior as a "unity between form and
matter"(wenzhi binbin )(jfffH~).
In Confucianism, eye and facial expressions, bodily movements, and
clothes are a system of social codes. Social codes are composed of various
nonverbal codes, including body language. Nonverbal codes include signs
ranging from markers revealing one's social standing, or rules of human
relations that determine how to interact with others, to means of social
communication that foster a sense of belonging and solidarity among com-
munity members, for example, ceremonies and festivalsY
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Eye and facial expressions and bodily movements in Confucian tradi-
tion are complex sign systems that represent both moral and power rela-
tions. The Book ofRites provides concrete examples for how people should
conduct themselves with appropriate eye and facial expressions and bodily
movements in various moral situations in the community. The numerous
accounts on facial expressions and bodily movements in the Book of Rites
cannot be understood beyond the "system of codes" according to which
the facial expressions and bodily movements are given meaning. Li t!
exists both as customary law, which defines the system and organization
of a state at the macrolevel, and as guidelines outlining proper behavior,
bodily movements, and facial expressions suitable for various situations in
everyday microlevel life. This is why James Legge translated the Chinese
word Ii t! to mean "propriety," which encompasses the meanings of situa-
tional appropriateness and good manners at the same time.28
When the body learns appropriate motion signs and expresses them
skillfully in every situation, facial expressions become, not intended actions
(Handlung), but natural expressions (Ausdruck). That is, artificial signs
become accustomed to the body like natural signs. When the internal expe-
riencing of proper emotions in each situation and their external expression
become unified, with voluntary actions becoming as natural as unintended
overflowing, this can be defined as "naturalized artificial signs." The ulti-
mate state of Confucian morality is not when action is tailored to fit the
universal principle, but when the model guide of behavior is spontane-
ously expressed through the body. Culture is formed through a customiza-
tion of signs. The better the customization and digestion of signs, the more
spontaneous and natural their use becomes. In this sense, the body of the
exemplary person is a moral paragon to others. The Doctrine of the Mean
(Zhongyong r:pJII) notes how one's body can become a moral paragon:
Next to the above is he who cultivates to the utmost the shoots of good-
ness in him. From those he can attain to the possession of sincerity. This
sincerity becomes apparent. From being apparent, it becomes manifest.
From being manifest, it becomes brilliant. Brilliant, it affects others.
Affecting others, they are changed by it. Changed by it, they are trans-
formed. It is only he who is possessed of the most complete sincerity
that can exist under heaven, who can transform.29
In order that inner virtues be spontaneously manifested, as opposed to
deliberately disguised, the embodiment of moral spirit through enormous
efforts of self-cultivation is required. Thus, not only the preservation of
inner state in sincerity but also the eye and facial expressions, gait, hand
position, and even breathing are the objects of Confucian self-cultivation.
The carriage of the exemplary person was easy, but somewhat slow,
grave, and reserved, when he saw anyone whom he wished to honor.
He did not move his feet lightly, nor his hands irreverently. His eyes
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looked straightforward, and his mouth was kept quiet and composed.
No sound from him broke the stillness, and his head was carried upright.
His breath came without panting or stoppage, and his standing gave
(the beholder)'an impression of virtue. His looks were grave, and he sat
like a personator of the dead. When at leisure and at ease, and in con-
versation, he looked mild and bland.30
The nine bodily expressions of the exemplary person in the Book of Rites,
known as the "nine expressions" (jiurong fLtf), are the guidelines of self-
cultivation in Confucianism. While people today are occupied with groom-
ing their physical bodies through skin care and body building, ancient
people focused on grooming the shen :!it as the site of unity of mind and
body.
Bodily Expressions and Recognizing the Person of Virtue
In traditional society, recognizing a virtuous person was not just a mat-
ter of moral concern, but one of great importance in politics and person-
nel administration, especially in hiring and appointing public officials.
The Book of Documents w~ci1 comments on the importance of the abil-
ity to judge character: "When [the sovereign] knows personhood, he may
be deemed wise, and then can put everyone into the office for which he is
fit."3! When Fan Chi ~~ asked what wisdom is, Confucius replied that
it is the ability to "know people properly [zhi ren 9;OA]."32 Confucius also
said, "I will not be afflicted at men's not knowing me; I will be afflicted that
I do not know men."33
These examples display the importance of being able to recognize the
virtuous person in the Confucian tradition of rule of virtue (dezhi t~m).
How can one recognize the virtuous person? Does one with bright eye
pupils really have a righteous heart, as Mencius said? How can we tell one
with dull pupils and a bright heart from one with bright pupils and a dull
heart? Should we really think that one with dull pupils has a dull heart and
one with bright pupils has a bright heart?
Reading others' inner states through sensual intuition surely has some
limitations. This is because people may hide or feign their inner feelings,
and also because we can be biased or prejudiced by the outlook or appear-
ance of others. Even Confucius was once prejudiced in his judgment of
character; that is, he failed to distinguish the body as an expression of
inner state from the body as a physiognomic outlook. According to the
"Biographies of Confucius' Disciples" (Zhongni dizi liezhuan {rpm5l3T31J
~) in the Records of the Grand Historian (Shiji .'t:~c), Confucius did not
like Dantai Mieming ~!E~l!fj, who wanted to be his student, because of
his ugly looks. But Dantai Mieming cultivated virtue diligently and always
conducted himself in a morally upright fashion. After graduation, three
hundred students adored and followed him, and his virtue became widely
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known among lords. Regretting his misunderstanding, Confucius con-
fessed, "I judged people based on their looks and made a mistake with
Dantai Mieming!"34
Confucius' confession teaches us that we must not evaluate people
by their physiognomic appearances, but must try to grasp the embodied
expressions emanating from their inner state. In this regard, the Confu-
cian recognition of the personhood is clearly distinct from physiognomy.
The physiognomist judges people's fortunes and longevity by their inborn,
fixed appearance. The Confucian tries to grasp a person's virtues and emo-
tions through reading his/her inner state overflowing through eye and facial
expressions. But how can we read a person's inner state if he/she covers up
or feigns his/her facial looks? Confucius admits that there are cases where
facial expressions and inner state do not go hand in hand. For example,
"There are cases where it flowers but no fruit is subsequently produced";35
"He who puts on an appearance of stern firmness, while inwardly he is
weak, is like one of the small, mean people; yea, is he not like the thief
who breaks through, or climbs over, a wall?"36 Therefore, single percep-
tual assessments of body signs such as eye and facial movement are not suf-
ficient to understand one's inner state, and it must be supplemented with
continuous reflective observation of "ways of doing." Confucius said: "See
what a man does. Mark his motives. Examine in what things he rests.
How can a man conceal his character? How can a man conceal his char-
acter? "37
Actions, motives, and desires mentioned in the passage are essential to
the formation of one's character. The consistency between one's actions and
will is called one's disposition. If one is inconsistent in his actions and will,
his disposition is not identifiable and, further, his self-identity is doubtful.
While pretentious behavior or hypocritical expressions may: fool people
at first, one's true character is eventually exposed through the continuous
observation of his/her disposition. Confucius tells us to assess character by
continuous observation of disposition, and not according to a cursory per-
ception of eye or facial movements. People cannot live their whole lives
concealing their inner state. That is why Confucius says, "How can a man
conceal his character?"
The conditions necessary to recognize the virtuous person in Confu-
cianism can be summarized as follows: (I) one's emotions and inner state
must be expressed externally through the body in order to be understood
by others; (2) both the carrier of expression and the reader of it should be
sincere; (3) continuous and reflective experience of a person's disposition
is required, and it is hard to understand those whose self-identity is unsta-
ble or who hide their emotions and will; and (4) those who have excellent
perceptive powers should be able to read others' emotions and inner states
better than those who do not.
Exposing one's emotions through facial expressions and bodily move-
ments is known as "encoding"; reading one's intentions and emotions
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from such expressions is known as "decoding." In Confucianism, culti-
vation is analogous to encoding and recognizing the virtuous person to
decoding. However, codes can lie. According to Umberto £Co, semiotics
is the study of all things that lie. If something is not used to lying, nei-
ther can it be used to speaking the truth.38 Lying can occur in both encod-
ing and decoding. Thus, in Confucianism, sincerity and intuitive ability are
required of both the encoder and the decoder as prerequisites to recogniz-
ing the personhood.
In the intellectual tradition of the East, many attempts have been made
to systematically establish the techniques and categories for understanding
human personality and character. Yet Confucianism has taken little inter-
est in this field, as it deals with the more fundamental question of how one
can acquire an authentic character rather than trying to establish system-
atic characterology. Behind this effort lies the belief that inner virtue can
be manifest even if it is not intended when it overflows from within, and is
known to others even if not attempted. Also, at the base of this belief lies
the lived experience of the unity of mind and body. Confucian cultivation
of the body is possible on the premise that the body is the unity of corpus
and spirit. That is, a refined, solemn body makes the mind sincere, and a
sincere mind makes the body appear clean and neat.
Character sketches of the deceased officials in the Obituaries Uoigi '$
~) in the Annals of the ]oseon Dynasty Uoseon wangjo sillok f;ljffx~.
~) frequently include descriptions of appearance and stature. This means
that one's facial looks and bodily expressions in everyday life as well as
one's macroactions should be examined to make a fair assessment of one's
character, human quality, and virtue. Following are some examples of the
bodily expression as they appear in the Annals of the ]oseon Dynasty:
Su i* of Yecheon passed away.... He had a decent appearance and a
dignified face, and was filial to his mother, trying not to disobey her. His
posthumous name was So-hyo Btl~; so Btl meaning reverent, beautiful
face and hyo ~ meaning generosity, benevolence, and filial piety ... 39
Choe Hang tl.Uf[ who served as the Second High State Councilor at the
State Council passed away.... His posthumous name was Mun-jeong X
:!i1'l'; mun X meaning high morality and great knowledge, and jeong :!i1'l'
meaning politeness and reticence. Choe Hang was modest, discreet, and
reticent. Even in the hot summer, he was fully dressed from head to toe
and sat down on his knees without the slightest indication of indolence
on his face ... 40
Yi Hun *t~, an assistant councilor at the State Council, passed
away.... His posthumous name was An-so ~Btl; an ~ meaning love of
harmony and dislike of argument, and so Btl meaning courteous, beau-
tiful face. 41
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As shown in the obituaries in the Annals of the ]oseon Dynasty, the Con-
fucian belief that "What truly is within will be manifested without"42 was
adhered to as an iron rule of self-cultivation by literati during the time, and
this belief was reflected even in facial expressions and bodily movements,
the most trivial elements of daily life.
The Need for Embodied Virtues
Thus far, we have examined the significance of eye and facial expressions
and bodily movements in the Confucian tradition. In the Confucian every-
day life, mind and body are inseparable. The self is the body (shen !l),
a union of the mental and the physical. The self reveals itself externally
through the body that is exposed to the intersubjective gaze of the com-
munity and becomes visible to the community members. Thus, an indi-
vidual's eye and facial expressions are external manifestations of his/her
inner spirit. In this sense, the body in the Confucian tradition is a means of
communication between the self and the world. Therefore, eye and facial
expressions, body gestures and clothes should be expressed in a moderate
fashion appropriate to the circumstances occurring in the various contexts
of life. Eye and facial expressions expressed through self-cultivation are
external indicators of one's inner state. Through them, people disclose their
emotions and feelings, and also experience those of people around them. In
so doing people construct their communal life. In this regard, Confucian-
ism is a philosophy of community.
With the introduction of liberalism and capitalism, however, the com-
munal life once sought after in traditional society has become outdated.
In this reality, a distortion of facial expressions in the wave of secularized
and materialized liberties has taken over the community. People exercise
bodily movements with no concern for their surroundings, 'make unsit-
uated, unembedded exhibition of emotions, and carry looks of hostility,
precaution, indifference, and disinterest. People's gaze is not considered
the intersubjective gaze of community members, but as an interference of
strange invaders or the expression of dissimilation. These gazes today are
the exclusionary gazes of which Confucianism warned. But they remain
irreproachable, because individual facial exhibitions and bodily movements
are no longer a part of moral consideration, but belong to the realm of self-
discretion. Taking issue with these expressions is regarded as infringing on
the liberty and rights of individuals.
In our capitalist culture, where all values are converted into mone-
tary value, facial expressions are no longer an outward expression of one's
inner state or inner virtue but an indicator of wealth and fame. For exam-
ple, faces undergo plastic surgery for a prettier look, bodies are created in
the gym for a sexier contour, and clothes and ornaments are worn to show
off wealth. These plastic surgically created, sexy-looking restructures and
rich-looking dresses are masks lacking authenticity, once criticized by Con-
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fucius and Mencius. But, although we know that they are deceiving, we
no longer inquire into their authenticity. In today's capitalist society, the
more possessions the better; and the swagger of possession is not a matter
of prudence or moderation, but of individual preference or personal dis-
cretion.
Modern-day people have been liberated from the restraints of com-
munity-tied life due to a technological civilization that surges with com-
mercialism. Wife and husband feel empathy mediated by the touching
performances of movie stars on television rather than facing each other eye
to eye. Children are busy at war on computers, destroying virtual villains
from outer space once they have finished their homework. College students
no longer bother to discuss serious matters such as poetry and the meaning
of life, but drift away to the rhythm of celebrities' singing and dancing in
music videos. Girls no longer waver over the choice between desire and
self-restraint; they choose partners based on the brand of their clothes and
cars. We no longer yearn for sincerity and authenticity overflowing through
eyes and showing on faces of families, friends, and lovers. In a society in
which only minimal rules such as those defined by laws can lead us to the
manageable path, any mention of character or personhood is regarded as
out-of-date sermonizing, like an old relic in a museum. Is it possible to
revive the old wisdom of seeking a unity between inner state and outer
expression in such a spoiled cultural atmosphere in which soulless faces
and spiritless eyes overwhelmingly prevail?
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12 Ethical Education as Bodily Training
Kitaro Nishida's Moral Phenomenology
of I~[ting-Intuitionll
In this essay, I explore Kitar6 Nishida's moral phenomenology of "acting-
intuition." Specifically, I am interested in how this notion can be used to
develop an ethics based not upon reflective thought but rather upon the
experiential learning emergent from our embodied and embedded somatic
practices. In short, I want to explore how Nishida's work can be used to
formulate an ethics of bodily training. The essay proceeds as follows. First,
I discuss William James' and Kitar6 Nishida's respective formulations of
what both term "pure experience." Nishida openly appropriates this notion
from James, and it can be seen as the conceptual foundation upon which
the whole of Nishida's philosophicai work rests. Next, I discuss Nishida's
notion of "acting-intuition," which emerges from his formulation of pure
experience. I conclude by developing a phenomenological model of the
moral significance of "acting-intuition." In doing so, I attempt to bring
some clarity and precision to this important concept, and to argue for both
its theoretical as well as, more important, its practical significance.
As a peripheral aim, I also hope to demonstrate along the way how
Nishida's insights into pure experience and acting-intuition challenge two
default-positions of Western philosophy: (I) Consciousness and perception
are solely internal processes in the brain-and the latter consists of re-
presentations of the external world somehow emergent from the neural-
chemical processes underwriting the former; (2) Moral action primarily
entails deliberative reflection-more precisely, a detached, critical form of
thinking concerned with a priori justifications of moral judgments. With
his notion of pure experience, Nishida will argue first that consciousness
and perception are not localized "in the head," but rather that, as embod-
ied and embedded, consciousness is both driven and constituted by its
bodily engagement with the external environment. Very literally, the mind
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is extended beyond the limits of the skin and skull. Against the second
default position, Nishida will argue for what I term "an embodied ethics
of involvement" that challenges the cognitivist paradigm (glossed above)
framing most contemporary Western ethical discussions.
Varieties of Pure Experience: James and Nishida
Nishida's development of pure experience was deeply influenced by Wil-
liam James' discussion of the phenomenon. Therefore, a brief consider-
ation of James' development of the notion is warranted. James first dis-
cusses pure experience at length in his posthumously published Essays in
Radical Empiricism.! What is pure experience for James? To answer this
question, we must first note that James' thought (as with Nishida) emerges
from a deeply empirical concern. Both James and Nishida offer what we
might term "philosophies of life," insofar as both men were interested in
articulating the general structures of our uniquely human, bodily percep-
tual experience of the world. However, this analysis of experience writ
large is no mere metaphysical exercise conducted for its own sake. Rather,
this inquiry into the general character of experience is always directed
toward the service of enabling a more sensitively attuned and attentive life,
including an attunement to the spiritual dimensions of human reality that
often resist tidy conceptual analysis. Any analysis of reality, according to
both James and Nishida, in this way has to be flexible enough to encom-
pass both the sacred and the secular, to the extent that both can potentially
provide experiential content for human consciousness.
James' development of pure experience thus serves as the foundation
of his radical empiricism.2 Moreover, it also grounds what, in contempo-
rary parlance, we might term his "situated" and "enactive" approach to
consciousness. James repeatedly emphasizes the body's central role in shap-
ing cognition. More precisely, he argues for the irreducible relationship
between our embodied agency-in-the-world and the constitution of phe-
nomenal experience. According to James, action and thought are always
thoroughly integrated.
The notion of "pure experience" reflects James' emphasis on the con-
nection between agency and experience. In his essay "Does Conscious-
ness Exist?" James writes: "The instant field of the present is at all times
what I call the 'pure' experience. It is only virtually or potentially either
object or subject as yet. For the time being, it is plain, unqualified actu-
ality, or existence, a simple that .. . the doubling of it in retrospection into
a state of mind and a reality intended ... is just one of the acts."3 With his
notion of pure experience, James argues for a kind of experiential monism
that has both ontological as well as phenomenological significance. First,
he is concerned with neutralizing the well-known problem-set associated
with ontological dualism, and the associated mental-physical explanatory
gap "which all sorts of theories had to be invented to overcome."4 This is
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pure experience's ontological significance. For if subject and object are ulti-
mately constituted by the same "primal stuff," as James elsewhere terms
pure experience-in other words, they are two aspects of the same inte-
grated unit-the explanatory gap is exposed as a pseudo-problem and it
simply dissolves.
More important for our present concerns, James is also arguing against
approaches to mind that individuate three basic components of cognition
(perception, action, and thought) and treat each as though they were func-
tionally discrete modules, capable of being analyzed in isolation from the
other components, as well as from the larger environment in which they
are embedded. This phenomenological significance of pure experience will
prove central to Nishida's concerns. Again, James (and Nishida, as we shall
see) insists that any adequate model of experience must account for the
basic organic interrelation between consciousness, perception, and situated
action. To put the matter in a more contemporary fashion: consciousness
and perception are not simply token or type identical to local processes in
the brain. They are not atomistic faculties that mysteriously come together
"in the head" via some spiritual principle of unification or transcendental
ego. Furthermore, they are not reducible to autonomous causal-functional
states that can be investigated independently of their embodied and embed-
ded realization. Rather, consciousness and perception emerge from skill-
ful bodily activities that unfold in a lived world that we interact with and
move throughout. And they do so within a fundamentally integrated level
of "pure experience." The important point is this: pure experience, for
James, describes the basic level at which embodied consciousness and the
world exist coupled together in a nondual relation-a pragmatic or enac-
tive relation that generates perception, reflective thought, and other subse-
quent subject-object dualisms (which are taken to be irreduci?le bifurca-
tions within dualistic ontologies).
As early as 1905, Nishida had taken an interest in James' writings on
pure experience.s The basic form of Nishida's development of pure expe-
rience, as discussed in his An Inquiry into the Good, 6 is quite similar to
James. Like James, Nishida writes that the defining feature of pure expe-
rience is its nonduality. It is "the state of experience just as it is with-
out deliberative discrimination.... In this regard, pure experience is iden-
tical with direct experience ... there is not yet a subject or an object, and
knowing and its object are completely unified. This is the most refined type
of experience."? Nishida insists along with James that pure experience is
both ontologically and phenomenologically "a simple fact."8 Like James,
Nishida, too, remains convinced that the most effective way to overcome
the mental-physical explanatory gap is to "discard all dogmatic hypotheses
[and] approach reality based on the content of our experience."9
With their respective developments of "pure experience," both James
and Nishida in this way look to disclose the underlying experiential unity
behind language and thought. Mirroring a basic Zen Buddhist presupposi-
I
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tion that Nishida will later utilize for his own ends, James argues that con-
ceptual analysis can never provide an exhaustive account of human experi-
ence in its phenomenal richness and unity. Like Nishida, James is suspicious
of the idea that conceptual thought functions as the primitive-and thus
irreducible-interface between self and world. On this conceptualist or
"intellectualist" line, as both James and Nishida refer to it, all thinking and
experience necessarily involve concepts. Against this intellectualist view,
however, both James and Nishida argue instead that the phenomenal con-
tent of embodied experience as experienced outstrips our capacity to con-
ceptually or linguistically articulate it. In other words, James and Nishida
insist that many of our basic experiences of the world harbor noncon-
ceptual content. That is, they have rich phenomenal content that is too
fine-grained and sensuously detailed to lend itself to exhaustive concep-
tual analysis.
For example, we can have visual experiences of colors and shapes of
things for which we lack the relevant concepts (a previously unfamiliar
shade of magenta or a chiliagon). This ability holds for other sensory modal-
ities as well. Our ability to report a wide range of tastes, smells, and audi-
tory experiences lags far behind our capacity to actually have an experience
of a nearly infinite spectrum of tastes, smells, and auditory experiences.
The deliverances of our senses continually run ahead of both our descrip-
tive vocabularies and our conceptual abilities. This phenomenal abundance
is the "teeming and dramatic richness of the concrete world," according
to James. lO Therefore, both James and Nishida insist that the phenomenal
givenness of experience is more basic than our antecedent categorizations
of it. However, Nishida moves beyond James in assigning moral action to
the realm of nonconceptual experience, and he further argues for the moral
status of certain forms of nonconceptual content. More on this later.
Based upon these sorts of observations, James insists that there is a
truth to our concrete experience that conceptual analysis and the formal
truths of logic cannot explicate. He writes: "I have finally found myself
compelled to give up the logic, fairly, squarely, and irrevocably. It has an
imperishable use in human life, but that use is not to make us theoreti-
cally acquainted with the essential nature of reality. Reality, life, expedi-
ence, concreteness, immediacy, use what words you will, exceeds our logic,
overflows and surrounds it."11 Similarly, Nishida argues that "meanings
and judgments are an abstracted part of the original experience, and com-
pared with the original experience they are meager in content."12 Thus pure
experience in its phenomenal immediacy is normatively superior to expe-
rience "carved up" with conceptual discriminations of any kind, accord-
ing to Nishida. For Nishida, experience "emptied" of dualistic distances
(of the sort imposed by language and concepts) discloses an intuitive truth
about the inner, interrelated nature of reality-an ontological and ethi-
cal truth that finds expression in the spheres of art, religion, and morality.
Nishida's notion of "acting-intuition" will attempt to capture the mode of
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action by which we both experience and express this insight. And he will
argue, moreover, that the experiential content of moral conduct is itself too
fine-grained and situationally specific to be exhaustively captured by con-
ceptual analysis (or "rational" approaches to morality, as he repeatedly
refers to them).
Nishida on ~~Acting·lntuition"
Put simply, acting-intuition for Nishida is the way that we realize pure
experience in embodied praxis. It is thus a kind of nonconceptual somatic
knowing. Nishida writes that "both conduct and knowledge must arrive at
the unity of pure experience.,,13 Acting-intuition thus simply is the bodily
expression of this unity: a creative and spontaneous bodily knowing.
Therefore, Nishida's twin notions of "pure experience" and "acting-intu-
ition" serve not simply as claims about the nature of mind and experience.
Nor do they serve as primarily metaphysical postulates. More important,
they found Nishida's rendering of moral experience as context-dependent
embodied action: the realization of "pure experience" within our intersub-
jective relations via "acting-intuition." Again, however, for Nishida this is
first and foremost a bodily and not a cognitive achievement.
Nishida critiques detached, critical morality concerned with the justi-
fication of universal principles-what he refers to as "rational theor[ies]"
of ethics14-by arguing that such a conception of moral cognition excludes
the fundamental aspect of moral experience: concrete moral conduct (or
what I term here "embodied action"). For it is only within moral con-
duct, or embodied action, that the substantive content of moral experience
arises. Nishida writes: "The power of formal understanding provides only
laws ... it cannot give any content."IS And this content of moral conduct,
Nishida argues-in virtue of its situational specificity, the uniqu"e situations
and intersubjective encounters within which moral action occurs-eludes
comprehensive conceptual articulation. Thus authentic moral conduct
(or acting-intuition) is a kind of spontaneous pure experience. However,
Nishida is not precise about what form intuitive moral conduct takes.
Therefore, in the remainder of this essay, I will sketch a model of Nishida's
moral phenomenology of acting-intuition and bring some structure and
clarity to this notion.
To begin: Nishida elaborates an important phenomenological feature
of moral conduct when he first claims that, by acting in a nondelibera-
tive and egoless manner (via acting-intuition): "the true personality comes
forth when a person eradicates [self-directed concerns] and forgets his or
her self. But this is not an activity of Kant's pure reason, which is com-
mon to each individual and totally separate from the content of experi-
ence."16 Rather, intuitive moral conduct "is a pure and simple activity that
comes forth of itself, unhindered by oneself ... and no separation of sub-
ject and object."!? What Nishida seems to mean can be understood as fol-
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lows. I suggest that, when Nishida says that intuitive moral conduct is a
"pure" activity "unhindered by oneself," he is arguing that this is a mode
of experience thai: lacks conceptual content. Importantly, this is a sponta-
neous bodily action. Acting-intuition is thus a bodily achievement; it is not
an experience invoking cognitive intentionality-since, in its most mini-
mal sense, cognitive intentionality involves a dualistic relation obtaining
between two relata: the cognitive act (noesis) of a conscious subject and the
act's content, or object (noema). Cognitive-intentional experiences are thus
not "pure" in Nishida's sense. Rather, Nishida claims instead that intui-
tive moral conduct, as embodied action, is activated within an experiential
dimension operative without cognitive intentionality: in other words, it is a
prereflective mode of bodily experience operative prior to cognitive inten-
tionality that is nonetheless itself directed, or intentional. Acting-intuition
is a noncognitive bodily knowing that restructures the perceptual form of
our experience of the world, including our intersubjective relations.
Acting-Intuition and the Phenomenological Structure
of Moral Conduct
Building upon Nishida's insights into the nature of pure experience and act-
ing-intuition, I now suggest that expert moral conduct consists of a synthe-
sis of intuitive moral perception and embodied action: what Nishida calls
the "unity of knowledge and conduct." Furthermore, I argue that moral
development-and moral education-entails the cultivation of a morally
attuned bodily comportment that enables one to skillfully and intuitively
respond to the morally salient features of concrete situations. More sim-
ply, I am arguing that the vast majority of our moral life involves embod-
ied moral action before it does moral thought. Moral education thus needs
to reflect this bodily emphasis.
Nishida's notion of acting-intuition serves as the basis for my remain-
ing discussion. I will develop its two correlative components-intuition
and action-independently, before then demonstrating how these two
components underwrite expert moral conduct. First, I develop a phenome-
nological description of the gestalt shift that occurs in intuitive moral per-
ception that enables one to realize a nondual perspective on the world.
Next, I discuss how this nondual gestalt shift enables one to creatively
respond to moral situations in a truly spontaneous and selfless manner-a
kind of prereflective "bodily knowing" that does not entail the imposition
of reflective judgments or rational action-guiding principles.
The Nondual Gestalt Structure of Expert Moral Perception
When I speak of intuitive moral perception as entailing a nondual gestalt
shift, I have in mind something like the following. ls In intuitive moral per-
ception, the moral expert immediately and intuitively perceives the morally
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salient features of an encountered concrete situation. The morally salient
features of a given situation can be of a nearly infinite variety, and vary
greatly in intensity and degree: for example, a nearly imperceptible change
in a coworker's tone during a casual conversation versus hislher suddenly
bursting into tears; the slight blush of someone whom I've abruptly made
uncomfortable by uttering an ill-considered comment; a twenty-dollar bill
that slips out of the pocket of a person in front of me as he/she continues
down the street unaware; a sudden cry for help just around the corner; the
expectant glance of a lone child waiting to be acknowledged in a room full
of adults.
Via this immediate and intuitive perception of the morally salient fea-
tures of an encountered situation, a gestalt shift or perspectival reorgani-
zation is affected. In Nishida's terminology, this entails the realization of a
new phenomenological "standpoint." What is normally in the foreground
of the moral agent's experience-egocentric self-interests, self-directed
concerns with one's own well-being and immediate desires-abruptly
shifts to the background. And what is normally in the background of a
moral agent's experience-other-directed concerns and considerations, a
global awareness of moral saliencies not directly relevant to one's own self-
interests-shifts abruptly to the foreground of their experiential field. By
intuitively fixing onto these morally salient features, the perceptual orga-
nization of the moral context is reconfigured in a profound way. In an
important sense, the very phenomenological structure of the moral sit-
uation itself has changed. The figure-ground shift that I am speaking of
entails a thorough moral refocusing. By intuitively foregrounding an other-
directed care-where my self-directed concern is no longer experienced
as over against the moral needs of the other as they present themselves to
me-I become capable of an immediate egoless response to the particu-
lar demands of the situation. By foregrounding the immediate needs of the
other, I enter into his/her experience openly, ready to act in a creative and
appropriate way. This is what Nishida seems to mean when he writes that
"True intuition ... means that the self becomes creative.... Therefore our
body becomes what sees as well as what works. ... The world becomes the
self's body." 19
An example will help clarify this point. Consider the following sce-
nario. At work one day, I am walking down the hall when I encounter' a
coworker with whom I'm on friendly terms. However, during this particu-
lar encounter, Jane seems unusually cold and indifferent. She is curt in her
response to my greeting and barely meets my gaze before continuing on her
way. Later in the day we have a similar encounter. The workday then con-
cludes with Jane walking silently by my desk.
That evening, I become deeply offended. I'm convinced that I have
done nothing to deserve this treatment. Pondering the day further, I decide
that Jane is clearly a moody individual, more so than I'd previously real-
ized. I begin to remember other previous encounters with her that I now see
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discreetly hinted at this propensity to sullenness. However, I now see that I
had failed to "read" these earlier signs properly. Thinking about the matter
even more, I decide that Jane is simply an unpleasant person. Furthermore,
I tell myself that I've always really felt this way about her; today's experi-
ence simply confirmed my intuition. I prepare to carry this realization into
future encounters with Jane.
Things change suddenly the following day. After arriving at work, I
see Jane and another coworker, John, chatting quietly at the end of the
hall. Steeling myself for an icy encounter, I walk toward them. However, as
I am suddenly within earshot of my two coworkers, Jane looks up at me
with swollen eyes and smiles. Simultaneously, John leans closer to Jane and
says, "I'm so very sorry about your mother's passing. I know the two of
you were very close."
At the moment, I experience an abrupt and comprehensive moral
refocusing. What was previously at the foreground of my moral percep-
tion-feelings of resentment and anger, an anticipation of future unpleas-
ant encounters that would reinforce my resentment-now recedes into the
background and subsequently disappears. A profound perspectival shift
has been affected. I move beyond the self-directed considerations that had
colored my experience until this moment, and I am immediately aware of
the morally salient features of the current situation, features I'd previously
overlooked. I see Jane for what she is: a daughter who is coping with the
death of her mother, an individual suffering in the face of a great personal
tragedy, a person in need of selfless compassion and sensitivity. In a very
important sense, I enter into Jane's grief by foregrounding her immediate
needs. In doing so, I am in a position to respond spontaneously to these
needs in an authentically selfless manner, as my prior bitterness has now
dissipated completely into the background via this moral gestalt shift.
In failing to be attuned to the morally salient features of my previ-
ous day's encounters with Jane-the fact that her behavior was in fact not
consistent with our personal history, an uncharacteristic heaviness of spirit
that would have disclosed itself had I been more attentive-I reaffirm my
status as a moral novice. My own self-directed feelings and concerns were
thoroughly foregrounded in my experience and colored my intersubjec-
tive encounters throughout the day. It is only through a comprehensive
gestalt shift, triggered by my coming into an appropriately significant con-
crete moral situation (Jane's palpable grief over her mother's death), that
I am "jolted," as it were, out of my egocentrism and into a moral-percep-
tual figure-ground shift that places me in an attuned state of readiness-
to-respond. A moral expert would have been poised to affect such a shift
much earlier, and would have been more sensitively attuned to the relevant
situational saliencies that affect such a shift. This perpetual moral attun-
ement, or bodily poise, is what differentiates the moral expert from the
novice. Poise, as a perpetual moral attunement, denotes not a passive state
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but rather a perpetual readiness-to-respond via affecting the gestalt shift
here described.
Far from being an rare experience, I contend that the vast majority of
our moral life is comprised of experiences similar to the one I've depicted.
These kinds of microencounters constitute the very marrow of our moral
life. They prove the real "content" of moral experience, as Nishida refers
to it. Throughout our everyday lives, we are all confronted with endless
concrete situations that call for an immediate moral response-and by and
large, we simply respond. And we do so without thinking.
The upshot of this model of moral action is that moral expertise is
seen as a primarily progressive cultivation of a skill, or refined form of per-
ception, and not, then, solely as a progressive refinement of moral princi-
ples. Moral expertise is viewed as bodily knowing: embodied know-how
and not a reasoned knowing-that. As we develop and age, move through
our lives, and accumulate experiences, we find ourselves encountering and
responding to an increasing number and variety of particular moral situ-
ations. Moral maturity develops through our involved engagement with
these concrete situations. Genuine moral maturity is therefore realized, not
primarily through reflective thinking or deductive principles, but rather in
embodied praxis: a progressively developed ability to perceive intuitively
the morally salient features of a given situation and to affect a nondual
gestalt shift or perceptual reorganization similar in its pragmatic expres-
sion to the one described above. Intuitive moral perception thus generates
skilled moral action.
Moral Action as "Bodily Knowing"
Nishida speaks of bodily skill cultivation in the context of b~th ethical
and aesthetic disciplines. He writes that" 'Consciousness that has become
nothing' is not something that is hindered by action; it must be something
that internalizes action. 'Sensitivity' acquired through discipline is not mere
mechanical habit. In the case of a painter painting a picture, he, of course,
does not follow conceptual judgment; but his painting is not mere spon-
taneous movement, either. His movement must have the self-awareness of
power. It is not reflective self-awareness, but self-awareness in action. "20
Similarly, Francisco Varela writes that "When one is the action, no resi-
due of self-consciousness remains to observe the action externally. "21 Like
Varela, Nishida argues that, in action-intuition as a nondual experience
there is no distinction between agent and action: our agency is our action,
the action as it is performed in a spontaneous and intuitive manner. This is
a "bodily-knowing."
When I use the term "bodily-knowing," I am referring to the fact
that our nonconceptual bodily responses to moral encounters of the
sorts described herein are not merely instinctual or mechanistic "blind"
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responses. Rather, they exhibit a directedness and situational appropriate-
ness that differentiates them from simple instinct (though again, this direct-
edness and appropriateness in not conceptually represented via antecedent
"conditions of satisfaction" or something similar). Moreover, I am arguing
that these nonconceptual bodily responses qualify as knowledge. This is
because expert moral action exhibits a goal-directedness. This goal-direct-
edness is a practical knowhow, a pragmatic understanding of how best to
respond to concrete situations based upon the various situational saliencies
that solicit a spontaneous response.
This sort of "bodily-knowing" is exhibited through the way that our
body is knowingly in touch with those objects in its environment toward
which it is intimately attuned. These objects are the practical saliencies of
my lived environment. I enter my apartment and know, without concep-
tualizing antecedent conditions of satisfaction, how to bodily navigate the
spatial arrangement of my lived space and the objects constitutive there-
of-even if the lights are out and it is completely dark. I enter my kitchen
early in the morning, bleary-eyed and half-conscious from lack of sleep,
and already bodily know how to find my coffeemaker, retrieve coffee, and
begin brewing it. Stumbling into my bathroom-pre-coffee and thus still
half-asleep-I am aware of the configuration of objects comprising the
lived space of my bathroom and can therefore skillfully navigate this envi-
ronment in such a way that I brush my teeth, wash my face, comb my hair,
and so on without conceptually attending to any of these activities. I open
the medicine cabinet, reach for my toothbrush, and apply toothpaste-all
in one seamless gesture, a prereflective activity performed while I am, more-
over, mentally running through the various things I have to do that day.
This latter feature of my experience-mentally attending to the various
plans for my day-is of course a conceptual act (or series of acts). How-
ever, I am not cognitively or conceptually attending to where my tooth-
brush is stored when retrieving it, or how best to apply toothpaste while
applying it. I simply do these things. These practical habits have been inter-
nalized within my bodily comportment-my body's intentional project.
What is the body's intentional project? Put simply, the body's inten-
tional project is the nonconceptual field of experience through which our
body is knowingly integrated into its lived environment, and by which it
intuitively responds to the practical saliencies of its lived environment by
knowingly inhabiting it. Bodily comportment or poise, then, is a readi-
ness to respond that enables intuitive, nonconceptual responses. The non-
dual gestalt shift developed in the prior section is what prepares the ethi-
cal expert both to intuitively respond to the particular moral saliencies that
present themselves in a given moral context and to respond to these moral
saliencies in an authentically selfless, spontaneous, and situational-appro-
priate manner.
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Conclusion
With this discussion of moral conduct as a form of nonconceptual bodily
knowing, I have attempted to demonstrate the relevance of nonconceptual
content to understanding the nature of our everyday moral psychology.
My intention in this essay has thus been twofold. First, I have attempted
to argue that nonconceptual content can serve as an illuminating explan-
atory mechanism for understanding both the nature and the phenomeno-
logical structure of skilled action and moral cognition (where forms of the
latter are in fact important, but generally overlooked, examples of the for-
mer). Second, I have attempted to sketch out a preliminary model of moral
experience that challenges basic cognitivist assumptions about the nature
of embodied moral agency. Nishida's notion of "acting-intuition" has been
helpful on both fronts.
To be clear, I do not claim that there is neither a place nor a need for
moral reasoning in the intricate topography of our moral experience. Not
all moral contexts can be neatly resolved by employing the sort of skilled
coping discussed above. However, many concrete contexts can. Thus
moral education, to fully acknowledge both the practical and the theoreti-
cal dimensions of agency, must recognize that embodied encounters of the
kind I have discussed are absolutely fundamental to our moral life. It must
then work toward articulating programs for cultivating a bodily sensitiv-
ity that enables us to become morally mature agents, skilled synthesizers
of intuitive moral perception and nonconceptual bodily action. It is here, I
suggest, that wisdom traditions such as Buddhism-with its prioritization
of somatic practice as the key to cultivating karuna, a universal compas-
sion that emerges from "skilful means" in dealing with others-and Chris-
tianity-with its discussion of agape love, the form of which differs con-
tingent upon various situational saliencies-can be of more assistance than
can the Kantian principle of universalizability.
I conclude by simply noting that, just as the development of expertise
in other skill domains requires practice, repetition, and a familiarity emerg-
ing from the accumulation of real-world encounters, so too does our devel-
opment as moral experts arise from the same components. With the over-
emphasis on the rational aspect of our moral agency at the expense of its
practical or embodied dimension, cognitivist moral theories have consis-
tently neglected a vital aspect of our moral experience and, concomitantly,
the possibility for a genuinely selfless and caring engagement with others.
It is this final feature of moral experience that must be present if we are to
exhibit the full expression of our moral capacities.
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Part IV
Creativity and Habilitation

JOHN HOPE MASON
13 What's Wrong with Being "Creative"?
The bags are packed, the horses outside are getting restless; the moment
of departure has come. The only son, Laertes, is leaving home for the first
time, off to university. (We are in Act 1 of Hamlet.) His father, Polonius,
torn between anxiety and pride, launches into a litany of proverbs and plat-
itudes, epithets and admonitions (not unlike that stock character of com-
edy, the brain-rich but socially dysfunctional professor). Finally, he arrives
at his conclusion: "This above all, my son, to thine own self be true;/And
it must follow, as the night the day,/Thou canst not then be false to any
man."!
To our ears this sounds strange. Why should being true to oneself nec-
essarily entail-"it must follow"-being honest in dealing with others?
The answer to this lies in the notion, derived from Stoic thought, that each
person has an innate "good" self, or good "nature" (itself part of an all-
encompassing "world-nature"), which is his or her "own."2 This is not
only in its being distinct to you, but something that becomes your "own"
when you make it so, by acting in a harmonious and orderly way with
other people; in other words, acting morally, becoming a socially respon-
sible person.
In 1972, the American critic Lionel Trilling called this attribute "sin-
cerity," a combination of "personal autonomy" and "virtue"; and he con-
trasted it with a different kind of quality that he termed "authenticity."3 He
described the latter as an overriding concern for being unique, wholly self-
defining, and he saw this as having first appeared in late-eighteenth-century
Europe. (This contrast-between sincerity and authenticity - had its paral-
lel in the contemporaneous shift in aesthetics from "imitation" to "expres-
sion," from an external point of reference that was imitated, to an inner
need, drive, or compulsion that could only be individually expressed.)4 The
opening lines of Rousseau's Confessions provide a perfect example of what
Trilling meant: "I am undertaking an enterprise which is without precedent
and which, when finished, will have no imitator. I want to show my fellow-
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men a man in all the truth of nature; and that man ... will be me. Myself
alone. I understand my heart and I know men, I am not made like anyone
else I have seen. I dare to suppose that I am not made like anyone else who
exists. If I am no better, at least I am different."5
In 2004 a study comparable to that of Trilling appeared, entitled On
Being Authentic. This adopted much of the same terminology-seeing sin-
cerity as a "social virtue"6 and authenticity as "self-defining and self-con-
tained" "uniqueness"?- but it added a new dimension. The "real me"
consists not only of my particular "feelings, needs, desires [and] capaci-
ties," but also the "creative abilities that make the person a unique indi-
vidual" (italics added).8 Since the Romantics authenticity had become "the
creative act itself," the "creative ... self-making" of oneself as "the ultimate
form of artistic creation."9 This aspiration, developed to its heroic utmost
by Nietzsche,!O has now become available to all: we can all be "if not artists
at least creative people, expressing ourselves in ... home decorating, gar-
dening, cooking, [and] shopping."!! The author's purpose here was not to
endorse these developments-on the contrary he is critical of them12-but
what his book demonstrates is how in the thirty years between Trilling's
work and his own the words "creative" and "creativity" have spread like a
virus through the language, coming to be used ever more widely, as an all-
purpose, all-weather, all-singing-and-dancing good.
The aim of this essay is to examine why this has happened and to con-
sider whether it is in fact all "good." First, however, it is necessary to clar-
ify what is understood by the words "creative" and "creativity." I take the
word "create" as meaning to "act in the world, or on the world, in a new
and significant way"; to act in the world is to perform an action, to act
on the world is to form or make something-an object, a text, an idea.
What distinguishes "creativity" from words like "innovation" or "inven-
tion" is that it refers to something that is not merely new or novel but also
significant. An action or artefact has significance if it has a meaning that
is widely shared, or profoundly experienced, if it is recognized as being
cogent or important or convincing (i.e., not superficial or transient or triv-
ial), occupying a distinct place within a broad field of understanding or
experience. 13
In the Western world-to which this discussion is confined-creativ-
ity first became an independent value in the middle years of the nineteenth
century. "The exercise of a free, creative power, ... a free, creative activ-
ity, is the highest function of man," wrote Matthew Arnold (in 1864);!4
his contemporary Marx made similar comments about "positive, creative
activity" (1844),15 and the young Disraeli had asserted that "man is made
to create" (1832).!6 That verb-"to create"-deriving from the Latin
creare (meaning to make, produce, or institute), could be used in a matter-
of-fact way. But it could of course also have an awesome resonance since
it is, so to speak, the primal verb of ]udaeo-Christian civilization: "in the
beginning God created the heavens and earth," and then (having brought
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into existence the material world and the animals) "God created man in his
own image, in the image of God he created him, male and female he created
them."I? For humans to assert their "creative" power could therefore be to
assume a quasi-divine status. To a limited extent this occurred in Renais-
sance writing about poets, combining the scriptural context with ancient
ideas of divine inspiration;18 but it was only in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries that the word began to be used more broadly. Only
with the unprecedented sense of human potential and achievement that
arose in the course of the nineteenth century, as a predominantly agricul-
tural economy gave way to the industrial world, changing for ever the bal-
ance between the God-given and the humanly made, did the modern value
(as expressed by Arnold or Marx) appear. The epitome of this change was
the way in which May Day ceased to be a thanksgiving for the divine gifts
of sun, rain, and the earth's fertility, and became instead (toward the end of
the nineteenth century) a celebration of human labour and productivity.
This immense alteration had taken place over the previous two cen-
turies as a result of a number of developments-scientific, technological,
and economic. The scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, which
examined nature in terms of efficient causes and measurable quantities (as
opposed to final causes and particular qualities), and combined observa-
tion and experiment with inductive reasoning, led to a dramatic change in
the relations of human beings to the natural world. It brought not only an
expansion of knowledge-Harvey on the circulation of the blood, New-
ton on the structure of the solar system-but a concomitant sense of pos-
sibility and power. Francis Bacon's prediction of "the enlarging [of] the
bounds of human empire, to the effecting of all things possible, "19 began to
become a reality. At the end of the century John Locke observed that "if we
will rightly estimate things, as they come to our use, and [con.sider] what
in them is purely owing to nature, and what to labour, we shall find that in
most of them ninety-nine out of one hundred are wholly to be put on the
account of [human] labour";2o nature-r percent, humanitY-99 percent.
Around this time the word "culture" began to take on its modern mean-
ing, referring not to the cultivation of what is given but rather to what sets
humans apart from nature.21
As scientific understanding and technological inventions began to
transform the material world another transformation began to appear in
economic life. In the late seventeenth century the Dutch Republic became
rich in a new way; they acquired their wealth not from native resources,
nor from conquest, but from trade. Their overseas commerce became so
extensive, and the volume and variety of goods traded so substantial, that
the market became permanent; and instead of maintaining restrictions (as
previously) to preserve a balance of trade, they permitted the maximum
amount of freedom, to increase trade. In addition, they invented new kinds
of company organization and financial structures, which made possible
both greater continuity and broader investment. All of these measures were
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introduced into Britain which not only had considerable manufacturing
activity of its own but also, after the union of England and Scotland, had
become the largest single market in Europe. The result was an exuberant
new sense of plenty: trade was now "a spring, ... an inexhausted current,"
"an unbounded ocean."22 At the same time, however, this confidence was
accompanied by a new kind of insecurity; prosperity depended on con-
tinual change, which did not happen in any planned way but according
to fashion. Nothing was fixed, all value was evanescent, and "every man
must [always1be inventing himself, or ... be advancing to further perfec-
tion upon the invention of other men."23 In other words, while science
and technology were making more invention and new activity possible, the
facts of the new commercial world were making more invention and inno-
vative action continually necessary.
In the last decades of the eighteenth century the evidence of cumula-
tive change in northern Europe began to lead to a new conception of his-
tory-the idea of progress: the belief that not only is today better than
yesterday, but tomorrow will be better than today, and the day after tomor-
row will be better than that. Arguments for this belief assumed various
forms, based on scientific advance, technological developments, economic
growth, educational projects, and the secularization of millennial or assim-
ilationist religious beliefs; but whatever their basis, the effect of this idea
of progress was to give rise to the expectation that whatever was new was
valuable. In other words, human creativity was not only possible and nec-
essary, but it was also desirable.
It is in this context that the statements by Arnold or Marx (quoted
above) were written. For each of them creativity was a defining feature of
being human and also an unequivocal good. Their confidence about this
was in part historical, and as such shared by most of their contemporaries,
but it was also quasi-theological and philosophical. That is, it drew on the
Judaeo-Christian tradition (in which both men had been raised) and the
character of the Old Testament Creator, the source not only of life but also
of the moral law. In this perspective creative power was linked inextricably
with the good. A further aspect had been subsequently added in the Italian
Renaissance when Christian theology absorbed elements of Neoplatonic
philosophy, bringing an aesthetic dimension to the idea of creativity. The
result came to be a trinity of the New, the Good, and the Beautiful. In sub-
sequent German thought this cluster of values became particularly influen-
tial, and this informed the writings of both Arnold and Marx. For them,
and their contemporaries, this trinity was central to their belief in both the
value of high culture and to their concept of creativity, and creative gifts
and artistic achievement were seen as inextricably linked.
It was not, however, a concern for the arts in general that led to creativ-
ity becoming so pervasive a feature of our world in the late twentieth cen-
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tury. That was one aspect of this story, but not the most important. In 1950
the president of the American Psychological Association, ]. P. Guildford,
chose as the subj~ct of his presidential address "Creativity," a word that (it
was claimed a few years later) had only recently come into the language.24
This was, in Guildford's words, "an area in which psychologists general-
Iy ... have feared to tread "25 and that he believed deserved their attention.
There was a general conviction "that all individuals possess to some degree
all abilities," and "creative acts can therefore be expected ... [however] fee-
ble ... among all individuals."26 There was a need now, he stated, to "dis-
cover the creative promise in our children and our youth,"27 because "the
social importance of [this] subject is very great."28 In government there
was needed not only judgement but also vision and imagination, "creative
thinking," and in large industries "the enormous economic value of new
ideas is generally recognized. "29 New kinds of psychological tests would
need to be devised, therefore, to achieve "creative productivity," and he
suggested some possible tests for "the scientist, the technologist and the
inventor. "30
The immediate impact of Guildford's address was limited, but it
turned out to be prophetic. Because seven years later the United States
was stunned by the news that the Soviet Union had successfully launched
a satellite, Sputnik, into space. Only twelve years after the end of the Sec-
ond World War, which had had a devastating effect on Russia (with the
loss of twenty-seven million lives), the Soviets had become technologically
superior. "We are [now] in a mortal struggle for the survival of our way
of life," wrote Guildford (in 1959); and "the military aspect of this strug-
gle, with its race to develop new weapons and new strategies, has called for
a stepped-up rate of invention."3! There was "a widespread desperation,"
wrote a Harvard psychologist three years later, caused by a sense of "the
possibility or probability of coextermination";32 another leading figure in
the field observed that "the future of our civilization-our very surviv-
al-depends on the quality of the creative imagination of our next gener-
ation. "33 So research on creativity became a "serious concern for the mili-
tary, government, and industry."34 As a result vast amounts of money were
invested in research on the identification and nurture of creative attributes
and abilities.
In the course of analysing the processes of creative thought in adults
it became apparent that there were similarities between these processes
and the ways in which the minds of children operated. This reinforced the
belief, held by some, that creativity was "a personal property of all [indi-
viduals],"35 which could therefore be encouraged by appropriate educa-
tional means. One result of Guildford's research had been to show how
distinctly different were convergent and divergent ways of thinking. While
intelligence tests could identify ability for convergent (logical) thinking,
they could not do that to identify the originality or flexibility of divergent
thinking. In fact "the usual practices in school not only neglect[ed] cre-
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freedom went hand in hand with demands for justice-for civil rights, for
the Third World, for women's liberation-which were driven not only by
fierce indignation over the status quo but also by an intensely optimistic
sense of new possibilities.
The Port Huron statement of 1962, the founding document of the rad-
ical student movement in the United States, Students for a Democratic Soci-
ety (SDS), articulated what came to be the central beliefs of the decade:
people "have unrealized potential for self-cultivation, self-direction, self-
understanding, and creativity.... The goal of man and society should
be ... finding a meaning in life that is personally authentic ... [which] does
not mean egotistic individualism ... [because] human relationships should
involve fraternity and honesty.... We should replace power rooted in pos-
session, privilege or circumstance by power and uniqueness rooted in love,
reflectiveness, reason, and creativity. "62 The political aim of the SDS was
"participatory democracy," which would contribute to "community" and
"establish an environment for people to live in dignity and creativeness."63
These sentiments found expression six years later on the walls of Paris:
"To be free in 1968 is to participate"; "Action should not be reaction but
creation"; "The imagination is coming to power"; "Creativity. Spontane-
ity. Life. "64
The student movements did lead to some educational reforms in
schools and universities, and an expansion of certain individual and civic
rights. But the decade ended with the Manson murders in California and
an American war still raging in Southeast Asia. What became one of the
most remembered song of the 1960s-John Lennon's "Imagine" -was
not actually written in the sixties, but in 1971; and it was more a lament
than a song of hope. We could only imagine "no possessions ... no reli-
gion ... no greed," and "all the people sharing all the world, "65 because
there were now no signs that that was likely to come about in reality.
The 1960s could be seen to have put creativity on the map, but only in
a restricted way and to a limited extent, namely, in psychology, educa-
tion, and the arts. It was only in the 1980s that the word came to attain its
present currency and status;66 and the main reasons for that seem to have
stemmed from the same kind of changes that had brought this human attri-
bute to prominence in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, namely, eco-
nomic and technological developments.
In the course of the 1970S the boom years of the Western economies
came to an end. An unprecedented situation arose in which high unemploy-
ment was combined with high inflation. The measures that had been intro-
duced in the 1930S, in response to the Great Slump that followed the Wall
Street crash-namely, a mixed economy with (Keynesian) demand man-
agement and the (New Deal) welfare state-were no longer effective. Gov-
ernment came to be seen as a cause of the problem rather than the means
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to a solution, because state-run bureaucracies could not avoid the iron law
of self-interest. They were regarded as having become unaccountable to
the public, inefficient in themselves, and dependent on a large amount of
tax revenue. In addition, high taxes were seen as discouraging individual
initiative. So, under Reagan in the United States and Thatcher in the UK,
supply-side policies-deregulation and tax cuts-became the order of the
day. Although in the UK the rhetoric of these changes was that of a kind
of nostalgic triumphalism, a return to "Victorian values"67 (referring to the
time when Britain had been a world power and the most advanced country
industrially), the theory behind them was not at all anachronistic. Rather, it
drew on a new vindication of the market that had been developed by Aus-
trian economists (notably Hayek) with its perception of the market as an
information system. In complex advanced societies it is also the most effec-
tive conceivable system, with every economic transaction-to buy this,
not to buy that-feeding into a constant exchange of information about
demand and supply. In addition, only the market is flexible enough to fos-
ter, and adapt to, continual innovation. Attention to this aspect brought a
renewed emphasis on the agents of economic innovation, namely-entre-
preneurs.
Prior to the 1980s the entrepreneur had been something of an invisible
man. For example, Milton Friedman, writing about Capitalism and Free-
dom (in 1962), had extolled the "extraordinary fecundity" and "produc-
tive capacity" of the market, and its ability "to utilize a wide range of spe-
cial knowledge";68 but he had almost nothing so say about the agents of this
activity. By the 1980s, however, the entrepreneur had become "creative."
In his book Wealth and Poverty (1981), which was devoted to "analys-
ing the sources of creativity and progress in all economies," George Gilder
asserted that "the source of wealth [is] ... quite simply: creative men with
money. "69 Adam Smith's mistake had been to locate the source of wealth
in the market's "invisible hand"; it lay, rather, in "the creative activities of
businessmen. "70 "Not taking and consuming, but giving, risking and creat-
ing are the characteristic roles of the capitalist,"7! with his "drive to under-
stand the world, ... to create things" and "to create value," 72 by putting into
action his "entrepreneurial creativity. "73 "Profit," declared Business Week
four years later, "thy name is creativity. "74 That was the view of "more and
more companies," and "dozens of consultants ... [were] finding a ready
market for their creativity workshops in offices and factories";75 more than
twenty thousand executives were expected to attend such workshops in
the United States that year (1985). (How many of these actually were [or
would become] "creative" is hard to assess, since there are of course ways
of making money without being creative, just as there are plenty of poems
written and pictures painted that are not creative in the strong sense I am
using here, that is, being not merely new but also significant).
In the UK this development was received with less enthusiasm: "in the
twilight of the British economy," wrote a contributor to the Times Liter-
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ary Supplement in 1986, "the great and the good have embraced the ideol-
ogy of entrepreneurship. "76 This voice has the unmistakeable tone of Old
World condescension and snobbery, but it was equally a product of bland
ignorance; because it had been in Britain during the eighteenth century that
individuals active in "creative commerce" (as it had been called in 1755)77
had played a vital part in making Britain the most prosperous country in
Europe. Numerous writers from Defoe to Bentham had recognized the cen-
tral role of "projectors" or "undertakers" (the terms then used for "entre-
preneur"), men with "enterprising genius" or an "adventuring temper."78
The fact that this perception then lapsed was due in part to the magisterial
analyses of Adam Smith, Ricardo, and others, which explained free-mar-
ket economics in terms of a self-perpetuating system, rather than a field of
action. It was also due (in the UK) to social causes and attitudes, in partic-
ular the continuing political status of the landed aristocracy and gentry and
the legacy of that Manichaean view (articulated by Wordsworth, Arnold,
Marx, and many others) that art is all good and money is all bad. There
was also the more general problem of acknowledging forms of action that
few people may either see or understand.
With regard to developments in technology, the 1980s did not see a
comparable sudden increase in either innovation or output, but there was
a growing sense that some kind of qualitative change was taking place. An
example of this was Alvin Toffler's The Third Wave (published in 1980).
Toffler claimed that as the agricultural age had been supplanted by industri-
alism, so now the latter was on the verge of being replaced by a new (third)
civilization, "the deepest social upheaval and creative restructuring of all
time," "a giant transformation in the way we live, work, play and think."79
The industrial age had brought specialization, centralization, standardiza-
tion, quantification, synchronization, and maximization,80 and had clung to
"ready-to-wear moral and ideological certainties."8! The new Third Wave,
by contrast, would see "greater individuality" and more "highly individual-
ized personalities,"82 with a "growing diversity of actual needs, values and
lifestyles. "83 Work would no longer take place in vast impersonal offices or
factories but could-thanks to modern technology and electronics-see
a return to cottage industry,84 a more face-to-face society where people
could become (instead of "classical employees") "independent entrepre-
neurs,"85 working to their own timetables- "flexitime"86- and enjoying
"creative lifestyles that are more round and varied, ... more creatively satis-
fying and less market-intensive" than those of industrial civilization.87 This
future age will be "a civilization pulsing with innovation" where "the most
basic raw material of all [will be] information," "intelligence and imagi-
nation. "88
In places Toffler's book reads like the daydream of a superannuated
hippy; but we are now in the 1980s and the hippies have been succeeded
by yuppies, whose view of reality was as clear-sighted as that of the hippies
had been vague. The Third Wave occupies some intermediate place between
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a clear perception of certain new realities and wishful thinking about the
future. The realities were those of cumulative technological advance, which
could be seen as having occurred in two stages, each bringing new ameni-
ties and more pe'rsonal freedom. The first stage, following World War II,
brought mainly household devices-television, fridges, washing machines,
dishwashers, freezers, and so on; the second stage, from the 1980s onwards,
brought more individual technologies-personal stereos, cell phones, the
personal computer, E-mail, the Internet, and iPods-all of them expand-
ing individual space and capacity. Instead of "see[ing] the world in a grain
of sand"89 we could now access the world in a single room. The result of
these developments has been both more varied forms of employment and a
vastly expanded range of personal choice..
In the 1960s the service industries had begun to become the larg-
est sector in the Western economies; now, in the 1980s, the "culture
industries" -arts and entertainment, design, fashion, advertising, market-
ing, and the media - became ever more prominent. Alfred Sloan, the man
who had invented planned obsolescence-what Schumpeter had called
"creative destruction"90-was in one respect the presiding deity of this
new consumer world; newly important were the "specialists in symbolic
production and dissemination,"91 because now sign value counted more
than use value.92 The nineteenth-century suspicion of markets was trans-
formed into an exaltation of marketing, and the mid-nineteenth-century
romance of production-Marx's vision of people in the future being ful-
filled by "productive activity"93 - became the late-twentieth-century fan-
tasy of consumption-with Mickey Mouse and Goofy greeting the custom-
ers as they entered the shopping mall, and every weekend an opportunity
for another Christmas.
Political liberalism and economic liberalization have now, thanks to
these new technologies, been joined by lifestyle liberalism, 'the motto of
which has been described as "No rules, only choices."94 Shopping could be
seen as a form of self-expression95 because with new technologies almost
any item could be "customized," made individually distinct. In addition,
the aesthetic dimension became ever more important in design (with the
use of existing artworks or new images, in advertising, marketing, and
branding), to the degree that it could be said that "art [is] everywhere,"96
and every day life had become"aestheticized. "97
The common name for this happy condition is, of course, postmod-
ernism. After the horrors of so much of the twentieth century it is perhaps
not surprising that there should be a longing for some light relief, and post-
modernism can certainly supply that. If there are no more foundations,
nor any centre, then there is no more alienation, only "fragmentation."98 If
there is no stable self, but only a performative self, you can be a different
person every other year; if there are no grand narratives, and no History
with a capital H (but only "his" story, just one among many perspectives),
then why would we need to disagree? Impermanence and indeterminacy
232 John Hope Mason
mean it is always spring, life a perpetuum mobile, and you too can have a
pick 'n' mix personality. Better still, if there is no human "nature," and no
centre to the self 99 or "true" self,IOO (only" a network of beliefs, desires and
emotions with nothing behind it"),IOl then the question is not "Who am I?"
but rather, "What can 1make of myself?"102
One exponent of this view (whose words these are) is Richard Rorty.
He describes it in terms of "self-creation," and for him "private perfection
[is] a self-created, autonomous human life."103 He sees this ideal as having
been first articulated by the Romantic poets, for whom success was "giv-
ing birth to oneself" and failure was "the horror of finding [one]self to be
only a copy. "104 For Rorty the word "poet" can be applied to all those who
"create something new"105 by inventing new metaphors and vocabularies,
whether they be the "utopian revolutionary," "the revolutionary artist or
the revolutionary scientist."106 A good society would be one that "made life
easier for poets" and had a "poeticized" culture,107 one that "would take as
its goal the creation of ever more various and multi-coloured artefacts,"108
and where each self could be "custom-tailored,"109 (i.e., customized, the
postmodern ideal). Rorty sees his model here as Nietzsche, because it was
"the Nietzschean substitution" of discovery with "self-creation," 110 and his
vision of "the strong poet as humanity's hero,"111 that opened the way to a
vindication of "the radical diversity of private purposes, and [the] radically
poetic character of individual lives." 112 As a public philosopher Nietzsche
is (for Rorty) "at best useless and at worst dangerous, "113 but in terms of
individual identity he has something of value to teach us.
Rorty describes "self-creation" in two ways: first, in terms of substan-
tial and influential figures ("the strong poet"); second, in terms of nov-
elty, imagination, and the utmost autonomy-the poet leading a life that
is "wholly his,"114 in which he is entirely "his own self," by creating a lan-
guage or vocabulary "which will be all his own."I15 The use of the word
"own" here has nothing in common with Polonius' advice "To thine own
self be true" (which was a way of describing moral integrity). But nor is
it what Nietzsche had in mind. Rather, it is an echo of Baudelaire's ideal
of the dandy,116 or of Max Stirner's Der Einzige und sein Eigentum (The
Unique One and His Own), both of which were assertions of uniqueness
as a self-sufficient value. For Stirner, all that is external to the individual is
hostile to true life: "I am only myself insofar as 1make myself, ... 1must be
my own work"; "I am the creative nothing, out of which 1myself as creator
create everything."117 His aim (similar to that of Baudelaire) was a form of
anarchism (and narcissism), which had no ambition to remake the world,
nor to put a distinctly lasting mark on the world. Rather, it was a celebra-
tion of uniqueness per se, the utmost novelty without any concern for rec-
ognition (i.e., significance). It could be called a domestic Nietzscheanism,
or Nietzsche without tears. From Nietzsche's point of view, of course, that
would be a contradiction in terms; from our perspective now, it looks like
an anticipation of the postmodern self.
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I have suggested that the contemporary emphasis on "creativity" has arisen
mainly from ideas about education, developments in economics, and the
hyperindividualism of postmodernism (the result of economic liberaliza-
tion, new technologies, and consumerism). There are no doubt other fac-
tors involved, but rather than expand on them I would like to conclude by
considering two questions: first, are all the activities described here-to
which the word "creative" has been applied-properly so described? Sec-
ond, whether or not that is the case, is more "creativity" (in the strict sense
of the word) either desirable or beneficial?
If we understand creativity in terms of the definition used here, then it
consists of both what is new and what is significant. The former-inno-
vation-is self-evident; the latter-significance-means that it speaks to
people other than the creator, it wins external, self-standing recognition, its
meaning and status being independent of its maker. It does that because it
engages with and alters, or extends, a language that is shared, contesting
the status quo in a manner which is (or comes to be seen as) plausible, con-
vincing, and important.
To what extent is that the case with the artwork of children? This can
certainly be new, different from existing images; and it can also be infor-
mative about the child, revealing in visual ways what he or she may other-
wise be unable to express (in which respect the art could be therapeutic).
It can also, of course, give pleasure, to the child and the immediate family.
But does it speak to other people, strangers? Does it attain a wider mean-
ing, an independent aesthetic status, namely, significance? In my experi-
ence, very rarely. Mostly, children's art seems like the holiday photos some
people insist on showing you - rich in associations for them, but of little or
no interest to anyone beyond good friends and family. Nor is this at all sur-
prising in the case of children's art; because a child has not developed that
degree of connection with a shared language and social world that makes
the difference between the personal (or anecdotal) and the general (or sig-
nificant). This is what one of the great authorities on childhood, Iona Opie,
meant when she stated that "Children are not really creative.... [They]
invent nothing. They adapt things.... They are Tories [i.e., conservatives]
of the whole and anarchists of the particular."118 This is not to denigrate
what children do; but it would be better categorized not as "art" but rather
as a form of "play," because that makes no claim to significance.
In the case of the entrepreneur, we have a situation that is completely
different, in two respects: first, we are dealing with a form of action where
the creative element is not in the outcome, the end result, but in the pro-
cess. Second, it is an activity the effects of which (unlike children's art) can
have a substantial impact on society in general. To take the first of these: as
in other forms of action, such as politics or warfare, the end result in eco-
nomic affairs is like the fall of the curtain, coming after the events of the
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drama have unfolded. A political agreement is reached, a battle is decided,
an economic initiative bears fruit, but none of these concluding events in
themselves embody the intelligence, insights, risks, persistence, daring, and
so on, that made them possible. The cumulative result of these various fac-
tors-when successful-wins recognition as a fait accompli; but the qual-
ities, attributes, and actions, which made that result possible, go unseen.
The obvious contrast (on this issue of visibility) is with a sporting event-a
game of football or tennis-where we see the actual process, and so are
able to admire the skills and flair of the individuals in action. Political, mili-
tary, or economic actions are far more elusive, and with them no such (gen-
erally available) visibility is possible. Our knowledge of the process that
led to the result comes from the diaries, biographies, and histories that may
describe such actions later. That is one difference.
Another aspect (which later accounts reveal) is that outstanding insight
and skil1 are never themselves enough. There also has to be a high degree of
ambition and drive, a need to assert a goal, change an attitude, push some-
thing through. Here we come to an obvious but (in hindsight) frequently
overlooked point: the existing world always mounts resistance to change.
Even now, when so many conventions and habits have lost their previ-
ous status, and the pressures for continual innovation or renovation have
become ever greater, there is still an accompanying pull of inertia, a bias
towards what is known and familiar. Although the balance between fixed
parts and moveable parts may have shifted towards the latter, the need for
a degree of stability remains. That presents resistance to change, but (and
this is the crucial point) it is the engagement with that which generates sig-
nificance. Without that established language and existing context new sen-
tences would have no more than personal meaning (as is the case with chil-
dren's art). As with language, so with action. The successful entrepreneur is
the person who sees an opportunity for something new and then convinces
other people that this perception is valid. That will not be easy, because of
existing resistance (and also, in this case, because money is involved). It is
therefore only those who have not only the ability but also the drive and
need who will achieve their desired objective. Having those qualities may
also mean that such individuals are personally disagreeable, or unscrupu-
lous, adept at cutting corners and (perhaps) at what is called "creative"
accounting.
The use of "creative" here (to mean "dodgy," possibly dishonest) con-
tradicts the common idea that what is "creative" is necessarily good. In
so doing it relates to an ancient tradition, symbolized by the myth of Pro-
metheus, which associated creative gifts not only with ability and insight
but also with disobedience to, and defiance of, moral laws or social con-
ventions, as being amoral in the process and possibly destructive in the
result. Action in the economic field, as in politics and warfare, occurs in
conditions of unpredictability and with flexible rules. Of course, there are
laws, regulations, and so on, but these can be, and may need to be, ignored
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to achieve an objective. Such forms of action can undoubtedly be creative;
the fact that they may also be morally ambivalent is not counter to that,
but often an unavoidable part of it. This may be equally true of artistic
activity. Beautiful poems are not necessarily the product of a beautiful soul.
From the earliest texts of European literature verdicts have been rendered
on poets being deceitful, jealous, vindictive, and vain. In the eighteenth
century, Alexander Pope's The Dunciad both expounded and embodied
this view magnificently, and some years ago a leading American novelist
declared, "It is not enough to succeed. Others must fail!"119
These examples belong to a long tradition in European thought, for
there have always been two radically different views about the character of
creative gifts. One (evident in Ficino, Shaftesbury, Coleridge, Emerson, and
others) draws on a metaphysic of order and harmony-Judaeo-Christian
and Neoplatonic-and sees creative ability as going hand in hand with
morality. The second, by contrast, is earthbound, often seeing nature as
indifferent and always seeing creative ability as amoral. The results of such
ability, in terms of a work of art for example, may have positive value, but
the animating impulse itself is different-the creative being distinct from
the aesthetic. Examples of this second view are: in myth - Prometheus,
in action-Machiavelli; in ideas about genius-Diderot, Goethe, and of
course Nietzsche. 120
In Nietzsche's writings the tradition that associated creativity with
amorality reached its culmination. For him, moral norms of every kind
were obstacles to the pursuit of creative excellence. Only the achievements
of an outstandingly gifted few could vindicate human life; and to make
that possible a contempt for, and exploitation of, more or less everyone
else, even to the point of slavery, was fully justified. l2l To be creative, for
Nietzsche, was a heroic undertaking, which could only be achieved at the
expense of others. While he acknowledged one or two poli"tical-military
figures, like Napoleon, to have done this, his main focus was on artistic
or intellectual achievement (like Wagner in opera, or himself in philoso-
phy-cum-literature). The reason for this narrowness lay in the tradition
(derived from Lutheran Two Kingdom theory) that made a sharp distinc-
tion between the realm of the spirit and that of matter, and that had come
to be formulated in terms of a contrast between Kultur (culture) and Zivili-
sation (civilization). The former, wholly admirable, was concerned exclu-
sively with the intellect and the arts; the latter, wholly inferior, dealt with
the material, social, and economic.
Nowadays, there seems to be an analogous Two Kingdom outlook,
in which the separation-no less drastic-is between the private and the
public. For Rorty, the exaltation of private self-creation goes hand in hand
with a concern for solidarity, the "public and shared" vocabulary of jus-
tice;122 but there is (he says) no bridge between them, no possible "synthe-
sis" between individual and society, the two are "incommensurable,"123
and there is no way the gulf can be overcome. There can be no meta-
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physic from above- "the ideal liberal culture would have no room for the
notion that there are non-human forces to which human beings should be
responsible"124- nor can there be a philosophical grounding: "the vocab-
ulary of Enlightenment rationalism," in terms of "truth, rationality, and
moral obligation," is now "an impediment to the preservation and prog-
ress of democratic societies." 125 Where reason was, imagination shall be,126
best exercized by reading or seeing fictional narratives;127 they can foster a
sense of solidarity with others, and be a basis for justice, and that will be
enough.
It is not clear, however, why those engaged in "self-creation" would
feel any concern about other people, least of all those whose predicament
made demands on them and distracted them from the absorbing business
of being "private self-creators. "128 But neither is it clear in what sense "the
necessarily private" ethic of self-creation,129 in which "every human life
[could be] a poem,"130 is coherent. First, being private means it could well
be without significance, and therefore not creative (in terms of the defini-
tion used here); second, to a certain degree a self is precisely what cannot
be created. You need a self in the first place in order to make an alterna-
tive, and that original self is always in certain respects given; we all arrive
equipped with particular tastes and capacities, which cannot be altered.
Even those whose profession it is to become other selves-actors-have
certain individual qualities on which they construct their performances.
Skills and certain attributes can be acquired, but other features are part of
the fabric of each person-to use a favourite phrase of Rorty's, they "go
all the way down" -and are not matters of choice. Third, Rorty main-
tains that letting everyone have their "chance at self-creation to the best
of [their] abilities" can be "the social glue" that holds together "the ideal
liberal society. "131 This implies a view of the creative need and process as
mostly benign. It may at times be that; but there is plenty of evidence to
show that often it is not.
Self-creation, for Rorty, is a "conscious overcoming of the past" 132 and
he sees no value in what is preexisting. He sets up an antithesis between
what is "found" and what is "made," in which the former has no indepen-
dent validity, since things which are thought to be "found or discovered
are really made or invented."l]] But that is not always the case, for there
are important things which are neither found or made; they are given. The
magnificent, indifferent universe, the wonders of life-these are the pre-
conditions for our existence; and we grow up in societies which are rich
with all that previous generations have handed down (i.e. given) to us.
We refashion these, of course; we face new problems, and need to make
contributions of our own. But we also have a duty of care, to transmit to
the next generation the best of what we inherited, if we wish there to be
an informed posterity. "What counts," writes Rorty, "is originality and
authenticity, rather than conformity to an antecedent standard";134 but this
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is doubly unconvincing. First, in making this claim he is ignoring the fact
that his own notion of self-creation conforms to numerous American ante-
cedents (amounting to a veritable tradition) of self-invention,135 or what
has been called "the pure potential of the American self." 136 Second, the
contrast he makes is a false antithesis; the critical choice is not between
originality (all good) and conformity (all bad), but between what is individ-
ual and what is shared. The middle term that links these two is what Trill-
ing called sincerity, just as the middle term between liberty and equality
(which alone makes it possible to reconcile those two) is fraternity.
Much of what is nowadays called "creative" is either merely "new"
or "novel," or else just "particular" or "personal." It does not carry the
weight of significance. In order to determine that, the question that has
to be asked, the test of evaluation, is not "Is it new?" but "Does it mat-
ter (on a more than personal basis)?" And this question naturally leads to
another: namely, does this issue itself matter? Is it of any consequence that
the words "creative" and "creativity" are so generally misused? I think it
does, in two respects.
First, it functions as a form of support or approval of the prevailing
situation in our rich, advanced societies, in which people live ever more
insular, self-contained lives and the public, social realm becomes ever more
attenuated. The degree of inequality grows ever greater and the attention
it receives becomes ever less. In this context I see a similarity between the
current belief in creativity as an all-purpose panacea and the confidence
that once existed in Freudian psychoanalysis; and my perspective on the
former is in some respects similar to that of Karl Kraus' verdict on the lat-
ter, namely, that it was the disease masquerading as the cure. 137 I under-
stand Kraus to have meant by this that Freud's method of ever more intense
introspection did not solve but instead reinforced the effects of the claus-
trophobic, alienating circumstances of his middle-class Viennese patients.
In our contemporary Western society now, the problem is not claustropho-
bia (since our private space has expanded enormously) but isolation. This
is strikingly evident from the figures that show a persistent decline in social
capital and an increasing withdrawal from forms of public engagement.138
A hundred and fifty years ago John Stuart Mill wrote that "the tendency
of all the changes taking place in the world is to strengthen society and
diminish the power of the individual";139 today our situation seems to be
the exact opposite.
Second, we delude ourselves when we think that we can have it all. The
earth is finite, its resources ever more scarce, the protecting biosphere ever
more fragile. Contra Rorty, there most certainly are "non-human forces
to which human beings should be responsible," out of simple self-inter-
est. That vast problem will require solutions that call for ingenuity and
skill, but they will be of no avail without a sense of common belonging
and shared dependence; and that sense is the antithesis of what I have been
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describing in these various forms of "creativity." The title of this essay is
ambivalent, and deliberately so; because I think that there are plenty of rea-
sons why we should be ambivalent about creativity.
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14 Constructing Identities
The Shifting Role of Indoctrination
in Chinese and American Education
Pierre Bourdieu and ]. C. Passeron write that the educational system has
an essential function of inculcation.] As apt as their analysis appears, in
the United States there is an aversion to any form of education that looks
like inculcation or indoctrination. This aversion is so powerful that it is
coupled with a refusal to acknowledge existing imbedded indoctrination
practices, creating an uncomfortable contradiction between stated princi-
ples and reality. By contrast, in China, the essential educational function
of inculcation is taken for granted, and there is general social acceptance
of indoctrination as an appropriate educational tool. Of course, the issues
are not so simple and there are justifications and debates on all sides about
what constitutes appropriate educational material and practice'. This essay
examines some of these debates, the social justifications, and the historical
roots of these differing approaches to indoctrination, particularly as they
relate to identity construction.
Scholars who tend toward a Western perspective look at the content
and method to determine whether an act is classified as education or indoc-
trination. Terms like "objectivity" and "rationality" are associated with
teaching and education, while subjectivity and nonrationality are seen as
properties of indoctrination. Michio Nagai explains that "Indoctrination is
concerned ... with subjective unverifiable knowledge such as national ide-
alism, class ideologies, family norms, mores, moral convictions, religious
creeds and the like."2 Verifiability of knowledge is at the heart of the mat-
ter. Indeed the term "indoctrination" derives from the "doctrine" associ-
ated with religious teaching. Expressions of doctrine reside in text, peda-
gogy, ritual, and images. In secular educational settings the connection to
religion is often tacit, but overtones of religiosity appear when the func-
tions of schools are legitimated by consecrating the cultural norms that
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they transmit.3 These cultural norms are often attached to powerful ideol-
ogies that are the foundation of educational systems, curricula, and peda-
gogy.
One legacy of the Cold War is the negative perception that indoctri-
nation evokes in Americans. This includes an image we have of education
with a collectivist texture and a coercive pedagogy that suppresses individ-
ual liberties and dissenting voices. Current conceptualizations of indoc-
trination point to its invasive nature and its suppression of variation and
diversity. Whether or not these perceptions are accurate renderings of the
social circumstances is less important, perhaps, than the power they possess
to trigger a visceral response to any mention of indoctrination. These per-
ceptions have evolved over time and reflect historical and political shifts.
Despite the emphasis on verifiability and rationality that tend to dom-
inate the U.S. discussion, the line between what constitutes education or
indoctrination is not always clear and has been vigorously debated in the
United States, particularly since the 1930S. Two unspoken assumptions
underlying these discussions are that these distinctions matter a great deal
and that there is in fact a universal definition of indoctrination that, once
articulated, can be applied cross-culturally and cross-nationally. Since
notions of "good" and "right" are inevitably tied to social and cultural
contexts, this probably is not a safe assumption. The proclivity to demar-
cate education and indoctrination is an activity that might emanate from a
cultural need to categorize and polarize.
In China indoctrination does not evoke such negative connotations.
Rather, it has been historically viewed as synonymous with moral educa-
tion and a natural and appropriate educational practice particularly well
suited to propagating orthodoxy, ideological remolding, and rectification
in Maoist and post-Mao times. The efficacy of indoctrination is evident in
smooth social relationships, avoidance of political chaos, and social cohe-
sIveness.
As noted, these differences in perceptions about the nature and efficacy
of indoctrination are clearly situated in their differing social, historical, and
cultural contexts. We shall explore these differing social and cultural con-
texts as a means to illuminating the meaning and role of indoctrination.
In an effort to ground this exploration in the ideographic world of real
social actors, this discussion of indoctrination begins with stories of two
women, one Chinese and one American, whose children attended school in
the United States and China respectively. Both women were initially enthu-
siastic about having their children attend school in another country but
experienced a sense of ambivalence when they realized that their children
were becoming absorbed into the political cultures of those schools. Their
stories point to different aspects of indoctrination, education, and identity
formation but will enable this discussion to move from the abstract toward
a more situational and concrete rendering of the concepts.
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Mrs. Zhang and Mrs. Douglas
When Mrs. Zhang was a graduate student in the United States she enrolled
her daughter in an American public school. Because of her interest in cul-
ture and education she took an academic as well as a personal interest in
her daughter's educational experiences and became a parent volunteer as
a way of understanding more about American education. Over the year
that her daughter was in second grade she began to notice a change that
she later came to see as the gradual erosion of her daughter's Chinese iden-
tity. Mei became adept at reciting the "Pledge of Allegiance" followed by a
couple of "patriotic" songs like "America the Beautiful" and "My Country
'tis of thee.... " At first Mrs. Zhang was pleased with her daughter's prog-
ress in English, but her concern about the "political content" of her educa-
tion began to grow. One evening when friends were visiting, her 9aughter
announced that she was "American, not Chinese." Mrs. Zhang was deeply
concerned that her daughter did not identify herself as Chinese, but at the
same time her academic interest was piqued. She asked the principal of her
daughter's school if she could conduct some research in the school because
she was interested in "how the school went about teaching patriotism."
The principal replied that they "don't teach patriotism" in their school and
she did not understand what Mrs. Zhang meant.
Mrs. Douglas' experience was somewhat different, although there
were some common elements of political identity fastening and assimila-
tion. While living in China, she and her husband chose to enroll their chil-
dren in a neighborhood elementary school, viewing it as a unique oppor-
tunity for them to learn Chinese language and culture through interactions
with playmates and school staff. The children attended school every day
in the morning and returned home in the afternoon to be home-schooled.
After several months, the school personnel asked the parents·to attend a
special school event. As part of the day's events there was a formal cere-
mony in which the children were given citations and red ties to indicate
their new identities as young pioneers. Like Mrs. Zhang, Mrs. Douglas
appreciated that her children were becoming socialized into their new cul-
tural setting but also felt a sense of deep ambivalence when the symbol of
acceptance included a powerful political message that her children were on
the path to becoming "good little communists."
These stories will be instructive in this discussion of indoctrination,
education, and identity in the United States and China because they raise
important questions about what constitutes indoctrination. They also stim-
ulate questions about the demarcation between cultural assimilation and
indoctrination and about the role of intentionality in the process. (Is the
American principal's failure to recognize the pattern of patriotic education
in her school an indication of her own indoctrination?) It is useful to con-
sider the cultural, social, historical, and ideological dimensions of these
two stories. We should note from the outset that the perception that their
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children were being indoctrinated was more profound because the systems
into which they were being inducted were foreign and, at some level, vio-
lated their own sense of identity.
Pejorative or Not?
Harvey Siegel describes indoctrination as a "cognitive straight jacket,"4
and Benjamin Speiker argues that "indoctrination has a pejorative meaning
because in the process one's fellow-man is approached in a morally unac-
ceptable manner."5 Speiker also states that inculcating doctrines is always
associated with the suppression of a critical attitude. He continues: "I can
now summarize the two necessary conditions for the correct use of 'doc-
trines', which together are sufficient: (I) doctrines are those systems of
belief that to a large extent determine the doings and dealings of the adher-
ents, and (2) doctrines are those beliefs that are screened from criticism,
from a critical attitude.... The inculcation of doctrines can never happen
by accident: to indoctrinate is to suppress willfully (the development of) the
critical disposition of the students. "6
A Chinese approach to these issues might sound quite different. Indoc-
trination does not imply the moral unacceptability of the individuals, but
rather is an appropriate way of educating precisely because of each individ-
ual's capacity for cultivation and perfectibility. A Chinese response to the
above statements might be to agree to the importance of doctrines, to the
intentional inculcation of certain beliefs as well as the need for some criti-
cal reflection. In the Chinese case, the critical disposition in students needs
not be repressed because the doctrine itself makes a space for this sort of
critical reflection. In other words, it is built into the doctrine, not separate
from it. Of course, the actualization of critical reflection is dependent on
particular social opportunities that mayor may not be present.
Education and Indoctrination in China
In Chinese culture, past and present, indoctrination and education are not
differentiated to the same degree as they are in the United States. Don-
ald Munro writes that the Confucian view of education "simultaneously
stressed introspection (to discover the innate evaluating mind and social
tendencies that are equally possessed by all) and the emulation of models
(to develop the habit of using the mind to make suitable decisions about
conduct)."7 This definition expresses a cultural ideal that is far removed
from indoctrination. Nevertheless, indoctrinative practices are part of
the educational fabric. Although Mao Zedong himself was opposed to
the inculcation method of teaching because it represented a mechanical
approach that was characterized by rote memorization,8 this method was
very much a part of communist pedagogy and propaganda practices. At
one point, before he fell into disfavor, Lin Biao wrote in a preface to the
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second edition of Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung that, "in order
to really master Mao Tse-tung's thought, it is essential to study many of
Chairman Mao's basic concepts over and over again, and it is best to mem-
orize important statements and study and apply them repeatedly."9 Lin
Biao's approach was very much in keeping with traditional approaches to
learning the Chinese classics.
Another key process in indoctrination is modeling. 1O Timothy Cheek
points to the important function that leaders play in the society as role
models and moral exemplars, and the natural connection between early
Confucian notions of education and post-1949 approaches to dissemi-
nating information and ensuring ideological purity. He comments that
"the medium of propaganda, state sponsored journalism, spoke power-
fully to intellectual traditions of public service and propagating orthodoxy
among the common people.... Since at least the tenth century, various lead-
ing Confucian scholars and various Emperors supported the transforma-
tion of popular morals through literati-led propaganda efforts-commu-
nity compacts (xiangyue) or readings of sacred edicts (shengyu) from the
Emperor."!! "Faith in the power of ideology to guide and motivate, in the
efficacy of political indoctrination, and in the 'unlimited creative power' of
the masses" -these are the main ingredients of the "mass line" leadership
approach that had proved so successful in the political and military strug-
gles of China's revolutionary war. 12
In his discussion of the reeducation of anticommunists that took place
in the post-1949 period, Fyfield is careful to clarify distinctions among dif-
ferent forms of indoctrination. He concludes that indoctrination actually
took place based on an assessment of the intention of the tutors and their
higher authorities, not on the means that they used. The method was not
one of coercion (qiangzhi) but of persuasion (shuofu: literally, to convince
through talk). None of the classic brainwashing techniques was employed.
There was no harshness, brutality, labor as punishment, administration of
drugs, or dietary restrictions as punishment.B This analysis of indoctrina-
tion as "persuasion" rather than "coercion," with the end result as bring-
ing the students (inductees) into the ideological fold, is curiously similar to
Chomsky's analysis of what happens in contemporary American society.
Chomsky's point will be discussed later. In the Chinese case, where the dis-
tinction between public and private domains is blurred and where individ-
uals are bound by a set of Confucian ethics, relationship and reciprocity
are central concerns that would be violated in coercive interactions. This is
not to say that coercion is not practiced, just that it is not desirable.
There is also an epistemological concern that we should consider when
addressing the issue of indoctrination. Learning from the past, learning
from role models, and learning from teachers are all imbedded pedagogies
that imply that knowledge is transferred from teacher to student in a man-
ner that suggests indoctrination. This form of education was criticized dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution. In a passage from a 1968 article published in
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China News: "The students in the study group also criticized and accused
the old, so-called inviolable rule that 'the teacher's opinion is always right.'
They said that in the past a student did not dare criticize the teacher." 14
Learning and education are absolutely central concerns in China, but there
is far less emphasis on how they differ from indoctrination, or even a solid
indication that they do. This makes the comparison with the United States
somewhat tenuous since this distinction is a central concern to U.S. schol-
ars, for reasons that will soon be discussed.
Historical Perspectives on Indoctrination among U.S. Scholars
During the 1930S in the United States there was a lively debate about the
role of indoctrination in education. The Social Frontier: A Journal of Edu-
cational Criticism and Reconstruction, published during that period ded-
icated an entire issue to the topic in 1935 entitled, "Indoctrination: The
Task before the American School?"15 In their introductory remarks, the
editors acknowledged the tension that existed among educational philos-
ophers and educationists regarding the use of propaganda in the schools.
They acceded that "textbooks have always been written and selected with
the idea of spreading particular social, religious, and moral doctrines. The
dissemination of particular doctrines by precept and example has influ-
enced to a considerable degree the selection of public school personnel. "16
The editors note that indoctrination was an integral part of American edu-
cation and that its legitimacy was not challenged until the 1920S. "What-
ever objections existed are leveled not against indoctrination in general but
rather against particular indoctrinations distasteful to certain groups. "17
In their discussion of the evolution of the "indoctrination versus educa-
tion debate," the editors encapsulate the thinking of "a prominent group
of educational thinkers" in this way:
Indoctrination ... is an attempt by one person or group of persons to
shape the minds and consciences of other people and thus makes them
dupes and instruments of those who are strategically able to wield influ-
ence. Education, on the contrary, is a process of direct experiencing by
an individual which leads him to formulate his own philosophy of liv-
ing, social orientation, moral ideals, and objects of loyalty. Indoctrina-
tion teaches what to think: education how to think.... These thinkers
made no distinction between the contents of various indoctrinations.
Indoctrination itself was bad-diametrically opposed to education,
which is the free reconstruction of experience by individuals.ls
Social Reconstructonists like George S. Counts, who saw education as
a means to restructuring society, were less ambivalent about using indoc-
trination to counter current forms of indoctrination. "He urged teachers to
be undeterred by the 'bogies of imposition and indoctrination' and to seize
the power they had to shape young minds."19 Counts and his contempo-
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rary, John Dewey, shared the concern that education in American schools
of the 1930S was essentially indoctrination of another type, "especially
with reference to narrow nationalism under the name of patriotism. "20 One
compelling argument against indoctrination that was expressed by the edi-
tors of The Social Frontier in their issue dedicated to exploring the topic,
was that values that are fixed through indoctrination might be maladap-
tive in a world constantly in flux. Counts and others noted that complete
impartiality is impossible. Some years later, Theodore Brameld would come
to a similar conclusion and acknowledge that all education that is based on
conviction is subject to "partiality."21 He introduced the concept of "defen-
sible partiality"22 to address this concern. Defensible partiality is a process
in which the search for answers to human problems comes about through
exploring alternative approaches and then defending the partialities which
emerge. This approach was a corrective to indoctrination, which Brameld
describes as: "that method of learning by communication which proceeds
primarily in one direction (from the 'communicator' to the 'communicee')
for the purpose of inculcating in the mind and behavior of the latter a firm
acceptance of some one doctrine or systematic body of beliefs-a doctrine
assumed in advance by its exponents to be so supremely true, so good, or
so beautiful as to justify no need for crucial, scrupulous, thoroughgoing
comparison with alternative doctrines. "23 Brameld raised a concern that
a liberal democracy's greatest weakness might be "its pride in open-mind-
edness and tolerance-with all their accompanying vacillations, uncer-
tainties, confusions ... as contrasted with the clear message, absolute devo-
tion and loyalty engendered among young people in other countries. "24 He
warned that "indoctrination may occur, also, within the kind of education
ostensibly most opposed to its practice."25 Concerns about indoctrination
in the United States continued into mid-century and beyond. I. A. Snook
is the name most associated with discussions of indoctrination and educa-
tion in the 1970S.26
Throughout the literature the same common dimensions are consid-
ered as part of the debate. These are: (I) content/curriculum, (2) pedagogy/
method, (3) teacher/indoctrinator, and (4) student/inductee.
In Figure 1 (see next page), these four dimensions are pictured in
dynamic interaction, and the larger social and cultural context is noted
as a key factor. Actors infuse teaching and learning events with the social
and cultural meanings that they draw from experience. As Richard Nisbett
notes, "people hold the beliefs that they do because of the way they think
and they think the way they do because of the nature of societies they live
in. "27 Social and cultural contexts need to be foregounded in this discus-
sion. If we hope to understand what constitutes education or indoctrina-
tion we need to situate the action and examine the particular characteristics
of each of these dimensions in the unique relationship where they occur.
Although scholars disagree somewhat on this point, the teacher's
"intention" seems to be a factor. 28 Snook suggests that content is indoctri-
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Figure 1. Education or Indoctrination?
nated if the teacher intends that the students believe it regardless of any evi-
dence of its truth. But was intentionality a factor in the experience of Mrs.
Zhang's daughter?
Mrs. Zhang's concerns about the unsubtle approach to assimilating
her daughter into the American political culture and the failure of the prin-
cipal to see the actions as "teaching patriotism" are mirrored in an article
written by fellow countryman Minxin Pei, who discusses American nation-
alism. He notes the paradox that, despite its nationalism, people in the
United States fail to acknowledge that they have nationalistic policies and
practices.29 He points out that, for Americans, the term "nationalism," like
the terms "ideology" and "indoctrination," is reserved for others, not for
themselves. This clearly uncritical approach to its own policies and prac-
tices suggests an environment that is ripe for indoctrination, as Brameld
earlier warned. Pei continues: "American nationalism is based on political
ideals, not those of cultural or ethnic superiority. "30 Whatever the source
of U.S. nationalism, educators need to consider the implications for edu-
cational practice and come to terms with the cultural dimensions of the
activities that they call "education." Certainly this is important for stu-
dents who come from cultures outside the United States and for marginal-
ized groups within it.
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Social and Cultural Contexts: Is Indoctrination
in the Eye of the Beholder?
The line between political socialization and indoctrination shifts depend-
ing on the perspective of the participants in the activity. Most of the liter-
ature on indoctrination focuses on the nature of the content, the means
of transmission (pedagogy), the intent of the teacher, and to some extent
the awareness and willingness of the student. As argued earlier, the social
and cultural ligaments that bind individuals together in communities of
thought and practice must also be taken into consideration. These liga-
ments determine, to a great extent, the meaning-making in which individ-
uals and groups engage.
For people who have been enculturated into a particular set of beliefs,
a new educational experience may trigger the sense of indoctrination. As
a general rule, the greater the religious, political, or ideological distance
from one's own belief system, the more like indoctrination it seems. If this
process also involves an accompanying devaluing of the culture, religious
beliefs, and political ideology formerly held by the student, the violation
may seem even greater. This is certainly the case in colonization. Two indi-
viduals may therefore experience the same "educational" process and it
may seem more like indoctrination to the one whose culture and beliefs are
not affirmed. Indeed, the process of opening a student to new and different
ideas may be perceived as "indoctrination" from some perspectives, espe-
cially if the new ideas present views that violate the deeply held beliefs of
that individual's family and community. The experiences of Mrs. Wang and
Mrs. Douglas suggest experiential, situational, and perspectival differences
in indoctrination. Indoctrination, like other forms of education is essen-
tially a cultural phenomenon.
One might look at societies on a continuum from affiliati.on-oriented
to achievement-oriented. At one end are societies in which the needs and
desires of the group are paramount: all actions and activities are oriented
toward group survival and harmony. At the other end of the continuum
are societies that focus on developing the individual to the fullest, the "be
all that you can be" paradigm. In this social context any constraint on the
individual's potential intellectual development is seen as a violation of her
rights, as maximizing opportunities for the individual to access different
points of view is fundamental to the development of that individual and
moves her toward fulfillment. Contrarily, in a society that emphasizes affil-
iation, individual needs are subsumed in the collective. Rational behavior
in this context is behavior that supports and sustains the ties that bind the
group together. Knowledge that challenges group solidarity and cohesive-
ness is counterproductive and threatens group priorities. Using this contin-
uum as a basis for determining the morality, rationality, or adaptivity of
indoctrinative practices, one can see that the concept will play out differ-
ently in different contexts.
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Chomsky's View of Indoctrination
Actions take on meaning depending on the context and the ways in which
social actors infuse them with significance. The U.S. context is one that is
fueled by a collective belief in liberty and democracy as the pinnacles of
human achievement and development. In the political climate of the first
decade of the second millennium, other countries are seen as less moral
and backward if they do not subscribe to this view of reality. Americans
tend to reserve the terms "indoctrination" and "propaganda" for other
social systems and assume that democracy and indoctrination/propaganda
are incompatible. Noam Chomsky disagrees.3! He argues that totalitarian
regimes and democratic systems merely employ different forms of thought
control. A totalitarian state that rules by violence, he points out, tends to
be behaviorist in outlook, in that it places more importance on actions than
on what people think.32 Chomsky suggests that democratic systems need to
rely on thought control because they cannot easily resort to physical pun-
ishment and violence. In order to overcome any threat to order, "[i]t is nec-
essary to establish a framework for possible thought that is constrained
within the principles of the state religion. These need not be asserted; it is
better that they be presupposed as the unstated framework for thinkable
thought."33
Even critics of the system tacitly accept the underlying doctrine and
believe in the benevolence and lofty intentions of the system, thereby
confining their critiques to tactical matters.34 To describe this phenome-
non, Chomsky borrows the term "manufacturing consent" from Walter
Lippmann. Chomsky cautions us that, "For those who stubbornly seek
freedom, there can be no more urgent task than to come to understand
the mechanisms and practices of indoctrination. These are easy to per-
ceive in the totalitarian societies, much less so in the system of 'brainwash-
ing under freedom' to which we are subjected and which all too often we
serve as willing or unwitting instruments. "35 As powerful as Chomsky's
argument is, "brainwashing," propaganda, and indoctrination are terms
that are incompatible with American views. Indoctrination continues to
be a source of negative images in the American mind. On the other hand,
the notion that individuals might entertain ideas that are not conducive to
group sustainability and the maintenance of solidarity is viewed as suspect
and even dangerous in Confucian and collectivist-based societies. Indoctri-
nation, in this case, is a tool for bringing everyone into harmony and for
creating a collective sense of purpose and common identity. In fact, there
was a time in postliberation China when the notion of "brainwashing" was
determined to be a necessity for those who had strayed too far away from
ideological purity.
A comparison between the perception of indoctrination in China and
the United States is somewhat difficult, because the distinction between
indoctrination and education is so meticulously debated in the United
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States whereas such debates are relatively less important in China, histor-
ically or in modern times. There is another difference here that makes the
comparison of indoctrination in the two countries difficult. This lies in the
U.S. ideology of freedom, liberty, and democracy and in the educational
practices that flow from these beliefs-namely critical thinking, construc-
tivist pedagogy, and democratic classrooms. These are also accompanied
by a meritocratic belief and notions of success that prize autonomy, indi-
viduality, and self-determination. Richard Fenn acknowledges "that a vari-
ety of changes in Western society have increasingly separated the self from
the local, familial and religious groups in which it has been encapsulated.
As the self emerges, the individual becomes more aware of his separate
identity; he becomes more autonomous."36 When there is a strong social
thrust toward autonomy, the individual's right to choose among alterna-
tives and to apply the rule of defensible partiality makes sense. In societ-
ies where individual autonomy is seen as selfish, and where the social ties
favor affiliation over personal achievement, the individual locus of control
is less favored.
One might argue that increasing autonomy implies a need for more
prescriptive approaches to education to prepare the individual for living
with greater freedom. Indeed, virtue-centered approaches to moral educa-
tion were fundamental in the past, before progressive education questioned
their appropriateness in a democratic society, and have returned full force
in the beginning of the twenty-first century. Alfie Kohn argues that cur-
rent iterations of character education in the United States that use exhor-
tations and extrinsic inducements are essentially indoctrination, and that
in some programs "what is presented as common sense is, in fact, conser-
vative ideology. "37 This contemporary critique of character education in
the twenty-first century, if taken seriously, suggests that current U.S. edu-
cation does not reflect the liberal democratic tradition in which the teach-
er's ultimate intention was that the student should become a self-actuated,
independent individual, even if that student adopted beliefs and attitudes
at variance with those of the teacher.38 The tension between these two ver-
sions of appropriate education is palpable.
Given the amount of energy that American thinkers and educators
have put into defining indoctrination and differentiating it from educa-
tion, it is disturbing to note the degree to which most Americans are blind
to its presence in the formal educational system. As Mary Catherine Bate-
son reminds us, "All views of the world are acquired, and learning a way
of seeing the world offers both insight and blindness, usually at the same
time."39 This sort of blindness may be attributed to the cultural isolation
that most Americans experience. There is no place where we can stand to
look back and see who we really are and how our system is often at odds
with itself. Chomsky's work helps to illuminate this point, but he is not
often read by those in the education system who would most benefit from
his perspective.
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Conclusion
Mrs. Zhang and Mrs. Douglas were sensitized to the indoctrination pro-
cesses that their children were experiencing because the systems instilled a
social-cultural-political identity that was foreign and, in some instances,
ran counter to their own values and beliefs. Ideology is welcome when it
comes dressed in a guise of truth that is familiar and accepted. Bateson's
reminder is again appropriate. "In all learning, one is changed, becom-
ing someone slightly-or profoundly-different: but learning is welcome
when it affirms a continuing sense of self. What is learned then becomes a
part of that system of self-definition that filters all future perceptions and
possibilities of learning. "40 Mrs. Zhang and Mrs. Douglas perceived their
children's activities as indoctrination because they did not affirm a con-
tinuing sense of self. Mrs. Zhang, in particular, saw her daughter changing
profoundly as she adopted an un-Chinese identity. Although both mothers
were willing to accept new perspectives and invited a certain degree of cul-
tural variation, they became increasingly uneasy as their children drifted
further away from their own cultural identities.
All educational systems work toward multiple ends. They direct the
educational process toward achieving certain knowledge, skills, and dispo-
sitions through a variety of means that reflect the particular social ends and
values of the society that they serve. Most would agree that means should
be in keeping with their ends. If the means violate the ends this raises seri-
ous problems. Educators in the United States are caught in a particularly
unreconcilable net of means and ends, particularly at times when the coun-
try is at war. The commitment to free inquiry and critical thought should
be weighed against the patterns of forced patriotism and ideology.41
China faces it own ideological difficulties, but they do not include a
debate over the fine points of indoctrination versus education. If one can
make generalizations about Chinese education in the past as well as in the
present, one might say that "correct thinking" is what is considered impor-
tant and that appropriate behavior should flow naturally from that correct
thinking. The means to achieving "correct thinking" and behavior have
differed over time but include exhortation, social pressure, modeling, and
other educational techniques that are conducive to social goals. Indeed, the
most important focus of education is its actual social outcome.
Clearly indoctrination does not find an easy communion with notions
of diversity and pluralism. Thus, in the United States it is identified with
the "other" because it runs counter to the story that Americans tell about
themselves, whereas in China it is accepted as a normal part of educational
practice and has a role in affirming Chinese identity and solidarity.
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15 ~~Initiating But Not Proceeding to the End"
A Confucian Response to Indoctrination
The Problem of Indoctrination
Is indoctrination acceptable? Most of us associate "indoctrination" with
notions such as propaganda, mind control, and brainwashing, and would
therefore tend to respond to this question with an unambiguous "no."
At the same time, however, the question is problematic, in part because it
appears that a clear formulation of the difference between education and
indoctrination is rather more difficult than those between education and
any of the other notions. As educators, we may occasionally find ourselves
in situations where we are not sure whether we are crossing the fine line
that is meant to separate indoctrination from education.
It seems certainly easy enough to point out cases of indoctr"ination. The
systematic and successful efforts in Nazi Germany to create a belief in the
superiority of the "Aryan" races, the historical "destiny" and "mission" of
the German people, and the inferiority of Jews, Slavs, and other minority
groups are among the clearest and most extreme cases of indoctrination.
But when challenged to provide a clear and concise definition of indoctri-
nation per se, we are, much as Socrates' dialogue partners in the Euthyphro
and elsewhere, dumbfounded. In this case, as in many others, we are still
unable to overcome the Socratic paradox.
A part of the reason for our inability to define indoctrination is that
its meaning is, to say the least, ambiguous. Its predominant connotation
is the pejorative one of a systematic and uncritical inculcation of ideas
that serves narrow interests. But it can also be synonymous with "instruc-
tion," though it is rarely so used. An etymological analysis is not partic-
ularly helpful either. The Latin doctrina simply means "teaching" or that
which is taught, and thus, "indoctrination" could be adequately described
as "the imparting of teachings" or simply "to teach." Although the word
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"doctrine" was later restricted to the teachings of the Christian church,
whence it acquired its modern and more general pejorative meaning close
to "dogma," it is nonetheless no less ambiguous than "indoctrination."l
In a Western narrative basing itself on modernist or Enlightenment
paradigms, a successful separation of education and indoctrination would
ultimately appeal to the concepts of truth and reason, whereby these would
be considered an essential component of the first and not of the latter.
According to such an analysis, truth and reason are taken to be "objec-
tive," "value-neutral," and, ultimately, intended to serve everyone's inter-
ests. Being devoid of truth and reason, indoctrination, on the other hand,
has the deliberate subjective, value-laden objective of serving the interests
of only a few at the expense of the many.
Most attempts to analyze these concepts philosophically follow this
line of thought. A classic formulation distinguishes between content and
method, attributing subjective unverifiable beliefs and nonrational meth-
ods to the practice of indoctrination, while "real" education is purported
to deal with "objective valid knowledge" and to rely on evidence and open
examination.2
In recent years, this view has come under increasing scrutiny. Such a
clear-cut distinction has been seen to be largely untenable. An important
reason is the problematic status, ambiguity, and even cultural arbitrariness
of what is meant by being "rational" or "objective."3 Not only is the claim
to such a status by some disciplines rather than others highly questionable,
as Max Weber reminded us a century ago,4 but even if we concede such a
status to them, a serious practical problem emerges. For given that indoc-
trination ought to be eliminated, it would then call for an almost unthink-
able reduction of the educational curriculum to the disciplines of logic,
mathematics, and perhaps some of the supposedly more reliable sciences.s
Seen from another point of view, if it is a sufficient condition for education
to include values in any form in order to be classified as indoctrination (in
its pejorative sense), then there is not much of our present-day so-called
education that is not indoctrination.
This, as a matter of fact, was the conclusion of some thinkers during a
heated discussion about the difference between education and indoctrina-
tion that took place in the United States in the wake of the Great Depres-
sion. Owing to the variety of often conflicting social and political plans
that teachers, who were eager to restore order in American society intro-
duced into classrooms, the question arose as to whether they ought to pre-
sent various views impartially or rally for plans that they endorsed them-
selves. Many argued that the school ought to take a positive stand with
regard to social reform. One of these was George Counts. When asked
whether the school ought to practice indoctrination, he responded in the
following manner: "I am prepared to defend the thesis that all education
contains a large element of imposition, that in the very nature of the case
this is inevitable, that the existence and evolution of society depend on
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it, that it is consequently eminently desirable, and that the frank accep-
tance of this fact by the educators is a major professional obligation."6
In other words, since education is always in any case indoctrination to a
considerable extent, it is futile to try to purge it. Instead, the responsibility
of educators should consist in appraising the divergent positions on the
basis of which they select the "best one" for presentation. Although Counts'
position was not without support, most believed that it represented a total
surrender to the vagueness of the important distinction between education
and indoctrination on the mere account of its philosophical unsettledness.
Among these were John Dewey and John L. Childs. In response to Counts,
they write: "Instead of recommending an imposed indoctrination, we are
striving to challenge all the indoctrinations of conscious dogma and of the
unconscious bias of tradition and vested interest which already exist."?
The modernist tone in these words is deceptive, for Dewey and Childs
did not regard education, as distinct from indoctrination, as an entirely
rational practice in the sense of being value-neutral and objective. They
argued, on the contrary, that because education is an affair of action, and
because human action always implies preference, "the scheme of education
itself cannot be impartial in the sense of not involving a preference for
some values over others."8
Value or valuation leads to a choice of certain actions above others,
and the seemingly most unambiguous cases of indoctrination are ones in
which it leads to some kind of undesirable action, as in the case of Nazi
Germany. But, as already stated, education cannot avoid dealing with
value without being reduced to an absurd concentration on mathematics,
logic, and other such ostensibly "value-neutral" subjects. Hence, it appears
necessary to bring up the much broader question of what education is and
what it is meant to achieve.
Needless to say, there is no universal criterion for what is supposed to
constitute education. Education is conceived differently depending on soci-
ety, culture, and periods. In classical Confucianism, which is the main focus
of this essay, despite its original inclusion of practical arts such as mathe-
matics, archery, and charioteering (which may not all be so practical now-
adays), education is predominantly regarded as a comprehensive process of
person making. In fact, it would be more accurate to portray the aforemen-
tioned arts as ways to develop the moral character of the student rather
than practical skills as such.9 The implication is not, however, that devel-
oping the moral character is not "practical"-it is in fact profoundly prac-
tical, both facilitating the integration of the human individual into his or
her social environment and contributing to a maximally harmonious soci-
ety-unless, of course, we find that a construction of a harmonious soci-
ety is not practical. In this respect, Confucian education is comparable
to Hans-Georg Gadamer's notion of Bi/dung or "edification": a culturally
based cultivation of human sensibility in its lived experience toward gen-
erality or commonality.1O Confucian education is therefore more appropri-
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ately understood as moral education, provided that the word "moral" is
understood in a broad sense.
From a historical point of view, Confucianism has often been criticized,
both in and out of Asia, as a reactionary ideology par excellence, aiming at
the maximum conservation of tradition. The importance that it assigns to
a ritualized form of human existence (lijiao tI<J&) is further taken as a clear
sign of reactionary glorification of the past and unwillingness to adapt to
new circumstances. This may not be surprising, considering the almost
fanatical concentration on ritual for reinforcing moral standards during
some dynasties, including, as one author has put it, the "purist quest for
the pristine Confucian doctrine" through study of ancient ritual during the
late Ming and Qing dynasties.1I But, as I will try to show, Confucianism
presides over ample resources to resist such a tendency.
Confucian Education as Incitement and Personal Cultivation
If some versions of Confucianism are currently on the rise in parts of Asia,
including the People's Republic of China, Confucian scholars need not only
dig into Han dynasty tombs but also into the received Confucian tradi-
tion and revive its most valuable, useful, and ingenious treasures-per-
haps in a way similar to what Confucius did with Zhou culture. Although
I could hardly present myself as a "Confucian scholar," I would still like
to consider this essay as a modest contribution to these efforts. My argu-
ment is that certain aspects of the Confucian philosophy contain sources
for a "healthier," more realistic, and less confusing attitude toward indoc-
trination.
In the early Confucian philosophy of education, I want to make a
distinction between two kinds of teaching method, which I call "verbal
incitement" and "performative discernment." It should be noted, though,
that the distinction is merely heuristic; at the end of the day, the two kinds
of method constitute two sides of the same coin and are not easily separated
in practice.
Now "verbal incitement" takes place through dialogue. In the Chinese
tradition, dialogue is broadly conceived as a continuous hermeneutic
process in which the teacher is meant to inspire the student to come
up with his or her own elaborations upon the original ideas. Thus, in
such a dialogue, a "teacher" could also be understood as a text and the
"student" as the reader and interpreter of that text. This partly accounts
for the long scholarly tradition of writing commentaries on canonical
texts-commentaries, however, that in most cases aim at elucidating the
relevant text for the particular circumstances of the time and place in which
the commentary is composed.
The major part of the Confucian Analects (Lunyu ~iiH§-g) is a particularly
conspicuous example of the priority of incitement over dictation. This
accounts for the virtually infinite richness drawn from it by Chinese
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commentators on the Analects for the last two and a half millennia, but,
interestingly, also for its general failure to leave an impression on westerners,
who tend to be disappointed by its lack of theoretical argumentation and
"rational" systematization. This is not merely a question of comprehension.
For the Master, when responding to the questions posed by his disciples,
tends to perplex not only his readers but also his own disciples by being
extremely laconic and vague. The clear expression of their perplexity in
the Analects is certainly not without significance. Moreover, many of his
answers also appear to be mere platitudes or tautologies, and he often
responds differently to the same question on different occasions. There
are some passages, however, where Confucius provides a hint of an
explanation, or at least a rationale, for his own method. For example: "If,
when showing [the students] one corner and they do not return with the
other three, I do not repeat myself." 12
Confucius' ideal students are those who elaborate on his vague
"sketches" and succeed in depicting a whole picture. On one occasion
he discusses some sayings with his disciple Zigong, who subsequently
illustrates the Master's answer with an appropriate quote from the Book
of Odes (Shijing ~~H~). Confucius responds to Zigong's performance by
praising him for being able to infer what could follow from the point
he himself had made initially.13 I say could follow, for, as will be clear,
Confucius is not fishing for one particular answer; the "other three corners"
are not already fixed in their concealment and need merely be discovered.
Confucius is not just a master of riddles; nor is it a case of the otherwise
perfectly valid and useful point, important in Plato's Meno and common
in contemporary pedagogic theory, that by making students go through
the entire process for realizing the answer one will help them acquire a
better and fuller understanding of the issue than if one simply told them the
answer. The method of "hinting" certainly serves the purpose of inciting
the students to reflect on the issue and develop their own understanding of
it. But the key point consists precisely in "their own understanding," or,
more appropriately, considering the practical nature of understanding in
Chinese thought, "realization."
This can be seen from another Analects passage, where Confucius
asks Zigong to compare himself with the prodigy-student, Yan Hui.
Zigong responds: "How could I dare compare myself with Yan Hui! On
learning one thing he realizes ten. I myself, on learning one thing, realize
the second." Confucius replies: "You are not his match. Neither I nor you
are his match."14
In his translation of this passage, James Legge provides an illuminating
elaboration on its fuller meaning. The Chinese character for "ten" (shi
+), by representing the four cardinal directions as well as the center, is
also associated with completion or entirety,15 Thus Legge translates it as:
Hui "hears one point and knows all about the subject." The implication of
this passage, as Fran\=ois Jullien has noted, is that "the slightest indication
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bears fruit in" Yan Hui, and that he can develop the lesson to the end
on his own. On the other hand, when Zigong learns something, he can
also complete it, but remains "limited by a successive progress, which is
flatly deductive, without rising to universality."16 Yan Hui's superior ability
consists in perceiving the opportunities and possibilities for development
proceeding from the initial point. This interpretation is further supported
by Confucius' comment at the end, that neither he nor Zigong is Yan Hui's
match. Confucius perceives Yan Hui's productivity or creativity as being
superior to his own.
In the section on learning in the Liji, this hinting method is spelled out
even more clearly:
When junzi 13T have realized the sources for successful teaching [jiao
iJ&], as well as the sources that make it of no effect, they are capable
of teaching others. Thus, when junzi teach, they lead and do not herd,
they motivate and do not discourage, initiate but do not proceed to the
end fda ~]. Leading without herding results in harmony; motivating
and not discouraging results in ease; initiating without proceeding to
the end results in reflection. Harmony, ease and reflection characterize
efficient teaching.... Good singers induce people to carryon developing
the tunes. Good teachers induce people to carryon developing the
ideas. Their words are few but efficient, plain but outstanding, with few
illustrations but instructive. Thus they are said to carryon developing
the ideasY
It may be added here that the insistence upon brevity of speech conforms to
Confucius' apparent distrust of speech, the tally of which is his emphasis on
xin ffi, "to be true to one's words." To this, the notion of zhengming lEiS,
of "using names appropriately," is closely related. Both zhengming and xin
imply that words ought to be properly applied in the right situation at the
right time, and thus emphasize the conformity between speech and action.
There are numerous passages in the Analects where Confucius underscores
the priority of action to speech.18 To speak of one's intentions is easy. The
difficulty consists in accomplishing that which one intends to do. There is,
moreover, the obvious possibility of deception through the use of language,
a phenomenon probably rampant in the unstable political situation of
Confucius' daysY The frequency of such incidences seems to have made
him gradually more wary of people's words, to the point of suspending
judgment about their character dispositions until the conformity of words
and actions could be tested: "The Master said: Initially, in my dealings
with others, I listened to their words and believed that they would act
accordingly. Now, in my dealings with others, I listen to their words but
observe their actions. "20
That good teachers "initiate but do not proceed to the end" means that
they only hint at the path, but do not describe it in detail. If they proceed to
the end, they are dictating or, indeed, indoctrinating, but not teaching. The
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nature of the path, moreover, is such that it is necessary that each and every
person discover it in his or her own way: "The Master said: Archery does
not consist in penetrating the leather target, because strength differs among
the archers. This is the tradition [dao m] of the ancients. "21
Zhang Weizhong ijJH~$, a commentator on the Analects, points out
that Confucius, in this passage, is not speaking of warfare archery, but of
the kind of artistic archery belonging to the sphere of "ritual and music"
(liyue tI~).22 What matters here is not the magnitude of strength needed
to penetrate the leather, but the development of a high skill of archery
guided by the aesthetic sensibilities of the tradition and refined by one's
own personal endowments. It is certainly important eventually to hit the
bull's eye, but first one needs to find and develop the style that suits one best,
and for this a concentration on strength, which one mayor may not have,
can be a serious impediment. Further, instead of mindlessly scrambling
toward their intended aims, people are better off reflecting on, practicing,
and developing means that accord with the way informed by the tradition
or the dao.
Tradition tends to be a rather deprecated word in modern philosophical
circles. But it is unnecessary to consider tradition as referring to some kind
of fixed and unchangeable state of affairs. Tradition is maintained by the
individuals who carry it forward, However, circumstances are in a constant
process of change-an insight probably nowhere as clearly expressed as
in the Chinese philosophical literature-and therefore the carriers of the
tradition must seek new ways to deal with new circumstances, which has
as a consequence the fact that the tradition also adapts and develops.
Confucius refers to the changes made to ritual observances in previous
dynasties as indications of how the tradition evolves.23
Now while people initially acquire modes of action fro.m within the
parameters of the tradition, it is no less imperative that they be given
sufficient latitude to refine and realize their own personalized modes: the
"way" must in this sense also involve a "leeway," for the tradition's main
evolutionary drive consists precisely in the refinement of the personalized
modes of its carriers. Thus, if the teachers also" proceed to the end," they
obstruct this evolution and prevent the tradition from growing. In other
words, the way, the dao, instead of continuing, will only lead back to the
starting point.
The Confucian philosophy of education is therefore in accordance
with the general Confucian concentration on action. In fact, it would be
difficult to see how that could not be the case. If the purpose of education
is to enhance knowledge and wisdom, and, in turn, knowledge and wisdom
are understood principally as the ability to handle affairs efficiently, then
education will necessarily revolve largely around ways in which how best to
enable the student to develop skills to manage concrete affairs. An educative
mode of performative discernment, one in which the student gains firsthand
experience of real circumstances, is therefore an indispensable supplement
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to verbal incitement. After all, as quoted in the Records of Learning (Xueji
!¥~), a chapter of the Liji: "Teaching is [only] the half of learning" (xue
xue ban !¥!¥# ).24 The point of Confucius' vague incitements is to make
the disciples ponder his words, develop their own understanding, and then,
most important, act on that understanding. Zhi ~ must lead to xing 19.
For this reason, education is to a significant part left to the students
themselves. It is only through self-education or self-cultivation, the kind of
education that must never come to an end, as Xunzi states in his opening
passage, that we may hope that society will keep developing and adapting
to the always unpredictable forces of circumstances as expressed by ming
IfP or tianming xlfP.
Self-cultivation or personal cultivation (xiushen f~:!it) could indeed
be identified as the crux of the Confucian philosophy. While the notion
itself may not be frequently encountered in the classical texts, the idea of
cultivating or refining oneself, of analyzing one's own character, stance, and
bearing, is pervasive. The meaning of the notion xiushen is suggestive for
the importance of ritual propriety for the formation of a noble character,
of a junzi, who has the potency, the de, to effect profound changes and
improvements wherever he passes through.25
Shen :!it has an extremely rich semantic scope and can refer to body, self,
life, and/or human character. In the Shuowen lexicon, xiu f~ is explained
through shi ~i1i, "to decorate" or "to ornament." Judging from this etymo-
logical association, xiushen could be understood as "decorating one's char-
acter," which is expressed in the way one appears and comports oneself. In
the Chinese tradition, the idea of character cannot be isolated from com-
portment. Just as knowledge (zhi ~) cannot be thought of in abstraction
from action (xing 19), there is, as we have seen, no strict border between
the internal (nei P'g) and the external (wai 7}). There is, therefore, a strong
relation between xiushen and the performance of a ritual or ceremony (Ii tI).
And indeed, Tang Kejing, a modern commentator on the Shuowen, takes
shi originally to mean wenshi )(~, which can simply mean a ceremonial
act. 26 Insofar as "self-cultivation" refers to the body, its relationship with Ii
can be further underscored by pointing to the latter's cognate relationship
with ti e, meaning "body." David Hall and Roger Ames suggest that this
relationship indicates that "Ii actions are embodiments or formalizations
of meaning and value that accumulate to constitute a cultural tradition."
They further argue as follows:
Ritual actions, invested with the accumulated meaning of the tradition,
are formalized structures upon which the continuity of the tradition
depends and through which a person in the tradition pursues cultural
refinement. Like a body of literature or a corpus of music, these rituals
continue through time as a repository of the ethical and aesthetic insights
of those who have gone before. A person engaged in the performance
of a particular formal action, taking meaning from it while seeking
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himself to be appropriate for it, derives meaning and value from this
embodiment, and further strengthens it by his contribution of novel
meaning and valueY
The practice or active embodiment of the Ii customs is therefore an
embodiment of the tradition. Here one may speak with Pierre Bourdieu,
who uses the word hexis to express the embodiment of the habitus, or
the practical dispositions informed by social reality, and thus "to signify
deportment, the manner and style in which actors 'carry themselves':
stance, gait, gesture, etc. "28 Confucius says quite explicitly that "without
studying Ii tI, one will be unable to take a stance (Ii :sL)."29 Bourdieu in fact
sees the body as a mnemonic device that absorbs the basics of culture in a
process of learning or socializing. It is through the physical experience of
bodily action that the habitus, the socially constituted bases for practices,
is inculcated in a way more effective than through explicit teaching.30
And I believe that this insight was no less clear to Confucius and the first
Confucians than to Bourdieu.
Indoctrinating or Culture Building?
Socialization in the sense just depicted may seem dangerously close to
indoctrination. But the extreme other side is no less dangerous, namely, a
lack of a system of common meaning that preserves coherence in society
and provides persons with some base on which they can orient themselves.
When Confucius explains to his disciple Zilu why, if he were to take a place
in government, he would start with an implementation of zhengming, or
a proper use of language, he says that the final and hence most disastrous
consequence of not using language properly is that people will not know
what to do with themselves-literally, "not know where ~o place their
hands and feet. "31 If speech has no coherent relationship with action, if
we cannot count on people's words, then to what extent can we speak of a
"common space" in which we acquire, to use Charles Taylor's words, "the
base in our common language" from which any kind of innovation must
take place. 32
It is on these grounds that some writers have claimed that indoctri-
nation is, in fact, not only acceptable, but inevitable and even desirable.
Without such a primary cultural framework within which we develop our
ideas about the world, any such ideas will most likely be internally inco-
herent and confused. In this regard, many have made use of Wittgenstein's
discussion of world-picture (We/tbild) into which I must be initiated before
further inquiring and asserting can take place, or, as Wittgenstein himself
refers to it in his On Certainty, "the inherited background against which I
distinguish between true and false."33
Now, the issue is not only about providing people with a shared
conceptual framework of truth and rationality. From a practical moral
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standpoint, it is also about providing them with a social-psychological
sense of security and significance. Confucius himself lived in a world in
which war, violence, misery, death, and cultural decay were the order of the
day. Such times inevitably bring with them a lack of orientation, confusion
about values, and an inability or at least insecurity as to how to respond
to the constantly changing situations. It is a form of anomie, as the French
sociologist Emile Durkheim called it, a social situation in which old values
have largely collapsed but consistent new ones have yet to take their place.
This can bring much frustration to people and result in loss of a sense of
belonging and acute personal crises. In our contemporary world compa-
rable situations are common, be it due to wars, natural catastrophes, or,
indeed, globalization and speedy economic development. Even in the so-
called modern liberal societies, the main threat to children may not be,
as William Galston has claimed, "that they will believe in something too
deeply, but that they will believe in nothing very deeply at all. "34 A secure
sense of cultural values is capable of alleviating both the difficulties result-
ing from a fast-changing society and the sense of apathy and meaningless-
ness that tends to be conspicuous in late industrial societies.
For Confucius, the practice of ritual (ti) was undoubtedly one of
the cornerstones of Confucian education. I am deliberately using the
word "cornerstone" in this context, for the practice of ritual requires,
no less than answering questions, that the students lay the other three
"cornerstones" to the ritual itself. The formalist demand for invariance
in ritual, which admittedly characterized the purist ritualism of the Qing
dynasty, is not significally present in the early Confucian literature. Instead
of imitation and invariance, the focus is on appropriateness, which requires
performative discernment and individual creativity. Theodore Jennings has
argued that any ritual allows for variations, which are explained through
the participants' exploration for the "right" or "appropriate" movements
or actions depending on the situation in which the performance takes place.
The repertoire of ritual performance, then, Jennings suggests, "provides
the necessary framework for exploration in much the same way that a
mastery of relevant data and theoretical construction is indispensable for
'scientific' exploration and discovery. "35 According to this intriguing simile,
ritual may function as a classroom or, indeed, a "cultural laboratory" in
which the values and norms of the culture are not only transmitted but also
developed further.
Now, of course when such explorations through variation are no
longer permitted-when individual creativity is inhibited, imagination is
suppressed, and the teacher always proceeds to the end, "making deposits of
information which he or she considers to constitute true knowledge, "36-we
have what Paolo Freire calls "the banking concept of education" and
Chinese students call "force-fed duck method of education" (:tJi'f\1jJ:t®:"W).
And this, in my understanding, is the very useful pejorative sense of indoc-
trination, a kind of indoctrination that we want to avoid.
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The other kind of indoctrination-if indeed we want to call it indoc-
trination-that of culture building, is inevitable and desirable as long as it
is conveyed in an 'open-ended manner, both toward the future and toward
other cultures. Ultimately, while it is certainly important for people all over
the world to be free of dogmas and trained to make use of their creative
way-making toward the future, it may be no less important to enable peo-
ple to know who they are, and indeed, to know where to place their hands
and feet.
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16 Either Self-Realization or Transmission of
Received Wisdom in Confucian Education?
An Inquiry into Lii Zuqian's and Zhu Xi's
Constructions for Student Learning
Individual self-realization and/or authoritarian transmissions of received
wisdom are two quite diametrically opposed characterizations that domi-
nate our modern perspectives of teacher-student relationships in Chinese
culture. On the one side, as a representative of the critical view, Nathan
Sivin characterizes relationships between mentors and students as "author-
itarian" because the "key is the pupil's receptivity as the teacher expounds
the text." 1 Although the Western educational system (from which he implic-
itly draws his comparison) also assumes considerable authority of teacher
and text, he suggests there was a significant degree of difference regarding
authority in the Chinese case. On the other side, as a representative of lau-
datory views, Daniel Gardner presents Zhu Xi's *_ (1130-1200) pro-
gram of guiding students to investigate principles, even in external things,
"as nothing but self-realization."2 Although Zhu taught students to read
books as sacred texts, he also reminded them that, compared to "experienc-
ing" the texts personally, "book learning is a secondary matter"3 because
the goal was to grasp moral principles within one's self and practice these
principles in one's life. One and/ or the other of these two characterizations
tends to dominate our perceptions of Chinese education in both traditional
and contemporary China. Indeed, Thomas Lee highlights the development
of both an "authoritarian personality" and a "non-compromising individ-
ual."4 On the one hand, school rules, regulations, and memorization con-
tributed to the first facet; the roles of teachers "were confined to transmis-
sion rather than innovation," and "students were not really encouraged to
be innovative or to challenge received wisdom."5 On the other hand, classi-
cal Confucian admonitions about "getting it oneself"6 and perfecting one's
self-cultivation inspired the second facet of the education of a learned per-
son. Moreover, despite unprecedented numbers of students during the Song
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(960-1279), Thomas Lee surmises that relations between teachers and stu-
dents were less formal and more intimate then than in earlier dynasties.?
Nevertheless, we might still inquire: Did the Confucian pedagogical goal of
"getting it oneself" remain as strong as it had been in the classical period?
For instance, when Confucius fLr (551-479 B.C.E.), in Analects 7:8, pre-
sented one corner or facet of an idea, he expected students to respond with
the other three corners;8 thus, explicitly, Confucius expected students to
come up with 75 percent on their own. What would a comparable percent-
age of a student's independent effort be in Zhu Xi's educational strategy?
In short, considering such a spectrum of evaluations of Chinese education,
I believe a review of the issue is merited-especially since essays in this vol-
ume generally focus on the positive side of Confucian education.
How were the goals and methods of Confucian teachers in traditional
China different from a common practice in modern education where
students are often expected to wrestle with the course material until they
get the one right answer themselves? Interesting light on this question might
be shed by borrowing from Elisabeth Hsu's anthropological analysis of the
transmission of medical knowledge in Kunming from 1988 through 1989.
She regarded Mentor Zhang as essentially a traditional Ru {1m ("Confu-
cian" or literatus physician) who had managed to survive independently
of the official "unit" (danwei ¥W) system of the PRC. Zhang sought to
transmit to disciples how he possessed the "virtuosity" of combining the
experience of the ancients with his own medical practice. Using a term like
gu ~ ("therefore" or "for this reason, we say") to justify linking a clas-
sical text to particular medical practice, Zhang did not seek causal argu-
ments, but rather focused on what he considered to be the crucial factor
in the linkage. He approached classical texts not as historical documents,
but as sacred texts with truths to be experienced. After first having the
students hand-copy and memorize a text, Zhang provided the "explanation.
Since words in the classics were "polysemous" -that is, the meaning of
the same words or terms differed according to context-the mentor was
the sole authoritative reader. Zhang could not provide (at least to Hsu's
satisfaction) any guidelines or rules for determining which meaning of a
term applied to what contexts; thus, she regarded his readings as arbitrary.
Exasperated, she concluded that there was an assumption that the teacher's
profound insights into the texts would gradually enable students to get the
"feel" of the ancient wisdom and experience. Being creative was seen as
extending or applying the text, or the mentor's insight, to another context.9
As Hsu's anthropological analysis suggests, there might be a difference in
degree of the teacher's authoritative stance, the clarity or accessibility to
independent rules of usage that could serve students in exploring texts, and
the limits of creativity expected from the reader.
Broaching the issue of creativity requires clarification. Surely no one
would deny that major Chinese philosophers were creative. Indeed, many
scholars have discussed Zhu Xi's creative synthesis of the philosophical
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statements of his predecessors and contemporaries, as well as how he jus-
tified the creative contributions of Zhou Dunyi )'.!ij$JcID'i: (1017-1073). John
Berthrong's thoughtful study of creativity drew particular attention to
Zhu Xi's creative cosmological synthesis of principle (li :fl.) and matter-
energy (qi *i.), as well as his view of the human mind-heart (xin iL') as the
primary nexus of creativity. Nonetheless, in his comparison of Zhu Xi's
and Alfred North Whitehead's relational, organic process philosophies,
Berthrong uses "archic analysis" to portray them not only as similar in
terms of perspective, reality, and method, but also as dissimilar in principle.
Where Whitehead's principle was "creative," Zhu's was "comprehensive."
Creative denotes "volitional, making a difference, the text makes a
difference in that the new replaces the old and the world is transformed
through creativity." Comprehensive denotes "totalistic, hierarchically
encompassing."l0 This contrast between transformative creativity and
hierarchical comprehensiveness parallels our beginning contrast between
individual self-realization and authoritative transmission of received
knowledge. Nonetheless, I want to clarify that I am not addressing the
issue of Zhu Xi's own creativity, but rather if or how students were taught
or empowered to be creative.
Specifically, we shall explore how the two most successful twelfth-
century Confucian teachers, Lii Zuqian §:tlH! (II37-II81) and Zhu Xi,
tried to construct learning experiences for their students. These two teachers
were also that crucial century's most important leaders of Daoxue m~, a
sociopolitical fellowship of the Learning of the Way (Dao m) Confucians.
We shall strive to understand students' education through considering such
factors as the structured space of the academies, the guidelines for learning
and behavior enforced therein, and the methods for reading set forth by the
teachers. Instead of dealing with this level of signifiers, I had initially hoped
to focus directly on the signified; however, materials directly presenting the
daily lives and learning experiences of students at academies remain too
scant and difficult to amass from this early period. ll Available materials,
which are mostly projections from the teachers, might still reveal significant
insight into Confucian education in the Song.
Aspects of the location, architecture, and organization ofSong academies
provide evidence for some observations about student life. Academies were
arranged in the traditional courtyard style of extended family lineage (and
somewhat similar to government or temple compounds); visitors entered
through the main gate leading into the first of several courtyards with
buildings around the four sides. However, academies had as their center
not a Buddha hall, but rather a shrine hall for rituals. A large lecture hall
open to the courtyard also commanded a central location. There, the
master teacher could sit on a platform while teaching assembled students.
On the walls and above the main doorways hung wooden tablets and stone
inscriptions with quotations from the Classics and other admonitions to
inspire the students in self-cultivation and love of learning. There were also
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shrine halls where'the headmaster would, at the beginning of each day, lead
students in paying homage to Confucius and major sages and worthies. In
addition to forested mountain hillsides near academies, there were gardens
within the walls. Two side halls within the main gate housed students, while
the master teacher would have his own private room and study, usually in
a separate courtyard. In addition to monthly salaries, teachers and staff
received additional daily stipends. Students were given stipends for lamp
oil and food; a measure of coal was provided for dormitory halls during
the winter. 12 The kitchen and eating hall would be on a side chamber of one
of the courtyards. The students would often eat their meals communally.
The communal living environment deliberately enhanced a sense of group
learning in a shared fellowship.
LU Zuqian
To reinforce this sense of brotherhood, Lii Zuqian provided an early model
for academy "regulations and agreements" in II67 and revised them twice
by II70. These guidelines stipulated how students should address and
relate to one another according to proper decorum. Even after "graduat-
ing" from the academy, students were expected to pay a courtesy visit to
their mentor once a year. Admission requirements also sought to ensure
that students lived by Confucian ethics within their kinship organizations.
Besides stipulating that students realize that filial piety, sibling affection,
loyalty, and faithfulness comprised life's foundational virtues, Lii Zuqian
elaborated: "Anyone is prohibited from entering school who does not obey
his parents, is not friendly toward his brothers, is not at peace with his
clan, is not sincere and faithful to friends, does not act in accordance with
his words, or who conceals his faults."13 Students were further required to
maintain principal residency with their parents, conform to mourning rites
for relatives, and avoid disputes over financial affairs with relatives.
The direct transferability of such family socialization into the academy's
learning community was demonstrated in how students were instructed
to deal with one another's faults. Fellow students first admonished an
errant student privately; however, if the student did not acknowledge his
shortcomings and mend his ways, he would be criticized publicly in an
assembly within the academy. Recalcitrant offenders would be expelled
and expunged from the academy's registry.
Encouraging students to work together for mutual progress, Lii
Zuqian's principal goal in his regulations or agreements for students was
to enhance their moral self-cultivation and moral perfection through a
program of both study and praxis. His stated purpose was "to draw and
lead students to the good Dao." 14 He exhorted students: "Those who come
here to study should be motivated by the desire to seek to understand the
meaning of the Classics, to illuminate principles and to embody them in
action. "15 Lii Zuqian's pedagogy was so weighted toward practical studies
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that he not only condemned the practice of having students engage in end-
less recitations but also insisted that students should spend only 10 percent
of their study time in recitation. Activity in life situations should constitute
90 percent of their time.16 He was particularly concerned about helping
students achieve a balanced and mutually reinforcing relationship between
knowledge from texts and knowledge from practice:
Extending knowledge and energetically practicing are interconnected
and mutually reinforcing. If students have solid intentions, then teaching,
pondering, searching, and concentrating certainly are the essentials for
advancing in virtue. There are some among the younger generation
who expend much effort on seeking the meaning of words but little on
daily practice and experience. Although they may achieve some vague
understanding, they actually have nothing to apply to themselves.... I
am not saying to have them practice with vigor and slow down their
extension of knowledge, but the one directing them should have an
orderly procedureY
The key was the teacher's supervision and grasp of priority and procedure.
The teacher's sense of priorities and methodology was crucial because
most Confucian teachers were evidently not on the proper path:
As for the difficulty of discussing learning, the flaw of the brilliant ones is
losing themselves in mystery and emptiness, and the superficiality of the
ordinary ones is being carried away with mere commentary on words
and sentences. As for the mistakes of these two kinds, the more brilliant
ones easily slip into heterodoxy, and the ordinary ones lose sight of
our greater tradition but still, for" the purpose of earnestly teaching,
diligently practice what is right. What they value differs, but all of them
are one-sided. 18
Teachers often complained about unhealthy social customs, but Lii Zuqian
asserted that it was the Confucian literati themselves, particularly the
teachers, who had responsibility for remaking customs.19
Therefore, according to Lii Zuqian, proper educational instruction was
the crucial key to solving the problems evident in social customs and public
affairs. Corruption of social customs and difficulties in the sociopoliti'.11
realm were rooted in the fact that educational instruction was still not clear.
Yet, there was hope. If a critical mass of instructors had "prominence and
attainments," they could easily extend their influence down into society.
Even if they remained in rather "straitened circumstances," they could still,
in principle, transform the situation-if the good ones were numerous.20
The times also required teachers to be strict because some students in
recent decades had given the fellowship's enemies pretexts for "defaming the
fellowship's teachings:
It is proper to scrutinize carefully those without a solid foundation.... Al-
though education should be for all without discrimination, this Dao of
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ours is still weak today, and those who want to defame us and exclude
us are everywhere. Thus, I'm afraid we must be diligent and strict.21
Even Lii Zuqian, surely the most open and widely accepted teacher within
the fellowship in his day, advocated enhanced discipline within the group's
academies and ranks.
Despite such emphasis on regulations and discipline, students flocked
to him in numbers that far surpassed his contemporaries, even Zhu Xi. In
IISO, the year before Lii died, almost three hundred students at one time
were studying at his Beautiful Pools Academy R~«1I'fG in ]inhua. Even a
conservative estimate would suggest that he had, altogether, taught more
than a thousand students. Zhu Xi, in retrospect the most successful teacher
of the Song era, had 467 students; and, at most, 49 of them came to Zhu
during the years before IISI, when instruction by Lii was still available.22
Some of Lii's friends complained (certainly with a touch of envy) that such
large numbers of students sought instruction simply because of his success
in training students to pass the civil service examinations.23
Beyond his ability to produce successful examination candidates, Lii
Zuqian's approach to education certainly attracted students. His pedagogy
emphasized seeking fresh perspectives instead of being bound by conven-
tional wisdom: "Nowadays, from beginners to elders, those who study
mostly follow what is conventional and familiar, and none get beyond set
patterns. Only after getting beyond set patterns can one have results. "24
For example, in the case of reading history, a student "should read half of
the book, set it aside, and then calculate the achievements and failures that
would be apparent in the second half."25 Besides reading history to under-
stand different contexts, the student should place himself into the situa-
tions and learn from the experiences of others:
You should picture yourself in the situation, observe which things are
advantageous and which dangerous, and note the misfortunes and ills
of the times. Shut the book and think for yourself. Imagine that you are
facing these various facts and then decide what you think ought to be
done. If you look at history in this way, your learning will increase and
your intelligence will improve. Then, you will get real profit from your
reading. 26
Thinking of history in such ways would dispel the student's notion of his-
tory as "nothing more than a vast collection of facts crammed into one's
memory." Rather, students should observe how things change and imagine
themselves confronting those challenges.
Lii Zuqian's attention to helping students think creatively about texts
is reflected in a comment by Zhu Xi: "I have seen that you discussed the
Zuo Commentary ft:1!JJ: with your students in a thorough and extensive
way. However, in your words and ideas, you suffer from a certain degree
of ingenuity."27 Later, Zhu explained to his own students that Lii's "defect
lies entirely in ingenuity."28 In using the term "ingenuity" (qiao J7]), Zhu
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was acknowledging Lii's concern for independent, creative thinking; but
he was also complaining about Lii's penchant for being clever, artful, and
opportune.
Lii's regulations for class preparation and participation also trained
students to raise doubts and questions for resolution within the learning
community of the academy. In addition to taking notes while reading
and during class lectures, students had to use their notebooks as a basis
for small group discussions between regular classes. Notebooks should
record whatever doubts arose while reading; the small groups discussed
these questions, and thus tried to draw lessons and reach conclusions.
Students also signed one another's notebooks to certify which questions
and issues had been addressed in their small groups. Such provisions for
certification suggest that Lii inspected the notebooks to ascertain students'
effort and progress.29 In short, his reading program provided considerable
encouragement and suggestions for students to analyze and think creatively
about what they read and how to relate their learning to contemporary
problems.
Zhu Xi
Like those of Lii Zuqian, Zhu Xi's "Articles of Learning" for students at
the White Deer Grotto Academy B~W!J~~7t opened with an exhortation
to follow Confucian virtues in their relationships with family members and
friends. Reiterating explicitly the five cardinal human relationships, Zhu Xi
went further in proclaiming that fulfilling these relationships according to
the appropriate virtue was "all they needed to learn." Having proclaimed
the virtues in human relationships as the content and goal of learning,
Zhu identified five procedures for learning in what he regarded as their
crucial sequence (as quoted from the Doctrine of the Mean $.): "Study
it extensively, investigate it accurately, ponder it carefully, sift it clearly,
and practice it earnestly." Zhu Xi then quoted passages as maxims pro-
viding the essentials for personal cultivation, handling affairs, and dealing
with others. Thereupon, commenting on these principles, he asserted: "The
sages and worthies of antiquity taught people to pursue learning with one
intention only, which is to make students understand the meaning of moral
principle through discussion, so that they can cultivate their own persons,
and then extend it to others. "30 Such admonitions focused on learning as
if it were simply personal cultivation of Confucian principles for human
relations, which does indeed (as Gardner claims) make his program appear
"as nothing but self-realization. "31
At the end of his" Articles for Learning," Zhu Xi admonished students
to dedicate themselves to this program of learning moral principles.
He complained that, although the sages did not want students merely
to memorize texts or seek government office, students of his own day
followed these priorities-instead of pursuing ethical principles. With
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students focused on such secondary matters to the neglect of moral
cultivation, schools had over the centuries instituted regulations to control
students. Condemning the superficiality of such prohibitive contrivances,
Zhu proclaimed his intention to avoid such rules; therefore, he had
collected principles of learning from the Classics to guide students in
their own personal cultivation. Having posted these articles over the lintel
of the doorway, Zhu Xi announced that students "should discuss them
with one another, follow them, and take personal responsibility for their
observance."32 In the classical passages Zhu had cited, he had reiterated the
need to "correct your errors." Thus, even though these guidelines were not
as explicit and detailed as Lii Zuqian's, Zhu Xi similarly expected his stu-
dents to discuss principles and correct personal faults.
Nonetheless, Zhu Xi was less reluctant to invoke conventional
regulations than has sometimes been suggested in modern discussions
of his "Articles of Learning." For instance, at the end of his Articles, he
warned students that conventional school rules remained very much an
option at his academy. If students did not enhance their personal cultivation
through following his program, he warned, "then the 'regulations' others
talk about will have to take over and in no way can they be dispensed
with."33 Zhu elsewhere complained about chaos in his academy, where
students were just eating and chatting about superficial things. Ascribing
much of the problem to the lack of regulations, he called for "mutually
acceptable regulations" that could ensure that meetings and conversations
would be conducted in an orderly fashion.34 In 1187, one of Zhu's students
wrote detailed regulations to supplement Zhu Xi's articles.35 In short,
despite the focus by modern scholars on Zhu Xi's general exhortations at
the White Deer Grotto Academy, his students were expected and required
to follow rigorous behavior; moreover, his academies did not lack specific
conventional rules for behavior.
Zhu Xi's expectations about, and rules for, behavior are reflected in
the extant thirteenth-century rules of the Illumined Way Academy 1~!:H]!iI
we, which were based on the late twelfth-century rules for the White Deer
Grotto Academy. In addition to regular bimonthly school rites, the rules set
forth guidelines for behavior and study-including exams at the academy:
Every ten days the headmaster enters the hall and gathers the students to
receive lecture tallies. Lectures are repeated according to the regulations.
There are 38 lectures on the Classics, and 16 on the histories. They
are all recorded on the lecture register. Each month there are three
examinations: the first ten-day period [examination] is questions on
the Classics; the middle one is questions on histories; the final one is
preparation for the civil service examinations. Those who excel are
recorded in the dormitory record of moral achievement.36
It is noteworthy here that approximately 33 percent of study was allocated
for preparation for the government's civil service examinations.
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Zhu Xi made two particularly striking observations about the decline
of rigor in studying. First, instead of laboriously memorizing whole sutras,
Buddhists since the Tang era (618-906) had developed a culture of focus-
ing only on a relatively small number of exemplary quotations that would
serve as shortcut guides to becoming enlightened.3? Second, Zhu Xi associ-
ated sloppy reading habits with the development of printing:
The reason people today read sloppily is that there are a great many
printed texts.... It would seem that the ancients had no written texts, so
only if they had memorized a work from beginning to end would they
get it. Those studying a text would memorize it completely and after-
ward receive instruction on it from a teacher.... For people today even
copying down a text has become bothersome. Therefore, their reading
is sloppy.38
Despite such laments about print advances encouraging laziness, Zhu Xi
contributed significantly to textual production and was even active at times
in the printing business. As Zhu mentioned, the primary role of teachers
had traditionally been to explain texts after students had memorized them.
However, as print culture made commentaries more readily available, stu-
dents did not need to rely so heavily on teachers in order to read texts. In
his preface to Reflections on Things at Hand lli,m~, he even hailed-as
a positive-this impact of having commentaries. Noting that the diverse
works of the five Northern Song Masters made it difficult for students to
know where to begin, he and Lii Zuqian had selected, organized, and com-
mented upon 622 passages to serve as a primer to these philosophical mas-
ter works: "Thus if a young man in an isolated village who has the will
to learn, but no enlightened teacher or good friend to guide him, obtains
this volume and explores and broods over its material in his own mind, he
will be able to find the gate to enter."39 Thus, even his selected shortcuts to
learning could serve as a way for students to enter into an understanding of
core texts of the tradition. Still, all Zhu Xi expected in such circumstances
was that the student would "be able to find the gate to enter"; in other
words, the student could reach a beginning level, but would need instruc-
tion before proceeding very far into the teachings.
In conversations with students, Zhu Xi addressed the role of the
teacher in students' education. Of course, he admonished students that
the process of learning was primarily their own responsibility: "In learn-
ing, do not claim that there's no one to analyze it for you. You need to go
to the core of it yourself, making the most careful effort. You must under-
stand it for yourself. "40 Still, as Lii had done, Zhu Xi's ideal program inte-
grated group learning among peers and the role of the teacher into the stu-
dent's own efforts:
The usefulness of teachers and friends lies simply in their ability to make
it known to you at the beginning and to correct it at the end. You have
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to struggle to do the middle 30 percent of the work on your own. Once
you've been instructed in it at the beginning, worked diligently on it
yourself in the middle, and deliberated with others to correct it at the
end, the benefits will be great. If you don't proceed like this, what good
will it do?41
This recommendation of 30 percent of one's time studying on one's own
reminds us of Zhu Xi's famous suggestion to his students that only using
30 percent of total study time be allowed for preparation for the civil
service examinationsY (That suggested time for preparing for the state
examinations was then mirrored in the rules of the Illumined Way Academy.)
This parallel 30 percentage might be merely incidental, but it might also
suggest how he relegated both these activities to a quite secondary role. In
other words, the remaining 70 percent, which was dependent upon being
instructed or corrected by others, far outweighed what one was expected
to attain on one's own.
Zhu Xi reiterated on another occasion that students were responsible
for handling their own affairs, reading the books, and investigating
principles. He then added: "I'm just one who guides and corroborates: if
you have questions or difficulties, we'll discuss them together, but that's
it. "43 Zhu Xi elaborated on the role of teacher: "In teaching and guiding the
younger generation, you must be stern and untiring. But only if you're able
to inspire and enlighten them as well will you be successful. If you're simply
stern with them, restraining them and that is all, it'll be of no help. "44
Another major topic was pedagogy, particularly how to read and think
about ancient texts. Since the principles and guidelines of Zhu Xi's program
for studying the Classics are widely known,45 I will only highlight points of
particular relevance to our current theme of the tension between somewhat
autonomously "getting it oneself" versus a relatively authoritarian mode of
transmitting without challenging received wisdom. .
On one side of this divide, reflective of Zhu Xi's theme of the student
reader actively engaged with the text, Daniel Gardner emphasizes that Zhu
Xi's educational program "placed a great deal of value on the autonomy of
the individual in the reading process. "46 Zhu said: "In reading, we cannot
seek moral principle solely from the text. We must turn the process around
and look for it in ourselves. "47 He further elaborated a similar perspective:
Once we have understood the Classics, there's naturally no need for the
commentaries. We rely on the Classics simply to understand principle.
Once we have grasped principle, there is no need for the Classics. Now
if we get stuck on these [the Classics and commentaries], when will we
free ourselves from them and reach a thorough understanding [of prin-
ciple]?48
So strong was Zhu Xi's attentiveness to self-cultivation that he occasionally
asserted the primacy of moral principles over the Classics. He even claimed:
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"When we read the Six Classics, it should be just as if there were no Six
Classics. We're simply seeking the moral principle in ourselves-this prin-
ciple is easy to understand. "49 This assertion is surprisingly comparable
to an earlier one for which Lu ]iuyuan (Xiangshan) IlifLilI\! (~L1J) (II39-
II93) was criticized by Zhu Xi and his school as denigrating the impor-
tance of studying the Classics: "If in our study we know the fundamentals,
then all the Six Classics are footnotes to ourselves. "50 Like Lu ]iuyuan, Zhu
Xi seems to be saying that even the Classics are not as important as the
reader. Ironically, this asserted principle is certainly not what Zhu Xi's stu-
dents, namely, the readers, seem to have learned from Zhu Xi-otherwise
they would not have been so critical of Lu ]iuyuan's comparable claim.
From this irony, we might surmise that, even if Zhu Xi's intention was to
empower students or readers, this is not what they felt-perhaps because
of his other teachings.
On this other side, Zhu Xi frequently made the Classics the repository
of moral principles to which students should conform. In reading, students
should approach the Classics with an open mind: "The mind, how can
we open it? We just have to take it and keep it focused on the text. "51
An open mind included restraint of their own assumptions: "In reading,
don't force your ideas on the text. You must get rid of your own ideas
and read for the meaning of the ancients. "52 Admonishing students against
stubbornly sticking to their own opinions, Zhu cited Zhang Zai's ~~
(ro20-ro77) advice: "Wash away the old understanding and bring forth
new ideas. "53 Having an open mind also meant having doubts: "The prob-
lem with men is that they feel the views of others alone may be doubted, not
their own."54 Of course, one could have doubts-or more appropriately
"questions" -about the text itself. Ifsuch questions arose about the Classics,
the resulting anguish and urgency within one's mind were likened to a keen
affliction; however, if a question came to mind while reading "superficial
stuff" like histories, one could just jot it down for later reference.55 Zhu's
point was to have students doubt or raise questions about themselves as
they encountered the classical text: "In reading you have to be very careful;
it's essential that you understand every sentence and every character with
certainty. If your effort is lax and you're not given to reflection, you'll
simply conclude that there's nothing in your understanding to be doubted,
but since your understanding isn't complete, you just don't realize it."56
Thus, while advocating the power of the Classics to transform an open
mind, Zhu Xi also expected an open mind to have particular responses to
the readings of the Classics.
The tension that we can perceive between the discussed two sides or sets
of passages was apparently not perceived, and/or not seen as problematic,
by Zhu Xi. First, he promised that self and text could ultimately become
one-if students "personally experienced" the texts.57 He announced:
"Generally speaking, in reading we must first become intimately familiar
with the text so that its words seem to come from our own mouths. We
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should then continue to reflect on it so that its ideas seem to come from
our own minds. Only then can there be real understanding."58 When
students reached this level of understanding of the texts and themselves,
they gained a means for transforming themselves. It was through finding
moral principles in the ancient sages' texts that students could realize those
principles within themselves, for "only through their words will we find it in
ourselves. "59 In other words, the texts were the objective reality into which
students should transform themselves. Thus, Zhu Xi's statements ascribing
a kind of autonomy to the individual in the reading process, as Daniel
Gardner acknowledged, "did not by any means translate into subjectivity
in the final understanding. For according to Zhu the truth in the text was
the same for every reader. It was an objective truth, first expressed long ago
by the revered sages. Zhu may have required the reader to 'experience' the
text personally, but that was simply so the sages' message would become
his own. The message was supposed to transform the reader, not the reader
the message."60 Second, Zhu Xi asserted that proper study of the Classics
ultimately provided clarity about what was right. Even when reading a
multitude of views, students could, through carefully reading and rereading,
reach the point where "the right and the wrong, the good and the bad, will
all naturally become clear. "61
Zhu Xi appears to have developed a quite novel way to enhance his
own, and also his students', confidence in his authority as teacher. First,
daily rituals led his students into an explicit awareness of their familial-
like relationship to him and their filial duties toward him. For instance, at
the Zhulin Study Lodge ttf*ffi% in Fujian, the students (dizi 513T) were
referred to as "sons and younger brothers" (zidi T5I3) as they participated
in daily sacrificial rituals not only before the statue of Confucius but also
at the ancestral image hall (yingtang ~~). Rituals in the ancestral image
hall were normally open only to lineage members, so the inclusion of stu-
dents in Zhu's rituals there did add substance to the practice of referring to
them as "sons and younger brothers" instead of merely students. Accord-
ing to a student's account,
Master [Zhu] arose early every morning and would emerge from his
chamber after all of us sons and younger brothers attending the acad-
emy had dressed, rung the bell, and gone to the image hall to await him.
After we opened the door, the Master ascended the hall, and led us, in
our proper ranks, in paying obeisance and lighting incense. He paid
obeisance again and withdrew. One of us would be sent to burn incense
and pay reverence to the earth god's shrine. Afterwards, accompanying
our Master and ascending into the chamber, together we would pay rev-
erence to the statue of the Former Sage/Former Teacher and then sit in
the academy's lecture hall. 62
Employing the nomenclature of lineage relationships and participating in
Zhu Xi's ancestral rituals every morning, the students would surely have
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grasped that their relationship to him was quite different from a conven-
tional student-teacher relationship.
Second, Zhu enhanced such implications of a family lineage in the
terms he and his students used in performing rituals celebrating the Trans-
mission and Succession of the Way (daotong tlit.!t) from the ancient sages
to Zhu Xi. Zhu Xi first adopted this term in I 181 and soon used it in his
commentaries to empower the more general notion that the Dao transmit-
ted via the ancient sages had been lost after Mencius until the Northern
Song master Zhou Dunyi received it directly from Tian :k (Heaven). Zhu
Xi spoke of the daotong in family imagery of "passing down inheritance"
(chuan f-$) and "lineage descent lines" (zong *). Celebrating the daotong
in II94, Zhu Xi led students in prayer:
1, the later student, Zhu Xi, venture to prayerfully entreat the Former
and Ultimate Sage, the King of Promoting Culture [Confucius]. Let us
celebrate the Dao legacy [extending] back to [the mythical sages] Fu Xi
f:*~ and the Yellow Emperor Jim. Its achievements were all assembled
by the Original Sage [Confucius], who transmitted the ancient [teach-
ings], gave instructions, and set standards for ten thousand generations.
His three thousand disciples were transformed as if [his instructions]
had been a timely rain.... Since then, subsequent followers lost the true
transmission in the process of teaching and receiving. The legacy was
not continued until more than one thousand years later. What Zhou
[Dunyi] and the Cheng f~ brothers learned and taught was that the
myriad principles had one single origin.... They made it easier for us
later generations, as if we were moving from the dark of night into the
dawning of a new day.
After mentioning how he had received instruction and met people who
possessed the Dao, he continued to expound on the spiritual connection
between the content of what was being taught presently and the spiritual
presence of the ancient sages:
Gazing upward respectfully, and even though nothing is heard, [1 know
that] due to the spirit consciousness (ling 'm) of Tian above, we are for-
tunate that nothing [being passed down] has been lost.... Presenting
our offerings and praying respectfully, trust that the spirits, descend-
ing to this place, will draw nigh, communicate and bless with illumina-
tion. [We] will then faithfully and untiringly-without rejecting any-
thing-transmit it [the Dao] without interruption to those coming in
the future. Now, as this is an auspicious day, 1 will lead the assembled
students in celebration, performing the rite of offering food to the spir-
its [of the sages and worthy masters named]. Please receive these food
offerings!63
Some of Zhu Xi's other prayers (which were also read aloud after the
students had assembled to pay homage before the spirit tablet of Confucius)
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even more explicitly presented Zhu Xi as the mediator between the students
and the spirit of Confucius. For instance, Zhu Xi requested and received
instructions from Confucius to enforce physical punishment and public
humiliation of a student whose behavior had "strained" the group at the
academy.64
In terms of encouraging creativity among students, Zhli Xi appears
to h~ve been in line with the kind of creative linkages and applications
characterized by Elisabeth Hsu's anthropological analysis of the personal
mode of transmission of traditional medical knowledge. A particularly apt
example is Zhu Xi's praise of Chen Ji's Il*i'Jf exposition resolving seemingly
conflicting positions in two of Zhu Xi's commentaries. After a longer sum-
mary of Zhu's statements, Chen provided this resolution:
Here [in the Mengzi jizhu (Collected Commentaries on the Mencius :tiS:
T~itt)l, you say that man and things are similar in respect to matter-
energy but different in respect to principle, in order to show that man
is higher and cannot be equaled by things. In the Daxue huowen
(Questions and Answers on the Great Learning *~~r",), you say
that man and things are similar in respect to principle but different in
respect to matter-energy, in order to show that the Great Ultimate (taiji
::*;:;@) is not deficient in anything and cannot be interfered with by any
individual. Looked at this way, there should not be any question. When
someone was puzzled by the discrepancies in the Daxue huowen and
the jizhu, I explained it in this way. Is this correct?6S
Responding, Zhu Xi lauded the student: "On this subject you have dis-
cussed very clearly. It happened that last evening a friend talked about this
matter and I briefly explained it to him, but not as systematically as you
have done in this statement." This example is consistent with assuming one
correct answer toward which students must struggle to get it "themselves;
however, there is no indication that the student was free to challenge the
received truth or to question the interpretative authority of the teacher.
Conclusions
Juxtaposing Lii Zuqian's and Zhu Xi's constructions of students' edu-
cational experiences thus sheds comparative light on Zhu Xi as educa-
tor. First, whereas Lii Zuqian's regulations and agreements for academies
gave more explicit attention to the duty of the community of students in
striving together to live in accord with Confucian virtues and values, Zhu
Xi's "Articles of Learning" appeared to focus somewhat more attention
upon one's internal, individual struggle. This relatively greater emphasis
on individual responsibility made Zhu's articles appear to be a clearer
alternative to conventional school regulations and prohibitions.
Second, Lii Zuqian's rules and pedagogy emphasized students actively
reading by themselves and discussing texts in study groups, as well as imag-
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ining themselves as confronting and working through similar predicaments
to the ones portrayed in the texts. Moreover, his emphasis on teaching essay
writing through analyzing and applying texts further suggests attentiveness
to student creativity and analysis. Zhu Xi, while serving as prefect of
Nankang, asserted his intent to lecture at least once every four or five days
at the government school there; later, while serving as prefect in Changsha,
he would routinely cross the river to teach at the Yuelu Academy ffiB~
~JG in the evenings. These examples suggest that Zhu was relatively more
focused on transmitting his own ideas to students. This observation is
perhaps further strengthened by Zhu's guidelines suggesting that students
spend 30 percent of their time individually struggling with the material.
This percentage is the same as that to which he limited study for the state
examinations; thus, the percentage implies a relatively low priority in his
educational agenda. In any event, compared to Confucius' demand that
students independently come up with 75 percent (i.e., to respond with
another three corners or perspectives when he raised one corner), Zhu Xi's
suggested 30 percent represents a significant decline in expectations.
Third, although Lii Zuqian sought to enhance group discussion and
interactions among students as a learning community, he insisted that stu-
dents maintain their residency with parents and focus their cultivation on
their relationships with their own families, so his learning community at
the academy did not seek to substitute for strong familial bonds. In con-
trast, Zhu Xi went further by incorporating students into his lineage rit-
uals and using ritual participation in prayers to Confucius and in sacrifi-
cial pledges to the Transmission of the Way. In such rituals, he suggestively
positioned himself as the principal lineage descent and a communicative
locus of filial piety; as such, he was making a move toward making his
learning community into a substitute family.
Fourth, beyond Lii Zuqian's and Zhu Xi's shared concern for moral
training in Confucian virtues, Lii Zuqian's educational program on the
individual level appears to have been relatively focused on academic train-
ing and gave greater attention to encouraging analytical thinking and cre-
ative insight into texts. Indeed, Lii's penchant for struggling with texts
creatively is reflected in Zhu Xi's complaint that Lii Zuqian's readings of
texts were distinguished by ingenuity or creativity. On the external level,
Lii appears to have been even more intensely concerned about the state of
social customs and the responsibility for teachers to extend their transfor-
mative influences down into society. Whereas Lii Zuqian displayed a higher
degree of diverse interests and commitments, Zhu Xi sharpened the focus
on the self as the center of transformation and narrowed the field of inquiry
by establishing hierarchical priorities, Even though, as Yung Sik Kim ~7j(
{i shows, Zhu Xi extended boundaries of Confucian learning to scientific
and occult topics,66 it is significant that he did so only very late in his life,
when he no longer was challenged either intellectually or for leadership
within the Daoxue Confucian fellowship. Within the last six years or so
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of his life, he was secure enough to identify and define what one needed to
know about such, topics.
Although Thomas Lee correctly emphasized that Zhu Xi's"Articles of
Learning" (especially when compared to rules at government schools) were
exhortations to personal development, Zhu Xi's academy still enforced var-
ious rules for behavior and study; moreover, Zhu Xi warned his students
that, if they did not follow his exhortations, conventional rules would be
enforced. Even though Daniel Gardner champions Zhu Xi's rules for read-
ing texts as guides to self-discovery, he does acknowledge that the purpose
of Zhu's reading program was to doubt and correct oneself so that one
could transform oneself to conform to the text. Furthermore, as we have
noted, even though Zhu Xi's comments to his students at times presented
himself as simply a resource for clarification after they had struggled with
the text themselves, Zhu's program and pedagogy structured and guided
students in a more proactive or even authoritative way than what is por-
trayed in some of his individual statements about his role as teacher.
Evidence of such an authoritative penchant in the teacher's supervision
and discipline of his students' learning process appears to be significantly
strengthened if we take into account Zhu Xi's use of rituals and prayers at
his academies. Therein, students were ritually integrated into Zhu Xi's rhet-
oric with language and images suggesting their filial duties to him. More-
over, in using the language of inheritance and lineage descent, Zhu Xi's dis-
cussion of the Transmission of the Way further enhanced his standing as
the elder in the direct line of descent from the sages. In this context, he led
the students in pledging never to change anything that they had received
via the transmission of the Dao from the ancient sages to their own Master.
Moreover, his prayers to the spirit of Confucius, while the students gath-
ered before the sage's statue and/or spirit plaque, situated Zhu as mediator
between the students and Confucius. All of these ritual performances rein-
forced Zhu's authority as teacher and the sanctity of what he taught and
passed down to his students.
Altogether, such considerations tend toward the conclusion that,
even if Zhu Xi "placed a great deal of value on the autonomy of the
individual in the reading process,"67 he still restrained that "autonomy"
by augmenting his authority over his students and placing a higher value
on transmitting the received Dao unchanged. Thus, encouraging students
"to get it themselves" did not, in Zhu Xi's educational program, detract
from the primacy of transmission. Despite his own philosophical creativity
and innovative reading of texts, we find no real evidence that he sought
to encourage his students to challenge what he taught or to become
innovators in reading classical texts. Especially compared to Lil Zuqian,
Zhu Xi's overall educational program appears far more controlled than
the general modern practice of encouraging students to wrestle with mate-
rial themselves until they get the right answer (or, in a pluralistic context,
one of the acceptable answers). Moreover, as the author of much of the
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commentaries and materials read and recited by his students, Zhu Xi and
his guidelines for reading texts could be seen as his establishing himself
as a more "author-itarian" teacher. Certainly Sivin's characterization of
student-teacher relations as "authoritarian" promotions of "attitudes and
modes of conformity"68 is somewhat overstated when applied to Zhu Xi.
Nonetheless, considering Zhu Xi's moves to enhance his authority over,
and guidance of, students might lead modern scholars to be more cautious
about their own idealizations of Zhu Xi's educational program through
selective focus on its positive aspects. At the very least, we are able to gain
a more nuanced picture of constructed learning communities and teacher-
student interactions in Zhu Xi's academies when we review his"Articles of
Learning" and hermeneutics, along with the rituals and prayers performed
at his academies. Such a balanced and realistic view would, I believe,
encourage much greater receptivity to serious consideration of Confucian
values and traditions of education.
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Part V
Education and Otherness

WORKINEH KELBESSA
17 Oral Traditions, African Philosophical Methods,
and Their Contributions to Education and Our
Global Knowledge'
This essay examines the nature and role of oral traditions in education
and our global knowledge by taking the Oromo oral tradition as an exam-
ple-the Oromo being the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia. The essay is
divided into three sections. Section one provides a general picture of the
nature and role of oral traditions. I will show how these traditions have
been defined by various scholars in various fields, then will look into how
the Oromo people employ oral traditions in their day-to-day life. Unlike
ethnophilosophers, I do not claim that all people in the Oromo society
are philosophers. Instead, the first section of this essay provides back-
ground information for the discussion on whether oral traditions can be
the sources of philosophy in the next section. Section two specifically looks
into the contribution of oral traditions to philosophy. Section three con-
cludes the essay.
The very existence of African philosophy has been denied at least since
the 'enlightened' philosophies of Hume, Kant, and Hegel. These and other
Western scholars have claimed that there was no such thing as 'philoso-
phy' in Africa independent of European influences. One justification for
this denial was the lack of a written philosophical tradition in many parts
of the continent, as they regarded oral narratives as performances or enter-
tainment that could not sustain analytical and rigorous philosophical dia-
logue. However, such claims concerning philosophy were often based on a
misunderstanding of orality in general.
Others proclaimed that writing is not indispensable for philosophical
enquiry, and that its absence cannot justify the assumption that nonliterate
traditions are devoid of philosophy. They argued that besides performance,
oral traditions involve rigorous intellectual discussions. I will argue that
oral tradition is a viable source of philosophical ideas and education. I will
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also show that Africa is not devoid of written philosophical works. The
main sources of t~is study are the various available relevant documents and
structured and unstructured interviews with key informants and elders.
Oral Traditions
What Are Oral Traditions?
In general the concept of 'oral' traditions developed in an attempt to under-
stand the traditional cultures of nonliterate peoples. Various scholars have
used different terms to describe the nature of such societies based on an
analysis of the concept of 'literature'. Among other uses, the word 'litera-
ture' is used to refer to a volume of written or printed texts. The Oxford
English Dictionary defines 'literature', as a "body of writings," and 'liter-
ary' as "pertaining to books and written compositions." Thus, Sophie B.
Oluwole argues, "since the word 'literature' comes from the Latin term lit-
teral which means of letters or the alphabets, talking of oral texts as philo-
sophicalliterature involves an implicit contradiction."! However, she sug-
gests the following: "the same cannot be said of the term 'text' which comes
from the Latin word texere and means, 'to weave'. Thought can undoubt-
edly be woven in the oral form."2 The word 'literature' is also given a
restricted meaning; it refers to "creative texts that appeal to our imagi-
nation or to our emotion (such as stories, plays, and poems), not to fac-
tual texts such as newspaper reports or historical records, however attrac-
tively written these may be."3 Clearly there are texts that function within
nonliterate societies in accord with this second more rt'stricted meaning
of 'literature'. Thus, despite Oluwole's etymological observations concern-
ing an implicit contradiction, we find the following emergent understand-
ing that "literature delivered by word of mouth" or "verbal expressions of
thought in different ways and style" is identified as 'oral literature'. Given
such discursive confusions, the word 'orature' is also used to emphasize
the oral character of the literature and is replacing the concept of 'oral lit-
erature'.4 At any rate, "an oral/aural society is a society in which the prin-
cipal means of communication and preserving information is passed from
mouth to ear."s
While there is a great deal of discussion and debate within academic
circles concerning the nature of 'oral traditions'6 for the purpose of this
essay I can simply stipulate that oral traditions involve various elements
that have been orally transmitted-wholly or partially-from generation
to generation. Oral traditions are one of the sources of social, economic,
environmental, and philosophical knowledge in nonliterate cultures. They
are instrumental in people's development of encyclopedic knowledge of
social life and of the local flora and fauna over the course of generations.
On 'oral tradition', the following is a revealing observation: "oral tradi-
tion is the great school of life, all aspects of which are covered and affected
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by it."7 Therefore, oral traditions help nonliterate people to acquire a wide
range of knowledge of various aspects of human beings, their activities,
and the natural environment and its inhabitants that no scientific treatise,
textbook, or journal can provide.
In my previous research, I showed that the Oromo of Ethiopia develop
their knowledge through a variety of oral media.s They have used folktales,
songs, riddles, and proverbs to entertain and instruct young children for
centuries. In Oromo culture, a corpus of oral sources can be categorized as
traditions referring to historical origins, migrations, wars, settlement/ plus
records of land heritage, moral principles, social and political life, God,
knowledge of birds, animals, plants, geologic features, and the relationship
between human beings and the natural environment. These wide-ranging
categories have enabled the Oromo to ensure broad and effective recogni-
tion of natural resources and to maintain ecological knowledge.
The Oromo transmit their history to the younger generation through
the tradition of argaa-dhageettii. Argaa literally means "to see" whereas
dhageettii means "that which is heard." Argaa-dhageettii refers to both
past and present events. Argaa refers to what has been witnessed in the
past, which is being witnessed in the present, and will be witnessed in the
future. Dhageettii also refers to stories that are heard about events in the
past and that will be heard about future events. Thus, sense experience is
an important source of knowledge. Accordingly, those who have argaa-
dhageettii are experts in customs and traditions. They have been observ-
ing different things and listening to elders and other knowledgeable per-
sons. The Oromo also recognize the role of reason in acquiring knowledge.
Although intelligence (qarooma) is believed to be innate, experience helps
it to develop.lo
The Oromo tradition involves two levels of knowledge that reflect the
broad and narrow interpretations respectively: the knowledge'of the aadaa
(custom) and the knowledge of experts. 11 While the knowledge of ordinary
men is common to all humans alike, expert knowledge, such as that of the
Hayyuu (legal experts) and that of the Wayyuu (experts of belief systems
and moral values) shows specialist knowledge. Those who have specialized
knowledge have had special training or an apprenticeship. Some individu-
als are reflective and act as the moral guides to their community. Some can
reject or amend aspects of received conceptions. Thus, some knowledge-
able people or sages-as they are conceptualized within the methodology
of sage philosophy (discussed later) -are the masters of rational thought,
vital skills, and the living libraries of their society. The saying goes "every
time an old one dies, a library burns down."
Moreover, the Oromo use proverbs to underline the significance of wis-
dom as a general capacity. The Oromo sages make a distinction between
knowledge and wisdom. Other ordinary individuals do not try to discover
the means by which our knowledge is acquired, the extent of our knowl-
edge, and the standards by which we can judge the reliability of knowl-
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edge claims. But, like philosophers, some sages have attempted to deter-
mine the basis of knowledge, and the difference between knowledge and
wisdom. 'Knowledge' refers to understanding gained by experience. Wis-
dom is deeper than knowledge and shows an individual's general capac-
ity for using his or her knowledge and making decisions. A wise, reflective
person is believed to have a deeper view of society and the natural envi-
ronment than the average person. He or she can defend his or her position
and can provide alternative arguments to the dominant view. A wise per-
son can formulate wise sayings whereas the unwise person can only make
commonplace assertions. Wisdom is considered as a human attribute and a
gift of God. This is indeed a philosophical distinction between knowledge
and wisdom. Later I will discuss Henry Odera Oruka's distinction between
folk and philosophic sages. While his distinction is not exactly the same as
the Oromo distinction between knowledge and wisdom, the two do seem
complementary and helpful in understanding some philosophical aspects
of oral traditions.
Oral traditions have unique features that are not found in written lit-
erature. In an oral tradition, the performer uses various visual resources to
influence the audience. For instance, in many stories the speaker's gestures,
expression, and mimicry can convey information. During performance one
can observe the complex structure of images and allusion, the manipula-
tion of sounds and of the voice to achieve specific effects of beauty and
meaning. Besides a verbal evocation of mood, the dress, accoutrements,
or observed bearing of the performer are crucial to convey messages to the
audience.12 Thus, the term 'oral tradition' is misleading, for its elements
are not merely 'oral', but they involve gestures, masks, performance, and
other features and characteristics that go far beyond simple storytelling.13
Thus, it would be wrong to argue that oral tradition is solely verbal com-
munication.
Another interesting aspect of oral literature is that the audience actively
participates in the actualization and creation of a piece of oral literature.
The members of the audience may make additional comments, question or
criticize the performance. 14 The audience has the chance of receiving the
contents of the messages and critically expressing a reflection on them at
the very moment of engaging the oral tradition. The performer can react
to the comments and questions of members of the audience. Fidelity, con-
viviality, and fraternity are the virtues of orature. On the other hand, the
written word is characterized by infidelity, artificiality, and individualism. IS
The written world seems to deconstruct social bonds. In contrast, in oral
literature, "[t]he whole enterprise is a collaborative activity from which the
audience expects to derive as much benefit and delight as the performer. "16
Thus, oral literature links speaker and listener in a dynamic way; if either
is missing, it collapses. This reminds us of the Socratic method, which
involved the contributions of the speaker and the audience. Socrates pur-
sued research in dialogue form-that is a conversation of question and
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answer. The impact of members of the audience on the performance and
the significance of the actual occasion shows one of the basic differences
between oral and written literary pieces. Consider Plato's observation in
Phaedrus: "[i]t is the same with written words [as with painting]. You
would think they were speaking as if they were intelligent, but if you ask
them about what they are saying and want to learn [more], they just go on
saying one and the same thing forever." 17 Ultimately, in Phaedrus, Socrates
endorsed an Egyptian king's conclusion that writing would only bring for-
getfulness and the "conceit of wisdom rather than authentic wisdom."18
On the other hand, Plato seemed to favor abstract, analytical thought over
mnemonic poetry in The Republic. He attacked a tribal identification with
the epic heroes.
In oral communication both the sender, a person who speaks in prov-
erbs, and a receiver, a person to whom one speaks in proverbs, are required
to be present at the same time, while the author of a written text entrusts
his work to the public without worrying about its acceptance.19 Moreover,
oral literature succinctly condenses complex ideas into memorable and
understandable form, while literacy can sometimes make ideas obtruse and
difficult to grapple with.
Myth is another form of oral tradition that can serve as the source of
moral value. Moreover, traditional songs can convey the historical devel-
opment of a certain group of people. Richard H. Bell states that, in Africa,
a consciousness of resistance and revolt was heightened by music, poetry,
and song that acted as subversive forms.20 Similarly, Addisu Tolesa argues
that the Oromo geerarsa (song) serves as a repository of history, a medium
of self-expression and national identity.21 Bell also showed the role of an
iconic tradition. Iconic tradition is a primary and reflective mode of human
expression and, as such, is philosophical in nature. Bell further argues that
some African iconic forms have philosophical import because they give rise
to critical judgments. They lead to new questions, interests, and ways of
seeing, knowing, and acting in the world.22
The Contributions of Oral Traditions to Education
Nonliterate people provide education to their children through oral tra-
ditions. Two kinds of training can be used in the training of African oral
artists and other experts: informal and formal. 23 Informal training refers
to the educational process where the person can learn from elders and
other members of the community when particular kinds of oral art are
practiced. Informal education for children begins in each and every fam-
ily. Understanding starts at an early age and develops gradually. In Oromo
society, the appropriate age to begin to receive instruction is seven or eight,
although it could be before or after. Some children are trained to perform
specific household tasks starting at age three or four: over the years girls
learn cooking and cattle tending while boys learn horse riding and spear
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throwing. Their mothers advise girls to sit and act properly starting from
age two.H Children learn more about their environment by tending siblings
and cattle, and helping in cultivation.
Moreover, Oromo elders and other knowledgeable persons are the mas-
ters of highly developed environmental knowledge and contribute to indig-
enous environmental education. They developed their knowledge through
experimentation and observation over centuries. They have discovered,
invented, experimented with, transmitted, and stored know-how in polit-
ical, social, economic, and ecological management among their commu-
nities. The Oromo use various proverbs to inculcate the value of conser-
vation in young people. They stress that those who waste their resources
will not be able to survive in the future. Thus, indigenous Oromo envi-
ronmental ethic reminds us that wise management and use of resources
can minimize irreparable damage of the environment. Accordingly, fathers,
mothers, aunts, uncles, older brothers and sisters, peer groups, communal
elders, and religious leaders all contribute to the education of children con-
cerning their behavior and how to live within their natural environment
and the larger community as a whole. Through informal training children
will be given the beliefs and practices of their society and inducted into the
society's organized way of life.
In many African countries, the people respect the elders and benefit
from their advice. Disobedience to the elders is morally wrong. The people
value submissiveness to parental and elderly authority. This does not mean
that all elders are considered knowledgeable. According to my informants,
"grey hair does not necessarily mean knowledge and wisdom." Some elders
may not have adequate knowledge of their society and the natural environ-
ment in spite of their grey hair. My informants attest that there are three
types of elders: a man with grey hair who has accumulated knowledge, a
young man who has grey hair in his heart, and a traveler who has grey hair
on his foot. A young man who is intelligent and often stays with elders is
knowledgeable about his culture. A traveler who moves from place to place
has the opportunity to develop his or her knowledge through his or her
interactions with various people.
As has been stated earlier on, the Oromo elders use proverbs, songs,
folktales, riddles, and the like to instruct the children. The Oromo use prov-
erbs to encourage their children to be fruitful and knowledgeable about
their culture. As the proverb goes, "Ilma yartu dhalchuu manna muka
tokko dhabachuu wayya" - "It is better to plant a tree than to have a use-
less son." A tree, which is analogized to a growing son, is very valuable
to someone who plants it. It provides a protective shadow during scorch-
ing overhead sunlight. So is a son in the rural areas reputed to have phys-
ical stamina and economic strength to provide protection for his family in
time of need. The seed, the leaves, the bark, and the trunk of the tree are all
useful to human beings. Young children are expected to serve their family
and lineage. Whoever is incapable of adopting this message should get out
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of the way. The people believe that children who have lived up to expecta-
tions are good citizens, whereas those who have failed to grow up properly
in accordance with the mores of society are worthless.
One can object that the above view is incompatible with philosophi-
cal thinking because it stresses conformism and traditionalism to the det-
riment of critical inquiry. This is a sound criticism. Within indigenous tra-
ditions it sometimes appears that one is meant to accept the teachings of
the ancestors as authoritative rather than subjecting them to skeptical scru-
tiny. It is certainly true that traditions can become dogmatic and conserva-
tive and repress the critical and reflective orientations within a community.
However, all existing traditions have clearly enabled a people to survive
for centuries, and therefore they ought to be respected. But not all values
should be uncritically endorsed by the young generation; some principles
and values should be replaced by new values that are more useful, because
values are not static. There are limits to old values that cannot go with new
circumstances. As I shall discuss, indigenous philosophical sages can chal-
lenge harmful principles and practices.
Not all persons can benefit from informal training. Among other fac-
tors, natural genius and close association with elders are very useful to
becoming an accomplished oral artist25 and/ or sage. Spending some years
in the company of the elders and developing one's technique of learning
will enable the person to acquire the knowledge of his/her society. What is
interesting is that, unlike formal education, informal education is a contin-
uous process.
In the formal kind of training, the trainee is supposed to have a teacher
either at home or in a school or association established to bring up young
persons in a particular form of oral art. 26 One example of formal training
in African oral literature is the training in ijala, or hunter's poetry, among
the Yoruba of western Nigeria,27 In the Oromo Gadaa system,"a male child,
whose age allows him to participate in the system, is required to train for
about forty years before he becomes the leader of his community. He must
be trained in warfare, including equestrian skills, archery, the martial arts,
and the celebration of rituals. The Gadaa system is a democratic egalitarian
system that has its own leaders who conduct government (political, eco-
nomic, social, judicial, legislative, ritual, and military affairs) of the Oromo
society for nonrenewable eight-year terms. The aim behind the training of
the Gadaa leaders and the training recommended by Plato for the philoso-
pher-kings of his ideal society is similar: to be a leader one has to undergo
different forms of training; the knowledgeable leaders should govern the
society. In Oromo society, the younger generation has the opportunity to
learn many rules and practices during the Gadaa assembly.
The philosophical input of informal and formal training is that chil-
dren are expected to achieve a deep understanding of Oromo thought and
practices. They are exposed to Oromo environmental values, values in oral
traditions, and Oromo concepts of God, spirit, and the natural environ-
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ment. Children will learn the significance of positive relationships between
human beings ~nd the nonhuman world, and develop a way of caring for
natural things. Oral traditions that reflect Oromo philosophy are also use-
ful for both philosophy and education about life. Education helps peo-
ple to make deliberate rational choices. Indigenous moral education also
enables children to be responsible moral agents and thereby oppose moral
decadence. Thus, the education of children ought to reinforce and fur-
ther develop the child's natural propensity to ask questions and be curious
about their environment. We need to question the degree to which tradi-
tional modes of education, and modern modes of education for that matter,
truly nurture the natural philosophic capacities of our children.
Oral Traditions as the Sources of Philosophy
Arguments against Oral Traditions as Sources of Philosophy
Many writers h,lve looked into the nature and role of proverbs. Some argue
that proverbs are the repository of the collective wisdom of the people.2s In
other words, proverbs are considered as the common property of all think-
ers and non-thinkers alike.
Some writers also argue that oral tradition is not hospitable to philos-
ophy because it is incapable of sustaining critical thought and exchange.
They stress that philosophy develops concepts that can be understood via
words that have a fixed meaning, whereas oral traditions do not offer fixed
meaning and encourage reflection, critical analysis, and skeptical question-
ing, for they are subject to multiple interpretations.29 It is argued that liter-
acy made Western science, philosophy, and written law possible. 30 No one
can doubt the contribution of literacy to these things. However, the rela-
tively low technology of India, which took over the Semitic alphabet at
about the same time as the Greeks, makes the argument that Greek artistic
and scientific glory emanated from literacy questionable.3!
Walter Ong, for his part, stated that literate cultures produce dis-
courses that tend to be abstract, analytic, syllogistic, and definitional, and
their immediate context of production is generally privatist, whereas oral
cultures tend to be traditional and conservative, and their conceptual cat-
egories are invariably concrete and are interiorized as communal knowl-
edge.32 In African philosophy there are a number of individuals, such as
Paulin Hountondji, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Valentine Y. Mudimbe, and
many others who have argued in one way or another that literacy is a nec-
essary condition for philosophy. For example, Hountondji stresses that phi-
losophy "writes its memoirs" and "keeps a diary."33 He further states that
oral tradition does not encourage the development of explicit philosoph-
ical tradition. Instead, "oral tradition favors the consolidation of knowl-
edge into dogmatic, intangible systems, whereas archival transmission pro-
motes better the possibility of a critique of knowledge between individuals
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and from one generation to another."34 For him, oral narratives tend to be
notoriously backward-looking and inward-looking. They do not show the
contradictions of the culture, for they encourage uncritical celebration of
the culture. Thus, for Hountondji, philosophy exists only in the form of
explicit discourse (in the form of a literature).
Similarly, Appiah and Mudimbe believe that the communal conditions
that prevailed in most traditional African societies did not allow the emer-
gence of reflective, critical attitudes on personallevels.35 The absence of
writing prevented this from happening. Orality is not hospitable to the
adversarial tradition of thought. They lamented that communal living,
the lack of mobility, and above all the predominant condition of illiteracy
failed to promote the evolution and consequent development of an adver-
sarial intellectual culture in Africa. They identified the low level of individ-
ual freedom of thought and the lack of courage to publicly disagree with an
existing order on matters of fact, knowledge, or logic as the major causes
for the development of the complacent, accommodative attitude in ancient
African thinkers. Peter O. Bodunrin, Lansana Keita, and Kwasi Wiredu
also stress the importance of written texts over merely oral modalities of
philosophical practice.36
Arguments for Oral Traditions as Sources of Philosophy
Other African philosophers argue that oral traditions are sources of phi-
losophy. For instance, Odera Oruka did not consider literacy or writing
as a necessary condition for philosophy.J7 According to him, philosophy
is thinking, and does not presuppose.writing. Thirty years ago he initiated
what he called "The Search for Sagacity" research project. One of his objec-
tives was to refute the claim that there was no such thing as 'philosophy' in
Africa independent of European influences, and that philosophy is and can
only be a 'written' enterprise. Odera Oruka's project is lent support by his
observation that every culture can produce individuals who symbolize the
best intellectual achievement. These intellectuals have deeper knowledge of
their culture, institutions, beliefs, and practices. Some of them can identify
the contradictions in their culture. To fulfill his objective Odera Oruka con-
ducted interviews with selected individuals acknowledged by their com-
munities to be wise in rural Kenya. On the basis of his research results he
argued that there are two types of sage in Africa: folk and philosophic.
Folk sages cannot go beyond the celebrated folk wisdom. They do not have
the ability to apply their own independent critical objection to folk beliefs.
They are able to interpret the wisdom of the community and apply it in
unique circumstances, that is, they are wise within the worldviews of their
respective communities. On the other hand, philosophic sages are thinkers
who can make an independent critical assessment of what the people take
for granted. Thus, Odera Oruka labeled the individualized critical reflec-
tion of sages 'philosophic sagacity'. So it is clear that not all elders, priests,
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medicine men, or prophets deserve the title of philosophic sages. As Odera
Oruka noted, a philosopher could in some ways help a sage to explicate
or give birth to his/her otherwise implicit ideas by raising various ques-
tions. Thus, the philosopher and the sage can contribute to the articula-
tion of the views of the sage. "The trained philosopher, interviewing the
sage, plays the role of philosophical provocation."38 In truth, all philoso-
phy can be regarded as "joint works with those philosophers who initially
inspired or provoked them. "39 It is in this manner that we should under-
stand the philosophical content of "philosophic sagacity." According to
Odera Oruka, in the strict sense, insight and ethical inspiration are at least
two abilities of a sage. A sage employs his insight "for the ethical better-
ment of his (her) community."40 Accordingly, "[s]age philosophy consists
of the expressed thoughts of wise men and women in any given community
and is a way of thinking and explaining the world that fluctuates between
popular wisdom (well-known communal maxims, aphorisms and general
common sense truths) and didactic wisdom (an expounded wisdom and a
rational thought of some given individuals within a community)."41
Concerning questions of gender, in spite of the fact that most cul-
tures do not encourage women to initiate philosophical challenge, there
have been some African women who can be considered as folk or philo-
sophic sages. In my research, I have interviewed a number of women who
could be classified as philosophic sages according to Odera Oruka's con-
ceptual framework. However, we must take into account the clear division
of labour by gender in Oromo society. Women are excluded from decision
making. They cannot be selected as Gadaa officials. They do not partici-
pate in the Gadaa system partly because of their dual identity-their own
and their husband's. As lineage is counted through the male line, wom-
en's identity does not count. For this reason they cannot go through all the
Gadaa grades. Culturally, women are separated from and subordinated to
men both by their exclusion from some cultural ceremonies and by their
roles within other ceremonies and society in general.
Reasonably strong empirical evidence suggests that men and rich per-
sons have tried to justify the power relationship in the Oromo society by
appealing to the law of nature that was believed to be authored by God and
various ethical codes. Some elders argue that Waaqa qualifies the female
sex for the bearing and rearing of children and maintaining the family and
household (for instance, cooking, collecting water and fuel). The follow-
ing Oromo proverb indicates the inherent inferiority of women. "Nadheen
furdoo qabdi malee beektuu hin qabdu" - "One can find many fat women
but not knowledgeable ones." Yet, in spite of cultural domination, individ-
ual women have developed profound and philosophically developed levels
of sagacity within Oromo society. In the future, the ongoing deconstruc-
tion of the exploitative and hegemonic gender relation within Oromo soci-
ety will encourage women to articulate and expand their knowledge, thus
contributing to the dynamic development of Oromo traditions.
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Thus this illustrates that traditional wisdom or 'sagacity' is not in itself
philosophy. Odera Oruka clarifies that sage research is aimed at looking
for philosophy within sagacity rather than claiming that "sagacity is, by
definition, philosophy. "42 Traditional Africa has both folk wisdom and crit-
ical personalized philosophical discourse. However, it is worth noting that
it is not always easy to demarcate a clear boundary between folk and phil-
osophic sages. Some persons can be critical regarding some aspects of their
culture while still supporting some questionable practices of their soci-
ety. This also applies to the great minds of Western philosophy. Aristotle
defended the idea of natural slavery and the inferiority of woman. Imman-
uel Kant, who argued that non-European races cannot be rational moral
agents, is another glaring example.
Proverbs are one of the key genres of philosophically relevant oral lit-
erature that has been subjected to a good deal of critical reflection by pro-
fessional philosophers. In contrast to the view that proverbs are the com-
munal invention of all members of the community, I contend that, although
one cannot cite the names of African sages, proverbs are originally the
works of individual thinkers who were in turn influenced by the beliefs and
culture of their own society. My informants have attested that they know
personally the individual authors of recently formulated proverbs. Some
critical individuals have created new proverbs in response to various socio-
economic and political conditions in their societies. Like the authors of
some African proverbs, the authors of some philosophical ideas in Europe
and Asia are also unknown autonomous individuals.43 Individual inven-
tion can be appropriated by the society. This indicates the progression from
individual authorship or composition to communal ownership.
In some cases, the author of a new proverb can reflect the floating con-
victions of the society around him, what others already felt, or even already
uttered. In this respect, a proverb can be conceived as "the wit of one, and
the wisdom of many. "44 In this connection, Trench stresses that one of the
constitutive elements of a proverb is acceptance on the part of the many
rather than an utterance by one person.
As Gyekye persuasively noted, proverbs are the result of people's reflec-
tion on their experiences. "The terseness of the sentences that express them
indicates that a particular proverb is a summary of some complex ideas.
It is these complex ideas which are condensed in the proverb so that they
can be retained and remembered in an environment that knew no writ-
ing."45 Proverbs are short, more often figurative and allusive in one way or
another, and marked by terseness of expression. Proverbs are sayings that
throw light on different aspects of arguments. In general, they have differ-
ent levels of meaning. Some proverbs have direct and clear meanings; oth-
ers have several meanings and require further reflection in order to under-
stand their deeper meaning. In some cases, the deeper meaning of a proverb
has nothing to do with its literal meaning.
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What has been discussed so far implies that the idea that philoso-
phy presupposes literacy cannot be defended. Thoughts can be expressed
in writings or as unwritten sayings and arguments associated with some
individual(s). As has been stated earlier, oral traditions can be the sources
of critical views about humans and the natural environment. History
reminds us that fragments, proverbs, and aphorisms have been sources of
philosophy in Europe and India. Among others, Socrates and Buddha did
not write any philosophical books. Likewise, fragments, proverbs, aphor-
isms, beliefs, customs, stories, folktales, rituals, folk song, and social insti-
tutions are the main sources of African philosophy.46 In short, literacy is
not a necessary condition for philosophical reflection and exposition and
there is overwhelming evidence of a long tradition of critical independent
thinkers who have guided their thought and judgments by the power of
reason and inborn insight in Africa. The question today is how to bring
various modern and written forms of philosophy together with nonwritten
sources of philosophical insight in a way relevant to human development
in the twenty-first century.
Given that proverbs, aphorisms, beliefs, customs, stories, folktales, rit-
uals, folk songs, and social institutions have been the main sources of Afri-
can philosophy in the past and are still functioning today, African philoso-
phy is in a strong position to introduce and defend the importance of oral
and nonacademic sources of global wisdom on the global stage. The late
Odera Oruka's method of seeking the 'philosophic sagacity' of African wis-
dom beyond the halls of universities has been an important source of tra-
ditional African wisdom and thought. It can also be the source of philo-
sophical and environmental education in other nonliterate societies and
contribute to our global knowledge. It should, however, be stressed that the
future of sage philosophy will depend on the dialogue with all African and
non-African sages: traditional, modern, literate, and illiterate. This dia-
logue should not be restricted to traditional sages, for this tendency could
hamper the further development of sage philosophy.47 As Odera Oruka
stated, illiteracy is not a necessary condition for sagacity.48 Sages can also
be found in literate societies.
This does not rule out the value of written sources. Oral and written
forms are not mutually exclusive. Both need each other. The introduction of
writing, not to mention modern information technology, obviously makes
the storage and retrieval of knowledge much easier.49 As some writers have
noted, literacy also intensifies, if it does not actually create, individuality
or 'individual' as opposed to a more 'communal' identity, subjectivity, or
private interior consciousness. According to Appiah, in the transition from
oral to literate cultures, the authorial 'I' struggles to displace the 'we' of
the oral tradition.50 Literacy also facilitates abstraction. Alphabetic literacy
and other forms of literacy such as the development of 'characteral' literacy
in East Asia, helped human beings to proceed from the sensuous, mimetic,
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profoundly embodied style of consciousness proper to orality, to a more
detached, abstract mode of thinking. When a word can be embodied in two
wholly different materials- (I) a sound and (2) marks on paper-then the
word is neither one nor the other of its two material embodiments, neither
sound nor ink; it becomes a bodiless meaning, an abstract entity.
In this connection, during the I930S in the Soviet Union A. R. Luria
undertook extensive fieldwork with illiterate and semiliterate individuals.
He employed clinical conversations in a relaxed atmosphere. One of his
findings was that illiterate subjects did not seem to operate with formal
deductive procedures at all. He further stressed that the informants were
not interested in trying to explain the obvious. They resisted all the ques-
tioner's attempts to elicit definitions. They used concrete and situational
rather than abstract methods to categorize things,51 Luria also tried to see
whether the illiterate subjects employed categorical abstraction. He stated
that they did not classify objects into the expected 'logical' categories but
into functional or situational groupings.
Luria's findings would seem to offer both a challenge and an interest-
ing line for further research concerning the development of 'philosophi-
cal sagacity' within Odera Oruka's conceptual framework and indigenous
knowledge in general. As has been stated earlier, philosophic sages employ
reason to evaluate ideas and beliefs, and also use some philosophical con-
cepts to deal with various issues. They define various words and analyze
them with logical reasoning, thus developing a high level of abstraction.
Thus, it would seem that Luria was too quick in inferring a necessary rela-
tionship between literacy and abstract, logical thinking, although nobody
doubts that literacy can facilitate abstract thinking. We could tentatively
hypothesize from such research that perhaps we should be looking for mul-
tiple and alternative pathways for the development of abstract thought
through a variety of forms of mediation and signification. Writing, work-
ing within such a hypothesis, would be just one such pathway.
On the other hand, we might be able to understand alternative modes
of rationality that go beyond the written word, which seem to be emerging
today and will perhaps surpass writing in the future, by taking seriously
'oral' or nonwritten modes of rationality of the past and that are still oper-
ant today. Maybe there are similarities between the emerging new modes
of rationality based on new technologies and the modes of abstraction and
logical reasoning that can be found in what has been called 'oral' tradition.
This needs to be explored in the future.
It is worth noting that the Internet allows us to transform the way we
develop ideas. However, what is unfortunate is that the information tech-
nology gap is widening. Although theoretically information and commu-
nication technology (leT) has an important role in improving the condi-
tion of human beings in the world, the information technology revolution
can very likely lead to the further marginalization of the majority of the
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world population. Rather than its enhancing and developing new potenti-
alities throughout the world, only a relatively privileged minority will have
the access necessary to realize these new potentialities. Thus, unless there
is some kind of reorientation of the global order, such trends will undoubt-
edly further entrench the growing gaps in every facet of life within a glo-
balized "knowledge economy."
Writing is also important to conducting research into oral traditions in
particular and indigenous knowledge in general. Researchers should write
down the views of informants and transcribe the interview data obtained
from tape recorders. African and non-African philosophers have already
produced literary oral scripts of various societies.
Written literature also draws on the achievements of oral literature.
According to Heinz Kimmerle, elements of writing can be found in a mainly
oral tradition and elements of orality can be found in a mainly literate tra-
dition.52 Various written sources in Africa also indicate that Africa is not
devoid of written philosophical works.53
This essay and the contribution of many writers show that the binary
opposition between oral and literate traditions does not hold water. Jacques
Derrida, for instance, stresses that writing involves both alphabetic writ-
ing that represents spoken words and the graphic elements of writing. Der-
rida extends the idea of text to include some kind of signs and what he
called "a readable tress." In his Grammatology,54 he wrote that the view
that regards literate cultures as superior to illiterate ones is a symptom of
ethnocentrism in Western thought. This view is embedded in the European
way of thinking, which maintains the opposition between soul and body,
heaven and earth, good and bad, true and false, upper and lower class.
For Derrida, there is no hierarchy between spoken and written language.
For him they exist together on the same level, although each has a specific
function. Following Derrida, Heinz Kimmerle concludes that "spoken lan-
guage and writing are not only on the same level, they are also of the same
age. Both functions or aspects have their origin in the process of homi-
nization. "55 Kimmerle considers broken branches of a bush, pictures on
the body, and traces in the sand as examples of different kinds of writing.
Scheub also noted the parallel development of written and oral literature.
The two media are not contradictory; instead, they "constantly nourish
each other."56 Writers can explore the various materials they have inherited
from the oral artists/ sages and thereby make oral forms literary.
Conclusion
Oral traditions are valuable sources of environmental, educational, and
philosophical ideas. They embody values, items of advice or warnings,
orders or prohibitions that are useful for the development of environmen-
tal and, in general, global consciousness. Proverbs are vehicles for educat-
ing children; they are used to add flavor to individuals' speech. Myths, rid-
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dIes, icons, and songs have played a paramount role in the development of
African societies. Accordingly, many cultural groups in Africa have man-
aged to retain their environmental and educational knowledge for gener-
ations through oral literature. Both 'folk' and 'philosophical' sagacity, in
Odera Oruka's terms, is passed on from generation to generation. Accord-
ingly, nonliterate societies have preserved important moral principles and
philosophical ideas without any 'written'-as it has been conceptualized
in this essay-record.
It should be emphasized that both written and oral literatures have
been and continue to be important sources of philosophy throughout the
world. African philosophy, perhaps to a greater degree than other mod-
ern philosophical traditions, is based on a rich oral and written intellectual
heritage, and thus benefits from the strengths of both orality and literacy.
Finally, I would like to suggest that African philosophers and philosophers
throughout the world should search out, record, learn from, and critically
develop the knowledge of our sages. In my opinion it is vitally impor-
tant that such sources of wisdom be integrated into the pool of human
knowledge. Oral tradition is not simply backward or primitive thinking; it
has value because it carries the wisdom of cultures and individuals. Thus,
research into oral tradition will have a tremendous impact on the solution
of the current problems of the African continent and the world. Indeed,
in my opinion, the critical appropriation and implementation of indige-
nous values and practices is a necessary condition for solving our envi-
ronmental, social, economic, and political problems. Specifically, in rela-
tion to the African situation, I am convinced that alien strategies that are
not based on indigenous ones will aggravate the current stalemate. How-
ever, in the appropriation of indigenous and other marginalized sources of
knowledge commercialization of such knowledge must be avoided. This
is not to suggest that the economic value of such knowledge' should not
be acknowledged and appropriately compensated, but that exploitation of
such knowledge and its human producers must be guarded against.
In conclusion, I would suggest that it is vitally important that profes-
sionally trained philosophers in other parts of the world be encouraged
to descend from their ivory towers and seek the wisdom of individuals
in rural and urban communities relatively isolated from the current cen-
ters of academic knowledge and power. It is not mere hyperbole to assert
that philosophers and other academic intellectuals who do not pursue such
sources of wisdom are failing to accomplish a sufficient review of the 'lit-
erature' relevant to their fields of research. Philosophers and other intellec-
tuals must begin to gather and document oral and nonacademic sources
of wisdom both in urban centers and in far rural reaches of different parts
of the world. It must be recognized that such an approach to addressing
global issues is absolutely necessary if the full range of human wisdom is to
be brought to bear on the health of our planet and its inhabitants.
306 Workineh Kelbessa
Notes
* This essay is a revised version of my paper "Can Oral Traditions Be the Sources of
Philosophy?" An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Second World Con-
gress on Transcendent Philosophy and Mulla Sadra, held in Tehran, Islamic Republic
of Iran, May 21-25, 2004.
I. Sophie B. Oluwole, Philosophy and Oral Tradition (Lagos: ARK Publications,
1999), pp. 53-54·
2. Ibid., p. 54
3. Isidore Okpewho, African Oral Literature: Backgrounds, Character, and Con-
tinuity (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 3.
4. Ibid., pp. 2-3·
5. Charles A Pike, "Form and Memory in Oral Tradition: The Luyia Olukano
Proverbs," in Sunday O. Anozie, ed., Phenomenology in Modern African Studies
(New York and London: Conch Magazine Limited, 1982), p. 14.
6. See William Thoms, "Folk-Lore and the Origin of the World," in Alan Dundes,
ed., International Folkloristics (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1965); Alan Dundes, "What is Folklore?" in Alan Dundes, ed., The Study
of Folklore (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965); Okpewho, African Oral Lit-
erature.
7. A Hampate Ba, "The Living Tradition," in J. W. Ki-Zerbo, ed., General His-
tory of Africa. Methodology and African Prehistory, vol. I (Portsmouth, NH: UNES-
CO/Heinemannm 1981), p. 168.
8. Workineh Kelbessa, Indigenous and Modern Environmental Ethics: A Study
of the Indigenous Oromo Environmental Ethic and Oromo Environmental Ethics in
the Light ofModern Issues ofEnvironment and Development (Ph.D. diss., University
of Wales, Cardiff; Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philoso-
phy, forthcoming).
9. Tesema Ta'a, "Oral Historiography on Oromo Studies," in Harold G. Mar-
cus, ed., New Trends in Ethiopian Studies: Ethiopia '94; Papers of the rzth Interna-
tional Conference of Ethiopian Studies (1994), vol. I, Michigan State University, Sep-
tember 5-10 (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1994), p. 984.
10. Gemetchu Megerssa, "Identity, Knowledge and the Colonizing Structure"
(Ph.D. diss, University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies, 1993).
II. Gemetchu Megerssa, "Oromumma: Tradition, Consciousness and Identity,"
in P. T. W. Baxter et aI., eds., Being and Becoming Oromo: Historical and Anthropo-
logical Enquiries (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1996), p. 96.
12. See Ruth Finnegan, Oral Literature in Africa (Nairobi: Oxford University
Press, 1970), p. 5.
13. Darwin Hanna, "Oral Traditions: Practical Considerations for Communities
in Light of the Delgamukw Decision, 2000," http://www.de1gamuukw.org/researchl
consideration.pdf, p. 3. See also Harold Scheub, "A Review of African Oral Tradi-
tions and Literature," The African Studies Review 28.2/3 (19 85): 3.
14. Finnegan, Oral Literature, p. II. See also Oshita O. Oshita, "Language,
Meaning and Orality in an African Setting," in Olusegun Oladipo, ed., The Third
Way in African Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Kwasi Wiredu (Ibadan: Hope Publi-
cations, 2002), p. 301.
15. Oshita, "Language, Meaning and Orality," p. 296.
16. Okpewho, African Oral Literature, p. 314.
Oral Traditions and African Philosophical Methods 307
17. Plato, quoted in Finnegan, Oral Literature, p. II.
18. Plato, quoted in David Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and
Language in a More-Than-Human World (New York: Vantage Books, 1996), p. II3.
19. Claude Sumner, "The Proverb and Oral Society," New Political Science 21.1
(1999): 12.
20. Richard H. Bell, Understanding African Philosophy: A Cross-cultural
Approach to Classical and Contemporary Issues (New York and London: Routledge,
2002),p.131.
21. Addisu Tolessa, "The Historical Transformation of a Follore Genre: The Geer-
arsa as a National Literature of the Oromo in the Context of Amhara Colonization in
Ethiopia" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, The Folklore Institute, 1990).
22. Bell, Understanding African Philosophy, p. 129.
23. Okpewho, African Oral Literature, p. 21.
24. Mengesha Rikitu, Oromo Oral Treasure for a New Generation: Proverbs and
Sayings of the Oromo People with English Explanation (London: Top Print, 1992),
pp. 2II-212.
25. Okpewho, African Oral Literature, p. 22.
26. Ibid., p. 23.
27. Ibid.
28. See Bernth Lindfors and Oyekan Owomoyela, Yoruba Proverbs: Translation
and Annotation (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies African
Studies Program, 1973), p. 1.
29. Samuel Oluoch Imbo, Oral Traditions as Philosophy: Okot p'Bitek's Legacy
for African Philosophy (Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), p. 48.
30. Eric Havelock, quoted in Emevwo Biakolo, "Categories of Cross-Cultural
Cognition and the African Condition," in P. H. Coetzee and A. P.]. Roux, eds., The
African Philosophy Reader, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 13.
31. Emevwo Biakolo, "Categories of Cross-Cultural Cognition and the African
Condition," in The African Philosophy Reader, p. 14.
32. Walter Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the World (London
and New York: Routledge, [1982], 2000).
33. Paulin Hountondji, "Reason and Tradition," in Tsenay Serequeberhan, ed.,
African Philosophy: The Essential Readings (New York: Paragon House, 1991).
34. Paulin Hountondji, African Philosophy: Myth and Reality (Bloomington: Indi-
ana University Press, 1983), p. 103.
35. Kwame Anthony Appiah and Valentine Y. Mudimbe, cited in Oluwole, Philo-
sophy and Oral Tradition, pp. 35-38.
36. For details see Peter O. Bodunrin, "The Question of African Philosophy," in
Henry Odera Oruka, ed., Sage Philosophy: Indigenous Thinkers and Modern Debate
on African Philosophy (Nairobi: ACTS Press, 1991), pp. 175-176; Lansana Keita,
"The Search for a Method in Contemporary African Philosophy," in Odera Oruka,
Sage Philosophy; Kwasi Wiredu, "African Philosophical Tradition: A Case Study of
the Akan," in Parker English and Kibujjo M Kalumba, eds., African Philosophy: A
Classical Approach (Upper Saddle River, N]: Prentice-Hall, 1996), pp. 101-102.
37. Henry Odera Oruka, "Texts by H. Odera Oruka," in Odera Oruka, Sage Phi-
losophy, pp. 13-83. Oluwole, for her part, stresses that, although writing is a tech-
nique of recording thought for further consideration, it is not a quality of thought,
just as orality is not. According to Oluwole, although writing promotes self-criticism
and the review of documented beliefs and principles, it is not a necessary condition
308 Workineh Kelbessa
of 'strict' philosophizing. Writing also promotes uncritical and rationally unjustified
principles, pseudo-scientific and mythological doctrines, even magical beliefs that are
presented in the adversarial style. The majority of users were not aware of the short-
comings of many doctrines accepted and used in literate societies. See: Oluwole, Phi-
losophy and Oral Tradition, p. 5 I.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Henry Odera Oruka, "In Defence of the Sagacity Approach to African Philos-
ophy," in English and Kalumba, African Philosophy, p. 184.
41. Odera Oruka, Sage Philosophy, p. 33.
42. Ibid., p. 41.
43. Kwame Gyekye, An Essay on African Philosophical Thought (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 21.
44. Richard Chenevix Trench, Proverbs and Their Lessons, ed. Wolfgang Mieder
(London: George Routledge & Sons Limited, [1905], 2003), p. 16.
45. Kwame Gyekye, "Philosophical Relevance of Akan Proverbs," Second Order.
An African Journal of Philosophy 4.2 (1975): 47.
46. See Kwame Gyekye, "The Akan Concept of a Person," in Richard A. Wright,
ed., African Philosophy: An Introduction, 3rd ed., (New York and London: Univer-
sity Press of America, 1984), p. 200; B. E. Oguah, "African and Western Philosophy:
A Comparative Study," in ibid., p. 51.
47. Kibujjo M. Kalumba, "Sage Philosophy: Its Methodology, Results, Signif-
icance, and Future," in Kwasi Wiredu, ed., A Companion to African Philosophy
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pp. 274-281.
48. Odera Oruka, Sage Philosophy, p. 37.
49. Havelock, cited in Biakolo, "Categories of Cross-Cultural Cognition," p. 13.
50. Kawame Anthony Appiah, "African Philosophy and African Literature," in
Wiredu, ed., A Companion to African Philosophy, pp. 546-547.
51. A. R. Luria, Cognitive Development: Its Cultural and Social Foundations,
trans. Martin Lopez-Morillas and Lynn Solotaroff, ed. Michael Cole (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University, Press, 1976).
52. Heinz Kimmerle, "The Philosophical Text in the African Oral Tradition:
The Opposition of Oral and Literate and the Politics of Difference," http://home.con
cepts-ict.nll-kimmerle/kimmerle3.htm. For instance, Arthur Schopenhauer and Fried-
rich Nietzsche used proverbs and aphorisms to develop their philosophies at differ-
ent times; see Oluwole, Philosophy and Oral Tradition, p. 56. Likewise, oral forms of
communication and tradition are very important within the written sources of Ethio-
pian philosophy.
53. The major categories of literary expression in the Old Egyptian Kingdom
(2700-2300 B.C.) included wisdom literature, religious poetry and hymns, autobiog-
raphy, storytelling, heroic poetry, and the like. Historical inscriptions on stelae, tem-
ple walls, and tombstones, scientific writings, mainly mathematical and medical, and
correspondence and accounts also represent other literary forms; see Harold Scheub,
"A Review of African Oral Traditions and Literature," The African Studies Review
28.2/3 (1985): 16. Herodotus (ca. 484-425 B.C.) also attested that the Egyptians had
written records 15,000 years ago; see Kevin Robb, cited in Imbo, Oral Traditions as
Philosophy, p. 47. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., also discovered that in the Middle Ages
over 50,000 volumes were found in the library of Timbuktu; see: Imbo, p. 47. Works
in Arabic in the northern and western parts of Africa, adapted translations of Ethio-
Oral Traditions and African Philosophical Methods 309
pian philosophical texts, and the philosophy of seventeenth-century Ethiopian philos-
ophers Zera Yecob and Walda Heywat, originally written in Geez but later translated
into English (see Claude Sumner, Classical Ethiopian Philosophy [Los Angeles, CA:
Adey Publishing Company, 1994]) are all examples of literate traditions in Africa.
54. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Bal-
timore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).
55. Heinz Kimmerle, "Foreword," in Oluwole, Philosophy and Oral Tradition, p.
xii.
56. Scheub, "A Review of African Oral Traditions and Literature," p. 16.
CHEN LAI
18 The Ideas of HEducating" and HLearning"
in Confucian Thought
Chinese thought on the subject of education is long-standing and pro-
found. Confucius, who lived some twenty-five hundred years ago, has been
regarded as a great educator both when he was alive and long after his
death. In fact, broadly speaking, the gist of the thought of Confucius is a
philosophy of education. Confucius' humanistic ideas and practices con-
cerning education have had a huge influence on Chinese traditional edu-
cation. This essay will explicate the ideals of education in Confucianism,
focusing mainly on Confucius' notion of "learning." I begin by discuss-
ing the attention paid by Confucius to the importance of education, point-
ing out that he not only stressed the role of "learning culture" (xuewen 'J¥:.
X) that is mainly about the acquisition of knowledge, but further empha-
sizes "learning dao" (xuedao 'J¥:.:iR), which is mainly about virtue-or per-
haps better, personal excellence. I argue that the inclusion of excellence is
key to the idea that "sagehood can be learned" (shengren ke xue :£:API
'J¥:.), revealing as it does what is unique in the character of Confucian edu-
cation. I will further indicate the significance of the Confucian idea of self-
directed learning. In conclusion, I will elaborate upon the ideals and objec-
tives of Confucian education.
Love of Learning (haoxue tlf"tl
The ancient Greeks considered "the love of wisdom" to be the unique spirit
of philosophia (philosophy), and this basic idea has had a great influence
on the subsequent Western cultural narrative. Of course, "the love of wis-
dom" has no exact counterpart in ancient Chinese philosophy, although
many scholars consider the idea of "illuminating excellence" (mingde tm
~) to be an apt comparison. Certainly, for Confucian philosophy this
argument would hold.
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If "to love" (ai~) means to "be interested in" and "to like," and "wis-
dom" (zhi 1W) has to do with education and learning, then in a compari-
son with "the love of wisdom" of the Greeks, Confucianism and especially
Confucius himself proffers another idea that we ought to consider: namely,
"to love learning" or "the love of learning" (haoxue M-~). "To love learn-
ing" is not just one more concept in Confucius' thought, but rather is an
idea of core significance. It plays an extremely important role, not only in
Confucius' philosophy of education, but also in his philosophy as a whole.
This point has not been stressed enough.
For example, Confucius once said: "There are, in a town of ten house-
holds, bound to be people who are better than I am in doing their utmost
(zhong ,[q and in making good on their word (xin 1~), but there will be no
one who can compare with me in the love of learning (haoxue M-~)" (Ana-
lects 5.28).1 This is to say that people who excel in doing their utmost and
in making good on their word are not so hard to find, but those people who
truly have the love of learning are few and far between. We must remem-
ber that in the Spring and Autumn period, doing one's utmost and mak-
ing good on one's word are considered to be among the most fundamental
virtues. But from this passage we can see that among the full spectrum of
Confucius' moral values, while we might not be able to say that the status
of the love of learning compares with "authoritative conduct" (ren 1=) and
doing one's utmost, we can be sure that, for Confucius, the love of learn-
ing is a quality more valuable than doing one's utmost and making good on
one's word. And for Confucius the quality of one's love of learning clearly
tends toward a more practical dimension.
In another example, Duke Ai of Lu once asked Confucius which of
his disciples truly loved learning. Confucius replied: "There was one Yan
Hui who truly loved learning. He did not take his anger out on others; he
did not make the same mistake twice. Unfortunately, he was to die young.
Nowadays, there is no one-at least, I haven't come across anyone-who
truly loves learning" (Analects 6.3). Confucius' disciples were legion, and
among them were seventy who were of truly exceptional character (xianren
l£tA), but Yan Hui alone was praised by Confucius as having "the love of
learning." Apart from this Yan Hui, Confucius had not "come across any-
one who truly loves learning." This is more evidence that Confucius cher-
ished love of learning as a signally important character trait that is diffi-
cult to acquire.
Another passage in the Analects reports: "Ji Kangzi inquired, 'Which
of your disciples really loves learning (haoxue M-~)?' Confucius replied:
'There was one Yan Hui who truly loved learning, but unfortunately he
was to die young. Nowadays, there is no one'" (Analects 11.7). Just as in
the previous passage cited above, this statement shows that Confucius was
consistent both in his attachment to the importance of the love of learning
and in his singular praise for Yan Hui.
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If we really understand the three passages cited, we can see that it is
no accident that the Analects begins with the line: "Having studied, to then
repeatedly apply what you have learned-is this not a source of pleasure?"
Confucius' unrelenting emphasis on "studying" and "the love of learning"
is quite exceptional.
Given this picture, we see that it is not surprising that Confucius
begins from "my heart-and-mind was set upon learning" (zhi yu xue ~T
?f:) when he states: "From fifteen my heart-and-mind was set upon learn-
ing; from thirty I took my stance; from forty I was no longer of two minds;
from fifty I realized the ming of tian; from sixty my ear was attuned; and
from seventy I could give my heart-and-mind free rein without overstep-
ping the mark" (Analects 2.4). His "heart-and-mind" in "my heart-and-
mind was set upon learning" is the heart-and-mind that truly loves learning
(haaxue M-?f:). Therefore, "studying" and "the love of learning" not only
serve as the genetic starting point for Confucius' philosophy of education,
but also as the logical point of departure for the thinking life. In short, the
love of learning is fundamental to Confucian philosophy.
Now we might ask, Is the love of learning a virtue or an acquired excel-
lence? At first glance, the love of learning seems different from those virtues
that Confucius normally talks about, such as authoritative conduct (ren
{=), wisdom (zhi 1W), and courage (yang ~), and perhaps does not belong
to the category of the virtues. But if this is the case, how do we explain
the fact that Confucius considers Yan Hui to be the only one who "truly
loves learning" while at the same time describing Yan Hui as someone who
qualifies for the category of "virtuous conduct" (dexing ~1i)? Aristotle
writes in the Nicomachean Ethics: "Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intel-
lectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and
its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time),
while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit.... From this it is also
plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that
exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature" (Book II).
According to this passage, the cultivation of intellectual virtue is related
to education. Since "the love of learning" is also intimately related to edu-
cation, then it should share some common ground with intellectual virtue.
Of course, since Aristotle's intellectual virtue concerns the proper appli-
cation of reason, it differs from "the love of learning" which is, rather, a
kind of capacity or aptitude in which one excels. Confucius also thinks that
moral virtue is related to education; but, nevertheless, he regards the love
of learning to be a quality and activity different from moral virtue.
The importance that is invested in the love of learning in Confucius'
thought is stated most clearly in his discussion of "six flaws that can accom-
pany the six desirable qualities of character" (liuyan liubi t;. Fi t;.jijl():
The Master said, "Zilu, have you heard of the six flaws that can accom-
pany the six desirable qualities of character?"
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"No, I have not," replied Zilu.
"Sit down," said the Master, "and I'll tell you about them. The flaw
in being fond of acting authoritatively (ren t) without equal regard for
learning is that you will be easily duped; the flaw in being fond of act-
ing wisely (zhi ~) without equal regard for learning is that it leads to
self-indulgence; the flaw in being fond of making good on one's word
(xin -wO without equal regard for learning is that it leads one into harm's
way; the flaw in being fond of candor without equal regard for learn-
ing is that it leads to rudeness; the flaw in being fond of boldness with-
out equal regard for learning is that it leads to unruliness; the flaw in
being fond of firmness without equal regard for learning is that it leads
to rashness." (Analects 17.8)
This passage is very important. From the perspective of virtue theory, it
suggests that the meaning each of the virtues has for a particular person
does not stand independently from the others, but develops its own function
in a way supplemented by and made complementary through its interplay
with the other virtues. It is only through the complementary interplay of
the several different virtues that the balanced and harmonious character of
exemplary persons (junzi ~-=f) and sages (shengren ?k.A) is able to emerge
and take shape. And in this mutually supplementary process, "the love of
learning" certainly has a singularly important role.
Authoritative conduct (yen {=), wisdom (zhi ~), making good on one's
word (xin m), candor (zhi H), boldness (yang ~) and firmness (gang !XlI])
are all "moral virtues." However, Confucius insists that the quest for these
moral virtues cannot be separated from the love of learning if they are
going to function positively in a balanced and harmonious way. For were
they to be separated, these moral virtues would develop and function in a
skewed and distorted way. In this respect, intellectual virtues. and moral
virtues are coextensive and mutually entailing. In Confucian thinking, each
of the virtues must complement, discipline, and supplement one another
because each of them on their own might in practical application have
weaknesses. At the same time, we can also see that "the love of learning"
is not only a capacity in which one excels and a special aptitude that one
might possess, but is also a disposition or habit that expresses the wisdom
of the heart-and-mind.2 And this capacity and orientation, then, is clearly
implicated in the process of knowledge acquistion and education.
Regardless of whether what Confucius has to say here has any partic-
ular relevance to Aristotle's analytic understanding of virtue, in shedding
light on the importance Confucius attaches to the love of learning, his
discussion of the six flaws that can accompany the six desirable qualities of
character are not merely random comments, but rather express the holistic
and balanced understanding he has toward ethics and wisdom, the virtues
and learning. If one possesses authoritative conduct, wisdom, boldness,
and firmness, but lacks the love of learning, then one's virtuous character
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is still imperfect and incomplete, and is easily led astray. From this, we
can see the importance that Confucius invests in education and intellec-
tuallearning.
Needless to say, the love of learning in this dynamic structure is neither
independent of other conditions nor self-sufficient. However, if there were
no haoxue !Ef$, but merely a commitment to authoritative conduct and to
making good on one's word, Confucius would not have become the person
we acknowledge as "Confucius," nor would he have become the educator
Confucius, nor would he be the person that he himself describes as one
who "continues studying without respite" (xue er bu yan $ji'ij~Bt) (Ana-
lects 7.2). In these images that Confucius has left for subsequent genera-
tions, the love of learning is always an important factor. There can be no
doubt about this point in pre-Tang Confucianism.
Learning the Dao (xuedao ~ll!)
We have established that the "love of learning" (haoxue !Ef$) is an impor-
tant value in Confucian thought and is also a kind of virtue (de ~). The
love of learning is realized in a lifelong, unrelenting process of study. It is
an attitude expressed continuously throughout one's lifetime, and is thus
entailed in Confucius' ideal of lifelong learning. Now that we have argued
Confucius advocates the love of learning, we must ask what, then, is the
content of this learning? Song dynasty Confucians repeatedly raised the
question: What was the learning that Confucius and his disciples truly
loved? For example, Cheng Yi once said: "In the stable of the sage Confu-
cius there were three thousand disciples, yet among them he praised Yan
Hui alone as truly having 'the love of learning' (haoxue !Ef$). Now all
these three thousand disciples were conversant with the Book of Songs
and the Book of Documents and were thoroughly practiced in the six arts.
What then was the kind of learning that Yan Hui alone loved?"3
It is said in the histories that Confucius taught his student the "six
arts" (iiuyi :t\t;): "ritual, music, archery, driving, handwriting, mathe-
matics" (ii, yue, she, yu, shu, shu tL*M1JtjJ~~).And Confucius devoted
his life to editing and revising the Six Classics (Liu-jing :t\~~): "the Book of
Songs, the Book of Documents, the Book of Changes, the Book of Rites,
the Book of Music, and the Spring and Autumn Annals" (Shi, Shu, Yi, Li,
Yue, Chunqiu i~~~tL*~tk).We know from the Rites of Zhou and the
Book of Rites that the Book ofSongs, the Book of Documents, and the six
arts constituted the basic content of education for the aristocratic classes
in the latter part of the Spring and Autumn period just prior to the birth
of Confucius. In the Records of the Grand Historian (Shiji ~ te), it states
that "Confucius had nearly three thousand disciples, and among them sev-
enty-two were masters of the six arts." Confucian scholars after the Han
dynasty came to interpret the six arts as the Six Classics. In Confucius'
own time, by extending the Book of Songs, the Book of Documents, and
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the six arts that had been the content of aristocratic education to an educa-
tional program that could be followed by all people regardless of class, and
in using it as the curriculum for his own students, he precipitated a kind of
liberation in the acquisition of knowledge.
There is a difference between the "six arts" as skills, and the Six Clas-
sics as textual learning; the latter is education in the classics, and the former
are practical techniques for living. It is clear that, between the two, Confu-
cius himself paid more attention to education in the classics, but "the love
of learning" includes them both within its range of concerns. This would
suggest that Confucius took the process of humanistic refinement centered
in classical learning and the transmission of culture to be the fundamental
content of education.
But though the six arts and the Six Classics fall within the scope of
Confucian education, they certainly do not exhaust the whole content
of his teachings. Indeed, nearly all of the teachings of Confucius that we
encounter in the Analects lie beyond the Book ofSongs, the Book of Docu-
ments, and the six arts. According to the Analects there are four categories
under which Confucius taught (sijiao [9f{): "culture (wen )e), proper con-
duct (xing 1-r), doing one's utmost (zhong ,~,), and making good on one's
word (xin f~)" (Analects 7.25). Reiterated in Analects 11.3, people there-
after referred to these as the "four subjects" (sike [9,f4): "virtuous con-
duct (dexing :l!1-r), eloquence (yanyu ~ifr), statesmanship (zhengshi jft{
!J), and culture (wenxue )e$:)." It would seem that, while the practical
techniques referred to as the "six arts" are lessons in fundamental skills,
and the "six arts" provided by instruction in the six classics are a special
field of research, it is virtuous conduct that is the core pervading this kind
of education. Hence, the "four categories of teachings" (sijiao [9f{) and
the "four subjects" (sike [9,f4) reflect the ideals and practices of Confu-
cian teaching more comprehensively than the expression "die six arts."
More important, the reason why Confucius is remembered by history, and
why there is a difference between his teaching and the aristocratic educa-
tion that included the Rites of Zhou (Zhouli J'liHL) and the six arts, is not
only because he extended this education to become the education of all
people regardless of class. It is also because his educational ideals went
beyond the six arts of the Rites of Zhou and the education in the classics
stipulated by these rites, developing into a kind of comprehensive liberal
education grounded in humanistic knowledge. In the Analects, "realizing
a certain quality of character" becomes the core consciousness of Confu-
cian education, an aspiration that was not entertained in the Spring and
Autumn period prior to Confucius. It is on this foundation that Confucius
proposed the ideal of the "exemplary person" (junzi :BT) as the very core
of "dao learning."
What did "education" or "becoming educated" mean to Confucius? It
is safe to say that this question is most often raised in the form of defining
"learning" (xue $:). This is to say, in Confucius' thought, "learning" cer-
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tainly means "to learn"; in addition, however, the concept itself also sug-
gests "to educate." In other words, the meaning of "learning" has two dis-
tinctive senses in the thought of Confucius and in Confucianism, with a
narrow and a broader connotation. Narrowly speaking, "learning" as the
counterpart of "thinking" (si Ji!;I,) is simply to learn. Hence, "The Master
said, 'Once, lost in my thoughts, I went a whole day without eating and a
whole night without sleeping. I got nothing out of it, and would have been
better off devoting the time to learning'" (Analects 15.3 I).
"Learning" can also be matched with "cultivating excellence": "The
Master said, 'To fail to cultivate excellence (de ~), to fail to practice what
I learn, on coming to understand what is appropriate (yi 5<.) in the circum-
stances to fail to attend to it, and to be unable to reform conduct that is not
productive-these things I worry over'" (Analects 7.3).
Broadly speaking, "learning" refers to the holistic education necessary
for becoming fully human. "Learning" in its narrow sense is also referred
to as "improving of oneself through study" (xuewen ~)(), that is, the
acquisition of knowledge. Thus, Confucius taught his students to begin
from the practice of "filial piety" (xiao ~), "fraternal deference" (ti t~),
"making good on one's word" (xin fi'f), and "authoritative conduct" (ren
f=), and further advocated that "if in so behaving you still have energy left,
use it to improve yourself through study" (Analects 1.6).
In a broad sense, "learning" is not only to acquire knowledge, but
takes the cultivation of virtuous conduct as its foundation. Therefore, just
as Zixia remarks: "As for persons who care for character much more than
beauty, who in serving their parents are able to exert themselves utterly,
who give their whole person in the service of their ruler, and who, in interac-
tions with colleagues and friends, make good on their word (xin fi'f)-even
if it were said of such persons that they are unschooled, I would insist that
they are well educated indeed" (Analects 1.7). This also reflects Confu~
cius' thinking. Herein, the "unschooled" refers to "not improving oneself
through study," that is, the narrow sense of learning. But Confucius takes
the practice of "filial piety," "fraternal deference," "doing one's utmost"
(zhong ,~,), and "making good on one's word," to mean "well educated
indeed" (weizhixue i~Z~) in contrast with mere book learning, entailing
as it does the concept of "learning" in its broad, holistic sense. Thus, Con-
fucius says: "In eating, exemplary persons (junzi tt-1-) do not look for a
full stomach, nor in their lodgings for comfort and contentment. They are
persons of action yet cautious in what they say. They repair to those who
know the way (dao ill), and find improvement in their company. Such per-
sons can indeed be said to have a love of learning (haoxue :!If~)" (Ana-
lects 1.14).
Thus, persons are considered to have a love of learning when they are
not concerned about material enjoyment, but instead pursue spiritual ful-
fillment and excellence of character, when they are cautious yet earnest,
and when they want to learn from those who know the way (dao ill). Here,
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having a love of learning is not "improving oneself through study" in its
narrow sense, but "learning" in the sense of consummating oneself as a
whole and complete person. In respect to the role of education, "learning"
is always education as such, and is not limited to simply improving oneself
through study. Corresponding to the narrow and broad senses of "learn-
ing," having "a love of learning" also carries these two meanings.
As for "improving oneself through study," it refers to the acquisition
of knowledge, especially the knowledge of the rituals and the classics.
Within the Confucian curriculum, "cultural learning" (wenxue )(~),
"reading books" (dushu i~~) (Analects 11.25), and "learning a great deal
and remembering it all" (duo xue er zhi ~~ffijiQ) (Analects 15.3) all refer
to this kind of book-learning. "Learn broadly of culture" (wen )() (Ana-
lects 6.27) is also directed at "improving oneself through study" (xuewen
~)(). "Learning," as in the passages "continuing to study without respite"
(xue er bu yan ~ffij~17t) (Analects 7.2) and "failing to practice what I
have learned" (xue zhi bu jiang ~Z~iJt) (Analects 7.3) as the counter-
part to "failing to cultivate virtue" (de zhi bu xiu ~Z~f~) (Analects 7.3),
is also mainly about this narrow sense of learning. In the Analects the texts
that are to be studied are the Yijing, the Book of Songs, and the Book of
Rites, and it is clear that Confucius put great store in the learning and
transmission of these classics. "Culture" ()() as the emblematic content
of learning the love of learning not only became a main feature of later
Confucianism, it also had a deep influence on the evolution of traditional
Chinese education.
However, as we have said, the learning that Confucius advocates goes
much beyond what we have discussed. Besides learning the classics and
the acquisition of knowledge, ConfuCius taught his disciples "to discipline
themselves through the observance of ritual propriety" (yueli ~"JtL) and
"to cultivate the virtues" (xiude f~~). This kind of realization in the prac-
tice of virtuous conduct and in political affairs is also included in what is
denoted by "learning." This is why Confucius replied to Duke Ai by say-
ing: There is one Yan Hui who truly loved learning. He did not take his
anger out on others; he did not make the same mistake twice" (Analects
6.3). The "love of learning" (haoxue M-~) in this context refers to "learn-
ing dao" (xuedao ~ll!) and to "learning to be virtuous" (de ~)-that is,
to acquire and to qualitatively enhance one's moral character. Thus, this
kind of learning can be also called "learning dao" -that is, learning the
proper way to conduct oneself as a human being-something that is nec-
essary for both exemplary persons (junzi tiT) and petty persons (xiaoren
/j\A) to do. In comparison with the learning of skills and techniques, Con-
fucius emphasizes the development of character: "The various craftsmen
stay in their shops so that they may master their trades; exemplary persons
(junzi tiT) study that they might promote their way (dao ll!)" (Analects
19.7). Therefore, the core of the learning of exemplary persons (junzi zhi
xue tiTZ~) is to learn dao. In the Book of Rites, it is referred to as "cul-
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tivating virtue and learning dao" (xiu de xue dao f~~?¥:jR). Obviously
this kind of learning does not focus on special skills (such as sowing and
planting Uiapu f*1I]). It is thus that Confucius declares: "Exemplary per-
sons (junzi ;,g-.:r) are not mere functionaries" (Analects 2.12). "Exemplary
person" means a person of consummate character, not someone with spe-
cial techniques or skills. In fact, this kind of learning has more to do with
learning how to become a leader and how to act as a leader. Learning to
be a leader does not imply that leadership is a technique, but rather that it
requires that one attain the capacity for leadership through cherishing the
observance of ritual propriety, appropriate conduct, and the making good
on one's word (hao Ii hao yi hao xin JlHLtlf:x.tlff"!'f) (Analects 13.4).
Confucius advocates that both exemplary persons and ordinary peo-
ple should "learn dao" (xuedao ?¥:J1!), where such learning stands in con-
trast to "improving oneself through study" (xuewen ?¥:X). In the politi-
cal arena, the exemplary person learns dao to become a good leader, while
the ordinary person learns dao to become a good citizen.4 Improving one-
self through study is something that persons do as a bonus after they have
committed themselves to the learning of dao. A person first practices "fil-
ial piety" (xiao ~), "fraternal deference" (ti .~), "doing one's utmost"
(zhong ,~,) and "making good on one's word" (xin {"!'f), and then, "if in
so behaving, one still has energy left, use it to improve yourself through
study" (Analects 1.6). Confucius is most probably directing this instruction
at ordinary people, but regardless, dao is still most important. As he puts it:
"If at dawn you learn of and tread the way (dao jR), you can face death at
dusk" (Analects 4.8). One entailment of the "love of learning" (haoxue tlf
?¥:) is to "be steadfast to the death in service to the efficacious way" (shan-
dao ~iI!) (Analects 8.13) in order to stand on the side of justice. There-
fore, the primary task of learning is to "set one's sights on the way" (zhi yu
dao ;G;T:ffi), while it is only as a final stage that one "sojourns in the arts"
(you yu yi i'htT!;) (Analects 7.6). Indeed, "Exemplary persons (junzi ;,g-.:r)
study that they might promote their way" (dao iR) (Analects 19.7). Later,
Han Yu (768-824), a great Confucian and educator in the Tang dynasty,
stated explicitly that the first priority for an educator is to "transmit dao"
(chuandao f~iR) and only subsequently to "pass on the knowledge one
has acquired" (shouye fJt~). Thus, from the standpoint of an educator,
the first priority is to "transmit dao"; from the perspective of the student,
"learning dao" (xuedao ,¥:jR) is of the utmost importance.
The "Notes of Learning" chapter of the Book of Rites states: "Jade
that is not carved cannot become a vessel; persons who have not stud-
ied cannot come to know the proper way. Therefore, when ancient Kings
established their kingdoms and ruled their people, their first priority was
to teach people how to learn." This underscores the point that the pur-
pose of learning is to "understand dao" (zhidao :m:iH). It is learning that
transforms ordinary persons into exemplary persons, and exemplary per-
sons then function as models for transforming the people and refining the
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customs of the land, and make their contribution both socially and politi-
cally. Therefore, just as in Pragmatism, the Confucian ideal of education is
always tied to the sociopolitical conditions.
Sagehood (an Be Learned (shengren ke xue ~A"ilJ~)
It is possible to teach factual knowledge, but to teach the knowledge
necessary for virtue and character is a different matter. In Meno, in the
dialogue between Socrates and Meno, Plato raises the question of whether
virtue can be taught. Of course, there are two aspects to this question.
First, is it possible for teachers to teach virtue to their students, and second,
can students learn virtue through the instruction of their teacher? In Plato's
dialogue, Socrates first asserts that a teacher who lacks knowledge of virtue
cannot teach virtue to others, and in the end, he claims that virtue cannot
be taught. It would seem that his main point is made from the perspective
of the teacher or educator.
What answer would we get if we were to put this same question to
Confucius and the Confucians? There is no quick and easy answer. How-
ever, although we cannot simply claim that indeed "virtue can be taught,"
we can state emphatically that virtue can be learned. This is addressed
explicitly in the Tong Shu by Zhou Dunyi (ro17-ro73) of the Song dynasty
when he asks, "Can sagehood be learned?" And his answer is "Yes it can."5
Cheng Yi (r033-II07) comments on the same issue: "Can sagehood be
reached through learning?" And again his answer is "Yes it can be."6
To say that sagehood can be learned is to say that we can learn the
virtue of the sages; but not only can we learn their virtue, but through
learning it we can become sages ourselves. Thus, in answer to Socrates' and
Plato's question of whether virtue can be taught, the ancient Confucians
would be inclined to rephrase the question as "Can virtue be learned?" as
a way of expressing the Confucianism problematic. We can say that the
Confucians, in asking the question "Can virtue be learned?" answer in the
affirmative. Of course, teaching is different from learning, but they both
fall under the category of education. Therefore, if we amend Socrates' and
Plato's question and ask whether we can acquire virtue through education,
then the Confucian affirmation that virtue and sagehood can be learned
is also an affirmation that there is an intimate relationship between virtue
and education.
If we recall, the Aristotelian answer to this same question is that, while
"intellectual virtue" can be acquired through education, "moral virtue"
cannot be so acquired. Confucianism, on the other hand, would insist that
moral virtue can be acquired through "learning" (xue $).
In fact, the idea that sagehood can be learned had already been
advanced as early as in the pre-Qin period. For example, Xunzi (298-238
B.C.E.) writes: "What is the beginning of learning? And what is its end?
The answer is: as for its lessons (shu !l&), it should begin from reciting
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the classics, and should end in reading the Rites; as for the goal of educa-
tion (yi 5(), it should begin with becoming a scholar-apprentice (shi ±)
and should end in becoming a sage" (Book 1: "An Exhortation to Learn-
ing"). "Lessons" refer to stages in one's curriculum of studies; "goal" is
the ultimate objective sought in education. According to Xunzi, "learning"
that will enable one to become a person of sagely proportions should be
one?s goal, which is to affirm that sagehood can be reached through learn-
ing. While we might say that mathematical calculation can be taught by
teachers, obviously neither Confucius nor Xunzi would allow that virtue
can be acquired solely through instruction. In fact, even mathematical abil-
ity requires that the students realize it themselves. The acquisition of any
kind of mathematical knowledge requires a combination of teaching and
learning, as well as practical application. As Confucius says, "having stud-
ied, one must repeatedly apply what one has learned" (Analects 1.1).
From this point of view, the acquisition of virtue requires more
than simply the teacher's instruction. On the other hand, Confucius and
Confucians after him took teaching to be their sacred duty, recruiting stu-
dents to develop the virtuous character of the scholar-apprentice and the
exemplary person. In their teaching, Confucians frequently discussed their
concerns over what it means to acquire virtue. The acquisition of virtue
certainly entails teaching, but in the final analysis, consummatory success
in becoming virtuous requires not only teaching, but the ongoing and
inseparably integrated process of teaching and learning.
From the perspective of education, the notion that sagehood can be
learned means that virtue is acquired through a process of study. Confu-
cius invokes the term "exemplary person" (junzi tiT) to designate his
conception of this ideal character. From the standpoint of the sum of Con-
fucius' thinking on education, the goal of learning is to learn how to become
an exemplary person-that is, to develop the character and aptitude of per-
sons who are deferred to as communal exemplars. This, then, is the main
message of the Analects. Prior to Confucius, the term "exemplary person"
denoted nobility of blood, but with Confucius it became a term designating
nobility of character. It is Confucius' great contribution to ancient human-
istic education.
The notion that sagehood can be learned is related to the theory of nat-
ural tendencies (renxinglun .A:l1ii:;) in mainstream Confucianism. From
the Song dynasty on, Mencius' concept of the goodness of the natural
inclinations developed into the most influential theory of human nature.
This theory contends that people inherently have a natural tendency to be
good regardless of the differences in their social class, their professional
status, and their level of education. That human nature is good represents
the fundamental distinction between human beings and animals, and it
also serves as the ground for self-education and self-development. Human
beings behave badly, not because of something in their basic natures, but
because of their social environment and prevailing customs. This profound
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faith in human nature means that the attitude of the Confucian philosophy
of education, far from entailing any lack of trust in the capacity of human
beings for personal articulation, in fact has the highest expectations of
humans' ability to maximize their self-education and development. For
this reason, leading human beings to behave well need not rely upon strict
laws and severe punishments, but can be achieved through relying upon
the intuitions of their original nature to overcome the temptations of social
depravity. Confucianism is a philosophy that in the most fundamental way
affirms the dignity of the human being.
Learning for Oneself (wei ji zhi xue jgBZ~)
The idea that "sagehood can be learned" is obviously directed at learners
rather than educators. Its focus is not on how teachers should teach, but on
how learners should learn, and mainly on how learners should acquire the
virtue necessary to develop sagely character. From this we see that Confu-
cian education focuses mainly on learning rather than on teaching-per-
haps a unique feature of Confucian philosophy.
In the Analects, the expression "learning" (xue ?¥:) appears frequently,
but the term "teaching" (jiao ~) is seldom found. This contrast indicates
that Confucius considered learning to be the primary factor in the educa-
tional process. Virtue is thus mainly acquired through learning. What Con-
fucius understood by education was a concerted process of personal real-
ization. He observed that: "Scholars of old would study for their own sake,
while those of today do so to impress others (Analects 14.24). "To impress
others" means doing something to show off to others, while "study for
one's own sake" is to cultivate one's character and spirituality to become
a consummate human being for one's self. From this perspective, the con-
crete nature and spirit of education is the embodiment of what'arises from
oneself-a proactive course of study on behalf of oneself. As Confucius
says explicitly: "Becoming authoritative in one's conduct is self-originat-
ing-how could it originate with others?" (Analects 12.1).
So, the idea that "sagehood can be learned" not only circumscribes
the humanistic nature of educational goals, but also focuses education on
learning rather than on teaching. Though learning may well include con-
tent derived from teachers and the subject matter of their instruction, the
primary emphasis lies in the need of learners to study and apply what they
have learned for themselves. This is especially so where this kind of learn-
ing is considered to be a process of self-awareness sought throughout one's
life as lifelong learning. This kind of self-awareness naturally relies on
the heuristics of education and effective models, but more important, it
depends upon the learners themselves. The Confucian concept of learning
also requires application and practice. This means that the ideal character
of the exemplary person must be attained through study and training, and
through the unrelenting disciplining of one's own character.
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Since the educational learner occupies the most important place,
learning itself is the primary factor in the educational process. The edu-
cational process is' one of arduous and continuous self-discipline, and
because the status of learner is in comparison more important than that of
teacher, the personal application of the learner is paramount. With respect
to education in the virtues, an educator's basic responsibility is to enlighten
learners, especially young people who are in the process of forming their
worldviews, and inspire them to become superlative in character. The edu-
cator should arouse students to an admiration of exemplary persons and
instill in them the desire to become this kind of consummate person. They
should want to achieve the same quality of character as their model, and
to uphold this high standard of personal excellence throughout their lives.
Strictly speaking, however, "becoming a sage and a worthy person" is not
something that can be "taught" by teachers. Amassing knowledge about
virtue is not the same as developing personal excellence through practice and
self-consummation. The responsibility of an educator is to inform learners
what it means to become an exemplary person, and how exemplary persons
excel in different situations. In such a way, the educator stimulates a kind
of awareness in the learners during the educational process, producing in
them an admiration for persons of exceptional character and inspiring
them to take on the project of emulating these exemplars as the funda-
mental mission in their lives. The most that a teacher can do is to make the
student aware of what virtue is (zhi ji zhi ffi.&.Z), but without the learn-
ers' own application and practice, "even though they might have grasped
it, they are sure to lose it" (sui de zhi, hi shi zhi lIH~z, &,~Z) (Analects
15.33). What the teacher teaches is knowledge, but what learners must
learn for themselves is its application in action.
Thus, we might say that Confucianism takes learning to be a self-
directed, lifelong, practical activity. As for virtue, far from being the kind
of knowledge that can be disseminated in the classroom, it is the developed
capacity to arouse those moral feelings and priorities that enable one con-
sistently to distinguish truth from fallacy, nobility from vulgarity, an ability
that is manifest in the familiar affairs of the day. Therefore, in Confucian-
ism, the important issue is not the analysis and definition of "authoritative
conduct" (ren f=) and "virtue" (de ~), because such analyses are deemed
of no practical use in the cultivation of personal excellence. The key ques-
tions for Confucian education are what does one have to do to be author-
itative in one's conduct; what does the realization of "authoritative con-
duct" entail; what kind of people are entitled to be called "authoritative";
what kind of practical virtue and behavior should moral exemplars dem-
onstrate; what are their practical guidelines for such conduct; what kind
of habits and virtuous conduct are necessary to become an exemplary per-
son; and what level of spirituality can be reached by people who are able
to become exemplary in their conduct? In reference to such people, Con-
fucius remarks: "The wise (zhi ffi) are not in a quandary; the authoritative
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(ren {=) are not anxious; the courageous are not timid" (Analects 9.29).
What should exemplary persons choose, and what should they reject? The
most common formula in the Analects begins with the words, "exemplary
persons do X and do not do Y" and "exemplary persons do X, while petty
persons'do Y." These formulae are used to describe the lifestyles and atti-
tudes of exemplary persons.
It is because education entails the self-directed discipline of the learner
that Confucius and the early Confucians make the point that "scholars of old
would study for their own sake, while those of today do so to impress oth-
ers" (Analects 14.24), and "exemplary persons (junzi tt-T) make demands
on themselves, while petty persons make demands on others" (Analects
15.21). "Learning" is learning to become an exemplary person; "for their
own sake" is to learn for the sake of one's own full spiritual and moral
development. The motive consciousness of Confucianism and of Chinese
philosophy more broadly is: What is the character of the most consummate
persons; what are the natural tendencies of the human being; and what is
the appropriate method for cultivating these natural tendencies?
The Dao of Becoining a Consummate Person
(cheng ren zhi dao J$GAz:i!!)
What then, from the perspective of Confucianism, is the function of teach-
ing? In addition to the dissemination of knowledge, instruction can identify
models of moral conduct and can conduce to the moral advancement of
students by exhorting them to exercise their moral judgment in critiqu-
ing human affairs. The task of the .educator is to communicate to the
learner what it means to be magnanimous of spirit and what constitutes
consummate character in order to stimulate their charges to cult.ivate such
moral excellence in themselves. This is a common tenet of classical edu-
cation closely related to the education of the noble class in ancient times.
Confucian educators neither attempt to inform learners of why they should
aspire to be persons of superlative character nor try to demonstrate what
practical benefit will issue from such an achievement. Indeed, this tenet is a
self-evident premise for Confucian educators.
The ancient Confucian dao of being an educator (shidao ~ijlil!) simply
attempts to explain what kind of people are of superlative character, what
kind of concrete virtues such persons possess, and how students should
cultivate themselves to achieve this kind of excellence in order to attain the
level of the sage. The emphasis of Confucian teaching is not to impart a
concrete understanding of the rites or even a familiarity with the classics.
As for the rites, Confucius takes them to be a general body of standards that
can be applied in the evaluation of human behavior, and thus as standards
for moral conduct.
As for the classics, Confucius is concerned with how to use their
language as an authoritative cultural resource. Taking these classics as
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normative teachings, he wants to tease out the values invested in them and
explicate how they might function as moral lessons. In the transmission of
the classics, Confucianism is certainly concerned about the literary content
of these documents, but when compared to their moral significance, such
literary content is of secondary importance. Indeed, it would be fair to say
that the kind of knowledge that Confucian teaching focuses on is moral
knowledge. For Confucianism, the most important aspect of "teaching" is,
in theory and in substance, to affirm the notion of ideal character. Hence,
a major portion of the Analects is devoted to discourses on the virtue of
scholar-apprentices and exemplary persons with the intention of using
praise and blame to cultivate a feeling of moral rightness and enthusiasm
for the spirit of public service.
The ancient Chinese educational ideal was to learn to "become human"
(zuoren -flit),.), that is, to become an exemplary person, or even a sage. This
ideal reflects the fundamental problematic in Confucian education: "What
kind of a person can I become?" Confucius and the Confucians after him
set as the highest goal of education the transforming of learners into sages
and persons of worthy character. The most important element in ancient
education and learning was to set up moral exemplars that could only be
represented by the images of sages within a humanist culture. In China,
although this ideal could be concrete historical persons such as a spectrum
of the ancient sage-kings, for the most part it lay in the reverence of "exem-
plary persons" and persons of "exemplary character" in the Confucian cul-
ture. These images evoked moral inspiration in the students, and it roused
them to exert themselves toward becoming persons of similar character.
In the character and moral excellence of the exemplary person, Con-
fucius places most emphasis on "authoritative conduct" (ren {=)-the key
idea in Confucius' moral education. According to some later interpreta-
tions of the Analects, "authoritative conduct" is the general, unified virtue
of human beings. This is to say, it is not just one aspect of human excel-
lence, but reflects the holistic nature of virtue. "Authoritative conduct"
in a narrow sense, is distinguished from "appropriateness" (yi )(), "rit-
ual" (Ii ;j:L), "wisdom" (zhi ~), and "making good on one's word" (xin
f~), but in a broad sense, it encompasses all of these four virtues. This
means that the educational ideal of Confucius and the later Confucians is
to cultivate persons of complete virtue. In the codes of the ancient rites, the
expression "complete person" (chengren ltZ),.) refers to a mature person
who has reached majority. However, Confucius transforms this term into
the qualitative notion of a person of consummate character. Persons who
have wisdom and courage, who know ritual and music, and who are in
control of their desires; who, "on seeing a chance to profit think of appro-
priate conduct (yi )(), on seeing danger are ready to give their lives" (Ana-
lects 14.12)-these, then, are "complete persons."
The Guanzi makes this same point in remarking, "Complete persons
are wise and authoritative in their conduct." Later, Xunzi also shares the
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idea that "complete persons" are whole in the quality of their personal
character and defines "exemplary person" in precisely these terms: "The
exemplary person prizes wholeness of character." Shao Yong (IOIl-IO??),
a neo-Confucian of the Song dynasty, designates persons who are whole in
their character as "whole persons" (quanren ~A). The defining criterion
of this kind of education is its commitment to the spiritual maturation of
the whole person, and the expression of the wholeness of personal charac-
ter in a life of excellence. Such education cannot be achieved through train-
ing in any particular skill, nor can its objective be realized through edu-
cating persons to become specialists in any particular field. Even though
there were "Ruists" or "proto-Confucians" before Confucius, they did not
establish this educational idea of the complete person. It was only with
Confucius and the Confucians after him that this aspiration came to define
education, expressed perhaps most succinctly in the statement "exemplary
persons (junzi ;f!.y) are not mere functionaries" (Analects 2.12).
In education, the expression "dao" represents the moral goal of
producing persons of whole character-an educational objective and ideal
always emphasized by the Confucian education that was forged by Con-
fucius. Ancient Chinese education focused on "becoming fully human"
(zuoren fill,{A). The most fundamental objective of Confucian education is
the cultivation of persons who take personal excellence as their ultimate
value, and in so doing, rise above all that is vulgar and common in their
conduct.
In contemporary philosophy, the education that considers sagacity the
goal of the human life and that relies on the benign influence of exhorta-
tion and inspiring models to educate students, is regarded as character-
focused education or consummatory education. Confucianism takes virtue
to be the core value in education, requiring that people atteq.d to their
moral responsibilities while delighting in the sagely path. Thus, the most
important aspiration in Confucian philosophy is not "being" in an existen-
tial sense but achieving "excellence" in the moral sense. It is not just about
"knowledge" (zhi ~), but more about "authentication in action" (xing
11"). The philosophical theory of the inherent goodness of human nature
posits this resource as providing the possibility for maturing into a person
of consummate moral character, and adopts the moral ideal of the sage as
both the objective and the motivation for learning.
In conclusion, the ideal of Confucian education is based upon following
the model of the exemplary person as one's guide, placing personal excel-
lence before knowledge, giving due importance to humanistic cultivation
in the classics, and taking the cultivation of sagely character as the ultimate
goal of education. It emphasizes the educational ideal of the "complete or
whole person," and gives prominence to the activity of learning and self-
directed discipline in the educational process, with a view to transforming
human beings into persons of fully developed character. The Confucian
philosophy of "education" is far more than education in its narrow sense,
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encompassing as it does the full understanding of what it means to be a
human being as it emerged during classical period of ancient China.
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JOHN J. THATAMANIL
19 Spiritual Transformation and Transethical Life
Thinking from Advaita
The absolute indispensability of the teacher-student relationship is a well-
known feature of Advaita Vedanta. The pedagogical relationship between
guru and disciple is intense and indispensable because it is the primary
matrix within which the spiritual transformation of the disciple is accom-
plished. Essential to effecting this transformation is a repertoire of spiritual
exercises that the teacher employs to elicit from the student a radical reori-
entation of subjectivity, a reorientation that enables the student to access
liberating truth. To comprehend the nature and purpose of education in
Advaita, one must understand the nature of the guru-si~ya relationship as
well as the practices of formation, the spiritual exercises, employed by the
teacher to enlighten the pupil.
Of special interest will be the following question: Are such spiritual
exercises broadly relevant beyond their home contexts despite their inti-
mate connection to specific worldviews? This essay will defend the hypoth-
esis that, although disciplines of spiritual transformation are always thickly
embedded within primary religious contexts, they can inform reflection
about theological anthropology, ethical life, and the nature and purpose of
education well beyond their primary religio-culturallocations.1 My conten-
tion is that, despite the variety of incommensurable ways in which spiritual
practices are understood and encoded by the world religions, such prac-
tices ought to be taken seriously by philosophers precisely because they
promise deep resources for transethical life.
I employ the term "transethicallife" to refer to the radical, spontane-
ous, and compassionate other-regard displayed by the liberated sages of
Advaita Vedanta and the saints of other traditions. To call such spontane-
ous other-regard "ethical" is to miss the mark. In Advaita Vedanta, com-
passion is prepared for by ethical living and brought to fruition through
liberating knowledge (jncma), but the spontaneous compassion of the liber-
ated sage cannot be called ethical because the sage no longer takes himself
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to be a willing agent of any sort, ethical or otherwise. The accomplished
adept is in no way bound to or obligated by ritual or ethical mandates even
if those mandates are found in the Vedas. The guru's compassion is trans-
ethical because it transcends the level of moral development at which the
framework of obligation is necessary and renders that framework otiose.
If ethical life is governed by the unconditionality of a supreme ought, then
transethicallife must be characterized as life "without a why," to use Meis-
ter Eckhart's phrase, made still more famous by Angelus Silesius.
The general ideal of transethical compassion can be found in Advaita
Vedanta, Eastern Orthodox Christianity, Buddhist traditions, and many
other traditions as well. In each case, transethicallife is brought about by a
rigorous regime of similar spiritual exercises. Such practices might include
meditation, ascetic disciplines, or even renunciation. However, if compara-
tivists ask why desire is being redirected by such spiritual exercises, strong
disagreements emerge. Buddhists and Advaitins are both committed to sim-
ilar practices for attenuating desire, but these practices prepare practition-
ers for incompatible liberating insights-in the Buddhist case, knowledge
of the nonexistence of any abiding self, and in the other, knowledge of the
absolute reality of the unchanging Self (atman). Mobile practices with clear
historical connection and overlapping functions are understood by the tra-
ditions themselves to serve incommensurable ends.
Both religious families agree on the broad principle that ultimate liber-
ating truth cannot be realized apart from spiritual exercises that attenuate
desire. Both insist that one whose subjectivity is distorted by the unrelent-
ing grip of desire cannot rightly see the way things are. Both believe that
once reality is understood, transethical compassion will arise. They just dif-
fer about what it means to see reality rightly.
If we take seriously these claims made on behalf of spiritual trans-
formation, incompatible ontologies notwithstanding, we must consider
the possibility that the vocation of thinking as such is metanoia. We learn
from Indic traditions that critical reflection, even the work of debate, is
itself spiritual practice when such reflection is situated within an itinerary
of spiritual transformation that shapes the lives of practitioner-students.
Most important, such transformation makes possible transethical action
construed not merely as activity in conformity with obligations derived
from some antecedent account of right action but instead as activity that
flows from "uncaused" or spontaneous compassion.
What Does Philosophy Have to Do with Spirituality?
Before turning to Advaita Vedanta, we must pause to ask what this con-
versation has to do with philosophy proper. Does not talk about spiritual
practice and self-transformation belong squarely on theological rather than
philosophical terrain? And if we are in fact engaging theological resources
rather than philosophical ones, can theological traditions yield portable
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resources, theoretical or practical, that enjoy broad applicability beyond
fixed boundaries established by specific configurations of scripture, tradi-
tion, and authority? To put the question starkly: Can public resources be
derived from private communities of faith? Questions such as these prompt
an examination of deep assumptions about the relationship between phi-
losophy and theology. These questions are particularly trenchant for com-
parative philosophers, who are keenly aware that the sharp divide between
philosophy and theology is largely absent from many non-Western cultural
traditions inasmuch as those traditions lack the rigid division between the
secular and the religious, the prior dichotomy that grounds and authorizes
the distinction between philosophy and theology.
The question of how to construe the nature of philosophy in cross-cul-
tural perspective has been posed with particular acuity by Richard King in
his book Indian Philosophy. King invites readers to consider the semantic
range of the term "philosophy" and asks, "Can philosophy be Indian?"2
He rightly contends that the answer to this question depends on what we
take "philosophy" to mean. To pose this query is to be immediately entan-
gled in a web of subtle questions, most especially questions of genealogy
and power. To what extent is philosophy a discourse peculiar to Western
tradition? Is it the case that only the West has developed abstract, theoret-
ical, and so genuinely universal modes of thought, whereas Indian philos-
ophy remains essentially mythological and thus culturally and religiously
circumscribed and thereby limited in extension and applicability (2S)? As
King shows, a whole host of philosophical luminaries including Hegel,
Husserl, and Heidegger have claimed just that!
To combat such charges King undertakes multiple strategies. He
observes that what counts as genuine philosophical reflection has varied
quite considerably even within the history of the West. Western philosophy,
as is the case with Plato, has often been as indebted to the mythic register
as Eastern traditions putatively are. Indeed, King's genealogy shows that
reigning conceptions of philosophy as abstract, rationalistic, and explicitly
nonreligious can be traced specifically to the Enlightenment (27). In a sug-
gestive aside of the first importance for this project, King observes that, for
much of Western history, particularly in Neoplatonic and Christian tradi-
tions, theoria was closely allied in meaning to contemplatio. Philosophy,
far from being "merely theoretical," was intimately linked to religious or
mystical vision (27).
After arguing that current intellectual habits that exclude religious
or spiritual motifs from the domain of philosophy have not been peren-
nial features of Western philosophy, King also maintains that the explic-
itly soteriological character of Indian traditions has been greatly exag-
gerated (28). Whether or not King is right on this point is debatable. A
great deal depends on how much relative attention we accord to various
strands within Indian thought. Those who spend their time reading Vedan-
tins would differ on this question from those who study Indian material-
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ists and logicians. At any rate, because King demonstrates well the contin-
gency of current configurations of the philosophical, policing the indistinct
and shifting boundary between philosophy and theology appears to be a
far more questionable enterprise.
King's ultimate goal is not merely to argue on behalf of including Indian
traditions within the philosophical canon. He wishes instead to challenge
Western philosophers to rethink what ought to count as philosophy. This
more radical venture, King argues, requires nothing less than divesting phi-
losophy of its long legacy of colonial entanglement. On his account, what
is required is a conception of philosophy that is not merely postmodern,
and thus calls into question Enlightenment conceptions of philosophy, but
also postcolonial and ultimately "postwestern" (233). Among the legacies
of such "postwesternism" would be openness to modes of philosophical
reflection which maintain that truth is to be gained not only by means of
critical reflection but also by way of meditation or contemplation. King is
explicit on this point. He notes that even Jitendranath Mohanty, who else-
where problematizes overly tidy Western distinctions between praxis and
theory, nonetheless reinscribes this very distinction when he contends that
Indian contributions to philosophy can come only from critical reflection
(manana) and not from any knowledge grounded in contemplation (nidi-
dhyasana). To accept the radical disjunction Mohanty proposes might well
amputate from consideration what is most distinctive in Indian traditions.
It would also be tantamount to projecting "the Enlightenment dichotomy
between philosophy and religion onto materials where such a polarity does
not exist" (29).
King would find ample support for his quest to think afresh the nature
of philosophy in the work of Michel Foucault3 and Pierre Hadot. Both
lend considerable support to King's contention that modern philosophers
have forgotten older conceptions of philosophy as "a way of life," one that
calls for comprehensive transformation brought about by means of spiri-
tual exercises (askesis). Foucault and Hadot argue that this older concep-
tion was not only integral to Hellenistic philosophy but must ultimately be
traced back to Socrates himself.
Foucault argues that the relationship between subjectivity and truth in
the Greek world can be understood only by way of the notion of "care of
the self" (epimeleia heautou). He argues that, even for Socrates, the far more
famous injunction "Know thyself" (gnothi seauton) can be rightly under-
stood only within the larger framework of "care for the self." According
to Foucault, the "more general rule" is "You must attend to yourself, you
must not forget yourself, you must take care of yourself. The rule 'know
yourself' appears and is formulated within and at the forefront of this
care" (5)' On this reading, Socrates' vocation is the practice of philosophy
understood as a form of therapy that enacts precisely this self-regard. Fou-
cault shows that this therapeutic regime of self-care was by no means pecu-
liar to Socrates alone but was a "fundamental philosophical attitude" in
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Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman culture (8), one that amounted to "a truly
general cultural phenomenon" (9) that extended into the Christian tradi-
tion. Central to this regime of self-care was not only an attitude of interi-
ority and attention but also a set of practices by which the self attended to
itself. As Foucault puts it:
The epimeleia also always designates a number of actions exercised on
the self by the self, actions by which one takes responsibility for oneself
and by which one changes, purifies, transforms, and transfigures one-
self. It involves a series of practices, most of which are exercises that will
have a very long destiny in the history of Western culture, philosophy,
morality, and spirituality. These, are for example, techniques of medita-
tion, of memorization of the past, of examination of the conscience, of
checking representations which appear in the mind, and so on. (II)
In the course of his later work, Foucault refers to these practices by various
names, but in the newly published translation of his 1981-1982 lectures
given at the College de France, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, he refers
to these practices under the general heading of "spirituality." He character-
izes the relationship between philosophy and spirituality as follows:
We will call 'philosophy' the form of thought that asks what it is that
enables the subject to have access to the truth and which attempts to
determine the conditions and limits of the subject's access to the truth.
If we call this 'philosophy,' then I think we would call 'spirituality' the
search, practice, and experience through which the subject carries out
the necessary transformations on himself in order to have access to the
truth. We will call 'spirituality' then the set of these researches, prac-
tices, and experiences, which may be purifications, ascetic exercises,
renunciations, conversions of looking, modifications of existence, etc.,
which are, not for knowledge but for the subject, for the subject's very
being, the price to be paid for access to the truth. (15)
Foucault's characterization of the intimate relationship between philoso-
phy and spirituality enables students and practitioners of Indic traditions
to give a theoretical account of their traditions as properly philosophical.
Moreover, on any account of philosophy that makes spirituality intrinsic to
philosophical life, the attempt to draw a hard-and-fast distinction between
philosophy and theology is unconvincing. Most important for our pur-
poses is Foucault's argument that some kinds of truth simply do not come
into view apart from spiritual exercises.
For both Advaita Vedanta and indeed a great many other Indic reli-
gions, a strong distinction obtains between conventional or worldly truth
(vyavaharikasatya) and ultimate truth (paramarthikasatya). Conventional
truth amounts to knowledge of the empirical world regarded as valid when
received under widely accepted epistemological conditions. Ultimate truth
cannot be had so cheaply. Without the "modifications of existence" effected
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by spiritual exercises, the subject cannot gain access to ultimate truth. In
the case of Advaita, a complex spiritual itinerary must be followed before
the seeker is in a position to understand scriptural teachings regarding non-
duality. Nor can the aspirant follow this itinerary unaided. Almost with-
out exception, Indic traditions argue that, without guidance from a teacher,
liberation cannot be achieved. Only one who has already made the jour-
ney 9f self-transformation is in a position to guide students on their way
forward.
Some contend that Foucault's characterization of spirituality is limited
because he overemphasizes the extent to which spirituality is finally a mat-
ter of self-regard. Pierre Hadot, in particular, argues that Foucault fails to
appreciate that the turn to self-transformation or interiority in philosoph-
ical and religious traditions is typically in the service of larger cosmologi-
cal ends (206-212). One turns to spiritual exercises so that the self can be
properly oriented to or within some larger cosmological framework. This
limitation in Foucault's analysis of pratiques de soi is evident especially in
his treatment of Hellenistic philosophers. Let us hear first from Foucault
before turning to Hadot's rebuttal: "The turning round urged by Seneca,
Plutarch, and Epictetus is a turning round on the spot as it were: its sale
end and outcome is to live with oneself, to 'dwell in oneself' and to remain
there. The final objective of conversion to the self is to establish certain
relations with oneself" (495; emphasis added).
Hadot rejects such claims as immoderate. He maintains, "from an his-
torical point of view, it seems difficult to accept that the philosophical prac-
tice of the Stoics and Platonists was nothing but a relationship to one's self,
a culture of the self, or a pleasure taken in oneself. The psychic content of
these exercises seems to me to be something else entirely. In my view, the
feeling of belonging to a whole is an essential element; belonging, that is,
both to the whole constituted by the human community, and to that con-
stituted by the cosmic whole" (Hadot, 208).
Hadot's account posits an intimate connection between interiority and
exteriority; for Hellenistic philosophers, and we might also add the Chris-
tian theologians who inherited from them these spiritual exercises, the turn
within is always undertaken for the sake of a turn without, for the sake
of a deeper attunement to the way things are. According to Hadot, Fou-
cault gives us just half the picture, spiritual exercises without the cosmo-
logical vision within which those exercises are embedded. Hadot dem-
onstrates that "this movement of interiorization is inseparably linked to
another movement, whereby one rises to a higher psychic level, at which
one encounters another kind of exteriorization, another relationship with
'the exterior.' This is a new way of being-in-the-world, which consists in
becoming aware of oneself as a part of nature, and a portion of universal
reason" (211). Hadot contends that this connection is precisely what Fou-
cault wants to play down. Hadot's analysis has Foucault wanting to rec-
ommend these practiques de soi to contemporary listeners who seek for
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an "aesthetics of existence" even though they no longer find credible any
claim of correlation between a given mode of life and an objective, ratio-
nal, and universal order (208).
Is Hadot's reading of Foucault fair? That is a question for Foucault
specialists. At least in his lecture course, Foucault does stipulate explic-
itly that the reconfiguration of subjectivity by way of spirituality is the nec-
essary precondition for accessing truth that would be otherwise unavail-
able. Let us suppose that Hadot gives a better historical reading of spiritual
practices in context. That still leaves open the question, Can these spiri-
tual exercises be compelling for contemporaries? On this point both Hadot
and Foucault concur. Hadol's insistence that we must not sever spiritual
exercises from their cosmological context does not compel him to contend
that these exercises are too thickly situated to be practicable for contem-
poraries. On the contrary, both Hadot and Foucault call for a return to a
conception of philosophy as "a way of life." Such a return cannot amount
to a wholesale adoption of some past philosophical framework. What is at
stake here, for both Hadot and Foucault, is never just a matter of taking
up some particular position from the past, but rather to philosophize once
more in the way of the ancients.
Advaita Vedanta's Itinerary for Spiritual Transformation
The theoretical framework offered by Foucault and Hadot makes possi-
ble a consideration of Advaita Vedanta's itinerary for spiritual transfor-
mation with confidence that such an itinerary is vital to philosophy so
long as one is open to a conception of philosophy as therapeutics. Fou-
cault and Hadot help to create-at least within the context of contempo-
rary continental philosophy-a hospitable space within which the insights
of Advaita reflection and practice can at least be entertained if not warmly
received. Thinking through the import of Advaita spiritual exercises is no
more exotic or extrinsic to philosophical labor than a consideration of
Stoic or Epicurean therapeutics.
As noted above, the work of spiritual transformation takes place
within the framework of the master-disciple relationship. Apart from the
guidance of a liberated teacher, Sailkara contends that liberation is impos-
sible.4 Having established the indispensability of the teacher-student rela-
tionship, we would do well to inquire more deeply into the nature of that
relationship and the qualities of the ideal teacher and the ideal student.
Advaita texts have a great deal to say about these questions.
The teacher-student relationship is marked by a fundamental asym-
metry even though the relationship between the two is characterized by
mutual affection and respect. The ideally prepared student possesses an
extraordinary list of prerequisite virtues before he comes to study with
the teacher.s Nonetheless, there remains a qualitative distinction between
the teacher and even the best of students. The teacher is established in his
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knowledge of Brahman; the student is not. The teacher knows that his true
identity is unlimited and infinite. The student thinks of himself in quite
conventional ways and may, as Advaita texts indicate, still be caught up in
caste pride-pride in his high-caste status as a Brahmin (US II.I.4, 212).
The student may know of those texts that teach that his true Self is Brah-
man, the ultimate reality, but this knowledge remains in the text and has
not yet been translated into the student's life. Indeed, a chief mark of an
extraordinarily well-prepared student is that he understands clearly that he
is trapped within the cycle of transmigration and has therefore cultivated
an ardent rather than a middling desire for liberation (mumuk~utva). The
teacher, by contrast, has realized that he is Brahman and so is a jivanmukta,
one who is liberated while living. Such a person no longer desires libera-
tion. The teacher has realized the ultimate telos of human life. Borrowing
from Gavin Flood's recent phenomenological and cross-cultural treatment
of the ascetic self, we can speak of the guru as one in whom the process
of "entextualization" has been brought to fruition.6 By entextualization,
Flood refers to ritual processes by which liberating knowledge found in
sacred scripture comes to be inscribed onto the body of the ascetic. Flood
convincingly shows that entextualization of the body is critical to the for-
mation process in Buddhist, Hindu, and Eastern Orthodox traditions.
The list of qualities ascribed to the teacher is extensive and impressive.
Sankara describes the teacher as "endowed with understanding, memory,
tranquility, self-control, compassion, favor and the like; he is versed in the
traditional doctrine; not attached to any enjoyments ... , he has abandoned
all the rituals and their requisites; a knower of Brahman, he is established
in Brahman; he leads a blameless life, free from faults such as deceit, pride,
trickery, wickedness, fraud, jealousy, falsehood, egotism, self-interest, and
so forth; with the only purpose of helping others he wishes to make use of
his knowledge."?
Critical to Advaita descriptions of the teacher is the conviction that
because the teacher is entirely identified with Brahman, he is entirely beyond
egotism and self-interest. He knows that those phenomena are manifesta-
tions of the conventional mind; as he has come to see that the reality of
the changeless Self lies beyond mind and intellect, he is utterly beyond self-
seeking habits. Faults or afflictions like desire, hatred, and delusion are
no longer possible for the person established in the knowledge of Brah-
man. The liberated person is incapable of immoral actions, actions counter
to dharma, even though he is no longer bound by duty. Sankara's famous
student, SureSvara, is quite explicit on this point. He insists that because
unrighteousness is itself the result of ignorance, the one in whom ignorance
is destroyed is now incapable of doing evil.8
Moreover, virtues, initially acquired by means of rigorous discipline
and ascetic practice, are now the effortless and natural disposition of the
realized person. SureSvara indicates that the realized person is "by nature
in harmony" with scriptural teaching (NS 4:68, 265). He writes, "In the
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case of one who has achieved enlightenment, virtues like nonenmity per-
sist naturally and without effort (ayatna). They are no longer practised as
a means to any end" (NS 4:69,265). The qualities that students and teach-
ers possess overlap; the difference is that in teachers these virtues need no
longer be sustained by striving and therefore can be characterized as spon-
taneous. Students, on the other hand, practice the virtues instrumentally
for the sake of attaining liberation. This is not the case for the sage who has
realized the ultimate end of human life.
The primary manifestation of the teacher's compassion is his teach-
ing activity, for it is through such activity that he relieves the pain of those
drowning in the sea of transmigration. Contemporaries might well wish
for an account of compassion that foregrounds activism or social jus-
tice. Indeed, neo-Vedantins like Vivekananda have called for a "practical
Vedanta" that moves in just these directions. The engaged Buddhist move-
ment also extends the meaning of compassionate activity beyond classi-
cal norms that regard teaching as the highest manifestation of unrestricted
compassion. Even apart from these contemporary transformations, we
can well appreciate traditional accounts that maintain that teaching is the
deepest form of compassion because it alone can lead to liberating insight.
The teacher's identification with Brahman is so complete that Advaita
texts show no reluctance to accord to the guru the adulation and reverence
due to Brahman. In the Vivekactujama1,!i, a text ascribed to Sankara,9 the
student at the moment of liberating insight praises his teacher as Brahman
itself: "Salutation to thee, 0 Prince of Teachers, thou unnameable great-
ness, that art ever the same, and dost manifest thyself as this universe-thee
I salute."lo The teacher is described as "an ocean of spontaneous compas-
sion" (ahetukadayasindhu) (VC 33; my translation). The descriptor ahe-
tuka quite literally means without cause, reason, or motive~in short,
"without a why." The guru's compassion cannot be explained by any
appeal to self-interest or obligation. The spontaneity of the guru's compas-
sion calls to mind the broad Vedanta theme that Brahman creates the uni-
verse as an expression of sheer play (lila). To describe world creative activ-
ity as "play" is to acknowledge that Brahman suffers no lack and so cannot
be said to create the world for any motive whatsoever. Play is spontaneous
expression of our nature or powers without thought to extrinsic purposes,
and so provides an analogical hook by which Brahman's world creative
activity can be described. We are on homologous grounds when describing
the compassionate teaching of the guru. Such activity, too, is inexplicable
by appeal to reasons or motives.
It is just precisely this effortless and spontaneous character of the teach-
er's compassion that marks it as transethical. As already noted, the teacher
is established in the knowledge of Brahman and is even treated by students
as Brahman made flesh. The teacher is the object of a quasi-theistic ado-
ration. As one who has wholly given himself over to his identity with and
as the Absolute, he no longer takes himself to be an agent, and one who is
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not an agent cannot be obligated even by scriptural mandates. The picture
of the liberated sage given to us in Advaita texts is characterized by uncon-
strained freedom. Entirely content, unaffected by the objects of the senses,
absorbed with Brahman with the intensity of a child lost in play, acting
and yet not acting: "the earth is their bed; they roam in the avenue of the
Vedanta; while their pastime is in the Supreme Brahman" (Ve 538,201).
Precisely because the guru is the very embodiment of the goal of self-
realization set forth in scripture, he is in a position to initiate and ulti-
mately bring to fruition in the student the very same process of transfor-
mative knowing. Reading scripture independently of a realized master will
not suffice, because the kind of knowing at stake here requires far more
than a mastery of information encoded in scriptures. Foucault's claim that
"a price must be paid" in order to gain access to liberating truth is on the
mark. The goal of the Advaita program is not to learn something new
while the learner remains unaffected and unchanged. What is required is
a reorientation of subjectivity such that a new sense of self takes the place
of selfhood as ordinarily understood. The guru is the adept physician who
knows how to apply spiritual exercises to bring about this transformation
in the student.
Readers new to Advaita are likely to be caught off guard by the long
and exemplary list of virtues that the ideal student must possess before he
begins formal study with the guru. The standard fourfold list of means to
liberation prescribes that the ideal student must be a renunciant who can
(I) discriminate (viveka) between what is eternal (nitya) and the fleeting
(anitya); (2) is dispassionate (vairagya) toward worldly or otherworldly
rewards resulting from action; (3) possesses qualities of mind such as tran-
quility (sarna) and self-restraint (dama); and (4) has a deep desire for liber-
ation (Ve 17-22; 7-8). Beyond tranquility and self-restraint, the requisite
qualities of mind also include withdrawal (uparati), forbearance (titik~a),
concentration (samadhana), and faith (sraddha).t1 Particularly noteworthy
for pedagogical purposes is the appearance of faith or sraddha on this list.
Advaita texts indicate that faith in this context has for its object the scrip-
tures and the words of the guru (Ve 25, 9). The ve characterizes faith as
follows: "Settled conviction regarding the truth of scripture and the guru's
words, that the sages call faith, the means by which reality is grasped"
(Ve 25; my translation). The teacher is the object of trust, faith, and devo-
tion, and his teachings are placed on a par with scripture. Such reverence
is entirely understandable given that the liberated sage is the truth of scrip-
ture made flesh-text embodied.
How does the student acquire such virtues? Readers of Advaita texts
should remember that they are typically jumping in midstream. An exten-
sive process of preparation must take place before the student repairs to the
guru. The Advaita spiritual itinerary seems deeply textual or exegetical-
a matter of hearing, reflecting, and contemplating scripture-only because
that preliminary preparatory process is often overlooked. Such oversight
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is hardly surprising because Advaita texts take the process of prepara-
tion largely for granted. Moreover, the texts are adamant that knowledge
(jntina) alone liberates. A great deal of polemical energy is directed against
opponents who contend that action (karma), most especially ritual perfor-
mance, must be combined with knowledge as knowledge alone cannot lib-
erate. That position is anathema to SaIi.kara's Advaita. After all, the cul-
minating truth of Advaita Vedanta is that the true Self is unchanging and
so utterly beyond agency (kartrtva). To insist that ritual performance has
equal standing with knowledge of the immutable Self as a double means to
liberation is to be caught in a performative contradiction. Hence, SaIi.kara
insists that the ideal student must be a renunciant who has surrendered
conventional ritual obligations.
To deny that action is on a par with knowledge as a means to libera-
tion is not to deny that ethical and ritual action can playa critical role in
preparing persons so that they may become capable of detachment. On the
contrary, Advaita explicitly maintains that karmayoga, the discipline of
action, plays a crucial role in preparing students for the liberating knowl-
edge that alone is soteriologically efficacious. Readers of the Bhagavad
Gitti12 are likely to be familiar with the meaning of karmayoga: "Be intent
on action, not on the fruits of action; avoid attraction to the fruits and
attachment to inaction. Perform actions, firm in discipline, relinquishing
attachment; be impartial to failure and success-this equanimity is called
discipline (yoga)" (BG 2:47-48). Action performed in this spirit of detach-
ment purifies the mind: "Action is for the sake of purity of mind and not
for grasping the Real" (VC I I, 5; my translation). No amount of action
can bring about knowledge, but by acting with no thought of reward, the
practitioner begins the process of diminishing unreflective attachment to
conventional identity. Anantanand Rambachan well describes .detached
action as a "method of neutralizing the force of desire and aversion while
remaining in the field of activity" (93). Detached action effectively prepares
persons for the insight to come later, namely that the true and infinite Self
is utterly beyond agency.
For our purposes, a detailed consideration of karmayoga is unneces-
sary, but it is critical to note that karmayoga is understood quite properly
as ethical action. In this stage, practitioners continue to think of themselves
as agents but now as agents, who do what is right for no extrinsic reason
whatsoever. But such ethical action is only a penultimate good, one that
serves to discipline the student's passions so that the student can then move
to the next stage in the spiritual itinerary, the study of the sacred scriptures
with a teacher in order to bring about liberating insight.
From a comparative perspective, the strong similarity between Advaita
Vedanta's understanding of karmayoga and Eastern Orthodox Christiani-
ty's understanding of the practical life are striking. There also, the spiritual
itinerary can be divided into two major segments, the bios praktikos, the
practical or ethical life, and the bios theoretikos, the life of contemplation.
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As Andrew Louth shows, in praktike the soul engages in the life of virtue
in order to, "overcome temptation and subdue the passions."13 In living the
practical life, the fourth-century spiritual writer Evagrius Ponticus writes,
"The good must be pursued for its own sake, not for some other cause. If
this is not admitted then it would appear that the occasion that moves us to
perform some good deed is better by far than the good that is done."14
For Evagrius and for Eastern Orthodox hesychastic spirituality in gen-
eral, the fruit of the practical life is apatheia. As is well known, apatheia
is not to be translated as "apathy." Louth recommends instead "impassi-
bility, freedom from passions" (103). By means of the practical life of vir-
tue, the practitioner of hesychastic spirituality is prepared for the life of
pure prayer. The practice of pure prayer, the heart of theoria or contempla-
tion, is impossible for those easily distracted by passions. Thus, disciplining
mind and soul is essential preparation for knowledge of God.
The structural and substantive parallel between praktike and karma-
yoga is exact. In both cases, the ethical life, lived with radical detachment,
brings order and integrity to the mind. In both cases, ethical life and its
resultant virtues are penultimate goods that prepare persons for the ulti-
mate good to be found in contemplative life. The truth to be found in the
contemplative stage has detachment or impassibility as a strict precondi-
tion. Finally, the truth discovered in contemplation leads in both cases to
transethicallife.
In the case of Eastern Orthodox spirituality, contemplative life, the
life of pure prayer, leads to theosis or deification. We become by grace
that which God is by nature. The process of deification is never complete,
because the soul's union with God has no end as the divine nature is infi-
nite. As one moves forward into deification, into union with the divine
life, the soul is infused with the eternal divine energies, including and most
especially love. Diadochos of Photiki distinguishes the special nature of
divine love from the natural love of the soul as follows:
One is the natural love of the soul and another that which comes to it
from the Holy Spirit. The first is controlled and also put in motion by
our will when we so desire. So it is easily carried off by evil spirits, when
we don't hold strongly to our will. The other inflames the soul with the
love of God so much that all its parts cling to the ineffable sweetness
of this love, in an ineffable and infinite affection. The mind, pregnant
then with spiritual energy, becomes like a spring from which love and
joy bubble forth. IS
Precisely this love from God becomes in the recipient love for the neigh-
bor. Diadochos makes it clear that this love does not originate in human
beings and so most assuredly is not to be thought of as a product of will.
It is true that practitioners can work to become more transparent to this
love, but the love itself is, strictly speaking, transcendent in origin because
it is an ecstatic gift of a divine energy. It surpasses the self and its powers;
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it is beyond command. It places the recipient wholly at the disposal of the
other. For all these reasons, such agape is plainly transethical in character.
This brief comparative glance at the Eastern Orthodox tradition sug-
gests that it shares with Advaita Vedanta a two-tier conception of the spir-
itual life.16 The first tier is the life of practice, the second, the life of con-
templation. No detailed treatment of this second stage in either Eastern
Orthodox spirituality or Advaita Vedanta is possible here. I? A few stipula-
tions will have to suffice. Contemplative life in Advaita requires the triple
practice of listening (sravat:ta), critical reflection (manana), and finally con-
templation proper (nididhyasana). In this stage of spiritual life, the teacher
teaches the student how to read the scriptures rightly. But reading the text
rightly is to put at risk and ultimately to undo the student's current sense of
self as a finite and particular male Brahmin.
Reading Advaita texts is risky because learning that one is truly Brah-
man requires a radical negation of conventional notions. The student must
be helped to see that all mundane markers of identity by which he here-
tofore understood himself are inadequate. Only then can textual claims
regarding his identity with Brahman amount to more than abstract prop-
ositions found in sacred scripture. That work requires rigorous critical
reflection whereby the student's difficulties and conceptual questions are
answered to his satisfaction. Finally, there is nididhyasana, which Ram-
bachan defines as "that process of continuous contemplation by which one
seeks to uninterruptedly focus one's mind on the true nature of the Self
gained from sruti" or scripture (II6).
Spiritual Exercises, Transethical Life, and Ontology:
Concluding Reflections on First Philosophy
This consideration of Advaita Vedanta and Eastern Orthodox spiritual-
ity has shown that the spiritual practices of both traditions have, broadly
speaking, two stages, one practical and the other theoretical and contem-
plative. The similarities in how each tradition envisages the practical life are
not merely formal but substantive. But the contemplative practices them-
selves are richly particular, and at least on the surface, marked by deep dif-
ferences. Even a brief glance at the contemplative resources of each tra-
dition suffices to demonstrate that contemplation is intimately tied to the
specific ontology and theology of each of the traditions in question.
One does not become divine in Advaita Vedanta; one just is Brah-
man. Deifying union does not imply a commitment to nonduality in East-
ern Orthodoxy, because the tradition insists on maintaining a sharp divide
between the divine essence and the divine energies. Divine energies infuse
and deify human beings, whereas the divine essence remains inaccessible
and incommunicable. Maintaining the distinction between essence and
energies ensures that divine intimacy does not by degrees elide into pan-
theism.
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These ontological differences notwithstanding, in both cases spm-
tual life culminates in overflowing and spontaneous compassion. In East-
ern Orthodox spiritual traditions, agape is an infinite energy that over-
flows from within the divine life and so is inexhaustible. By definition it is
not a product of human effort. The transethical gift of agape is rooted in
the superabundance of the divine life. Students of Indic traditions know
that the bodhisattva in Mahayana Buddhism is the very embodiment of
transethical compassion, even though, in this case, the bodhisattva's com-
passion derives from his or her understanding of emptiness (sunyata) and
not by appeal to divine compassion or knowledge of Brahman. In Advaita
Vedanta, spontaneous compassion emerges from knowledge that one is
Brahman, a knowledge that extinguishes the private desires of the finite
ego. The cumulative weight of this broad consensus from several traditions
lends a measure of support for the proposition that the disciplined redirec-
tion of desire can lead to a life of radical other-regard. The labor of inte-
riority motivates and funds a life in which persons can expend themselves
without consideration of cost on behalf of the neighbor.
What can one infer by observing that, although these religious tradi-
tions differ on ontological matters, they nonetheless agree that a life com-
mitted to spiritual exercises results in transethical compassion? Are we to
infer that ontological considerations are secondary or even immaterial to
spiritual life and the fruits thereof? The trajectory of this inquiry brings to
mind a fundamental question in much contemporary continental thought
that follows in the wake of Emmanuel Levinas: What is first philosophy?
Must the ethical, or in this case the transethical, take priority over ontology
and metaphysics?18 Has this journey through Indic and Eastern Orthodox
traditions demonstrated that Levinas is right to insist on the priority of the
'ethical? If a wide assortment of tensive and even contradictory ontological
insights can lead to the possibility of life lived transethically, then should
we not channel energies to the hard labor of spiritual transformation rather
than on the secondary work of establishing a compelling account of how
such a life is metaphysically possible?
The force of this query ought to linger long if for no other reason than
because the question disrupts prevailing habits of philosophical life, a life
given over far more to theory than to theoria. Perennialist thinkers might
even argue that these ontological disputations are derived from second-
ary theoretical interpretations of primary mystical experiences-interpre-
tations that can neither be confirmed nor falsified by appeal to those expe-
riences themselves inasmuch as mystical experience exceeds language and
conception. In any case, the compelling supererogatory appeal of life lived
transethically and the exigent need for self-surrendering other-regard in
a world ruptured by cruelty and violence suggests that interminable and
inconclusive wrangling over ontology might be an ethically misguided
expenditure of resources better spent otherwise.
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For these reasons, subordinating the ontological to the spiritual and
the transethical may seem appealing. But this temptation must be resisted
for at least two reasons. First, to make this judgment by appeal to gen-
eral similarities discovered through comparison would amount to mar-
ginalizing the concrete and particular claims of religious traditions. True,
every tradition considered herein insists that spiritual exercises culminate
in transethical life. A broad consensus on this salient point exists. But each
tradition maintains that transethical life can be reached only by under-
standing its own special insights regarding the nature of reality. All agree
that right vision enables practitioners to make the transition from disci-
plined striving to effortless compassion, but what it means to see rightly is
a matter of debate.
An elementary issue regarding the logic of comparison is at stake here.
It is possible for traditions to agree at a general or vague level and yet to be
in substantive disagreement on the specifics. Robert Neville makes just this
claim when he differentiates between vague comparative categories and
their specifications. 19 A "vague comparative category," Neville argues, is
one that admits of a variety of specifications. Specifications of a vague com-
parative category may be "contraries, contradictories, different but over-
lapping ... , supplementary, complementary ... and so on" (63). Two tradi-
tions might agree at a vague level that human life can be characterized as
a predicament. They might agree still further that that predicament can be
described as illness in need of a cure; but those same traditions might then
proceed to offer contradictory diagnoses of the illness in question. One tra-
dition might insist that the human predicament is due to ignorance and the
other that illness is generated not by faulty cognition but by errant voli-
tion: a rebellious and intemperate will and not ignorance is the root cause
of the human predicament. This example demonstrates that conC\lrrence at
a vague level need not imply agreement on specifics.
The work of comparison would result in a strange and self-defeating
conclusion were we to maintain that the specific claims brought together
in comparison are unimportant. To dismiss the particular claims of the
world's religious traditions and to opt instead for their spiritual exercises is
to do violence. After all, it is precisely in and through particular scriptures,
motifs, and arguments that traditions call for and defend the possibility of
transethicallife. The process of reading, analyzing, and contemplating the
specific intellectual resources of the world's religious traditions is itself part
of spiritual life. There is no particular spirituality that is not through and
through imbricated within some particular ontological frame.
There is a second major reason why ontology ought not to be subor-
dinated to or severed from the transethical. To notice that the religious tra-
ditions considered herein agree that transethical other-regard is the culmi-
nation of the spiritual life does not mean that these traditions agree about
what transethicallife is. True, the formal similarities between traditions are
striking and merit sustained attention. But it is in no way clear that Chris-
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tian agape is Buddhist karu1Jii. Only further comparison can determine
the rich affective, cognitive, and volitional meanings encapsulated in these
two extraordinarily rich notions. There is every reason to suspect that the
fecund scriptural, ontological, pedagogical, and sociocultural specificities
of traditions enter into the constitution of the transethical in each case.
Consider, for example, the role of particularity in Advaita and Chris-
tian traditions. Advaita Vedanta rigorously demands that spiritual prac-
titioners dismiss particular configurations of identity in order to discover
their underlying identity as Brahman. Saint Paul also encourages Chris-
tians to relativize particular differences, such as those separating Jew and
Greek, male and female, slave and free. But in the Pauline instance, differ-
ences are not relativized because they are taken to be unreal-as is the case
in Advaita. These differences are real indeed because they flow from divine
creativity. Differences are relativized for the sake of creating a new and uni-
versal community of those united in Christ, a community to be character-
ized by agape, a love that does not overlook differences but seeks only to
ensure that they do not become occasions for sundering community.
These speculations about karu1Jii and agape are cursory and hypothet-
ical. They are offered here solely to demonstrate that only extensive com-
parison and dialogue can determine wherein the similarities and differences
lie. Still further dialogue is needed to determine what constructive modi-
fications thinkers from both traditions might be prepared to make after
those similarities and differences are precisely delineated.
What, then, can be inferred from the strong general claims made on
behalf of spiritual disciplines and the transethical in each of the religious
traditions thus far considered? I shall offer the following proposals, propos-
als that are wholly provisional, necessarily humble, but not without risk.
First, we may legitimately conclude that the work of philosophy remains
impoverished and altogether too safe if it does not risk the vocation of
metanoia. Philosophers must recover once more an experimental commit-
ment to living otherwise, even if that should mean that they are compelled
to set out on a journey to destinations unknown. By means of the transcen-
dental turn inaugurated by Kant, philosophy arrived at a critical awareness
of the possible limitations of reason itself. The work of Foucault, Hadot,
and the spiritual traditions suggests that philosophy's critical appreciation
of the capacities and limitations of reason remains severely limited. Phi-
losophers will need to consider the possibility that human capacities for
knowing are sufficiently malleable so as to be subject to therapeutic mod-
ification by means of spiritual exercises. Philosophical reflection, left to
its own devices, may remain blind to dimensions of reality that come into
view only after the mind has been disciplined by askesis.
What follows from this insight? What does not follow is that philos-
ophers are free to disconnect and appropriate the spiritual exercises from
their traditions of origin. Hadot and Foucault are right to point to the
intrinsic and abiding worth of these practices even for moderns, but Car-
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rette and King have prudently warned against the dangers of severing spir-
itual practices from the traditions in which they are embedded. Moreover,
spiritual practices are not like medications that would be equally efficacious
regardless of the ethical or spiritual character of the prescribing physician.
This therapy does little good and might even do harm when separated from
the therapist; it cannot be self-administered. Spiritual disciplines are ulti-
mately effective only when they are part of the vital relationship between
teacher and student.
So far, I have argued that transformative knowledge does not come
about unaided. Hence spiritual disciplines are vital. Now the argument has
been advanced that those spiritual disciplines are efficacious only in the
vital intimacy of a pedagogical relationship. It would seem to follow, then,
that philosophy cannot access spiritual truth apart from apprenticeship to
particular persons and religious traditions. Does the intimate connection
between spiritual disciplines and tradition mean that philosophers-espe-
cially comparative philosophers-must apprentice themselves to the tra-
ditions they study? Would not any such apprenticeship threaten and even
undermine philosophical autonomy?
First, I would argue that learning from and not just about religious
traditions does not require capitulation to heteronomous coercion. Crit-
ical reflection (manana) has always been an indispensable component of
religious life and will continue to be a part of any contemporary spiri-
tual itinerary. In our time, critical reflection will inevitably be compara-
tive in character. Even practitioners securely located within particular reli-
gious traditions cannot turn a blind eye to compelling alternatives offered
by other traditions. If all are obliged to listen to traditions other than their
own and to account for current commitments in a context of robust plu-
ralism, it then follows that ours is a time that does not permit a ri.gid, arti-
ficial, and unsustainable dichotomy between private commitment and pub-
lic accountability. Even traditions that entertain maximal claims on behalf
of their scriptures must defend those claims to communities who are not
bound by those scriptures. The inevitably public character of religious
inquiry suggests that it might indeed be possible for philosophers to learn
under the tutelage of particular religious traditions without compromising
away commitment to critical reflection.
Second, I propose that we employ transethical compassion as a crite-
rion by which to measure the adequacy of any ontological proposal that
might result from the explicitly comparative and yet spiritually committed
life that seems to be called for in our time. Proposing such a criterion is not
tantamount to deciding for the priority of ethics over ontology. On the con-
trary, a more compelling reading of the comparative consensus discovered
herein points not to the priority of the transethical over the ontological but
rather to the inextricability of the two. In Buddhist, Hindu, and Eastern
Orthodox traditions, we must know something about the way the world is
by way of spiritual transformation and only then can radical and sponta-
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neous other-regard take root. But in order to know what must be known,
there must be a rigorous commitment to ethical disciplines that prepare
aspirants for knowledge. There is thus a complex and dialectical relation-
ship between ethics and ontology that does not allow for an absolute pri-
ority of one over the other.
What, then, follows for pedagogy from this vision of philosophical life
as given over to learning with and from religious traditions? Comparative
philosophers, open to a conception of philosophical life as transformative,
are not in a position to make authority claims of the sort made by sages
and spiritual masters. Rather, the distinctive piety of the comparative phi-
losopher will find expression in a vulnerability to being transformed by the
traditions he or she studies, and not in any claim to finished mastery of any
tradition's spiritual ideals. The teaching work of comparative philosophers
must consist, in part, of inviting students to share in this vulnerability. Such
openness in no way requires dismissing the philosopher-theologian's com-
mitment to critical reflection. We have no reason to believe that critical
reflection is incompatible with vulnerability to transformation. On the con-
trary, I have argued that there is ample reason to believe that critical reflec-
tion must be regarded as intrinsic to philosophy conceived as therapeutics.
The conception of philosophy I have sketched only prevents philosophers
from adopting either of two diametrically opposed postures: the transcen-
dent spiritual authority of the guru and an utterly uncommitted detach-
ment that in no way brooks vulnerability to transformation. The work of
imagining what might lie between these two extremes remains to be done.
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BRIAN J. BRUYA
20 Education and Responsiveness
On the Agency of Intersubjectivity
Human agency is the new frontier of contemporary philosophy. You may
have noticed it already-that the Berlin Wall of the determinism/free-
will dichotomy will soon be coming down, and a new paradigm of human
action will sprout from seeds both new and long dormant. There have been
hints of the impending cataclysm already: the work of Antonio Damasio
in neuroscience,l Thomas Metzinger and Alicia Juarrero in the philosophy
of the self,2 Ananta Giri in development ethics,3 and Fran~oisJullien along
with David Hall and Roger Ames in comparative philosophy. We've taken
it for granted for so long-despite the best efforts of compatibilist philos-
ophers, we've lulled ourselves into believing that we can have it only one
of two ways-that either we choose or we merely appear to choose, super-
naturalism or robotics. The former is incoherent, and the latter is too chill-
ing to take seriously when our own phenomenological experience separates
us far enough from its plausibility that we are comfortable keeping it out of
mind. In human robotics there could be only discomfort, especially for the
humanist philosopher who relies on genuine human decisions when formu-
lating the barest of propositions, the imperative to believe.
This essay will not bring the wall down single-handedly. It will, how-
ever, endeavor to carve out a chink, generate a crack that branches as it
spreads. My approach will be from the narrow subject of transitivity as a
linguistic feature. Transitivity, which implies at least one kind of agency, is
a nice starting point because in this narrow field the eventual complications
already begin to show themselves, but in a manageable sphere.
The heart of education is the student-teacher relationship, which can
be construed in a number of ways. In Fran~ois Jullien's Detour and Access,
he identifies Confucius' style of education as relying on indirection: "The
ideal of Confucian speech is not to promote dialogue but to imitate nature's
indirect manner of operation" (p. 202).4 This reluctance to enter into dia-
logue appears to be in direct conflict with the Socratic method, often lauded
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as the paragon of Western education. Socrates used dialogue in an attempt
to access universal truths that everyone had encountered but could not
immediately recollect. Confucius, Jullien argues, attempts to incite reflec-
tion in the student with the purpose of assisting the student to comport to
the demands of circumstance (p. 213). Jullien cites Fan Chi's comparison
of a teacher to falling rain: "which, without anyone knowing, makes every-
thing grow" (p. 202). By contrast, the heart of the Socratic relationship is
the guidance of the teacher.
It is often noted that the root of the English word "education" is the
Latin educare, cognate with educere, both having connotations of "to
lead," hence the English word "educe," to draw forward. This perspec-
tive on education implies two important things: (1) that the teacher knows
where the student needs to go, and (2) that the teacher knows the way to
the student's destination. This very active role of a teacher in education is
revealed also in the grammatical designation of "to educate" as a transi-
tive verb.
Syntactic monotransitivity, as linguists call it, refers to the characteris-
tic of some verbs to indicate a transfer of action from an agent to an object,
or patient. Common examples are "to throw" and "to touch." The lin-
guists Paul Hopper and Sandra Thompson5 fleshed out the concept of tran-
sitivity by identifying ten components of it, each lying on a continuum, that
together could allow one to identify the effectiveness with which an action
is transferred to an object/patient, in other words, the level of transitivity.
The components they identify are participants, kinesis, aspect, punctual-
ity, volitionality, affirmation, mode, agency, affectedness of the object, and
individuation of the object. It turns out that there is one aspect of transi-
tivity that this nearly exhaustive examination does not consider, and that is
the agency of the patient. Etymologically, "patient" indicates passivity, but
is the recipient of action always passive? .
In what follows, I will attempt to draw out a few implications with
regard to the education of a recipient of action who is active rather than
passive. In the process of doing so, I will need to introduce a novel term
and a novel use of an obscure term, "intertransitivity" and "numisma-
tism." I shall begin with the numismatic.
Imagine a blank screen. Appearing on the screen are four circles of
identical size. In each of two of the circles is an image of a person's head - a
man in one and a woman in the other. In each of the other two circles are
images of a plant in one and a building in the other. These four images,
you come to realize, are faces of coins of undetermined nations. Because
they are unfamiliar to you and the denominations are not apparent, it is
impossible to pair up the sides as they appear on the actual coins. The task
is impossible because it is of the nature of coins that the two sides, while
attached, cannot, under normal circumstances, be viewed simultaneously,
and because the conditions of their unity are entirely contingent. There is
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no way while viewing one side to be privy to the contents of the other side
or to deduce the connection.
This intriguing feature of coins is an appropriate metaphor for intersub-
jective experience. The term "coin" is a single term that refers to an object
with two discrete perspectives. Many intersubjective experiences also have
a single term that refers to two isomorphic but experientially distinct per-
spectives, such as "commerce" and "exchange." Each of these terms can be
broken down into two perspectives, each described by a distinct term. For
"commerce," there is "buying" and "selling"; and for "exchange," there
is "giving" and "receiving." In form, these two perspectives are identical,
each an agent of a commercial transaction. Experientially, however, they
are quite the opposite: one selling, with all of the concerns and expecta-
tions that selling entails; and one buying, with very different concerns and
expectations.
Often, the intersubjective experience does not have a distinct term to
identify it and instead borrows one of the opposing terms, such as "lend-
ing," "parenting," teaching," and "leading." Each of these terms implies
an opposing pair. In these instances, the experience differential is more
readily apparent. A lender has a borrower, a parent has a child, a teacher
has a student, and a leader has a follower-each with a particular perspec-
tive. In rare instances, a single lexical root captures not only the experience
but both sides of it as well. An example is "employment." An employer
employs an employee.
Whether coming in three distinct terms, coming in a pair in which one
does double duty, or coming singly, in which one covers all three, numis-
matic terms convey the sense of a single experience that is apprehended
from two radically different perspectives. Take as an example the delivery
of a conference paper. It is intersubjective in that it involves the listener on
one side and the speaker on the other. In an obvious sense it can be singly
conceived as a conference talk. This term "conference talk" is itself per-
spective-free and does not describe the experience of any single person.
And yet it cannot be understood unless at least two subjects are participat-
ing in the experience from radically different perspectives. It is, after all, a
very different experience to be standing in front of a group of people offer-
ing ideas and sitting as one of a group trying to grasp new ideas. Because
these two radically different perspectives are unified in the talk, one can
refer to the entire experience as numismatic, coin-like, in nature.
You have probably noticed that these terms describing numismatic
experience have different levels of transitivity. For instance, a conference
talk involves ditransitivity: two objects, one of which is indirect- "The
speaker delivers the paper to the listener." Some are more obviously mono-
transitive, as in "X employs Y." In none of these, however, is there a patient
in the strictest sense of the term-as a passive recipient of action. Some
experiences involving two people do have an agent acting on a patient,
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such as a nurse dressing or bathing a comatose person in a hospital-here
a patient in two senses. But such cases would not be intersubjective.
Intersubjective experience expands the sense of transitivity to a point
that traditional conceptions of "transitive" do not capture. The indirect
object in the case of ditransitivity is not an object at all but an agent with
an integral part in the experience. To say that I buy someone a book, how-
ever, is not in the least misleading, because it is understood that the object
being bought is the book and not the person. The case of monotransitivity
is more ambiguous.
The structures of the sentences "X teaches Y" and "X touches Y"
are identical and analyzed grammatically as S-V-O, with the "object" in
the case of "teaches" sometimes called a "patient" in reference to he or
she being animate. But isn't a student, in the most meaningful sense of the
term, more than just animate? Isn't a student, after all, an active agent of
experience? To describe the agent-verb-agent construction of intersubjec-
tive experience, I have coined the term "intertransitivity." In an intertran-
sitive construction, action is predicated on both sides of the verb, not in
the sense of bidirectionality, but in the sense that in order for the deliver-
ing agent's goal to be realized, the receiving agent must playa cooperative
role.
Try to develop a list of intertransitive verbs-verbs in which the recip-
ient of the action must playa cooperative role for the verb to be meaning-
fully carried out under its normal sense: to lead, to question, to marry, to
promote, to scold, to help, to kiss, to love. For each of these verbs, if the
recipient of action is noncompliant, the action itself becomes meaningless
in the normal sense of the verb. This is unlike the case with other transi-
tive verbs, such as to touch, to emulate, to see, to sentence, and to divorce,
all of which can be effected with full force on a noncompliant recipient.
The notion of intertransitivity becomes especially interesting in cases that
at first appear to be merely transitive, such as to marry, to scold, to love,
and to oppress. In legalistic terms, marriage can be conducted on a mono-
transitive basis only; but to be fully meaningful, it has to be intertransitive.
Gandhi discovered that the same goes for oppression.6 A people cannot
be oppressed if they refuse to be a party to oppression; if they retain their
agency, they can be imprisoned but not oppressed. Try scolding a child
who refuses to accept blame, or try helping someone who does not wish
to be helped. Immediately, you realize that intertransitivity requires mutual
agency, and recognizing this can have practical advantages.?
Education is an interesting case. Here is a numismatic experience with
a typical transitive construction of X educates Y, in which one gets the dis-
tinct impression of a subject acting on a patient. It helps to refer to the Latin
root to bring out the intertransitivity: X is leading Y, and for it to be mean-
ingful, Y has to take an active part by following. Socrates could accept this,
but Confucius, according to Jullien, would not be satisfied stopping here.
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For Confucius, the active role of the intertransitive follower must indeed be
active, to the point that the so-called follower must take the initiative.
The Responsiveness of the Agent as Object
A transitive verb carries the action from the subject to the object, or patient.
An intertransitive verb identifies an intersubjective, or numismatic, expe-
rience with an action that involves two agents in an isomorphic but expe-
rientially distinct relationship of mutuality. The relationship differential
accounts for the transitive nature of the action, as if it were being car-
ried over from one to the other. The agency of the object (of the receiving
agent), however, complicates this description. In Confucian education, the
receiving agent is not merely compliant: he or she is the instigator. Learn-
ing for Confucius is pragmatically prior to teaching; following is pragmat-
ically prior to leading. How can we make better sense of this?
In ]ullien's examination of Chinese poetics in Detour and Access, he
identifies allusive incitement (xing) as the most important, and character-
istically Chinese, trope in the tradition. Unlike symbolic representation,
which presents a specific idea by way of reference to a specific object, allu-
sive incitement uses reference to generalized features of the world to evoke
nonspecific emotions in the reader. According to ]ullien, the achievement
of this effect relies as much on the reader as on the poet. The reader must
(1) achieve a state of quietude, (2) be receptive (he calls it "inner availabil-
ity") to the incitement, and (3) reflect on it (p. 156). As a result, the read-
er's interiority opens up to the landscape and to a web of emotional asso-
ciations. Finally, "the mind is not led to see but moves as it pleases" (p.
190). This is the height of Chinese poetics, as well as the height of Confu-
cian education.
An easy way to understand this kind of poetics, perhaps, is by think-
ing of the difference between realistic and abstract painting. Whereas real-
ist painting is taking you in a specific direction, abstract painting sets you
off through associations that you yourself bring to the painting. In this
sense, traditional Chinese ink-wash painting, which has been criticized as
cartoon-like by those expecting realism, is more akin to abstract paint-
ing than to realist painting. As in Chinese poetry, the allusions run deep,
and so someone steeped in the tradition and open to the literary and artis-
tic allusions that are presented is able to achieve a level of receptiveness
that allows for the emotional incitement to take affect. This is unlike West-
ern expressionism and other modernist and postmodernist expressions of
aesthetic emotion in which the artist emotes with the purpose of express-
ing particular emotions. The Chinese painter and poet allude and incite,
and the viewer or reader responds spontaneously. The painter and poet's
job is to raise a scaffolding of richly but subtly evocative form and syntax
within which the viewers or readers move according to their own predis-
positions.
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The Chinese term xiuxing is often rendered into English as "self-culti-
vation." Whereas the Chinese means literally to build, improve, or repair
one's behavior, the horticultural metaphor in the English (but absent from
the Chinese) is serendipitously appropriate and demonstrates to us that our
own tradition is not devoid of the important idea that education can be
viewed as cooperative. Like "to educate," the term "to cultivate" also goes
back to Latin and meant originally what it still means today-to foster the
growth of something. How does this term fit with the notions of numis-
matic experience and intertransitivity? On the surface, it seems unrelated.
If I am fostering the growth of the philodendron on my desk in Michigan,
I don't normally take the philodendron to be an agent engaged in an inter-
subjective experience with me. But why don't I? Is it because the philoden-
dron is not a person and therefore incapable of agency? Where does the
ontological boundary of agency lie? What about a dog-is it capable of
agency? If so, what does a dog bring to the experience that a philodendron
does not? A dog, if you allow, brings a mind, and a mind brings intention,
and intention brings directionality through desire, impulse, choice-what-
ever mental characteristics you would like to attribute to the dog.
I would like to suggest, contrary to much of the last 130 years of West-
ern philosophy, that the most fundamental aspect of agency is not inten-
tionality but sensitivity.8 A shift in emphasis from intentionality to sensi-
tivity provides a nice limit case from which to conceive education. In the
cultivation of my philodendron, the philodendron is not a static, inanimate
object. Rather, it has its own vectors of growth and a concomitant sensi-
tivity to its surroundings. In its proper place in nature, it would not need
to enter into a relationship with me at all and would be able to realize its
full potential through natural interactions with its environment, most of
which are beyond our normal ken. In the impoverished environment of my
office, however, I must enter into an intersubjective relationship'with it by
fostering its growth. What is necessary for this fostering to occur success-
fully is that the philodendron itself must bring to the experience that vector
for growth and that sensitivity to allow my fostering it to have its intended
effect. In fact, my fostering is but a tiny part of its growth, and most of
its poietic interactions are produced by the plant itself. I humor myself by
thinking that most of the work is done by me and that the plant is a pas-
sive recipient of my largesse. And although I curse those plants that aren't
appropriately sensitive to my overtures, of course the mistake is mine.
Responsive Education
The conclusion that I am heading toward is not that students need to be
coddled like hothouse orchids but that, in any meaningful sense of the word
"education," they bring to the experience their own vectors of growth and
sensitivity. The educational experience is numismatic. Although a teacher
and student are in the same room together and discussing the same mate-
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rial, their perspectives on the experience are radically different. First, there
is a practical power differential-the teacher can affect the student, pos-
itively or negatively, in ways that the student cannot reciprocate. Second,
there is an authority differential-the teacher is in a position to pronounce
right or wrong, and often, unfortunately, this is parasitic on the power dif-
ferential. Third, there is a knowledge differential-the student's knowl-
edge base is scant, while the teacher's, one would hope, is broad and deep.
Fourth, there is an incentive differential-the teacher is there to earn a liv-
ing, and the student is there to get a grade.
The verb "to educate" is intertransitive. Rather than involving a
teacher who is transferring information to a passive student, the student
must be an active agent in the interaction. In an ideal setting, according to
]ullien's Confucius, not only must the receiving agent be active, but he or
she must initiate the experience for it to be meaningful.
Now for the kicker: in a modern educational environment the numis-
matism and intertransitivity of the educational experience that are so inti-
mately related actually conspire against each other. The numismatic dif-
ferentials of the contemporary classroom strip the student of that motive
agency, of the sensitivity and the vector for growth that education aspires
to meet and foster. The student becomes more interested in the grade than
in learning. The student defers to the teacher's vast knowledge rather
than exploring on his own. The student sits quietly so as not to offend
the teacher. The teacher works as little as possible so as to get a paycheck
while still holding on to his or her job. An originally intertransitive expe-
rience is reduced by intangible, and often unnoticed, numismatic differen-
tials to mere monotransitivity.
And so the challenge of teachers today is to bridge the numismatic dif-
ferentials in order to renew the latent receptivity of the student and foster
the growth that is there waiting to blossom. This recognition of the impor-
tance of agency in the student-teacher relationship lays a large part of the
educational responsibility on the student, to be sure. In addition, it chal-
lenges the educator and administrators of the educational systems to do
their utmost to foster this agency and allow it to develop along its natural
patterns of growth.
Conclusion
"Agency" is a term in need of redefinition. It is not practical to say that
because of its Aristotelian or Cartesian ontological connotations it can be
dispensed with altogether. One cannot deny the phenomenological indi-
vidual or the individual's actions. Even in a Deweyan transactional world,
we have to be able to speak of the actions performed by A, in which case
A is ascribed at least minimal agency-and therefore responsibility. The
path to redefining agency in such a way that it conforms to the current
physics/metaphysics is to imbue it first with the notion of sensitivity. Sen-
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sitivity brings both agent and world together through an internal prim-
ing (occurring phylogenetically-as with an infant-and historically) that
readies the agent to be able to receive further information from the envi-
ronment and to use that input to respond appropriately. Sensitivity plus
a sufficiently complex responsiveness (as in ]uarrero), dispenses with the
need for supernatural freedom and provides a dynamic path to action and
responsibility that await further delineation.
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21 Different Encounter between Teacher and
Student in Sankara's Upadesa-Siihasrf and in the
Teaching of Jiddu Krishnamurti
The following essay attempts to discuss the educational approaches of two
great Indian thinkers: Sailkara, the famous eighth-century Advaitin, and
Jiddu Krishnamurti, a twentieth-century reluctant "world teacher." While
the latter explicitly talks of education, the former discusses the interlace-
ment of teacher and student, as well as the process of teaching that leads
to ultimate knowledge (iitmavidyii). Krishnamurti is the founder of several
schools worldwide that attempt even today to offer an alternative method
of education inspired by his teaching. Sailkara is considered by the Advaita
tradition to be the founder of several mathas, "monastic study-centers" at
every corner of the Indian subcontinent.
The main argument of the essay is that both Sailkara and Krishnamurti,
despite the more than a thousand years stretching between them, shared
a similar pedagogical approach, based on the fact that they both rejected
the conventional model of teaching, according to which the teacher knows,
the student does not know, and the former conveys knowledge to the latter.
Instead, they both maintained that "knowledge" takes place only within
an intimate encounter between teacher and student. Such an encounter
brings forth a special type of knowledge, or rather awareness, which lies
in each of them waiting to be "invited" out. They are equal partners in the
enterprise of recovering this inner awareness, to the extent that it is often
impossible to determine who teaches and who is taught. This raises a ques-
tion regarding the difference between teacher and student: If they are equal
partners, what makes the former a teacher, the latter a student and not vice
versa? This question is closely related to the purpose of education accord-
ing to Sailkara as well as Krishnamurti. For both of them, as we shall see,
education or the unique encounter of teacher and student has nothing to
do with information, but rather with transformation.
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This alternative approach is presented by 5arikara in an exceptional
work of his, the Upadesa-Sahasri (A Thousand Teachings). It is the only
work of 5arikara-considered by scholars to be authenticl-which is not
a bha~ya. Here, he is free to express his views without being bound by any
external textual framework, and he dedicates a large portion of the text
to what I wish to refer to as his educational approach. Furthermore, the
uniqueness of this work is the outcome of its exceptional tone. In 5arikara's
other, more famous works, namely his commentaries on the Brahmasutra,
the Upani~ads, and the Bhagavad-gita, severe battle takes place between
the advaitin and his purva-paksins. In the Upadesa-Sahasri this battle, or
rather firm debate, is replaced with patient, sometimes even affectionate
dialogue between teacher and student, out of which deep understanding
concerning human nature is to be achieved.
In the first chapter (in prose) of his work, titled "Si~ya-pratibodha­
vidhi-prakaralJam" (How to enlighten the student), 5arikara lists the quali-
ties required of both teacher and student, acarya and si~ya,2 to facilitate the
emergence of a special type of knowledge-self-knowledge-which refers
not to the objects of the "outer world" but rather to one's own being. Let
us inquire into the qualities required from both participants in the "peda-
gogic encounter" to better understand this very encounter and its purpose,
namely 5arikara's unique notion of atmavidya.
The qualities required of the student, as specified by 5arikara in
UpadeSa-Sahasri 1.2,3 can be divided into inherited and acquired. I am
less interested in the inherited requirements (i.e., the student should be a
brahmin, whose caste and family have been carefully examined).4 We are
allowed to assume that they reflect the social atmosphere in 5arikara's time.
The acquired qualities can be classified under two headings: general qual-
ities of a student and specific qualities of a renunciate. The general quali-
ties include equanimity, inner restraint, and generosity,s as well" as what is
referred to by Sarikara as "sastric qualities of a student."6 He further sug-
gests that the student should approach the teacher in the proper manner
(namely, not empty-handed, etc.) and be a Veda-vid, that is, versed in the
Veda.7 Above and beyond these general qualities, Sarikara emphasizes the
fact that the student should be endowed with qualities of a renunciate. He
is required to be indifferent to everything that is transitory (namely, every-
thing but the atman),8 to be a paramahamsa-parivrajya, a wanderer belong-
ing to the "paramahamsa" category of ascetics;9 and finally to give up the
desire for sons, wealth, and worlds (i.e., heritage in this life and the next).
In this final requirement, Sarikara draws on BrhadaralJyaka Upani~ad
3.5. I; here it is said that "When they come to know the self (previously
depicted as being "beyond hunger and thirst, sorrow and delusion, old
age and death"), brahmins give up the desire for sons, wealth and worlds
and undertake the mendicant life. "10 In other words, the three-dimensional
"inner renunciation" required from the student by 5arikara (which might
later on lead, as specified by the Upani~adic text, to "outer" or "physical"
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renunciation in the form of bhik~a-carya) is the clear outcome of a certain
understanding regarding one's true nature; the clear outcome of atmavidya
(self-knowledge). The striking conclusion, then, is that SaiJ.kara requires the
student to be a "graduate" even before embarking on his studies, namely
to enter the "pedagogic encounter" already equipped with atmavidya. The
question is why? If he is already an atmavid, why approach a teacher? And
whai: is the purpose of the guru-si~ya encounter? In a nutshell, SaiJ.kara's
answer would be this: Every human being is endowed with atmavidya from
the very beginning. To know the atman is to be the atman, which we all are
and have always been. The atman is the very essence of teacher and stu-
dent alike. Yet the student fails to realize that he knows. The purpose of the
"pedagogic encounter" is to awaken this very realization. It is not about
knowledge, but rather about "knowledge-of-knowledge," about the subtle
awareness referring to knowledge itself.
Just like the student, the teacher too is depicted by SaiJ.kara as required
to have both general qualities (of a teacher) and specific qualities of a renun-
ciate.1I The general qualities include equanimity, inner restraint, generos-
ity, and kindness (anugraha). Only the last quality, referring to the teacher's
special urge to teach (compatible perhaps with the student's mumuk~atva,
special urge to be liberated)12 is inclusive and has not been mentioned in
the requirements of the student. Anugraha and mumuk~atva mean that
both should participate in the "pedagogic experiment" voluntarily, rather
than be forced into it. Furthermore, the teacher is expected to be endowed
with moral values (to refrain from deceit, trickery, etc.), fine memory, and
the desire to teach, not out of personal interest, but rather for the ben-
efit of the student and for the sake of knowledge itself. He should be a
"Vedic teacher," namely well-versed in the Veda; and lastly he is expected
to be skilled in argumentation (to be able to confront whatever argument
the student raises to protect and sustain his familiar, dualistic perspective).
On top of these general qualities, the teacher (like the student before him)
should have the qualities of a renunciate-he is required to be indiffer-
ent to worldly pleasures, as well as a renouncer of rituals. He is further
required to be a brahmavid brahma1Ji sthitah, knower of brahman and
established in the brahman. I consider this last requisite as belonging to
"the qualities of a renunciate," since it "uproots" the teacher from the
maya-laka in favor of the so-called brahma-loka.13 By insisting that the
teacher should not merely be a brahmavid but rather a brahma1Ji sthitah,
SaiJ.kara makes it clear that for him, self-knowledge is not su~ka-tarka (dry
reasoning) but rather existential, experiential knowledge, converted into
flesh, into being, into life.
SaiJ.kara further emphasizes the existential dimension of atmavidya in
his commentary to the Bhagavad-gtta, by replacing the Gtta's notion of
jiiana-yaga with his very own jiiana-ni~tha.The term ni~tha literally means
"position," "condition," "fixity," "steadfastness," "application," "accom-
plishment," and "devotion," and is derived from ni~tha, "being in." In
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his MU1}daka Upani~ad bhii~ya, Sankara explains the meaning of jiiiina-
ni~thii (here, brahma-ni~thii), as used by him: "One who renounces all
activities and remains absorbed in the non-dual brahman only is a brahma-
ni~tha, just as it is in the case of the words japa-ni~tha, absorbed in self-
repetition, and tapo-ni~tha, absorbed in austerity. For one engrossed in
action cannot have absorption in brahman, karma and the knowledge of
the iitman being contradictory."14 To clarify the notion of brahma-ni~tha
(a person absorbed in the brahman), Sankara draws on the more famil-
iar notions of japa-ni~tha (a person immersed in recitation of mantra) and
tapo-ni~tha (a person engaged in tapas). Prima facie, these two practition-
ers differ immensely from the brahma-ni?tha; if they are dedicated, each
to his own practice, the latter-owing to Sankara's clear-cut distinction
between knowledge (jiiiina) and action (karma)-is not doing anything.
Yet, my contention is that even though "knowledge," in Sankara's sense
of the word, has nothing to do with practice, nevertheless it refers to prax-
is-it is to be accomplished, applied, lived! Like the japa-ni?tha and the
tapasvin, the knower of brahman is not merely dedicated to a certain path,
but rather cannot be divorced from it. He is not just a knower, but rather
he is knowledge itself.
If we compare the requirements of both student and teacher as speci-
fied by Sankara, again we are faced with a striking conclusion: the require-
ments are the same! Both are expected to be endowed with general posi-
tive qualities (sama, dama, etc.) and to be versed in the scriptures; both are
expected to be renunciates; and finally, both are knowers, in the metaphys-
ical, iitman-centric sense of the word. What could be the explanation for
this salient resemblance of the two? First, a "common language" is needed
to enable fruitful communication between them, which is necessary for
the emergence of iitmavidyii; common language, both literally (teacher and
student alike should be well-versed in the Vedic language) and figuratively
(both of them should have the tendency of "looking within" rather than
"without").
Second, 1 believe that the striking similarity between the two partici-
pants of the pedagogic encounter reveals something of the uniqueness of
the knowledge for which sake they meet. It is found "at the beginning and
in the end." It belongs to and is available for teacher and student alike. The
only difference between them is that the latter fails to acknowledge the fact
that being the iitman he necessarily knows; he fails to acknowledge his own
nature, due to the veil of avidyii ("ignorance").
Writes Sarikara: "The teacher said [to the student]: Though you are
the highest iitman and not a samsiiri ["man of the world"], you hold the
inverted view, 'I am a samsiiri.' Though you are neither agent nor enjoyer,
[you hold the inverted view, 'I am] an agent and an enjoyer.' Though you
know, [you hold the inverted view) '[ do not know'-this is avidyii."15
The teacher's task, then, is to unveil the covering of avidyii, due to
which the student is unable to recognize his true eternal, quiet, free nature;
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to remove the obstacles owing to which the student cannot hold (graha1Jam)
onto knowledge. 16 Atmavidya is depicted by Sarikara as something that has
to be firmly held or grasped at. It is elusive, easily forgotten in favor of
identification with maya, mere appearance. The obstacles to be removed by
the teacher include, as specified by Sarikara, adharmic behavior, laukika-
pramada (translated by Mayeda as "worldly laxity"},17- nondiscrimina-
tion between eternal and transitory, care about what other people think,
and arrogance owing to one's class in the social hierarchy. Sarikara's list
of obstacles further illustrates the elusiveness of atmavidya. If previously
he has required the student, preliminarily, to be a knower and a renunci-
ate (which for Sarikara are none but "two sides of the same coin"}-now
we come to realize that the purpose of the pedagogic encounter is to bring
these two "in-built" qualities into light, lest they be forgotten in favor of
the "external" karta-bhokta-samsari perspective, resulting in the obstacles
mentioned by Sarikara. The seeds of atmavidya as an existential notion are
already there; it is the teacher's "job" to facilitate their growth and bloom.
The question is how? How to protect the seeds of "knowledge as renunci-
ation" (renunciation of avidya, of the conventional "I do, therefore 1 am"
perspective)? How to remove the obstacles? How to convince the student
that everything that has so far been taken for granted is not "necessary"
but rather "voluntary"?
Sarikara's reply, or method of teaching, is twofold: First, the teacher
should repeat the advaitic alternative (condensed in a single phrase, "tat
tvam asi") again and again, until the "given-ness" of the conventional,
dualistic, perspective fades away.
Second, he should prescribe certain yamas (guidelines) for the student,
thus admitting him into a "framework" which will not enable him to pro-
ceed according to his previous view of himself as an "individual self," i.e.,
doer and enjoyer, but rather encourage him to "extend his boundaries."
The prescribed yamas consist of "ahimsadi" (non-injury, etc.};18 ahimsa,
being an example for equal treatment of "me" and the "other." Elsewhere,
instead of mentioning yamas, Sarikara speaks of the dharma ("duty") pre-
scribed for the brahma-samstha ("a person established in brahman"):
His dharma, viz. restraint of the senses and the like, is not opposed to
the state of being grounded in brahman, but rather helpful to it. For the
only work (karma) enjoined on him by his asrama is the state of being
firmly grounded in brahman (brahmani~thatva), wherein he is strength-
ened by restraint of the senses and so on-just as sacrifices and the
like are prescribed for the other asramas-and loss he incurs only by
neglecting that work. 19
The dharma prescribed for the brahma-samstha consists of sama-
damadi, "equanimity, inner restraint, etc.," included by Sarikara-as we
have seen-in the list of qualities required of both student and teacher.
This dharma, just like the yamas previously mentioned, is presented by
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Sankara as "supportive environment" for him who wishes to accomplish
the karma (!) of the brahma-samstha, namely to be established in brah-
man, to know- existentially, not theoretically. The teacher, according to
Sankara, then, operates on two levels: on the level of knowledge (the epis-
temologicallevel), by repeating the "advaitic mantra" tat tvam asi, and on
the complementary level of the student's way of living, by prescribing cer-
tain yamas, particular asrama (the fourth), and special dharma. Implied is
an intriguing assertion regarding the interlacement of knowledge and one's
way of living. According to Sankara, a certain "way of living" (mental
approach entailing a particular outer lifestyle) determines a certain "type
of knowledge," and vice versa.
As far as we have seen, the teacher and the student share the same
way of living (inner and perhaps even physical renunciation), as well as
the same "type of knowledge" (atmavidya). The only difference between
the two, as I have ceaselessly suggested, is that the latter fails to acknowl-
edge the fact that he is already an atmavid. G. C. Pande, digging deeper
into the significance of this difference, explains that even though "there is
a continuity of qualities and aspects between the spiritual-seeker (the stu-
dent) and the liberated person (the teacher), the seeker assiduously prac-
tices the virtues which come naturally to the realized person. "20 In the light
of Pande's observation, the astonishing fact that Sankara-famous for
his razor-sharp distinction between "knowledge" and "action" -clearly
speaks of knowledge (i.e., of being established in the brahman) in terms
of action (karma) might be intelligible. The student needs to "work" to
accomplish that which is only natural for the teacher. Sankara, as we have
seen, prescribes "supporting environment" for such "work" in the form
of yamas, and so on. Perhaps the teacher-student encounter, too, should
be seen as "supporting environment" -supporting not merely. for the stu-
dent, but rather for both of them. Considering the elusive nature of atma-
vidya, can't we assume that the teacher too needs support in grasping at it?
According to the traditional accounts of Sankara's life, he certainly does.
Composed hundreds of years after Sankara, these hagiographic texts pro-
vide us with a narrative illustration of his thought-as seen and under-
stood by the later Advaita tradition-including his understanding of the
guru-si~ya encounter.
A famous episode, related to this very theme, tells of Sankara's debate
with Ubhaya Bharati, wife of the well-known Mimamsaka MaQdana Misra.
Determined to defeat Sankara, she decides to ask him about what Madhava
VidyaraQya, the author of the Sankara-digvijaya,21 refers to as Kusumastra-
sastra, "the scriptures of erotic love" (or literally, of Lord Kama's "flower
arrows"). Having been a samnyasi from his early childhood, Sankara is
totally ignorant with regard to the chosen subject. He therefore asks for a
month-long "time-out," to prepare for the debate. Instead of contemplat-
ing relevant texts (such as Vatsyayana's Kamasiitra), Sankara prefers to use
the time given to him for entering (with his yogic powers) the body of a
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dying king, in order to acquire "erotic-knowledge" by acquaintance, with-
out breaking his brahmacarya vow.22 Absorbed in sensual pleasures, he
"forgets himself" altogether and in due time fails to appear for the debate.
Worried for their master, as well as for themselves having been left with-
out a guru, Sailkara's students show up at the king's court disguised as
musicians. They sit at the feet of the king and sing the following song:
"0 honey sucker! We, your companion bees, guarding your body on the
wooded top of a mountain peak, have long been most anxiously await-
ing your return.... 0 one with moon-like face! How is it that by identifica-
tion with your present situation, you have continued to stay on here, for-
getting all your antecedents? 0 victor of passions! May you be pleased to
be reminded of your higher nature through those words of ours! Tat tvam
asi, tat tvam asi!"23
This whole episode is full of irony. If I have previously suggested that
due to the intimate interlacement of teacher and student, it is sometimes
difficult to ascertain who teaches and who is taught, the story clearly illus-
trates the vagueness of the "borderline" between the two. Owing to the
unique nature of atmavidya, each of them (as even the great Sankaracarya)
is always at the risk of losing it. The sentence "tat tvam asi," depicted
by Sailkara (the philosopher, not the protagonist) as the only remedy for
avidya, is here used, not by the "teacher," but rather by his "students," in
an attempt to unveil his sudden ignorance. If the teacher's task, as already
said, is to remove obstacles "blocking" the student's vision of his atman-
hood-here, the obstacle that has to be removed (for the atman to be
revealed) is desire or sensuality (belonging perhaps to what Sailkara refers
to in the Upadesa-Sahasri as "laukika-pramada"). In his commentary of
Chandogya Upani~ad 2.23.1, Sailkara mentions a much more relevant
obstacle for the "typical" bhik~u (renunciate), namely bubhuk~a, hunger.
It is not difficult to imagine a person forgetting everything, perhaps even
his own identity, under conditions of hunger. The episode about Sailkara
entering the king's body further emphasizes the link between knowledge
and way of living. Implied is the assertion that a certain way of living not
only facilitates a certain type of knowledge, but might as well "block"
other types of knowledge. Here, Sailkara's brahmacarya (celibacy, monk-
hood, renunciation), which facilitates (or at least supports) his atmavidya,
prevents him from acquiring the required "erotic knowledge."
To sum up, I would like to suggest that the purpose of education in
Sailkara's thought, or rather the aim of the unconventional encounter of
teacher and student, is none other than to weave the thread of "knowledge
as a way of living"; it is the teacher's task to reveal the intrinsic connection
between these two notions.
]iddu Krishnamurti's educational approach is intriguing, as prima facie
there is a contradiction between his famous assertion "Truth is a pathless
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land," proclaimed on August 2, 1929, when he dissolved The Order of the
Star in the East, and repeated later on, in different formulations on differ-
ent occasions, and his firm belief in education that led to the establishment
of several schools worldwide attempting to offer an alternative in the field
of education. In the following discussion, I will make an attempt at depict-
ing Krishnamurti's educational approach, focusing on the "purpose" of
education and the teacher-student encounter. My attempt will naturally
draw on what has been said so far.
Krishnamurti (henceforth K) distinguishes between two modes of the
mind: the absolutely conditioned and the totally free. The former he refers
to as consciousness; the latter as Intelligence.H According to him, conscious-
ness is determined by thought, which is divisive, hence cannot touch truth.
Consciousness is further determined by time; it is brain that has evolved
physically and psychologically through time. Consciousness functions
merely in the realm of time. It is a movement from past to future, regarding
the present as merely complementary to these two notions. Indeed, thought
is preoccupied with past and future, the latter being merely a reflection
or a modified continuity of the former. Therefore consciousness is actu-
ally a movement from past to past. It is further determined by desire. Con-
sciousness, says K, is "an agglomeration of desire. "25 Further, it is depicted
by him as equivalent to the known.26 Consciousness is knowledge, since
knowledge, like consciousness, is (an outcome of) the past. Consciousness
is confined to the realm of the known. It is a movement from the known
to the known. Knowledge or the known is ever limited, never complete;
therefore, so is consciousness. K further claims that consciousness is never
an "individual consciousness," but rather the "inheritance" of humanity at
large. It is the psychological content or "the story" of humanity-perpet-
ually egocentric, conflicting, violent, lonely, suffering, confused, and so on.
Like a computer, consciousness has been (and still is) programrried accord-
ing to religious, nationalistic, and other cultural agendas. According to K,
consciousness is also temporal; there is nothing permanent or eternal in it.
Unable to deal with its temporariness, consciousness fabricates a so-called
permanent entity in the form of "the thinker." It is thought which divides
itself into "thought" and "the thinker," whereas in reality there is no differ-
ence whatsoever between the seemingly two. The thinker is not an indepen-
dent entity, but merely a projection of thought, as conditioned as thought
itselfY The artificial notion of a permanent thinker carries along an equally
false sense of security.
Totally different from consciousness is Intelligence, synonymous in K's
terminology with "the unknown," "the immeasurable," "nothingness,"
"what is," and "truth." "To be absolutely nothing," he asserts, "means a
total contradiction of everything you have learnt, everything that thought
has put together. "28 We are so habitual, identified, and dependent on the
known, on the measurable, on "things," on past and future, on what K
metaphorically refers to as "smoke," that we have completely forgotten the
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"flame." The unknown cannot be grasped by consciousness. All the same,
thought constantly tries to capture "nothingness." In its efforts, conscious-
ness merely gathers more content, words, and fear (of losing the known,
the already accumulated). The more it tries, the more thought is strength-
ened, hence moving further away from the immeasurableY
,K's description of consciousness trying its best, but in vain, to grasp at
the unknown, reminds me of Sari.kara's nineteenth and last chapter of the
metric part of the Upadda-Sahasri, titled "Atha atma-manah-samvada-
prakara1Jam" (A conversation between the atman and the mind). Dedi-
cated as he is to the teacher-student encounter, Sari.kara offers a dialogue
between the atman and the manas (the mind), here depicted respectively as
teacher and student. The theme of their discussion is naturally atmanvidya,
knowledge of the atman, self-knowledge. Says the atman to the manas:
"Oh, my mind, you indulge yourself in vain ideas like "me" and "mine."
Your efforts, according to others, are for one other than yourself. You have
no consciousness of things and I have no desire of having anything. It is
therefore proper for you to remain quiet. "30 The atman explains that the
notions of "me" and "mine," thought of by the manas (by thought itself)
are futile in referring to the metaphysical level (i.e., to the atman). He seems
to be an "Advaitic atman" as he rejects the Sankhyan position, according
to which the mind (belonging to prakrti) is functioning for the sake of the
self (puru~a). He further tells the manas that all its efforts are in vain since
he (the atman) is free of desire, and concludes by suggesting "be quiet!"3!
In other words, the manas is requested to stop! To stop thinking as well as
desiring. Only such "stoppage," such silence, will enable the atman to be
revealed. Just like Sari.kara's manas, K's "consciousness" is unable to grasp
the "unknown." Only when the known comes to an end (to rest, to sus-
pension), might the unknown be revealed. Just like Sarikara's atman, "the
immeasurable" is always there, but the "noisy" mind (thought, conscious-
ness) prevents us from "hearing" its silent existence.
In view of all that has been said so far, K's "purpose of education" is
clear: to evaporate the smoke of self-centricity, fragmentation, fear, confu-
sion, loneliness, possessiveness, envy, violence, and so forth-all belonging
to consciousness, to the past-to enable the revelation of the flame, of the
immeasurable. Before asking how, I would like to add that K is not merely
phrasing what I have referred to as his "purpose of education" via nega-
tiva; he explicitly talks of love, creativity, spontaneity, sensitivity, beauty,
and wisdom (different from accumulated knowledge) as the goals (or the
"milestones") of the process of education. Now, the question is how? How
to extinguish jealousy and possessiveness, to enable the flow of love? How
to renounce the disciplined, past-centered mind in favor of spontaneity?
How to be free from the known? How to find truth? Replies K: "One can-
not find it. The effort to find truth brings about a self-centered end; and that
end is not truth. A result is not truth; result is the continuation of thought,
extended or projected. Only when thought ends, is there truth. There is no
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ending of thought through discipline, through any form of resistance. Lis-
tening to the story of what is brings its own liberation. It is truth that liber-
ates, not effort."32 His last sentence, "it is truth that liberates, not effort,"
echoes Sailkara's clear-cut distinction between "knowledge" and "action."
For him, just as for K, self-knowledge (K's notion of Intelligence) cannot be
a result or an outcome of any action. Instead of doing, just be! Education is
depicted by K as an invitation to listen to the story of what is. Thought is
constantly telling us another story, namely the story of what should be. The
story of what is can only be listened to when thought is not. Explains K:
"Thought has created all the things in the world- great paintings, poetry,
music, and so on. Thought has created everything except nature. The tiger
has not been created by thought, nor that lake which you see. "33 Thought is
limited, nature is not. This is the reason why nature is given such an impor-
tant role in K's life and teaching. He himself has lived in nature. His schools
are in nature. Every page of his diaries starts and ends with nature expe-
rience. For him, the tiger and the river, the tamarind tree and the moon,
are the only authentic reflections of our human nature, not as depicted by
thought but as it is.
Furthermore, the story of what is cannot be found in books. For K,
books are the past; they reflect hierarchy and authority; they are "ware-
houses" of accumulated knowledge, of old values. Intelligence has nothing
to do with information; therefore it does not belong to, cannot be found in
or derived from books.34 This explains why K has never written any book.35
The numerous books ascribed to him are edited protocols of talks given by
him at every corner of the globe. K only kept a diary,36 considered by him
to be a totally different undertaking than writing a book, as it flows spon-
taneously, rooted in here-and-now experience rather than in the past/ fu-
ture, and because it is-as Nietzsche puts it- "a book for none and all":
for none, as it is a diary intended merely for the author himself; for all, as
it refers to what K calls the experience of "aloneness": "Aloneness is not
aching fearsome loneliness. It's the aloneness of being; uncorrupted, rich,
complete. That tamarind tree has no existence other than being itself. So is
this aloneness. One is alone like the fire, like a flower ... one can truly com-
municate only when there is aloneness."37 K's journal is "a book for all,"
as it communicates at the level of being, which for him is "true communi-
cation." At this level, the author is "anonymous," free of identification. It
is no longer K communicating with his readers; "K" has faded away; it is
nature, bare nature, communicating with nature. It is a book for all, as the
nature of each one of us is not personal because to be "alone" is to be "all
one." At the same time it is "a book for none," since it is nature communi-
cating with none but itself. By writing to himself, K was trying to establish
a different relationship between "me" and "other," hence aiming simulta-
neously at oneself and at the other, not at all different from one's own self.
H the immeasurable is not to be found in books (diary being an excep-
tional experiment), how are we to find it? Or rather, how are we to find in
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ourselves the receptivity and awareness without which we shall not be able
to ascertain the flame from the smoke? Nature, as we have seen, is "sup-
portive environment" for such task. As supportive as the nature experience
is direct communication between teacher and student, taking place at the
present moment. Before digging further into the nature of such commu-
nication, it should be noted that K has objected wholeheartedly to guru-
disciple relationship based on authority. "To me," he said, "authority is
terrible, destructive. The quality of authority, outward or inward, is tyran-
nical."38 And he further suggested that "Humility is unaware of the divi-
sion of the superior and the inferior, the Master and the pupil. As long as
there is division between the Master and the pupil, between reality and
yourself, understanding is not possible. In the understanding of truth there
is no Master or pupil, neither the advanced nor lowly."39 For him, author-
ity is the arrogance of the so-called guru, religious leader, politician, and
so on, as well as the heredity ("people want to be told, to be led")40 of
those who abide by it. As far as K is concerned, where authority ends
freedom begins. Now, K spoke not merely of immediate communication
between teacher and student, but rather converted his belief in this unique
encounter into action by offering numerous talks, meetings, question-and-
answer sessions, all throughout his life. Having severed himself from the
Theosophical Society at the age of thirty-four, thus renouncing his role as
a "world teacher," ironically he became ... a world teacher; or, as Mary
Lutyens puts it, "The most remarkable thing about Krishnamurti's life was
that the prophecies made about him in his youth were fulfilled, yet in a very
different way from what had been expected."41
At the opening of many of his talks, K used to say:
The speaker is not giving a lecture; you are not being talked at, or being
instructed. This is a conversation between two friends, two friends who
have a certain affection for each other, a certain care for each other, who
will not betray each other and have certain deep common interests. So
they are conversing amicably, with a sense of deep communication with
each other, sitting under a tree on a lovely cool morning with the dew on
the grass, talking over together the complexities of life. That is the rela-
tionship which you and the speaker have-we may not meet actually;
there are too many of us-but we are as if walking along a path, look-
ing at the trees, the birds, the flowers, breathing the scent of the air, and
talking seriously about our lives; not superficially, not casually, but con-
cerned with the resolution of our problems. The speaker means what he
says; he is not just being rhetorical, trying to create impression; we are
dealing with problems of life much too serious for that.42
Before discussing the implications of this typical statement (quoted from
a talk given at Benares in 1981) concerning the nature of the dialogue
between teacher and student, I would like to suggest that because of his hav-
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ing been practically engaged in education rather than being merely a theo-
retician, K's educational approach should be evaluated not only according
to what was said (the content, the words) but also according to the how, to
the tone in which the words were uttered. His own application of the alter-
native :J.pproach presented by him (education not based on conveyance of
knowledge!) should be taken into account. Does he not sound, for exam-
ple, extremely authoritative in rejecting authority?
K depicts both the participants in the educational process as two friends
(thus excluding any type of authority) walking along together through
nature, attentive to the world around them as well as to themselves. They
are equal partners in the exploration of the inner details of life. Just as in
Sankara's thought, both are required to have the same qualities: openness,
receptivity; "mumuk~atva" of a new kind, that is, sincere curiosity and
willingness to meet life in all its complexity, to discover rather than repeat,
to be creative rather than imitative, and to change rather than renounce
the world. Both of them are further required to possess a great deal of seri-
ousness (after all, it is life itself that is about to be explored), courage (not
to conform), and above all eagerness to question, inquire, experiment. The
first step in their mutual inquiry would be to find out what inquiry is all
about. What does it mean to really ask (not searching for an answer that
you already have)? What does it mean to inquire without being told what
to inquire? to observe without being told what to observe?43 This existen-
tial rather than theoretical or abstract inquiry, as already stated, is about
life and living in the world. "To understand life," maintains K, "is to under-
stand ourselves, and that is both the beginning and the end of education. "44
Referring to Sankara's atmavidya, I have argued that it is to be found "in
the beginning and at the end"; in the beginning as potentiality waiting to
be awakened; at the end (namely, following the guru-si~ya en<;ounter), as
full-fledged understanding regarding knowledge as a way of living. K's ter-
minology is different. He discriminates-as we have already seen-be-
tween knowledge (accumulated information about "things," equivalent
to Sankara's avidya) and awareness, Intelligence, wisdom (equivalent to
Sankara's atmavidya, at least in the general sense of "understanding our-
selves" and despite K's firm objection to the use of the Sanskrit term atman
with all its "religious connotations").45 Intelligence is not to be achieved or
gained, but rather to be revealed as it is always here and now. Therefore, K
says that it is "the beginning and the end of education." The teacher-stu-
dent communication is undertaken to awaken that which is already there,
which is the very essence of each of them. Both are made from the same
material; both start from conditioned mind and have the capacity to tran-
scend it, to find in themselves a "place" (or rather "no-place") that is free.
The teacher's task is to invite the student to ask questions and to facili-
tate an open environment, willing to tolerate true inquiry. She or he invites
and facilitates, but the inquiry is mutual. The student's role is as active
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(in asking, listening, discovering) as the teacher's. Regarding the differ-
ence between teacher and student, K ironically remarks that the teacher is
already conditioned,46 while the student (referring to schoolchildren) is still
being conditioned. In a sense, the student stands in an "advantageous posi-
tion," as her or his "programming" is not yet completed. In rare instances,
the teacher is completely free of conditioning (as in the case of K himself, at
least as he has been seen by his students); in other cases, the seeds of free-
dom are already there, to be nourished by the immediate communication
of the participants during the process of education.
The teacher's role and the nature of the teacher-student communica-
tion are further clarified in a dialogue between K and a questioner in a talk
delivered at the Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, in I984.
Questioner: Throughout your talk you claimed that there is a lot of con-
fusion in this world. But I do not remember your having a suggestion or
a solution regarding that. Don't you think that this adds to the confu-
sion rather than reduce it?
K: Certainly. But confusion is there; I don't claim it; it is so. Aren't
you all confused? When you look at yourself honestly, clearly, aren't
you all confused? The speaker says there is no suggestion. He is not
offering you a thing; he is not telling you what to do. But look at this
confusion carefully. Don't say there is no confusionY
Elsewhere K adds: "Clarity cannot be given by another. Confusion is in us;
we have brought it about and we have to clear it away."48 That the pro-
cess of education is not based on exchange we have already seen. As K puts
it, the teacher does not give the student "a thing," but rather invites him
or her to observe. Just like Sarikara's teacher, who cannot but repeat again
and again the "mantra" tat tvam asi, thus constantly putting the student
in a position from which he can truly (uncommitted to any previous, con-
ventional perspective) investigate and reach a conclusion regarding his own
nature, K's teacher cannot do other than persistently point out the prob-
lem. She or he wakes (or shakes) the student up, thus putting him or her in
a position to face life with all its intricacies; from here onward, it is up to
the student to deal with what is, arriving at her or his own solutions and
modes of action. By offering a solution, the teacher would take away rather
than facilitate the student's freedom.
To close, I would like to make an attempt at reconciling the irreconcil-
able, namely K's insistence on the fact that "truth is a pathless land" and
his just as firm emphasis on the importance of offering an alternative edu-
cational path. My attempt will draw on Crockett Johnson's famous chil-
dren's book Harold and the Purple Crayon. As you may know, this lit-
tle book tells the story of a boy named Harold, traveling the world with
a purple crayon in his hand. He follows a purple path that he is sketching
with his crayon, facing different purple adventures-all at the tip of the
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crayon. Harold's world is not "given" or "ready-made," but rather created
at every step by none other than himself. Having gone out for an evening
walk, Harold suddenly forgets his way home. Worried as he is of getting
farther lost in the woods, he draws a very small purple forest consisting
of only one tree. It turns out to be an apple tree, and Harold thinks that
the apples will be very tasty when they get red. So he puts a scary dragon
under the tree to guard the apples. It is a terribly frightening dragon, fright-
ening to the extent that even the hand that is drawing trembles with fear.
So far-if I may offer my own bha~ya to the story-Harold is a typical
Advaitin, crafting his world, frightened by a dragon (in place of the tradi-
tional snake) that he himself has created. When time comes to go to sleep,
Harold needs to find the way home. He draws a lot of purple buildings
with purple windows, but he is not sure which of the windows is his own.
He therefore approaches a policeman (ironically depicted by Johnson as a
clown), asking him which way to go. The policeman-who turns out to
be a "Krishnamurti type of teacher" - "points the way Harold was going
anyway. But Harold thanks him, and walks along with the moon." The
happy ending is inevitable: Harold finds home, draws his purple bed, and
drops off to sleep.
What is the contribution of this story to our discussion? I would like to
suggest that, for K, education is a "pathless path." To an "Indian ear," this
inner contradiction would sound challenging, even familiar. Is true renun-
ciation, for example, not defined by Sarikara as "actionless action'?49 Har-
old's path, I would like to suggest further, is an illustration of such a "path-
less path"; it is spontaneously created anew by him every moment (hence
leading from the present to the present); it is a ni~tha, in Sarikara's sense
of the word, namely existential, even experiential, not at all a theoretical
way of living. The "pathless path teacher" invites Harold to embark on
his journey and equips him with a crayon to sketch his own path; he is a
traffic policeman (with a smile!), always giving you the right of way, espe-
cially when it seems to you that you have altogether lost your path. He is
always available, a co-traveler on a parallel path, sketched with his own
crayon. He is always available, willing to sit under a tree, share a cup of
chai, and openly discuss the hardships of the way. But all the same, the stu-
dent is alone, always alone, necessarily alone; not lonely, but rather alone.
His aloneness is his freedom. He is a light to himself. And when the sun
sets, he thanks the teacher (until their next meeting) and walks along with
the moon.
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Part VI
Education and the
Aesthetics of Moral Cultivation

FRED DAllMAYR
22 Beautiful Freedom
Schiller on the l'Aesthetic Education" of Humanity
During his dark period, the Spanish painter Goya depicted the horrors
and "monsters" that are slumbering or lying in wait behind the fa«ade of
reason. In doing so, he anticipated one of the most troubling questions
besetting the ensuing centuries: how is it possible that one of the most
developed and scientifically advanced civilizations on earth-Western civ-
ilization-could spawn the string of atrocities ranging from Auschwitz to
Hiroshima to Abu Ghraib? How is it that such a vast expansion of knowl-
edge and information could be accompanied by such a derailment of con-
duct and such an atrophy of ethical sensibilities? The question has occu-
pied major social thinkers in the West. In his "Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism," Max Weber presented modern society as being pop-
ulated chiefly (or tendentially) by two character types: "specialists with-
out spirit" and "sensualists without heart." In turn, Alasdair MacIntyre,
in his After Virtue, portrayed contemporary Western society as dominated
by a limited number of "stock characters," and chiefly two: the "manager"
wedded to the efficient functioning of anonymous rule systems, and the
"aesthete" devoted to privatized consumption and gratification. In light
of these stock features, he noted, contemporary society reveals a curious
coexistence of two strands: the "realm of the organizational," governed
by objective rules, and the "realm of the personal," governed by private
whim.!
As it happens, these features are not a discovery of recent theorists.
More than two hundred years ago, the German poet Friedrich Schiller
had penned these lines: "The Enlightenment (Aufklarung)-not unjustly
praised by the educated elites of our time-is in the end a merely theoreti-
cal culture, a culture which, on the whole, is not only incapable of cultivat-
ing ethical sensibilities (Gesinnung), but in fact aids and abets the spreading
corruption in society, rendering the latter incurable. "2 The lines are found
in draft manuscripts preceding the publication of Schiller's famous "Let-
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ters on the Aesthetic Education of Humanity" (Briere aber die iisthetische
Erziehung des Menschen, of 1795). As one will notice right away, the term
"aesthetic" here does not coincide with subjective whim in MacIntyre's
usage, but rather refers to the entire range of human sensibilities that pre-
cisely need to be cultivated or educated for the moral and political benefit
of humanity at large. Fifty years ago, in 1955, on the occasion of the one-
hundred-fiftieth anniversary of Schiller's death, Thomas Mann praised the
humanism, indeed the cosmopolitan humanism, of Schiller, extolling it as
the "demand of our time" -provided humanism (Humanitat) ceases to be
a merely abstract axiom and instead embraces our heart and sensibilities
as well. This "comprehensive feeling," he said, is what is "needed" (not-
tut) above all.3
Mann's words, I believe, have lost none of their urgency today. The fol-
lowing pages are meant as a contribution to the two-hundredth anniversary
of Schiller's death. As I realize, Schiller's argument in the "Letters" -and
indeed the entire worldview of the classical age of German literature-is
quite removed from contemporary perspectives or frames of understand-
ing. For this reason I shall, in a first step, provide some historical back-
ground in an attempt to profile the "Letters" against prominent intellec-
tual currents of modernity. Next, I shall offer a condensed discussion of
the main points made in the "Letters," paying special attention to Schil-
ler's relations to Kant and Fichte. By way of conclusion, I shall sketch the
chief lines of subsequent historical responses (Wirkungsgeschichte) in order
to present finally some comments on the present-day significance of Schil-
ler's work.
Diremptions of Modernity
The stock characters mentioned by MacIntyre have not always dominated
social life in the manner they do today. For a long period of time-stretch-
ing from antiquity through much of the Middle Ages-the domains of
thinking and doing, of rational knowing and feeling or sensibility were
more closely correlated (without being entirely fused). The same linkage
prevailed between public and private spheres and hence between politics,
ethics, and the arts. The philosopher who most clearly epitomized this
relatedness was Aristotle, whose work served as model and benchmark
for many centuries. In the words of Hans-Georg Gadamer: "Aristotle gave
expression to what was basically already implicit in the Socratic and Pla-
tonic doctrine about the knowledge of virtue-namely, that we do not just
wish to know what virtue is, but to know it in order to become good."
Accentuating the connection and correcting a potential "intellectualism"
in Socrates and Plato, the Aristotelian notion of "ethos" highlighted pri-
marily one point: namely, that "virtue does not consist merely in [theoret-
ical] knowledge," since the very possibility of knowing depends on "what
a person is like" and what a person is like is "formed beforehand through
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his or her education and way of life." Reflecting on the basic tenor of Aris-
totle's philosophy, and especially on the key feature of situated judgment
(or phronesis), Gadamer reaches this conclusion: "The crux of Aristotle's
philosophical ethics, then, lies in the mediation between logos and ethos,
between the cognitive faculty of knowing and the substance of being."4
As is well known, the symbiosis depicted in these lines was dissolved
or ruptured in the late Middle Ages and with the onset of modernity. In a
sense, the whole worldview of modernity can be seen as an assault on Aris-
totelian linkages and mediations. The rise of nominalism and voluntarism
during late medieval times drove a wedge between knowing and willing
(or doing) and also between public (or "universal") categories and private
particularity. The decisive break with the past, however, was triggered by
modern rationalism, and especially by Descartes' equation of reason with
an inner mental faculty. What emerged with Descartes' philosophy was the
demise of classical holism in favor of a systematic dualism or bifurcation:
the dualism between mind and matter, between inside and outside, between
subject and object, and between reasoning and acting (as well as creating).
Taken together, all these modes of bifurcation carried a profound tension
into individual and social life; during the classical age of German philoso-
phy and literature, they tended to be seen as "diremptions" (Entzweiungen)
calling for both theoretical and practical remedies.
Without doubt, the chief glory of Western modernity resides in the
steady advancement of science and technology, coupled with the unleash-
ing of market forces propelled by individual enterprise; in large measure,
Western civilization tends to be identified today with those traits. Both
advances, however, share a common drawback: the neglect or sidelining of
ethical and aesthetic praxis (that is, of the older Aristotelian ethos). Faced
with the dominant trademarks of Western modernity, modern ~thics and
aesthetics suffered a common fate: in order to remain viable or even intel-
ligible, they had to adjust to the dominant paradigms of the age-that is,
cognitive rationality and subjective feeling or sensation. The history of eth-
ics and aesthetics during the pre-Enlightenment and Enlightenment period
gives ample evidence of this kind of adjustment (an evidence to which I can
allude here only in the briefest way). On the one side, we have the empha-
sis on private feeling or sensation as articulated by the "moral sense"
school-a school loosely associated by MacIntyre with the rise of moral
"emotivism." On the other side, we have strenuous efforts to subsume eth-
ical and aesthetic praxis under the norms of cognitive rationality and to
derive the former deductively from the latter-efforts that form the hall-
mark of modern "natural law. " Most prominent among the advocates of
the second approach were the pre-Kantian proponents of rationalist meta-
physics such as Lambert and Christian Wolff.s
Notwithstanding partial anticipations, the decisive struggle with or
against modern diremptions was the hallmark of classical German philoso-
phy and literature. In this respect, several stages of argumentation need to
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be distinguished: stages leading from the preclassical "Sturm und Drang"
period via Kant to ~he high-classical period represented by Fichte, Schiller,
and Hegel (and the postclassicism of Schelling). During the immediate pre-
classical period, one voice in particular stands out because of its spirited
elan: that of Johann Gottfried Herder. Deeply affected by the intellectual
tendencies of his time, Herder was alarmed both by the arrogance of enlight-
ened rationalism and by the decay of ethical sensibilities-or rather, by the
mutual complicity of rational abstractions and sensual decay. As he wrote
in his treatise Another Philosophy of History for the Education of Human-
kind (1774), the ascent of enlightened reason has had a deeply ambivalent
result: on the one hand, "light, infinitely elevated and dispersed"; on the
other hand, "affective inclination (Neigung) and the drive to live incompa-
rably diminished." For Herder, "education of humankind" could not rely
on abstract ideas alone, for-as he wrote-"ideas only yield ideas"; but
how are they meant to transform human conduct concretely and to "mix
within the soul"? The basic task of education, in his view, resided in the
reflective cultivation and elevation of human sensibilities-something that
could not be accomplished by depending either on abstract rules or untu-
tored sentiments (in the empiricist vein).6
Herder's Another History was imbued with youthful fervor-that
needed to be further filtered and refined through philosophical reflection.
This refinement was basically the work of Kant and Fichte. Philosophically,
Kant was reared in the rationalist metaphysics bequeathed by Lambert
and Wolff; but, as he himself admitted, he was raised from his "dogmatic
[rationalist] slumber" by his encounter with Hume. To be sure, this awak-
ening did not land him in the empiricist camp; instead, it turned him into
a rationalist of a special sort: one intent on specifying the precise boundar-
ies or limits of reason. In his ethics, Kant was willing to assign a support-
ive and facilitating role to human inclinations-making it clear, however,
that this role was secondary and passive in comparison with the actively
governing role of reason. This top-down arrangement was further relaxed
in Kant's aesthetics, and especially in his theory of "aesthetic judgment,"
which, for him, was anchored not so much in cognitive reason as in the fac-
ulty of "imagination" guiding human "taste."7
Kant's writings had a profound impact on his contemporaries, func-
tioning as a kind of yardstick of philosophical reasoning. Most intellectuals
of the time, including Schiller, underwent its influence-although efforts
were soon afoot to modify the more rigid contours of Kantian thought.
Leading these efforts in the German context was Johann Gottlieb Fichte, an
early follower of Kant and later Schiller's colleague in Jena. What troubled
Fichte in Kant's philosophy above all was the unresolved tension between
mind and matter, inside and outside, between the knowledge-constituting
role of reason and the external "things-in-themselves"-a tension repli-
cated in the gulf between rational duty and sensual inclination. For Fichte,
it was a demand of reason itself not to leave this gulf unattended. Basically,
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what such attention yielded was insight in the impossibility of one-sided
formulas-that is, recognition that the very conception of the self presup-
poses the nonself, the constitution of the ego that of the non-ego (Nicht-
Ich). This insight, in turn, led to the conception of the ultimate co-consti-
tution 6f self and nonself, or else the conception of a basic reciprocity or
reciprocal relationship (Wechselwirkung)-a notion not far removed from
the idea of "dialectics" as developed by classical idealism.8
Schiller's Letters
The preceding discussion of modern intellectual trajectories has led us to
the threshold of Schiller's own work. Like a prism, this work gathered or
brought together all the great intellectual tendencies of his age, while simul-
taneously transforming and integrating them in a higher, more creative syn-
thesis. Literary historians have instructed us about the broad range of influ-
ences operating on the poet. The young college student was introduced by
his teachers to Enlightenment rationalism (from Descartes to Wolff), to
"moral sense" empiricism (from Hutcheson to Hume), as well as to leading
texts in contemporary psychology and physiology. In telling fashion, his
doctoral thesis (submitted at the end of his medical studies) was devoted
to the examination of the "correlation between the animal nature and the
spiritual nature of human beings." What surfaced here was a question that
was to occupy Schiller for the rest of his life: namely, how internal spiri-
tual freedom is possible or conceivable in the face of humanity's location
in the nexus of natural forces and instinctual drives. By way of a critique
of both rationalist metaphysics and British empiricism, the thesis arrived at
the conception of a "middle force" or "physiological spirit" (Nervengeist)
capable of mediating between nature and spirit, physis and logos.:
During the years following his thesis, Schiller emerged quickly as one
of the leading literary figures of his age: as writer of dramatic, quasi-Shakes-
pearean plays, author of lyrical poems, and historiographer of major histor-
ical events. The same years also provide evidence of his intensive involve-
ment with Kantian philosophy, especially the Critique of Judgment (first
published in 1790). An initial outcome of this involvement was a series
of writings composed between 1791 and 1793 dealing with a variety of
related topics, such as the "ground of enjoyment," the meaning of "tragic
art," and the nature of the "pathetic" and the "sublime." Relying clearly
on the Kantian distinction between "noumenal" freedom and "phenome-
nal" dependence or heteronomy, Schiller in these essays located the core of
dramatic pathos precisely in the tension and possible collision between free-
dom and external determinism. Regarding art and aesthetics, Schiller-to-
gether with Kant-opposed their equation with rational cognition while
also questioning their reduction to private sensation or pleasure. Going a
step beyond Kant, however, his essays adumbrated the possibility of a rec-
onciliation between freedom and sensibility in the concept of the "beauti-
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ful" seen as the sensual manifestation of ethical freedom (Er-scheinung der
Freiheit). This move toward a closer correlation was continued in Schiller's
famous essay on "Anmut und Wurde" (Grace and Dignity) of 1793 where
the former was portrayed as the harmony of freedom and nature and the
latter as the maintenance of freedom in the face of external adversity.lO
The mentioned essays were only preambles to Schiller's most ambi-
tious theoretical work: his "Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Human-
ity." As previously indicated, the "Letters" were preceded by draft manu-
scripts sent to the Danish prince of Augustenburg. In these manuscripts,
Schiller made the intention of his work abundantly clear: aesthetic educa-
tion was to remedy the deficit of concrete sensibility evident in Enlighten-
ment rationalism and demonstrated so graphically in the brutal aftermath
of the French Revolution. What was needed in the modern context was
both a tempering of abstract (Jacobin) logic and a refinement of brute sen-
suality through art. The "Letters" of 1795 comprise twenty-seven install-
ments, which appeared consecutively in a journal edited by the poet. The
installments can be subdivided into three major portions or segments: a
first segment discussing the intellectual and historical background (Letters
1-9); a second more philosophical portion offering a quasi-transcendental
analysis of the nature of art and aesthetics (Letters 10-16); and a final sec-
tion exploring the practical-ethical and political implications of the preced-
ing arguments (Letters 17-27). Throughout, the letters reveal a continuous
engagement with, and transgression of, the Kantian paradigm of aesthetic
judgment. They also reflect an adaptation of certain Fichtean initiatives
regarding the relation between ego and non-ego, self and other-now
transposed into the realm of art and aesthetic creativity. Finally, and most
prominently, the letters seek to vindicate Schiller's conviction of the impor-
tance of the cultivation of aesthetic sensibility as a gateway to genuine free-
dom and social-political well-being.
The opening segment offers a stark portrayal of the ambivalent char-
acter of the modern age-what more recently has been termed the "dia-
lectic of enlightenment." In his very first letter, Schiller invokes the author-
ity of "Kantian principles," which would serve as guideposts in subsequent
arguments; however, this authority is immediately qualified by the avowed
need to rely on "feelings [or sensibility] no less often than principles." For,
the letter explains, left to its own devices philosophical reason tends to
demolish sensibility, to "compress sensual appearance into the fetters of
rules, to dissect its fair body into concepts, and preserve its living spirit
in a mere skeleton of words." Ensuing letters underscore the detrimental
effects of modern diremptions or bifurcations, especially the diremption
between reason and desire. On the one hand, Schiller notes, we find "mate-
rial needs" reigning supreme and bending "a degraded humanity beneath
their tyrannical yoke." On the other side, enlightened reason has led to
the advancement of sciences bent on "wresting one province after another
from the imagination."
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In vivid terms, the fifth letter depicts the human and social costs of
these developments. The progress of Enlightenment, we read, has laid siege
to a natural human condition governed by instincts and has brought into
view a different prospect: namely, the possibility of "setting law upon the
throne, of honoring humanity at last as an end in itself, and of making true
freedom the basis of political association." This prospect, however, has
proved to be entirely illusory, giving way instead to "extremes of human
depravity." Among ordinary people, the letter states, we are confronted
with "crude, lawless instincts, unleashed with the loosening of the bonds of
civil order." Among the educated classes, on the other hand, one finds "the
repugnant spectacle of lethargy and of a depravation of character which is
all the more offensive as civilization itself is its source." Civilized advance-
ment, in a dramatic reversal, thus is accompanied by a barbaric regres-
sion (first noted by Herder and Rousseau): "In the very bosom of the most
sophisticated social life, egotism has erected its system, and without ever
acquiring a truly sociable heart, we only suffer the contagions and afflic-
tions of society." Hence, Schiller concludes, the spirit of the age hovers
hopelessly "between refined perversity and brutality, between unnatural-
ness and mere nature, between superstition and moral unbelief."!!
From this portrayal of modern times, the letters turn to a comparison
of ancient-and modern culture-conventionally styled as "la querelle des
anciens et des modernes." For Schiller, ancient-especially Greek-cul-
ture had much in its favor; above all, it managed to combine in some kind
of unity what modernity splits asunder. In ancient Greece, sensibility and
intellect did not yet move in opposite directions because no dissension had
yet pushed them "into hostile partition." In contrast to the modern divi-
sion of mind and matter, intellect and passion, ancient reason-no mat-
ter how high it might soar- "always drew matter lovingly with it," and
however fine the distinctions it might make, it did not "proceed to muti-
late." How different the situation has become in modernity with its bent
to fragmentation! Whereas antiquity reflected an "all-unifying nature,"
modern times pay homage to the "all-dividing intellect." In Schiller's view,
the change was manifest also in politics and the character of government.
Divorced from the lifeblood of an ethical community, modern government
develops into a rational artifact, into a "crude and clumsy mechanism" of
control.!2
Although deploring modern diremptions, Schiller did not view moder-
nity as either avoidable or entirely without merit: the separation of domains
also gave a powerful boost to human freedom and the unfolding of individ-
ual talents and capabilities. The question for him was how modern divisive-
ness could be tamed without stifling human freedom-differently phrased,
how freedom could be promoted in such a way as to transcend fragmenta-
tion. As he phrased the issue, we must find a way "to restore by means of a
higher art and culture that very wholeness of our nature which art and civ-
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ilization have destroyed." How or by what means could this recovery be
accomplished? Schiller doubted that modern politics or government were
suitable means for the purpose. Given their corruption and their reduction
to mechanisms of control, modern states-far from being agents of trans-
formation-themselves needed to be transformed. The only hope thus
resided in education, and especially in aesthetic education that would cul-
tivat~ sensibilities so as to render them congruent with ethical freedom. In
accentuating aesthetic education, Schiller was not so much denying mod-
ern reason and civilization as rather attempting to place freedom on a more
promising ground. As he wrote in his eighth letter: "Reason has done its
work when it has discovered and established the (moral) law; its implemen-
tation, however, demands a resolute will and the ardor of feeling." If rea-
son and truth wish to be victorious in the struggle with primitive instincts,
they must themselves "become a force (Kraft)" and "appoint some drive
(Trieb) as their champion in the realm of concrete phenomena." 13
As indicated before, the middle segment of the "Letters" seeks to pro-
vide a philosophical (or quasi-transcendental) grounding of the nature of
art and aesthetic education, an endeavor I bypass here except for hinting
at some key points. It is in that segment that Schiller develops his famous
theory of human drives (Triebe), thus distantly anticipating Freud, Mar-
cuse, and others. Based on the Kantian distinction between reason and sen-
sation, between "noumenal" and "phenomenal" domains, Schiller ascribes
to human beings two primary but opposed drives: the "material drive"
(Sinnentrieb, Stofftrieb) rooted in sensory experience; and the "form drive"
(Formtrieb) rooted in human rationality and noumenal subjectivity. Mov-
ing dramatically beyond Kant, however, Schiller introduces a third drive,
which mediates and transcends the primary drives: the "play drive" (Spiel-
trieb). It is this play drive that is the real source of human freedom by lib-
erating humans both from the compulsions of nature and the constraints
of moral law (duty). It is a drive anchored in beauty, and thus inaugurates
a realm of "beautiful freedom."
For Schiller, the "play drive" completes the "idea of humanity" by
establishing a standard of harmony that can serve as yardstick for art and
aesthetic education. Judged by this yardstick, Schiller adds, most of the
aesthetic theories prominent during the modern period can be seen to be
faulty or lopsided. This goes both for theories that equate beauty with
sensual pleasure or moral senses-Schiller mentions especially Edmund
Burke-and for the "dogmatic systems" of speculative philosophers that
reduce art to rational cognition. What all these theories are missing is the
appeal of aesthetics to an ideal of human completion-that is, the intrinsi-
cally humanizing quality of art. For, "to mince words no longer, only when
playing are human beings properly and in the full sense human, and only
fully human beings are able to play."14
In the concluding letters, Schiller concentrates on the humanizing
effects of art as well as its social and political implications. As we read in
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the twenty-second letter, it is in art and aesthetic beauty that "our human-
ity is disclosed with a purity and integrity as though it had as yet suffered
no impairment from adverse forces." The reason for this purity resides
in the fact that art and beauty release us from the compulsions of both
instinct and abstract reason-that is, from our domination by nature as
well as reason's impulse to dominate nature-and thus reveal a mode of
freedom beyond instrumental use. Above all, art and beauty are not goals
to be pursued, panaceas to be executed or implemented, because, residing
in the realm of free play, they are inaccessible to fabrication or social engi-
neering. Unable to willfully fabricate them, humankind cannot properly
take credit for beauty and art but has to acknowledge them for what they
are: gifts bearing the mark of divine grace. The capacity granted to us in the
aesthetic dimension, Schiller writes, must be regarded as "the highest of all
bounties, as the gift of humanity itself (Schenkung der Menschheit)."!5
Although beyond willful manipulation, art and beauty appeal to, and
find support in, human sensibility-which can and needs to be awakened
through aesthetic education. At this point, the pedagogical motive of Schil-
ler's Letters assumes center stage. As he writes in a famous passage: "There
is no other way of making sensual-instinctual beings rational except by
first making them aesthetic" (that is, fostering their aesthetic sensibilities).
For Schiller, in order to prosper and not to become destructive, reason and
morality require the underpinning of aesthetic sensibility which alone fur-
nishes a motivation for conduct and a passageway from nature to norm.
Therefore, "one of the most important tasks" of culture and education is
to prepare through art a seedbed for truth and virtue; the basic point is to
teach humans to "desire more nobly" so that they do not instantly have to
"will sublimely." 16
By way of conclusion, Schiller reflects on possible implicatiqns of aes-
thetic education for social and political life. Here he distinguishes three
types of social-political regimes: a natural-dynamic, a moral-rational, and
an aesthetic regime. While in the first type-also termed "state of natu-
ral rights"-human impulses collide like forces of nature, and while in
the second type moral duty reigns "with the majesty of law," the aesthetic
regime allows individuals to interact playfully as free agents. In Schiller's
words: in the midst of "the fearful kingdom of forces" and "the sacred
kingdom of laws," the aesthetic faculty guides individuals into a "joyous
kingdom of play and semblance in which they are relieved of the shackles
of circumstance and released from both physical and moral constraints."
Entry into this last kingdom is not a haphazard event, but prepared by both
nature and reason. While the former provides the impulse and the latter the
norms, aesthetic sensibility alone sustains society as a mode of sociability:
"Although needs drive individuals into society, and reason implants prin-
ciples of conduct, beauty alone can confer on individuals a sociable char-
acter. Taste alone brings harmony into society because it fosters harmony
in individuals."!?
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The Legacy of Beautiful Freedom
In celebrating the taming of brute forces through art, Schiller's "Letters"
constitute a manifesto of a gentle and high-minded humanism, extolling the
crucial work of humanization through education. Despite their complexity
and occasional inconsistencies, it is important to uphold the central merit
of Schiller's work: his attempt to promote morally responsible freedom,
and a morally responsible free society, through art and aesthetic sensibil-
ity. This merit tends to be missed by critics who-often driven by political
or ideological motives-fasten on simplistic or extraneous objections. One
such objection has to do with Schiller's focus on the "play drive" and artis-
tic playfulness, a focus, it is claimed, that elevates cardplayers or billiard
players to ideal models of humanity. What critics here ignore is that "play"
for Schiller is not an occasional pastime or entertainment, but rather the
synonym for an entirely transformed human life-a life devoted to good-
ness and beauty beyond utility and calculation. IS
Another objection-equally misguided in my judgment-attributes
to Schiller certain "bourgeois" or even elitist tendencies at variance with
modern demands of social equality. A closer reading of the "Letters" helps
to rebut the charge. Schiller at no point substitutes art or playfulness for
the material drive (Stofftrieb) and the concrete survival needs of people. As
he repeatedly insists, creative imagination can play its role only once basic
needs are met-but then its role becomes crucialY
Quite aside from such (mis)readings, Schiller's work has inspired
important later debates, often serving as a kind of benchmark for assessing
intellectual trends.20 Well known is the tribute that Hegel, his junior by a
decade, paid to Schiller when he praised him for pointing the way beyond
Kantian one-sidedness-more specifically, for having "broken through
Kantian subjectivity and abstract reasoning in order to grasp and express
through art the truth of unity and reconciliation. "21 Schiller's bold attempt
to bridge reason and nature, freedom and sensibility, also connects him
with Schelling (even in the absence of any direct mutual influence). Crucial
in this regard is the statement in the fourth letter that "the cultured [or edu-
cated] person makes a friend of nature and honors her freedom while only
curbing her caprice"-a statement not far removed from Schelling's ambi-
tion to recuperate nature through sensibility in civilization.22
Resonances with Schiller's legacy can also be found in more recent
Continental philosophy. Prominent European thinkers-from Ernst Cas-
sirer and Karl Jaspers to Martin Heidegger and beyond-have struggled to
remedy modern diremptions and to inaugurate a more balanced or holis-
tic mode of individual and social life. Although himself imbued with neo-
Kantian leanings, Cassirer acknowledged in Schiller's work a remarkable
symbiosis of Shaftesbury and Kant, of "moral sense" teachings and ratio-
nal-moral imperatives. In turn, relying on existentialist premises, Jaspers
applauded in the "Letters" the linkage of art and freedom, stating that it is
Beautiful Freedom: Schiller on the "Aesthetic Education" of Humanity 385
in play-and indeed only in play-that the "freedom of human beings"
and their genuine "humanity" become manifestP In a different register,
Heidegger attempted to undercut modern diremptions through his depic-
tion of human existence as "being-in-the-world" and his key category of
"care" tSorge) located at the cusp between knowing and doing, reasoning
and sense experience. At the same time, starting in his middle period, Hei-
degger increasingly paid tribute to Holderlin, Schiller's near-contemporary
and Hegel's friend. In several of his hymns and poems, Holderlin-echoing
Schiller-had celebrated the liberating quality of art and beauty, and indeed
the constitutive role of poetry in the formation of humanity-a celebration
echoed in Heidegger's famous essay" ... Poetically Man Dwells.... "24
In my view, it is the correlation of aesthetic education and ethical prac-
tice that reveals most clearly Schiller's relevance in our time. Basically, aes-
thetic education in Schiller's sense does not imply a utopian project or ideo-
logical blueprint, but rather the practical initiation into a freer, more ethically
responsible and humane way of life. Here one should remember and take
seriously his portrayal of aesthetic life as a life of ethical freedom, a freedom
that needs to be cultivated and nurtured through the fostering of aesthetic
sensibility. In Schiller's own words (found in his second letter): in order to
resolve "the problem of politics" we need to take our approach through aes-
thetics; for "it is only through beauty that we find our way to freedom."25
Important here is also Schiller's emphasis on the nurturing of sociability
through art. To repeat a passage cited before: "Although [nature's] needs
drive individuals into society, and reason implants principles of conduct,
beauty alone can confer on individuals a sociable character."
From the contemporary perspective, one of the most impressive and
striking features of Schiller's "Letters" is his reconciliation of freedom and
ethical virtue or goodness-two categories that tend to be radically split
asunder in modernity. In our time of social and political disarray, Schil-
ler's "Letters" can serve as a classical handbook for civic education or edu-
cation in civility-especially in situations where governments are trying
to escape, or have already escaped, from the bonds of justice and civic
responsibility. Here are some additional passages that might form part of
such a handbook. A political regime, Schiller writes, "is still very imperfect
if it is able to achieve unity only by suppressing variety or difference." A
regime, therefore, should honor not only general rules but also "the partic-
ular and unique character of individuals" and hence, in erecting the intelli-
gible realm of morals, aim "not to depopulate the sensible realm of appear-
ance." Human life, another passage states, can derail in two major ways:
either by becoming "savage" when brute feeling blots out conscience; or by
becoming "barbaric" when abstract reason destroys feeling. The remedy
for those derailments is the "holistic formation of character" that is possi-
ble only through civic engagement in the "realm of freedom."26
There is another aspect of Schiller's work that is crucially important in
our age, an age marked by globalization and global "terror wars": I mean
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his freedom from ideological fervor, especially from the destructive zeal
of nationalism or chauvinism. Together with his Weimar friend and com-
panion, Goethe, Schiller was deeply imbued with cosmopolitan leanings,
with an openness to the broad range of global humanity. This openness is
a hallmark of his plays and poems. As one might recall, Schiller was also
the author of the great "Ode to Joy" that Beethoven incorporated into the
final movement of his Ninth Symphony. The ode contains these captivat-
ing lines: "Be embraced, all you millions-this kiss [I give] to the entire
world!"
In celebrating Schiller's anniversary a half-century ago, Thomas Mann
focused especially on this cosmopolitan commitment, citing among oth-
ers these lines of the poet: "It is a poor and petty ideal to write only for
a nation; this limit is entirely intolerable for a reflective spirit." Looking
at his own period, Mann noted with dismay the gulf separating it from
Schiller's legacy. Recent decades, he stated, had witnessed "a regression of
humanity, a cultural decay of the most frightening sort, a loss of Bildung,
decency, civility, and the most elementary kind of reliability." Against this
grim background, his "Essay on Schiller" calls readers and listeners back
to the lofty demands the poet bequeathed to posterity:
Work in the service of humanity-a humanity which deserves civility,
order, justice, and peace in lieu of reciprocal demonization, wild lies
and poisonous hatred. This goal is not a flight from reality into lazy aes-
theticism; rather, it is an engagement in the service of life, guided by the
will to heal us from fear and hatred through inner liberation.... Cos-
mopolitanism is the demand of the hour and of our frightened hearts.
The notion of humanity and of the broadest sympathy has long ceased
to be the expression of a "weak sentimentalism." Rather, it is precisely
this broadest sympathy which is required, urgently required today. For
unless humankind as a whole is able to remember its honor and the
secret of its dignity, we are all morally and physically 10st.27
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23 Musical Education for Peace
In Silent Night: The Story of the World War I Christmas Truce, Stanley
Weintraub recounts the tale of combatants on both sides of the front line
putting down their weapons and celebrating Christmas together in Decem-
ber 1914. A striking feature of spontaneous gestures of goodwill at many
points along the front line was how often it was facilitated by song: "it
was with shared traditions and song that the two sides approached one
another," Weintraub observes. "Yuletide carols initiated a tentative court-
ship that further developed through physical contact and ultimately the
sharing of the soldiers' most valued commodities-food and tobacco and
such souvenirs as uniform buttons and insignia.... Everywhere, Christmas
ritual-especially song-eased the anxiety and fear of initial contact."! At
times song was used to transform the struggle with the enemy into some-
thing more like sport. One Seaforth officer wrote home about a challenge
from the Germans to sing and the irreverent renditions of "Who Were
You With Last Night" and "Tipperary" that his side sang in response.
He goes on to register his surprise when "the enemy played 'Home Sweet
Home,' and 'God Save the King,' at 2:30 A.M.!" Weintraub also reports
Lieutenant Sir Edward Hulse's claim in a letter to his mother that "his 2nd
Scots Guards 'assaulted' the Germans with carols." Hulse remarked "we
are going to give the enemy every conceivable song in harmony from car-
ols to Tipperary.... Our object will be to [shout] down the now too-famil-
iar strains of Deutschland iiber alles and the Wacht am Rhein we hear from
their trenches every evening."2
Certainly, the 1914 Christmas truce was remarkable, though unfor-
tunately short-lived. And the present-day audience might ironically recall
the alternative vision of Christmas celebrations presented in HBO's mini-
series Band of Brothers. In the episode depicting the Battle of the Bulge,
American soldiers the night before battle overhear their opponents sing-
ing "Stille Nacht" -their own "Silent Night" in its original form-while
knowing full well the Germans' unrelenting aim to kill them. Nevertheless,
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the role of song in 1914, forging peace across the front lines of armed com-
bat, testifies to the, amazing power of music. Music can transcend barriers
and forge some sense of solidarity even among people who consider them-
selves to be enemies.
Ethnomusicologist John Blacking (1928-199°) was convinced that
music is a valuable means for promoting peace on earth. At the close of
his book A Commonsense View of All Music, he maintains that "human
beings have the mental equipment to feel beyond the cultural trappings of
the different worlds of music to the common humanity which inspired the
music. Thus music can become a universal language when individuals are
acquainted with all forms of artistic musical expression, and through the
transformation of individuals it becomes a 'vehicle for world peace and the
unification of mankind.'3 Anthony Storr rejects Blacking's claim, contend-
ing that it is "a Utopian phantasy which can never be realized.... Blacking,
as those who knew him realize, was possessed by that archetypal vision
of universal brotherly love which has inspired so many political move-
ments, but which, so far, has always failed."4 Plausible as Storr's comment
appears, I intend to defend Blacking. Music can help make the world more
peaceful. It not only bridges seemingly insurmountable gulfs between peo-
ple; it also offers an education in living humanely.
What happens when music brings about a genuine cessation of violence,
as it did in the case of the Christmas truce? Most obviously, music estab-
lishes a sense of fellow feeling with others. One reason that it creates
this sense-and ultimately a feeling of solidarity with other performers
and listeners-is that music exerts a powerful physical impact. As Xunzi
observes, "Music enters deeply into men and transforms them rapidly."5
Eduard Hanslick similarly comments, "The other arts persuade, but music
invades US."6 Music literally permeates the body. It is insistent, and it is
inside us.
The physical impact of music also helps to blur the boundary sepa-
rating the individual from the larger environment. Music, which literally
enters the body through the ears and our tactile sensations, also remains
part of the external world. The space inside the body and the space outside
it are resonating to the same music, and so are the bodies of all the other
people in the musical context. Even if we are simply listening, we are typ-
ically motivated to move along with the music, even if we suppress that
urge. Perhaps we even feel like dancing, literally moving around in space,
an apt way of expressing the simultaneous presence of music within our
bodies and within the area that surrounds us.
Other people in the vicinity are part of that larger environment with
which we become attuned through music. We recognize them as fellow par-
ticipants in the musical experience and as similarly affected by it. The same
music that invades us invades them as well. We feel physical sympathy with
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them because we consider ourselves to be undergoing essentially the same
physical experience.7 Music forges a real, palpable connection between us.
Literally, we identify with music. We often feel as though our own psy-
chologicallives are well expressed by music, even when we are only listen-
ing. Insofar as we take other people to be possessed by music just as we are,
we extend our identification with music to identification with them.
Music also transforms our sense of time. It replaces our everyday sense
of the temporal flow with its own alternatively structured time. When
we successfully attend to music, moreover, we are focused on the pres-
ent moment in a way that we usually are not during our everyday pur-
suits. Accordingly, our ordinary agendas become less focal during musi-
cal experience. These agendas can isolate us or put us in competition with
each other. In that musical experience centers us on the present, we take a
break from our routine attitudes toward both ourselves and others. This
break provides occasion for greater openness to sympathy with the others
who surround us. Being in the present, we are aware of others who are also
present. Because they are engaged in a common enjoyment with us, music
creates the conditions for bonding with them.
In fact, a sense of connection through music can extend to people
beyond our physical vicinity. The sense of connection with the rest of the
audience is relatively open-ended. The audience we feel conjoined with can
spatially extend as far as the music can be heard. Given the technology of
recording and sound reproduction, in our era we no longer have to consider
the audience as necessarily restricted to a particular location. Granted, the
solidarity produced by experiencing the same music at the same time and
in physical proximity with others is particularly palpable. But the fact that
music can create a sense of spiritual solidarity with other listeners who are
not in spatial proximity has the potential to create a sense of fellow feeling
with other human beings beyond our usual sense of boundaries, whether
natural, national, or cultural. We shall return to this point later.
A second aspect of music's role in attenuating violence stems from its
role as a means of expressing emotion. I will not take up the issue of exactly
how music relates to our emotions, or whether music and emotion literally
can be said to have the same shape, as theorists such as Susanne Langer
have claimed.s But certainly, human beings tend to take music to be an
appropriate means of expressing emotional states. Xunzi aptly described
ritual and music as means of channeling emotional expression and in doing
so to offer some satisfaction for one's desires.9 Because music is well suited
to emotional expression, it can serve as an expressive outlet for political
frustrations, and a nonviolent means at that.
Music is a relatively peaceful means of political expression. It offers
satisfaction by enabling people to express their feelings in an aestheti-
cally pleasing way. Modern political events make evident people's desire to
express their political demands theatrically. Political demonstrations (often
not so labeled) display considerable creativity, and they are by definition
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for display. Sometimes the theater of expression is violent and destructive,
as was the case in the attacks on the Pentagon and the New York World
Trade Center on September II, 200I. One likely motivation for suicide
bombings and other forms of terrorism is the conviction on the part of dis-
empowered groups that other outlets for political expression are lacking. If
so, the availability of alternative aesthetic venues and a sense of a receptive
audience within the larger society are crucial for undercutting this impe-
tus to terrorism. Martin Stokes remarks on music's serviceability as a mode
of political expression among the alienated: "For regions and communi-
ties within the context of the modernizing nation-state that do not identify
with the state project, music and dance are often convenient and morally
appropriate ways of asserting defiant difference."lo
Music is a practical means for the disenfranchised to express them-
selves because some form of music making is available to virtually every-
one. Almost all of us can sing. Music also commands attention. Music eas-
ily combines with ritual, so much so that performances gravitate toward
theater. Both the performance and the consumption of music require that
those involved be focused on the present event. Insofar as a sense of the
possibility of change requires a sense that the present is not predetermined
by the past, this focus is valuable, for it makes participants aware of the
vital energies of the present and the seeming openness of their trajectory.
The fact that satisfying musical events must nonetheless take account of the
past also makes the musical present akin to the political present.
Political authorities from ancient China to contemporary Latin Amer-
ica have recognized music's usefulness as a means of political expression.
Chinese rulers were convinced that the music sung by the people was a
sure sign of how they were feeling about things, and they frequently hired
bureaus with the task of collecting songs so that they would be aware of
their subjects' current concerns.11 The powers that be in many societies
have sometimes suppressed oppositional music, fearing its effectiveness in
promoting the causes supported by song. Thus the Chilean dictatorship of
General Augusto Pinochet suppressed singer-songwriter Victor Jara. Jara
was arrested after the coup led by Pinochet. He was shot to death three
days later on September 16, 1973, after having been tortured and having
all of his fingers broken so that he could never play the guitar again. While
his fingers were being broken, Jara reportedly continued to sing "Vencere-
mos" ("We Shall Overcome"), which was the hymn of the Popular Unity
coalition that had been led by Salvador Allende. Obviously, suppression of
musical voices of dissent does not further the cause of nonviolence, espe-
cially when this suppression is conducted so brutally. Those in power may
be right to think that music is a real threat to authoritarian control. But
they are benighted to suppress music if they want to maintain peace in their
societies, for music allows for the peaceful expression of dissent. Political
authorities would do well to follow the ancient Chinese practice of paying
Musical Education for Peace 393
attention to songs to discover the people's concerns, and then to respond to
these concerns themselves.
So music can produce temporary transcendence of barriers and pro-
vide nonviolent means of emotional and political expression. But these are
not the only means by which it promotes peace. Music also serves the ends
of peace over longer time spans by offering education in humane living.
In this respect, it contributes to peace by preempting incentives for vio-
lence, providing models for social interaction, and developing skills that
are involved in humane coexistence with others.
The first way in which music promotes peace is by providing pleasure.
This might not seem to be an obvious political benefit; as we shall con-
sider later, Theodor Adorno claims that the pleasure is an actual vice if the
result is a sense of contentment. Nevertheless, if violence is encouraged by
dissatisfaction among the populace, the pleasure taken in music serves as
a damper on the volatility of their frustration. In that the pleasure taken in
live music is typically interpersonal, making or listening to music with oth-
ers can also ameliorate the sense of hostility toward the world at large that
leads some individuals to violent action. One experiences those with whom
one shares music as companions, not as opponents. The fact that music can
make the world look a bit better for a while does not, of course, represent a
reason to ignore causes of one's own or others' discontent. But the satisfac-
tion taken in music can make frustration less explosive, creating the oppor-
tunity for enough calm to deal thoughtfully with the situation.
The temporary feelings of solidarity with others that arise from shared
musical experience can have an impact on one's broader outlook as well.
As fellow participants in this common enjoyment, we come to feel that the
external environment and its inhabitants are not alien, but one with our
own physical lives. Both of these effects undercut a sense of competition or
opposition to other human beings. What is encouraged insteaa is a sense
of shared humanity.
The pleasure afforded by music is also key to its role in moral edu-
cation. Music helps to establish confidence that one is not diminished by
cooperating with others but is enlarged. Friedrich Schiller makes this point
in his Letters on the Aesthetic Education ofMan. Schiller wrote in response
to those who claimed that the arts were a distraction from more impor-
tant concerns in politically troubled times. He sought to demonstrate that
the arts playa vital political role. According to Schiller, beauty is crucial
for transforming the selfish infant into a cooperative member of society,
and the arts are the means by which society can ensure the availability
of beauty to its members. The infant believes, perhaps reasonably at an
early stage, that its survival depends on diverting others' attention away
from their own goals and toward relieving its problem. According to Schil-
ler, the essential step in developing moral sensitivity is for one to become
convinced that abandoning selfishness will not preclude the satisfaction of
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one's needs. The arts inspire this conviction. Through the arts, individuals
experience enjoyment that is shared, and that is enhanced by being shared.
The person who experiences the arts learns firsthand that satisfaction is not
a zero-sum game.
Furthermore, the satisfaction the arts provide is aimed at the entire
person, unlike satisfaction in virtually every other circumstance. Schiller
largely follows Kant in claiming that human beings possess a dual nature.
The human mind, in particular our reason, aspires to what is abstractly
perfect, while our sensuous nature aspires to the physically real. Experi-
ences of the beautiful, which the arts seek to provide, offer satisfaction to
both parts of us at once, for it provides us with elegant shape that is also
living, genuinely real for the senses. In that it addresses the entire person,
beauty is uniquely suited to express the full nature of our humanity. Schil-
ler concludes:
Though need may drive Man into society, and Reason implant social
principles in him, Beauty alone can confer on him a social character.
Taste alone brings harmony into society, because it establishes harmony
in the individual. All other forms of perception divide a man, because
they are exclusively based either on the sensuous or on the intellec-
tual part of his being; only the perception of the Beautiful makes some-
thing whole of him, because both his natures must accord with it. All
other forms of communication divide society, because they relate exclu-
sively either to the private sensibility or to the private skillfulness of its
individual members, that is, to what distinguishes between one man
and another; only the communication of the Beautiful unites society,
because it relates to what is common to them all. 12
Schiller defends the value of all the arts, but his analysis applies with par-
ticular force to music. Music affects us powerfully, engaging us on multi-
ple levels at once-intellectually, emotionally, physically, and spiritually.
As we have already observed, it literally enters our bodies, but at the same
time it pervades our environment. The boundary between what is inside
and what is outside becomes blurred. Through music, we experience that
the life within us and outside us moves to the same tune.
Music also manifests the ideal that Schiller describes, the situation in
which independent elements of society can operate harmoniously without
one dominating another. Music is able to do this because it enables mul-
tiple independent voices to express themselves simultaneously and in har-
mony. Individual instruments or voices are evident within the larger tex-
ture, sometimes going their own way (perhaps joined by other voices or
instruments of the same sort).
Within the Western tradition, much Renaissance music, for exam-
ple that of Josquin Desprez, emphasizes the free unfolding of the inde-
pendent lines against each other. Although they maintain relative conso-
nance with one another, the voices seem to qevelop of their own accord,
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unconstrained by each other. In other music, for instance the Fourth Move-
ment of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, harmony more obviously controls
the possible movements of the melodic lines, but the lines continue to have
relative independence. In either case, the music reveals the possibility for
distinct identities to be manifest along with other identities, pursuing their
own distinct trajectories. Such music provides an instantiation of the ideal
that Schil1er was defending: the coexistence of diverse elements that simul-
taneously pursue their own goals without interference from each other.
At the same time, music with multiple voices can demonstrate the pos-
sibility of reconciling divergent elements by bringing them into harmonious
interaction. Ethnomusicologist Catherine J. El1is applies Schil1er's point to
the music of the Australian Aborigines:
Through experiencing music, people can attain a perspective that allows
validly opposite opinions to coexist without damage to either. In the
process of the education of the total person, which occurs through
the use of music, the student may learn relatively little about music
(although this is not necessarily so). But he inevitably gains a great deal
of experience in reconciling and rising above contradictions both within
himself and in his relations with others. This occurs as a group pro-
cess when people centre their attention on the common goal of making
music together. 13
By making music together, we participate in creating harmony among
voices that are nevertheless expressing their own character. And this is so
whether the harmony created is the vertical harmony of Western music or
the "harmony" of musical balance.
In demonstrating the possibility of harmonious cooperation among
distinctive elements, music presents not only an ideal for social interac-
tion, but grounds for believing that it is possible to fulfil1 that"ideal. Schil-
ler emphasizes interaction at the individual level, but music can also inspire
confidence in the possibility of harmonious cooperation at the sociopolit-
ical level. For if the texture of music enables one to believe that individ-
ual expression need not compromise either its own integrity or that of the
larger social whole, it also suggests reason to believe that strong minor-
ity expression is compatible with social stability. The jazz solo provides an
especial1y good il1ustration of a strong individual or minority voice within
a larger texture. This is especially evident in progressive jazz, where the
solo instrument often displays extreme independence, at times seeming to
ignore the ensemble. John Coltrane's solos, for instance, sometimes have
this character.
Such musical reflection of social dynamics does not present the interac-
tion between minorities and the larger group as devoid of tension. The ten-
sions of human interactions can be modeled realistically. Indeed, the jazz
soloist might create considerable dissonance with the rest of the ensem-
ble. Part of the chal1enge for the soloist is to create a solo that is strongly
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individual but seamlessly rejoins the group. In this way, the solo demon-
strates that rapport does not have to be compromised by strongly individ-
ual expression. The aesthetic satisfaction that comes from a solo reveals
that we can take pleasure in adjudicating among elements in tension with
one another, a lesson that can be applied to societal experience as well.
Works of music may resolve tensions more completely than is ever
the case for political life. But this does not make them any less relevant to
our political situation. "What is perfect teaches hope," says Nietzsche's
Zarathustra. 14 In a similar vein, John Dewey sees the arts as having the
potential to direct our imaginations toward possibilities that have not yet
been achieved in actuality: "The first intimations of wide and large redirec-
tions of desire and purpose are of necessity imaginative. Art is a mode of
prediction not found in charts and statistics, and it insinuates possibilities
of human relations not to be found in rule and precept, admonition and
administration." 15 Without hope and convincing models, we will not move
thoughtfully toward a more peaceful, harmonious world. Music not only
gives us grounds for believing such a world possible; it teaches us hope and
provides the models that we need to get closer to that possibility.
Besides providing pleasure and inspiring confidence in the possibility
of nonoppressive social harmony, music provides another kind of educa-
tion: it gives its participants practice in skills vital to humane living. Listen-
ing to others is such a skill. The experience of performing music in ensem-
ble demonstrates the importance of listening to others and provides an
opportunity to develop one's skill as a listener. Again, jazz solos provide a
useful illustration. The jazz soloist might seem to be paying no attention to
what the other performers in the group are playing, but actually be quite
attentive to it.
William Day considers the development of the capacity to listen to other
musicians as itself a kind of moral education. He comments on Steve Lacy's
account of his experience playing with Thelonious Monk, in which Lacy
describes his initial efforts to show off and his subsequent development both
as a person and as a musician. Lacy reports that at one point Monk told him
that he should make the drummer sound good. Day comments:
Lacy's playing at the time did not so much reveal as expose his thinking,
in its confusion. The question about instructing thinking now becomes:
What confusion of thinking is removed by taking up the advice to make
the drummer sound good.
It is not exclusively a musical confusion; it is also a moral confusion.
("I learned ... not to just play interesting notes just to be interesting.... 1
was trying to be too hip.") One might characterize it as the false con-
viction that my identity (musical or otherwise) is, since mine, best pur-
sued in isolation.16
Through his experience with Monk, Lacy learned to reinterpret his own
identity. Instead of an isolated individuality, he came to consider his iden-
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tity in relation to others and to reconceive success as a matter of effective
responsiveness. Day summarizes this transformed outlook:
the exemplary improviser finds the task of the present moment to be
the reshaping of the experience of the present moment-by attending
to the drummer, say, or by feeding the drummer, nourishing him with
ideas-as if this were what his identity rested upon, or as if learning
that "resting" is not the most unquestionable or indubitable attitude for
one's (musical) identity to assume. l ?
Music offers practice in other skills as well. Through experienc-
ing music that involves buildup and resolution of tensions, we can prac-
tice delayed gratification, as Leonard B. Meyer suggests. IS We can learn
to enjoy the whole cycle of tension and resolution, instead of seeing the
moment of resolution or fulfillment as the only part of the process that can
satisfy. Translating this insight into daily life may not be automatic, but the
skill of appreciating the tension-resolution cycle is transferable.
Some of the other ways in which music provides practice in skills that
are valuable for humane living have already been touched upon. By afford-
ing a sense of connection with an open-ended audience of others, includ-
ing some people who may be different from oneself in many respects, music
can offer practice in extending one's sympathy beyond one's narrow circle.
Music can also cultivate one's ability to attend to the present moment, for
even following music requires immersion in the present. In this respect, it
can improve participants' attention span and ability to concentrate, traits
that enhance one's ability to respond to others, as well as assisting one's
ability to direct one's actions more generally.
I can imagine several objections to the view I have been defending, the idea
that music can help make the world more peaceful. First, one might point
to evil individuals in history who loved music but perpetrated violence
against other human beings. Goebbels and Hitler come to mind. Other
Nazi leaders, too, were eager to witness musical performances by captives
in concentration camps but continued to treat these performers as worthy
of extermination. Slaveholders were also often enthusiastic audiences for
the music of those they oppressed. If one considers such cases, music does
not appear to offer much of a moral education after all.
Second, some music seems not to reduce violence and destructive ten-
dencies, but actually to incite them. Music has an impact on our emo-
tions, and when it arouses particular emotions, it stimulates corresponding
tendencies toward action. But not all of these emotions are peaceful. The
behavior of some musicians and audiences bears this out. The destruction
of musical instruments used to be a signature of the Who in concert. Rock
concerts have sometimes led to people being trampled. Even more disturb-
ingly, music has been used in military operations over the course of his-
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tory to incite ferocity toward "the enemy." Michael Moore's Fahrenheit
9/11 includes some chilling footage in which a United States soldier in Iraq
describes how he and his fellow soldiers would prime themselves to kill:
"You know you're going into the fight to begin with, and you got a good
song behind you.... " He says that the best song for the purpose is "Fire
Water Burn" by the Bloodhound Gang, a song that uses strong language
in urging the roof that is aflame to burn. 19 If music can incite soldiers to
human slaughter, it can hardly be said to promote nonviolence.
A third objection is raised by Theodor Adorno. He agrees that music
often induces feelings of contentment but thinks this is undesirable.20 Con-
tentment is not the primary emotion we need politically, in his opinion;
we need bold new ideas and the willingness to seek changes in society. He
thus contends that music should be edgy, pushing people past their area of
comfort.
A fourth objection is that music can actually encourage ethnocentric-
ity, as it is tied to various cultures. When we feel solidarity with other mem-
bers of a musical audience, our feelings are based in part on our common
enjoyment of the same music. But music differs from culture to culture, and
some foreign music is downright alienating. If this is so, how is solidarity
to spread from one musical culture to a vastly different one? This problem
appears all the more harmful to my case, in that the boundaries separating
musical cultures often coincide with political boundaries as well. I will con-
sider each of these objections in turn.
First, what are we to make of the evil folk among the enthusiasts of
music-Nero strumming his lute while having Rome burned, for example?
I think we should recognize that music does not comprise the entirety of a
moral education. For example, music cannot replace the ordinary means of
instilling in individuals the idea that murder is wrong. Without accompa-
nying lyrics or messages conveyed in framing it, it is not able to communi-
cate anything so specific. Music does, however, offer opportunities to expe-
rience empathy with other human beings and develop skills that help to
translate such empathy into responsiveness to particular individuals. These
are positive moral benefits that music can offer. One can avoid making use
of these opportunities, or, as I think was often the case with evil connois-
seurs in history, one can hermetically seal off one's practical agendas from
the impact of such humanizing influences. I am not arguing that we only
need music to cultivate moral people and a peaceful world; I only suggest
that music can help.
The second objection is that music sometimes incites or encourages
violence. Of course, this is true. But music as such needs the assistance
of some other mode-often language, sometimes cultivated associations,
sometimes the theatrical aspects of the context-to promote violence
explicitly. The Bloodhound Gang's "Fire Water Burn" performed without
lyrics would probably still motivate one to move aggressively, but the lyr-
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ics insisting that one should let the roof burn probably contribute greatly to
its driving power for soldiers about to begin bombing targets. Unless some
sectarian message is added to music (through lyrics or some other means),
music encourages a sense of solidarity with others in an open-ended sense.
In this era of widely disseminated recording technology, we can reasonably
feel connected with an audience that might extend across the globe.
The fact that music can be used divisively and with the aim of incit-
ing violence shows the importance of discriminating choice in using music.
Different music can have different impacts on listeners' kinetic responses,
drive, and emotions. Schiller distinguishes between "energizing" and "melt-
ing" beauty, noting that some art is well suited to relax a tense person while
other art tends to enliven a flagging one. Music can do either, with different
pieces and performances tending more toward relaxation or more toward
animating the listener. Many psychologists observe that people often use
music in their everyday lives to regulate their emotions. In other words,
people select what music they want to hear on the basis of their expecta-
tions of how it will affect their moods or feelings. One can select music
that will reinforce an affective condition (e.g., choosing edgy music as an
expression and amplification of one's angry state of mind) or music that
will mitigate or transform one's current condition (e.g., choosing "relax-
ing" or relatively slow music to calm oneself after a strenuous day). Music
can be used to heighten an undesirable emotional state as well as to dis-
solve it. Music education should lead students to recognize the varying
impact different music can have on one's state of mind in given situations
and to develop some sense of appropriateness in using it. In the modern
world, where we can accompany our activities and our leisure time with
music of our own choosing, it is important to recognize that we can do this
well or poorly.
Third, let me respond to Adorno's complaint that music that fosters a
sense of contentment is politically harmful. Although I agree with Adorno
that music can sometimes jar listeners out of a state of complacency, and
that this is politically valuable, I do not think this is music's primary pur-
pose. Music, seemingly in all societies, serves to instill a sense of basic secu-
rity. I concur with Alan Lomax, who claims:
[F]rom the point of view of its social function, the primary effect of
music is to give the listener a feeling of security, for it symbolizes the
place where he was born, his earliest childhood satisfactions, his reli-
gious experience, his pleasure in community doings, his courtship and
his work-any or all of these personality-shaping experiences. As soon
as the familiar sound pattern is established, he is prepared to laugh, to
weep, to dance, to fight, to worship. His heart is opened.21
Alan Merriam similarly explicates his point that music contributes to the
"stability and continuity of culture":
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[N]ot many elements of culture afford the opportunity for emotional
expression, entertain, communicate, and so forth, to the extent allowed
in music. Further, music is in a sense a summatory activity for the expres-
sion of values, a means whereby the heart of the psychology of a culture
is exposed without many of the protective mechanisms which surround
other cultural activities. In this sense, it shares its functions with others
of the arts. As a vehicle of history, myth, and legend it points up the con-
tinuity of the culture; through its transmission of education, control of
erring members of the society, and stress upon what is right, it contrib-
utes to the stability of culture. And its own existence provides a normal
and solid activity which assures the members of society that the world
continues in its proper path.22
In this context I cannot give a defense of the idea that music basically pro-
motes security, beyond the hints offered in these passages from Lomax and
Merriam. But if one accepts this view, then Adorno's objection to music's
encouraging contentment appears wrongheaded. Music can penetrate peo-
ple's defenses, but it can only do so because it promotes a sense of basic
security. One of the effects of music's conservatism-that tendency to rep-
etition that is so typical of music but would be distressing in most other
arts-is to engender or reinforce a sense of background stability as well
as confidence that humanity and one's own society will continue into the
future. Music can shake people up and encourage change, but this only
works effectively, I am convinced, because music supports the belief that
one is ultimately safe.
The fourth objection to my case for music's value in promoting peace
is that music encourages ethnocentrism. The argument here is that the
music of different cultures varies, and that music of a sufficiently unfamil-
iar culture is more likely to make us feel alienated from that society than
to experience fellow feeling with its members. I think there is some merit
in this claim, and accordingly, I think music education should preempt the
problem by familiarizing students with music from other cultures. Ameri-
cans can learn to appreciate Japanese painting. Similarly, they can learn to
appreciate Japanese music, and are most likely to do so if given some basic
guidance.
The objection overemphasizes, however, the extent to which the music
of different cultures diverges. Yes, tuning varies around the world, and it
can be most jarring to encounter the music produced by a Thai ensem-
ble, for example, if one is only familiar with the tempered tuning of the
West. Rhythmic cycles employed in Indian or Javanese music are similarly
startling to uninitiated Western listeners. But much is common to music
around the world, and the commonalities can serve as entrees into a for-
eign music. Having the same perceptual system, human beings around
the world structure their music in accordance with a number of common
parameters. Throughout the world, people (I) construct melodies primar-
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ily out of small successive intervals;23 (2) tend to use a centering tone (or
tonic) in a piece of music;24 (3) use considerable internal repetition within
most pieces of music;25 (4) use similar devices (such as volume, speed, and
height in pitch space) to suggest emotional excitement;26 (5) use tones of
uneven duration;27 (6) typically construct rhythms on the basis of patterns
of twos and threes;28 (7) select tempos for different sections of a perfor-
mance that stand in simple proportions to one another (such as 1:1, 1:2,
or 1:3 );29 and (8) use frameworks of discrete pitches, or scales, usually with
uneven step size.3D The number of pitches used is usually limited to seven
tones, plus or minus twO.31 This applies even in systems that use micro-
tones, intervals smaller than the smallest one used in the West (the semi-
tone, the interval between adjacent tones on the piano). In Indian ragas,
for instance, which have at least five tones, it is seldom that a tone is fol-
lowed by one that is only a microtone away, and when this occurs, one of
the tones is almost always an ornament.32 I cannot in this context take the
time to elaborate, but each of these commonalities is of use in helping a
novice to maintain a rudimentary sense of what is happening in the music
and, most important, to remember some of the basic patterns from which
musical structure is formed.
Of course, none of these potentialities of music will assist the effort
to bring about a more peaceful world in the absence of a receptive and
responsive audience. One of the reasons music education is so important is
that those involved with music, both performers and audiences, need initi-
ation into how music works if they are to feel themselves real participants
in musical experience. Some of this education should make people aware
of music from elsewhere besides their own tradition. But even before this,
students should be introduced to some of the basic sounds that various cul-
tures employ in music and learn to aurally distinguish them. Music educa-
tor Robert Walter observes:
To approach music education panculturally rather than uniculturally
requires, initially, the development of auditory gestalts that relate more
to the autonomous qualities of sound per se than to the sounds of any
single musical culture. The modern cultural environment is so cultur-
ally mixed and confusing that it is necessary to educate the ear in the
subtleties of the autonomous qualities of sound prior to an education
in the sounds of a particular musical culture. In this way, the distinct
and unique acoustic properties of different musical cultures can best be
approached.33
Awareness of the types of sounds cultures employ in music and some of the
ways they are used is necessary if audiences are to grasp the human and
interpersonal expression involved in foreign music, and not simply inter-
pret it as foreign. Music education should expose students to foreign music,
but simply listening to foreign music is not likely to give them a sense of
global community. Students should also be helped to become comfortable
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with other vernaculars (that is, helped to overcome the initial disturbances
caused by alien tuning, etc.) and taught to recognize "universals," those
seeming constants of music and musical experience that are common to the
whole human phenomenon of music.
My arguments in defense of the idea that music offers a humane edu-
cation have implications for educational policy.
I. Musical education should be a basic part of the curriculum
and not considered an extra that is dispensable when budgets
are constrained.
2. Musical education should involve practical experiences of
performing music with others (whether or not for an audience).
This is particularly vital in the era of iPods, in which listening
to music is for many people a private activity, and as much a
means of tuning other people out as experiencing common
enjoyment with them. The value of learning to listen to others
while making music oneself has transfer value for daily life.
But one can only learn the practice of listening through
performing if one is, in fact, performing.
3. Efforts to familiarize students with at least some of the sounds
and structures of music outside their own culture should be a
basic aspect of music education.
4. Students should be exposed to a sufficiently wide range of
music to develop some insight into its impact on their moods
and emotions, in the hope that they may develop some skill
in selecting music that is appropriate for different purposes,
including regulation of emotion. In an era in which background
music is ubiquitous and ever more subject to personal control,
musical education should acknowledge this fact and help
students learn to make good choices regarding it.
In our historical context, collisions among religiously affiliated groups
are so widespread as to suggest that organized religions are generally too
sectarian in focus to convey a sense of participation in the entire human
community; and such a sense is necessary if we are to avoid intermina-
ble conflict. Music offers prospects for people to experience themselves as
part of the human community and to take satisfaction in that experience.
Accordingly, music can be a force for peace.
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24 Fact and Value in the Analects
Education and Logic
Confucius' philosophy centers on two ideals-that of sagacity and that of
a virtuous and harmonious society-and gives recommendations for how
these ideals can be approached. In this essay I shall concentrate on sagacity.
It can be justified in terms of what human beings will find fulfilling.
An intricate psychology is mixed with philosophy in the Analects.
Confucius is not unique in this: there is a similar mixture in the work of
David Hume and of Nietzsche. None of the three could be termed a "sci-
entific" psychologist. All the same, in each case there are brilliant insights.
Nietzsche had a remarkably subtle and independent view of psychology
that included human ambivalence. Confucius also has much more to say
about ambivalence than at first one might think.
The three philosophies just mentioned all contain strong claims about
what is good in human life. Hume's has a matter-of-fact quality: there are
certain kinds of behavior of which (given human nature) we are bound to
approve, and Hume treats it as obvious that what we are bound to approve
of is good. The relation between psychology and normative recommen-
dations is, for both Nietzsche and Confucius, more complicated. Human
nature is various for both philosophers; and some of what is pointed out in
typical human nature needs to be overcome.
We need to look more closely at Confucius' psychology and its rela-
tion to ethics. One question then is "How can the psychological claims
provide support (if they do) to the philosopher's normative conclusions?"
Another is "What role in education can appreciation of the psychological
claims play?'
Part of what should emerge from this is a portrait of Confucius as one
of the many philosphers in the long history of philosophy who somehow
arrived at the "ought" on the basis of the "is." In the first section we shall
look at psychological truths that were important to Confucius. The second
section will examine their educative functions. The third will outline Con-
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fucius' central normative recommendations. This prepares us to consider
the relation between the putative psychological facts that emerge in the
Analects and the normative recommendations. First, however, some prob-
lems with facts have to be admitted and discussed. The final section of the
essay will consider the logical relation of the psychological observations to
Confucius' normative outlook, relating this to the general philosophical
problem of the relation between facts and values or between the "is" and
the "ought." Passages quoted from the Analects will be in Edward Slinger-
land's translation.!
The Natures of Human Beings
Let us begin with ambivalence. Confucius' remarks are of a mixed sort.
Some are general comments, summing up a variety of experience. Some are
keyed to particular individuals, including Confucius himself. Many of the
remarks about himself express a sense of personal imperfection, along with
openness to criticism. Book 7.3 speaks of potential failings; 7.34 denies
that he has achieved sagacity or Goodness, but does claim that he is con-
stantly working at self-improvement. It is possible to see in other people
clues to what is lacking in oneself (4.17, 7.22). One might connect this
effort with Hume's observation that "No one can well distinguish in him-
self betwixt the vice and virtue, or be certain, that his esteem of his own
merit is well-founded."2 Hume emphasizes the role of "mirroring fellow
minds" in the development of the self.3
It would be a mistake to regard Confucius' self-deprecatory remarks
as conventionally modest. I think that they have to be taken at face value.
But they also may have other functions. One is that of helping students to
maintain a degree of independence in their thinking: there is little more
deadening than having a perfect-seeming teacher. Another function is that
of emphasizing the social nature of wisdom, in which discussion and a
sense of a variety of viewpoints often playa part and can be useful correc-
tives to individual lapses of judgment.
What is said to be true of everyone can be implicitly true of Confucius.
One general truth is that people desire things that are not, in Confucius'
view, most important in life. You can realize this, but continue to have the
desires. For example, "wealth and social eminence are things that all peo-
ple desire" (4.5), even though they are far less important than Goodness.
It is abundantly clear that Confucius himself would have liked to hold an
important official position-as an effective way of propagating his ide-
als but also for the eminence that it represented. In 4.5. he says that unless
wealth and social eminence are acquired in the proper way he will not
abide them. This strongly suggests that they are desirable to a degree (per-
haps a slight degree), unless they conflict with Goodness.
The next passage (4.6) has Confucius observing that he has never met
anyone who truly loved Goodness. This is a ·comment on the emotional
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power of the various things one would like to have. Even someone who
wants to be truly good, and works steadily toward that goal (as Confucius
did), may feel strongly the tug of very different aspirations and find that
the steady appeal of becoming good lacks the magnetic power that some
of these other aspirations can have. Perhaps there are exceptions to this.
Confucius remarks that his favorite student could go for as long as three
months on end without any other concern but Goodness (6.7). What about
Confucius himself? The answer is not clear.
Then there is 9.18, in which Confucius says that he has never met a
man who loves virtue as much as he loves female beauty. Here the obvious
exception is Confucius himself when he reached the age of seventy (Ana-
lects 2.4). One might be reminded of the case of Sophocles as reported by
Plato, in which at a similarly advanced age the playwright remarked that
he was no longer affected by desires that had the power of a savage and
tyrannical master.4
An aside might be in order here. Some of these comments about the
Analects might seem a bit cynical. I, however, see them as admiring. It is
a mark of a really serious ethics that it is not rosy and has room for skep-
ticism about general human goodness as well as for the ethicist's self-crit-
icism. Plato's report of the power of passions in the best of men already
has been mentioned. Another example is Kant's observation, in the Grund-
lagen, that he does not know of a single instance of an act done entirely out
of duty. "Dear self" he says will intrude.s The reader realizes with a shock
that this observation applies to Kant's own actions.
What seems central to the observations in the Analects on the mixed
wishes of human beings is this. We can have a reflective sense of what is
really important (and will prove deeply satisfying) in human life. This is
a central element of personal goodness. We also have various emotional
states that pull us in various directions. Some of their goals (wealth, status,
etc.) are truly not of overwhelming importance, but the strength of the pull
often is out of proportion to the importance of the goal. Improvement in
life hence requires management of these desires.
Two further passages can be read in relation to this. One is 1.14, which
says that the gentleman is not motivated by the desire for a full belly or a
comfortable abode. Bear in mind that there is a difference between having
a desire and allowing oneself to be motivated by it. Some desires sweep into
the mind, and we can reflectively judge that they are not for anything truly
important and should not be acted upon (or should be given low priority).
Hence it can be true, as 1.14 says, that the gentleman is not motivated by
desire for good food or a comfortable home, and also true that a gentle-
man could have some desire for these things. Similarly, one could think that
wealth is not "worth pursuing" (7.12) without in one's heart being totally
indifferent to money.
Some of what is said in the preceding paragraph requires explanation
and also qualification. It can be argued that one element that is typically, if
408 Joel J. Kupperman
not in every single case, involved in the occurrence of an emotion is moti-
vation along the lines of the emotion. I have argued for a model in which
there are three elements typically present in an emotion - feeling or affect,
judgment or construal of an object of the emotion, and motivation-even
though one or another of these elements can be missing in cases of an
unusual sort.6 So there is a sense in which to desire good food and a com-
fortable home is to be motivated to acquire these things.
We do, however, reflect on how much various desires of ours should
influence what we do, and (because of a reflective veto) the desire for the
good food and the comfortable home might not show up in an accounting
of the causal factors that can be assigned to our behavior. In this sense, one
can say that we need not allow these desires to motivate us.
There also is the possibility that we might decide that a desire should
not have significant influence in what we do, while still allowing it to have
some influence on occasions in which nothing else is at stake. Thus, we
might not allow the desires for good food and the comfortable home to
influence our behavior when there are more important considerations of
what Goodness requires, but might all the same gladly accept the good food
and comfortable home in circumstances where there was no risk of compro-
mising the quest for Goodness. It is hard to know how to speak of this dis-
counting of desires that does allow the desires some peripheral role in our
life. In a context in which most of what is being discussed consists of choices
related to the quest for Goodness, it might be simplest to say that the gen-
tleman is not motivated by a desire for good food or a comfortable home.
That is, these desires will not be strongly evident factors in his behavior.
Educative Functions of Confucius' Psychology
First, a major function is motivational. Confucian psychology provides
a prominent place for the motivation provided by the sage, and also the
near-sage. These accounts provide incentives for educational progress. The
incentives are needed for the following reasons.
The sage-and to a large degree, the near-sage-has developed a style
conducive to virtuous choice. There will also be a harmony (he) evident in
ritual behavior and other personal interactions (see Book 1.12). There can
be a deep enjoyment in these sequences of skilled behavior, and also in the
positive sense of self that they engender.
Good education also requires some motivation on the part of the stu-
dent in order to introduce a positive element of attraction to what other-
wise might be experienced as dull and dispiriting. A sense of what the deep
enjoyment is that is promised can be highly motivating. The fact that, as
Confucius points out (4.2), these satisfactions are less vulnerable to chance
than the commonly sought ones of money and prestige, adds to the moti-
vational power.
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How might a student obtain an idea of what is appealing in sagacity or
near-sagacity? There are impressive stories about the ancient sages. Confu-
cius' students had in him the example of a near-sage. Subsequent genera-
tions could benefit from the portrait of Confucius in the Analects.
Beyond all these sources of appeal, there is this. Probably we all in
some ways have divided motivations. We can experience states that would
rank high in Confucian terms, and also moods or stray desires that would
rank low. The former can give us some sense of the likely rewards, in terms
of poise, self-esteem, and psychic security, of Confucian education; and
thus can motivate us to move forward.
Second, a long period of progress is important because of the follow-
ing. If virtue can be taught, it cannot be taught in any brief way. It is tempt-
ing to suppose that transmitting a moral code will be sufficient. Such a
transmission can be highly useful, but by itself it may well not lead to
reliable good behavior, especially in difficult cases or ones involving great
temptation. A refined appreciation of what virtue involves does matter.
Such an appreciation can provide continued motivation to be virtuous that
memorization of a code often does not provide.
Third, one reason why some people might not continue to move for-
ward in virtue is that they are too easily satisfied with themselves. As David
Hume points out, there is a general tendency to overestimate one's degree
of virtue.7 The self-critical remarks of Confucius are not merely an hon-
est expression. They are also an educational tool that can serve to deflate
excessive self-satisfaction. If even Confucius worried about his faults and
mistakes, then the rest of us certainly should.
Fourth, excessive self-satisfaction is a danger, but so too is finding
so much fault with oneself that one is discouraged. This can be an espe-
cial risk of training directed toward ideals of complete purity-for exam-
ple, the training of Christian or Buddhist monastics. Confucius diminishes
these risks, in relation to the education he recommends, by highlighting
the normalcy of having faults and stray unworthy desires. Even Confucius
has these. Imperfection is always a matter of degree, and it is made clear
that you never should be complacent. (Confucius was not.) But faults and
unworthy desires are not a general reason for giving up.
Fifth and last, the education recommended has a structure. A key psy-
chological claim is that inspiration by the Book of Songs, practiced (and
internalized) ritual, and the right sort of music can move you forward.
Even if you are near the beginning of the process, this will provide hope. It
also, of course, articulates direction; and if the psychological claim is taken
seriously, it will make real progress toward sagacity more likely.
Central Normative Recommendations
Confucius' long-standing reflective opinion is that, while such things as
high official position and wealth seem appealing, the ideal life is one of
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sagacity. Sagacity would have two elements: a virtue that is deeply instilled
and reliable and also an element of what might be called wisdom. Tradition
recorded legendary examples of sagacity; in Confucius' lifetime it perhaps
did not have living exemplars, but all the same was able to be approached
by degrees. Confucius (in 9.8, a passage to which I shall return) denies that
he is wise. But he clearly was working on being better and wiser.
Let us look more closely at the two elements of this ideal: the virtue
that is deeply instilled and reliable, and wisdom. Wisdom is a concept that
is not much in accord with the spirit of our age: stories about supposedly
"wise" people who turn out to be fools are very popular. But it recently has
been the subject of investigation by psychologists, especially Robert Stern-
berg at Yale and the group around Paul Baltes at the Max Planck Institute
in Berlin.8 Sternberg accepts a "balance" theory of what wisdom is, which
insists that (unlike, say, cunning) it must have a prominent altruistic ele-
ment. Other people count, and Sternberg's view is very consonant with
Confucius' claim (2.14) that "The gentleman is broad and not partial."
(Waley has "A gentleman can see a question from all sides without bias.")
Baltes and his colleagues have investigated ways in which people
arrive at judgments that are considered by others to be wise or unwise.
The chances of making a wise judgment are increased if the experimental
subject engages with other people and listens to their views. None of these
psychologists, as far as one can tell, has read the Analects; but this finding
neatly fits with Confucius' repeated emphasis on being open to other views
and ready to correct possible mistakes.
One of the implications of this research verges on paradox. It is that
if you think you are wise, you very probably are not. This follows from
the assumption that anyone who thinks that he or she is wise would be
less likely to listen to other people and consider their views seriously than
someone who does not think that he or she is wise. In Analects 9.8 we have
Confucius quoted as saying, "Do I possess wisdom? No, I do not." He goes
on to emphasize his willingness to discuss a question with even an ordi-
nary person. This fits the portrait of Confucius in 9.4 as free of arbitrari-
ness and rigidity.
What is the relation between wisdom and reliable good behavior? In
ethics, as in the law, one can distinguish between ordinary cases and "hard
cases." Hard cases, it is said, make bad law; and in ethics hard cases are
not the ones you want to dwell upon in teaching the basic central rules of
morality to small children. A hard case could be one in which there are
unusual factors such that the sort of thing that normally is right might rep-
resent a poor decision, or in which two well-established moral rules appear
to conflict. Hard cases are just the ones in which the "village worthy" of
Analects 17.13 is likely to appear at his or her worst.
Wisdom traditionally has been portrayed as involving an element of
experience, of knowing how things tend to play out, and also of being
able to deal with complexity. It also can be argued that wisdom requires
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thought-out values concerning what is important in life. Someone who has
these attributes would be better equipped to deal with ethical hard cases
than the average person or the "village worthy" would. Wisdom hence
would be crucial to reliable good behavior.
This is particularly apparent in relation to the imagined cases that have
been prominent in ethical philosophy for a long time. Two examples in
Plato's Republic come to mind: the ring of invisibility, with which a hum-
ble shepherd grows into a great tyrant (Book II), and the near-death expe-
rience of Er (Book X) in which he witnesses someone who in a previous
life had been well behaved (someone who had had good habits, but not
philosophy) choosing an ultimately ruinous new life as a tyrant. Anyone
who knew what is important in life would not be tempted to make those
choices.
These values are crucial to the structure of the ethics offered in the
Analects. Before proceeding further, I should say something about the
word "value" in order to avoid confusion. There is a very broad sense
of the word "value" in which any judgment about how to live (includ-
ing moral judgments as well as judgments ab.out what is worth attaining
or taking as a goal) counts as a "value judgment." There is also a narrow
sense of "value," specific to the subdivision of ethics known as axiology, in
which a value is something that would be rewarding or the reverse. Judg-
ments like Aristotle's of the importance of leading a contemplative life are
of value in this narrow sense; moral judgments are not. In what follows,
"value" will be used in the narrow sense unless the broad sense is specifi-
cally indicated.
Let us return to the immediate point, concerning judgments of value in
the narrow sense. What one thinks is most important in life, and finds most
satisfying, will determine the nature of one's emotional life. Here are three
ways in which thought-through values can make a difference. .
First, there is the matter of happiness. Happiness is distinguishable
from pleasure in a number of respects. One is that happiness, in the sense
that has most concerned philosophers, can well extend over a long time
period. Pleasures, in contrast, tend to be momentary. Another contrast,
though, is this. Pleasures, especially those of the senses, tend to be reac-
tive, and not deeply connected with self-concept. People of very different
sorts often seem to derive much the same pleasure from various objects and
experiences. Nevertheless, it turns out that one's relation to oneself-the
level of self-esteem or self-acceptance-bears great weight in how happy
one is. 9 Presumably this would be reflected in the happiness of someone
who is a really good person and knows that he or she is a really good per-
son. This supports Analects 9.29, which claims that the good do not have
to worry.
Arguably there is more to the relation between genuine virtue and hap-
piness than this. The presentation of a virtuous life in the Analects, with
its repeated emphasis on ritual, gives such a life the character of a social
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dance. The virtuous person is repeatedly expressing virtue in activities con-
nected with other people, and Analects 1.12 emphasizes the harmony that
can manifest itself in the style of these activities. These represent highly
skilled performances in which one can lose oneself. Mihalyi Csikszentmi-
haly's well-known research on what he calls "the psychology of optimal
experience" finds that experiences of losing oneself in the flow of highly
skilled activities are the most prized in people's lives.
They also are largely within a person's control. You can easily lose
your money and your reputation, but it is not so easy to lose this element
(once it is attained) in your life. There is a contrast here between the satis-
factions of virtue, patterns of personal relations, and social poise, on one
hand, and those of money and prestige-things that most people want
very much in life-on the other. The second group of satisfactions is much
more vulnerable and subject to luck than the first. Hence (Analects 7.37),
"The gentleman is self-possessed and relaxed, while the petty man is per-
petually full of worry."
The second group of satisfactions have one further disadvantage. They
often are the objects of strongly felt desire. When attained, they do bring
satisfaction, for a while. But desiring of this sort is highly addictive; and
very often someone who had gained some wealth and prestige finds herself
or himself wanting more in, as we say, the worst way. There are two neg-
atives here. One is the way such people feel when they lose their money or
prestige. The other is the way in which, even when they have succeeded,
they are unlikely to be content for long. All of this is captured in Analects
4.2, which reports that "Without Goodness one cannot remain constant in
adversity and cannot enjoy enduring happiness."
Problems about Facts
The remainder of this essay will be more directly concerned with the rela-
tion between the "is" and the "ought" or (as it is sometimes put) between
facts and values, both in general and specifically in the Analects. We first
need to look more closely at the terms of the relation. David Hume famously
said that one could not derive the "ought" from the "is." He was criticiz-
ing books that, he said, produced sentences in which the operative verb
was "is" and then slid effortlessly into sentences in which the operative
verb was "ought," as if the second group of sentences followed from the
first. What is basically the same point can be put in other ways. The "is"
sentences can be said to state facts (or alleged facts); and the "ought" sen-
tences affirm values, in the broad sense of "values" in which any judgment
of how we should live counts as a judgment of "values." Alternatively, we
could speak of the "is" sentences as descriptive and the "ought" sentences
as prescriptive. ("Prescriptive" here means that their primary function typ-
ically is to guide our choices.) In any of these three formulations, Hume's
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point would be that what look like plausible trains of reasoning in fact are
fallacious.
There are issues of interpretation here. Hume is usually interpreted
as asserting that no "ought" statement can be logically derived from "is"
statements. Alasdair MacIntyre, however, in a 1959 paper to be discussed
shortly, held that what Hume actually maintained was that "ought" state-
ments could not be derived from "is" statements in the manner that was
most common (but that Hume had his own way of doing it). A further com-
plication is that one might hold that no collection of "is" statements will
entail an "ought" statement, but that there can be a logical relation weaker
than entailment between "is" and "ought" statements. If "is" statements
create a strong-but not absolutely compelling-case for an "ought"
statement, could one speak of "deriving" the latter from the former?
Then there are problems about "is" statements, which we can speak
of (from this point on) as statements of facts or of alleged facts. One prob-
lem concerns the general nature of a fact. It is tempting to think of facts as
bits of reality, parts of the furniture of the universe. But P. F. Strawson has
argued that this is a mistake, that facts are not "in the world. "10 In his view,
what we call facts always have elements of interpretation in them, elements
that are inevitable because facts are formulated in words or symbols, and
also because the facts presuppose structures of investigation and categories
governing what is investigated.
Psychological facts, whether they are those reported by Confucius or
by Tversky and Kahneman, embody ways of looking at the world and
at human life. Alternative worldviews, which would result in a different
reporting of facts, always are possible. These could represent a different
culture or subculture, or simply a different scientific or philosophical ori-
entation. Think of a Daoist psychology of goodness, such as the one amus-
ingly presented by the Pseudo-Confucius in the Zhuangzi. Ther"e can be a
very different sense of what contributes to goodness or wisdom.
It is important to say that these remarks do not represent relativism
of an "all views are equal" or "anything goes" sort. But they do represent
what is sometimes called perspectivism, the view ably developed in T. S.
Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Some views are more per-
spicuous and fruitful than others, and can represent real scientific or ethi-
cal progress. But there is no ultimate definitive single system of truth that
would be (to borrow language from Richard Rorty) a mirror of reality.
Another deep problem about facts that is related to the central issues
of this essay is this. When we ask how wise decisions are arrived at, or how
people can attain a desirable pattern of life, it may look at first as if the
inquiry is simply into what works. It can seem down-to earth and matter-
of-fact. However, the inquiry and its results are shaped by contestable ele-
ments. These include views of what does or does not constitute a wise deci-
sion, and also views of what the most desirable elements in life would be.
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In this sense the investigations of Baltes and his colleagues into what is
conducive to wisdom are value-laden. Views of what counts as a wise deci-
sion can be specific to a culture or subculture. What seems like meticulous
estimation of probabilities and means-ends relations can seem like optimal
practical sense to some and petty calculation (that detracts from the qual-
ity of life) to others.
If we want to know what will enable us to achieve a highly desirable
kind of life, our answers will depend on a starting point: namely, a view
of what would be a highly desirable kind of life. Confucius' view rests on
psychological facts about the emotional structures of various kinds of life,
and about what is likely to produce continuing reliable gratification. How-
ever, different people may prize very different kinds of gratification. The
satisfactions of a serene, poised life are likely to seem appealing to most of
us; but some might value far more highly the pleasures of a life of febrile
excitement. What counts as human flourishing is always contestable, and
hence judgments of what is conducive to human flourishing will always
rest on contestable judgments of value.
Again, one needs to emphasize that the foregoing does not represent
relativism of the "anything goes" or "all views are equal" sort. It is arguably
possible to have knowledge of values, and in particular that people some-
times are (and often are not) in a position to make a judgment of value.
Being in a position to judge the value of something does not guarantee
that the judgment will be good: there can be bad judgment of value just as
there is bad taste. But to be in a position to make a judgment of value does
improve the chances of a good judgment. It requires knowing the nature of
what is being evaluated, and also having some standards of comparison.
As Hume remarked in his essay "On the Standard of Taste," you can't be a
good judge of poetry if you have never read any really good poetry: if you
haven't, you might consider something great that a more experienced judge
could see was rather mediocre. You also cannot be a good judge of a poem
if you don't know the meanings of some of the words.
Let me sum up what I think we have seen about facts, if Strawson's
view of the interpretative structures within facts is correct, and if what I
have said about the "value-laden" character of some psychological facts is
also correct. Facts no longer look so ontologically pure, and the contrast
between facts and values (in the broad sense) will be far less neat than one
might like. This should not prevent us from drawing a contrast between
facts and values (in the broad sense), or from inquiring into the relations
between the two. We need, though, to be mindful of the imprecision and
roughness of our terms. We can take the contrast and relations as obtain-
ing between primarily descriptive statements, on the one hand, and primar-
ily normative ones on the other.
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Facts and Values
Let us return to Confucius and the relation between his facts and his ethi-
cal conclusions, looking also at what recent philosophy can suggest about
the relation. It should be clear by now that what Confucius offers is not
ethics in the abstract, but helpful recommendations that were keyed to the
human condition (including the imperfection of Confucius and of every-
one he knows). What are presented as psychological facts in the Analects
include observations about the variety of human beings and their capaci-
ties, and also about the frequent disproportion between strength of desires
and the value of what they are desires for. There also is a set of observa-
tions on methods of self-improvement (including knowledge of the classics,
ritual, and music) and on how they have been seen to work.
How do these putative facts connect with the central normative recom-
mendations? Let me begin to answer this by claiming that the facts, taken
together, indicate (I) that human beings in general need to improve them-
selves, (2) that successful efforts at self-improvement contribute to human
flourishing, and indeed (3) that they make possible a kind of calm and grat-
ifying life that is widely thought to be highly desirable. Is this a logical rela-
tion between the facts (assuming that they are facts) and normative conclu-
sions? We can see the case for answering "yes" if we look at a 1950S line of
thought about the general characteristics of the "is"-"ought" relation.
Stephen Toulmin argued in 1950 that reasons of a broadly factual
sort in ethics can give logical support, weaker than entailment, to nor-
mative conclusions. Two sorts of reasons that Toulmin mentioned were
reasons that appeal to accepted normative rules (e.g., "You promised, so
you should keep your promise") or to what promotes human flourishing.
In the end, both sorts point toward considerations of consequences. He
also points out that accepted practices and their constitutive rules could be
actually unacceptable, in which case they would hardly provide good rea-
sons in support of normative conclusions. Think of "This is how we have
treated refractory slaves for generations." The accepted normative rule,
Toulmin says, can be tested by asking whether its general observance has
good consequences. Presumably the rule that we generally keep promises
meets that test.
Some complications need to be mentioned. Not all philosophers would
agree that a normative rule can be tested by asking whether its general
observance has good consequences. Even those who do agree with Toulmin
on this could differ on what would count as good consequences. The classi-
cal utilitarians, in order to finesse difficulties and also keep their story sim-
ple, spoke of pleasure or happiness as the measure of the goodness of con-
sequences. One might wonder, then, about whether the highly pleasurable
life of a very successful sadist is truly enviable.
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If happiness is the standard, then what about someone who undergoes
a right-side lobotomy, becomes an idiot, and is "happy as a clam"? John
Stuart Mill, who expressed uneasiness with the axiology that he had inher-
ited from Bentham and from his father, in various writings pointed toward
a conception of "happiness" enriched and high-minded in comparison with
the ordinary colloquial meaning. Toulmin is following in J. S. Mill's tracks
when he deftly speaks of "fuller and happier lives."!! The word "fuller"
avoids some problems. One might equally speak of "human flourishing."
But, as we have already seen, what counts as human flourishing is contest-
able.
The most striking part of Toulmin's ethics remains the idea that
broadly factual considerations can give logical support, weaker than entail-
ment, to normative conclusions. This was attacked by R. M. Hare, among
others. Alasdair MacIntyre weighed in on Toulmin's side of the debate.!2
Macintyre argued that when Hume had made negative remarks about
deriving the "ought" from the "is," he was suggesting that it is difficult
and that attempts often are unsuccessful, but not that it was impossible.
Hume himself, Macintytre contended, derived his ethical position from
facts about what it is in human nature to approve. The textual evidence,
let me say, is very much on Macintyre's side on this point. Hume assumes
a general uniformity of human nature in the respects that are relevant to
moral judgment, so much so that his verdict on people who seemed thor-
oughly wicked (his instances are the emperor Nero and the ancient Scythi-
ans) is that they had lost their humanity. 13 Hume regards ethics as we know
it as the general expression of what it is human nature to approve and to
disapprove.
Philippa Foot also attacked the orthodoxy that assumed a sharp gap
between facts and values, especially in the form of G. E. Moore's "open
question" argument. If it is claimed that X is a good man because he clasps
and unclasps his hands three times an hour and never turns north-north-
east after turning south-south-west, then (absent some claim about the
point of this) it is not an open question whether this counts as a reason for
saying that X is a good man. It would be unintelligible to say that it did.J4
Good reasons can be understood in relation to the general conditions of
human life, and of human wants and needs.
I have argued elsewhere that Foot here has captured part of the mean-
ing of words such as "good," although the claim has to be qualified by
being limited to its meaning in typical contexts (allowing for variations
among subcultures and for idiolects).15 The word "good" typically has a
prescriptive function, urging us to do or bring about what is said to be
good; although this would not be its meaning as used at a club meeting of
satanists. It also, as Foot contended, typically has a function of praising
what cooperates toward or promotes human flourishing; although some
who are sour on that kind of thing might use it, in a special tone of voice,
to sneer. We can appreciate these typical elements of meaning of words like
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"good" if we reflect on how the meaning of the word typically is taught
to small children. Normally the child will quickly understand that to call
something "good" is to encourage it, and also will quickly realize that
what tends to qualify as "good" is cooperative, helpful behavior.
If Foot is right in thinking that part of the meaning of terms such as
"good" is that they typically are applied to helpful, cooperative choices,
this is relevant to the question of whether there can be a logical connection
between facts and values. The paradigmatic cases of logical connections of
course are those of deductive logic. It is generally accepted that the validity
of deductive inference is owed to the fact that what the conclusion asserts
is implicit in the meaning of the premises. If Foot is right, there then is a
similarity between the relation in some cases in which facts provide rea-
sons for ethical conclusions and relations that are clearly ones of logic. Ele-
ments of meaning normally found in the conclusions will already be pres-
ent in the premises.
The connections in the Analects fit the broad pattern we have been
discussing of facts providing reasons for values. If certain forms of behav-
ior tend to promote human flourishing, then (if one accepts a Toulmin-
MacIntyre-Foot sort of position), this fact can give logical support to the
normative recommendation of these forms of behavior. Such an argument,
if spelled out, could go like this.
We can assume that a life that is assured in its happiness, and
that is largely free from worries and vulnerability to luck, is
very desirable.
The life of a very good person is assured in its happiness,
because a major element in happiness is gratification provided
by acceptance of one's own character and enjoyment of the
interpersonal skills that are part of personal goodness..
Further, such a life is largely free from worries and vulnerability
to luck, because what is most valued is largely under the
control of the person whose life it is.
Therefore, the life of a very good person is very desirable.
Also:
There are ways (through appropriate use of the classics,
immersion in ritual, and through music) that one can become
a very good person.
If the end is very desirable, then (other things being equal) an
effective way of attaining it is to be recommended.
Therefore, Confucius' recommendations of self-improvement
programs should be accepted.
Confucius would never have spelled this out. We might recall his prefer-
ence for a student who, given one corner of a topic, could come back with
the other three. All the same, the argument is there, implicit in what he did
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provide. It is worth insisting on this, because a very common view among
teachers of philosophy is that something like the Analects does not really
contain arguments (and therefore perhaps should not count as philosophy).
Some of the people who hold this have a view (of what argument should
be) that is to rational thought as primer prose is to writing and speaking.
When we look more closely at the relation in the Analects between psy-
chology and ethics, we can see that there is something at work that could
be considered a logic and that there are implicit arguments.
Complications and Problems
It would be nice to end here. I do think it is clear that the psychological
facts referred to by Confucius throughout the Analects supply implicit log-
ical arguments for his ethical conclusions. Nonetheless, a fuzziness remains
in the logic of such arguments that must be admitted and discussed.
None of the 1950S philosophical discussions of logical connections
between facts and values that I have discussed claimed that the logical con-
nection could amount to entailment. The complication here is not merely
that no one has produced a formal logic of logical relations weaker than
entailment. It also is that, even when it is widely agreed that a set of facts
constitutes good reasons for a certain ethical conclusion, there can be a
range of seemingly reasonable estimates of how strong the reasons are. It
becomes tempting then to say that the strength is, at least within a certain
range, indeterminate.
An example might help. Suppose that Bloggs establishes that a certain
policy would lead to a fair amount of human suffering and takes this to be
a strong reason for holding that the policy should be rejected. Ruff con-
cedes that it is a reason but regards it as not as strong (or nearly conclu-
sive) a reason as Bloggs thinks it is; some of this suffering, Ruff contends,
will lead people to be stronger and more creative. Bloggs agrees that this
might be true, but all the same regards his reason for rejecting the policy as
stronger than Ruff thinks it is.
A discussion in Philippa Foot's "Moral Arguments" opens the door
to cases of this sort. 16 Her position is that there is a limit (as in the case of
the man who clasps his hands) to what can count as a recognizable moral
view, but that a range of views can qualify as recognizable moral views.
She instances Nietzsche: what he recognizes as virtues may not coincide
with what most people recognize as virtues, but there is some overlap (as
in Nietzsche's high rating of strength and creativity).
In much this way, a conciliatory Daoist might maintain that the facts
to which Confucius refers in the Analects do provide reasons for his eth-
ical conclusions, but at the same time hold that the reasons are much less
strong than Confucius thinks they are. Indeed, the complaint could go fur-
ther than this. It could include the counterclaim that Confucius' "facts"
are shaped by judgments of value that are disputable, and also that a bet-
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ter sense of what human flourishing is would lead to different recommen-
dations. No logic can settle this.
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SCOTT R. STROUD
25 Xunzi and the Role of Aesthetic Experience
in Moral Cultivation
Two aspects of what has been called the "aesthetic" in the Western world
are said to be of immense importance: it seems to have a significant value
to the parties involved, and it involves a non-ordinary experience by a par-
ticipating person. The first aspect has been heavily explored in Western aes-
thetics, especially in regard to what properties make works of art different
from nonart and in regard to moral evaluations of works of art.! As for the
second aspect of the aesthetic, some have explored what has been called in
the West "aesthetic experience." Key elements to this experience, according
to writers such as John Dewey, are its unity and completeness as an expe-
rience and its enlivening of the whole living observer/creature.2 This expe-
riential side is held to complement an analysis of the objective features of
an artwork, linking the properties of such an object to the subjective expe-
rience of an observer. The important point here is that some sort of special
experience caused by the aesthetic object is uniquely valued by individu-
als experiencing it.
What is the value of aesthetic experience? Western aesthetics has, since
Kant and Hegel, found its value in a removed/disinterested pleasure or
cognition free of other practical purposes. Writing on just this point, Har-
old Osborne notes that "It is usually assumed that aesthetic experience on
the other hand is of intrinsic value, a self-rewarding activity worth pursu-
ing for its own sake.... It may, for instance, open up a source of manifold
pleasures, it may have beneficial effects on character by heightening sen-
sibility, enabling one to appreciate the world more richly, and so on. But
it is the belief that the appreciation of beauty is a thing worthwhile on its
own account even apart from all incidental benefits that may accrue from
it which is the ultimate ground for all aesthetic evaluation."3 The true value
of the aesthetic experience is internal to its occurrence and is not integrally
related to issues of moral cultivation, development, and worldly pleasure.
Such purposes are not held to be hallmarks of the aesthetic experience, and
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following Kant, the presence of such motives may even impugn a given
experience's status as aesthetic. Aesthetic experience is brought on, in the
standard case, by an object (an artwork) and is an experience of a subject
that is felt as removed from daily concerns, uses, and meanings.4
This conception of the aesthetic experience, like many aspects of West-
ern aesthetics, can be widened through an examination of the aesthetic
practices of other cultures.s Specifically, I will argue that aesthetic experi-
ence is a key part of Xunzi's (Hsiin Tzu) explication of Confucius' initial
description of music and ritual in moral self-cultivation.6 Of course, the
word "aesthetic" traces its modern usage back to Alexander Baumgarten
in the 1700s, and is originally a "Western" concept. What is of importance
in regard to comparative philosophical enterprises (aesthetics included) is
that one take into account her perspectival anchorage and respect both dif-
ference and similarity in the cultures being examined. In addition, a key
methodological realization is that one is using the resources of another cul-
tural tradition for her purposes, and such use should attempt to respect
insights of that other culture while they are usefully appropriated for a
new employment (such as elucidating or reforming one's own tradition of
thought).? What is essential in the basic notion of the aesthetic, as intimated
by Baumgarten in his definition,8 is the connection of a human being, her
mind, and her environment through sensed experience. The scope of such
sensory interaction can be narrowed, but the basic experiential and lived
aspect remains.9
What is special about "aesthetic" experience will be something that is
phenomenologically unique. It will be something that is part of the expe-
rience of observing something, reflecting on something, or doing some-
thing. What is of interest to Western aestheticians, however, is the empha-
sis ancient Chinese philosophers such as Xunzi put on the actual doing of
something in aesthetic experience. This "doing" is both a bodily enactment
of some form, such as ritual (Ii) or music (yue), that is an action and that
does something outside of its merely being done. Thus, the sharp separation
of intrinsic and instrumental uses of aesthetic experience is confounded by
the description given by Xunzi. Not only does his account not center on an
object (such as an artwork), but it also holds as important the cultivating
role that such experience can hold. Confucius began a tradition of look-
ing at aesthetic activity as inherently tied to self-cultivation, but left it suf-
ficiently vague to spur later interpreters such as Mencius and Xunzi. Both
of these later Confucian thinkers fill in what was left relatively ambiguous
by Confucius-namely, the subjective nature and experience of the subject.
I will begin to give the details of such a story, first by examining a poten-
tial reading of aesthetic experience given by Confucius in the Analects (Lun
Yu). Noting that such a reading seems to emphasize the experience of an
aesthetically active subject (but lacking key details of such an experience),
I will then give an account of Xunzi on aesthetic experience (music and rit-
ual activity) that provides the subjective aspects to the experience hinted at
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in the Confucian description pulled from the Analects. Such an account is
of interest to Western aestheticians because it highlights an alternative con-
ception of aesthetic experience and its role in the moral development of the
individual, as well as correcting an overly cognitive account of Xunzi that
tends to minimize issues of bodily experience. tO
A Reading of Confucius on Aesthetic Experience
Interpreting Confucius is incredibly difficult, given the state of the surviv-
ing texts and the very nature of their composition. l1 Interpretations must
be made if we are to come to some sort of understanding of such a foun-
dational thinker in the Chinese tradition. While synoptic interpretations of
Confucius as presented in the Analects are given by David Hall and Roger
Ames and others,12 this section will focus on a narrow interpretation of
how aesthetic activities (such as music and ritual) may function in the cul-
tivation of the junzi, or refined/ authoritative person. While not being given
as the only reading of the use of aesthetic means in moral cultivation, it will
be claimed that the following reading proves useful in understanding Xun-
zi's analysis of ritual and music. Such usefulness in interpretation, after all,
is one of the guiding lights of comparative philosophy.13
One of the main purposes of the Analects is to explain the process and
goal of human self-cultivation. This entails explaining the end point of ren
(translated variously as "authoritative conduct," "humanity," or "benevo-
lence"), a term that occurs over a hundred times in the course of the Ana-
lects.14 The junzi (exemplary or authoritative person) will often display ren
in her actions and dispositions (A 14:6). Sor-hoon Tan characterizes ren as
being integrally tied to the concept of Ii (ritual): the cultivated one has an
inner disposition toward human harmony and an outer display of the ritual
actions needed to procure and secure harmony.J5 A more determinate and
simple account of ren is bound to fail, as Confucius operationally defines
it in a multitude of differing, and sometimes conflicting, ways based upon
who is inquiring about it. Two important characteristics of ren deal with
how one treats and feels toward other humans. Confucius indicates that
the person of ren establishes his character by also establishing the character
of others; he establishes his prominence by also building the prominence of
others (A 6:28). An alternative but complementary statement of ren is that
one should not do to others what she does not want them to do to her (A
12:2). In explaining this rule, Confucius talks of going abroad-you are
to treat strangers as if you are receiving a great guest, as this is putatively
how one would want to be treated were one in the place of the strangers.
With many other statements, Confucius begins to flesh out the conception
of ren. For our purposes, however, it is enough to see this goal of display-
ing ren (i.e., being a junzi) as a state of control over yourself in social situa-
tions such that you could be said to be appropriate or honorable. The ques-
tion becomes, how does one instill or cultivate this virtue?
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An answer can be culled from the Analects in terms of aesthetic activ-
ity. Confucius advises that individuals who want to improve themselves
should study music and rites (Ii) (A 16:13). The question posed to the inter-
preter now becomes one of figuring out how exactly such aesthetic activities
aid in moral cultivation. I believe that a causal reading and an experiential
reading can be found in the Analects. The causal reading of aesthetic activ-
ity would place importance on actual causal effects on a participant from
the activity of music or ritual. Thus, the activity causes certain changes in
the participant that are desirable and beneficial but are not an integral part
of the aesthetic activity itself. Taking part in music, for instance, would be
directly cultivating because it qua activity develops one's ability to empa-
thize with others. Empathizing with others, however, would not be an inte-
gral part of listening to instruments being played. Such a direct relationship
of aesthetic activity to moral cultivation can be in found in the Analects.
For instance, licentious music must be banned because of its harmful effects
on listeners (A IS:II). More important, one verse in the Analects suggests
that poetry (included in the Confucian notion of music)16 can be useful to
moral cultivation because it can (causally) instill desirable and useful traits
in a person. Confucius remarks: "Reciting the Songs can arouse your sen-
sibilities, strengthen your powers of observation, enhance your ability to
get along with others, and sharpen your critical skills. Close at hand it
enables you to serve your father, and away at court it enables you to serve
your lord. In instills in you a broad vocabulary for making distinctions in
the world around you" (A 17:9). Thus, reciting poetry is useful because it
prepares one to be a better observer, a more harmonious person, a better
subject, a filial son, and so forth. None of these stated reasons allude to a
phenomenological!experiential point to participating in aesthetic activity;
instead, the activity is important (on this view) merely because it causally
assists in producing a better (more cultivated) person.
At this juncture, I will advance the claim that there is an experiential
reading of aesthetic experience and its relation to moral cultivation in the
Analects. Such an experiential approach alludes to the employment of aes-
thetic activities (poetry, music, etc.) toward a purpose separate from the lit-
eral!causal effects of music. Such an account would involve more phenom-
enological detail, or at least point to such an aspect of aesthetic activity; the
causal view, on the other hand, refers to such activities merely in terms of
the effects they produce. Can such an experiential view be found in Confu-
cius? I believe that one can. As David Hall and Roger Ames indicate, Con-
fucius often uses analogical or correlative thinking as his primary reason-
ing style.1? Such a style uses particular and concrete images to create an
"image cluster" in which "complex semantic associations are allowed to
reflect into one another in such a way as to provide rich, indefinitely 'vague'
meaning. "18 This emergent image must then be correlated with equivalent
situations or moments in one's own lived experience. Thus, Confucius does
not offer an abstract, universal account of ren, because it will differ in all of
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the concrete circumstances in which individuals find themselves. As one's
experiences change, so do the explanations of ren-like behavior. Analogi-
cal thinking is a perfect way to convey a point about an experience that is
not in the text; the point Confucius wants to get across lies within the life-
world of his disciples (both immediate and far removed via his transmitted
teachings). Thus, his account of music could be an analogue of what culti-
vation may feel like in those concrete situations.
To begin such an account, we turn to Analects 17:II, where Confucius
is portrayed as saying, "in referring time and again to making music (yue),
how could I just be talking about bells and drums?" The experiential inter-
pretation takes, not the literal effects of music on individuals as object-like
agents to be reformed, but instead focuses on the experience of something
important conveyed through music. Thus, Confucius can be portrayed as
using music as a medium to convey the feeling of moral cultivation to the
participant. In talking with a "Grand Music Master," Confucius declares
that "'Much can be realized with music if one begins by playing in uni-
son, and then goes on to improvise with purity of tone and distinctness and
flow, thereby bringing all to completion" (A 3:23). At another point, he
remarks about the act of singing in harmony with other singers (A 7:32).
In both of these verses, he is discussing the experience of playing music, but
he is not focusing on the products of such interaction (as does the causal
approach).
Further indication that an experiential point is being made through
the activity of music is given when Confucius himself is analogized as an
instrument. At 3:24 an official says to a disciple that "All under tian have
long since lost their way (dao), and tian is going to use your Master [Confu-
cius] as a wooded bell-clapper." Confucius is being analogically described
as a timekeeper or signaling device, an instrument of tian (heaven). Thus,
music may directly help people become better (the direct view), or it could
be an indirect/ analogical route to showing them what moral cultivation
feels like. Thus, I advance the claim that the experience of musical train-
ing is analogous to the experience of moral cultivation. Notice how this
interpretation does not exclude the causal view-both are logically com-
patible. The experiential approach merely emphasizes the phenomenologi-
cal aspect of the experience of aesthetic activities such as playing music as
an analogue to becoming a morally cultivated individual. Hall and Ames
point out that while either causal thinking or analogical thinking appears
to be dominant in the Western or Eastern tradition, the other "excluded"
pattern of reasoning is also present as a recessive cultural way of think-
ing. Thus, while the Western trend has been dominated by abstract, prin-
cipled search for conceptual clarity and abstract definition, the recessive
strain of analogical thinking has been present in such voices as those of
Heraclitus, Nietzsche, and others.19 One could possibly reconcile the causal
reading with the experiential reading in a similar fashion, with the former
merely being a way of approaching the same problem with a causal think-
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ing strategy. The point remains, however, that the analogical!correlative
approach is the dominant strategy in classical Chinese texts, and should
thus be explored more in readings such as the "indirect" way I am now
examining.
This experiential interpretation is supported by portions of the Ana-
lects, as well as by Confucius' description of the junzi's character develop-
ment. An important point that Confucius strives to make about the junzi
is her instantiation of harmony. This harmony is reflected in the junzi's
dealings with others and is in turn strengthened by such interactions (A
6:30, 14:42). This not only concerns outer behavior but also inner dispo-
sition/condition. Thus, one's bodily comportment is as important as one's
inner disposition toward that comportment. At Analects 2:4, Confucius
describes the progress/ experience of his life and his learning, noting: "From
fifteen, my heart-and-mind was set upon learning; from thirty I took my
stance; from forty I was no longer doubtful; from fifty I realized the pro-
pensities of tian (tianming); from sixty my ear was attuned; from seventy I
could give my heart-and-mind free rein without overstepping the boundar-
ies."20 This is a clear description of the stages of Confucius' development
or moral cultivation. One must note the ideal and developmental nature of
the end goal: it seems to require the passing through of other stages before
one can attain the highest (and most difficult) stage. It is safe to identify
this account as the development of the cultivated or authoritative person.
The process of becoming a junzi must include this type of progress toward
cultivating one's inner self to the stage where resistance to obstacles (inner
and outer) are no longer an issue; indeed, at the final stage, Confucius'
heart-and-mind (xin) actually wants or wills all the things it should want
(all aspects are in harmony, and there is no struggle at the most fundamen-
tal level of what one wants to do and what one should do). OI}e must also
notice the musical metaphor being used-Confucius was attuned to the
propensities of heaven/fate (tianming). Such musical references to the act
of desiring and to Confucius as an instrument for cultivating others is sign
that an analogical point could be made with his musical references.
A close examination of 3: 2 3 highlights the following progression in
becoming proficient at the performance of music. First, one learns to play
in harmony with others; such a performative display can be classed as an
outer action (playing the right notes at the right time, etc.). Second, one
learns how to improvise while playing along with other musicians. This
appears to be the outer action of making musical sounds, but as modi-
fied by individual initiative (the improvisational nature). Such exquisite
embodiment of "pure tone" and "distinctness" can be individual but still
in harmony with the other musicians and the music. The conclusion to this
process is one "Bringing all to completion" -being able to fulfill one's
individual role (through individual musical skill and improvisation) and
one's role as a member of a group (harmony with the other players, or sing-
ers, e.g., A 7:32). This serves as a workable description of the process by
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which musical training proceeds, and by which one can gain an insight into
what the experience of such training may be like. Indeed, if one has such
musical training, then one may readily know that the experience is like that
described by Confucius.
This description found in Confucius is analogous to, but not identical
with, the experience of moral cultivation (as exemplified at A 2.4). Just like
the experience of playing in unison with others, one must initially learn to
follow rites (Ii) and prescribed ways of interacting with others. Such behav-
ior then results in external harmony among individuals in society. Next,
one reaches the stage of being able to freely do what one wants without
overstepping the boundaries of what one is supposed to do in a social con-
text while occupying a certain role (internal harmony coupled with and
leading to external harmony). Thus, the inner disposition of one toward
the practice of rites and moral behavior is no longer "doubtful" (A 2:4).
Finally, one brings all to completion when one willingly seeks to "estab-
lish others in seeking to establish themselves and promote others in seek-
ing to get there themselves" (A 6.30) and to not "impose upon others what
you do not want" (A 12.2). This final state also includes that of the culti-
vated junzi willingly following her heart, which due to cultivation enjoys
the rites and upholding her societal obligations. This is the state of Confu-
cius at seventy, and this is the ideal state of the cultivated person-know-
ing the correct way (dao) and wanting to follow it. The point of Confucius
mentioning musical training is to make an analogical point about knowing
how to play in unison with individuality, and wanting to create the most
beautiful order/harmony of which a song is capable. Indeed, a key point
about ritual (Ii) is that it contributes to social harmony (A 1:12). The aes-
thetic, embodied activities of music and ritual can do more than to prompt
individuals to act harmoniously; on the experiential view, such activities
can inform and motivate us in regard to moral cultivation. Knowing some-
thing about the process and experience of aesthetic cultivation (in this case,
musical development) lets one figure something out about the process and
experience of moral cultivation.
Such an indirect reading begins to show another way in which Confu-
cius uses embodied practices and training to say something about the prac-
tice and cultivation of human excellence. He hints at such a experiential
reading in such statements as "I find inspiration by intoning the songs, I
learn where to stand from observing ritual propriety (Ii), and I find fulfill-
ment in playing music" (A 8:8). The problem with the teachings of Con-
fucius, however, is that they are usually terse and incomplete in terms of
explanation; hence, later Confucians have much to elaborate upon and to
argue with each other about. As Maurizio Scarpari has argued, Confucius'
lack of detail on the characterization of human nature left a grand exi-
gency for later thinkers such as Mencius and Xunzi to address,21 Confucius
emphasized the aspects of inner and outer activity through ren and ritual
(Ii), but did not indicate what the basic nature of humanity is. This ambi-
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guity also leads to differing ru educational programs put forth by Men-
cius and Xunzi based upon their conceptions of human nature.22 Another
important ambiguity in the Confucian account, related to the composition
of human nature, is what such an experience of cultivation feels like. Thus,
the end' point of the analogy between musical training and moral activ-
ity is still unclear-one must still wonder about the details of "giv[ing]
[their] heart-and-mind free rein without overstepping the boundaries" (A
2:4). Concentrating on Xunzi, I will argue that an important aspect of his
emphasis on aesthetic activity (ritual and music) is the expansion of this
experiential reading of Confucius on ritual, and that Xunzi's inclusion of
basic elements in human nature assist in filling out the account of what har-
mony and cultivation feel like for the human agent. Indeed, to embody the
dao in ritual and musical activity is to experience some important type of
understanding of the dao, which in turn holds motivational force for con-
tinued cultivation. Instead of music and ritual being an analogue to moral
activity, Xunzi will be seen to make them intrinsically moral.
Xunzi on Aesthetic Experience
To say that Xunzi wrote anything specifically on the concept of "aesthetic
experience" would be misleading; that term is a Western notion and it sim-
ply was not used by Xunzi. What Xunzi did explore were ritual and music,
two activities that have extensively aestheticized aspects. Thus, while he
did not discuss aesthetic experience per se, his writings did take a stand as
to what aesthetic experiences such as partaking in ritual and music offer
to a participant. Notice that the Western concept involves the experience
(usually) of an observer; as we shall see, Xunzi's account (in line with Con-
fucius) emphasizes the experience of the participant. This serv~s as a sign
that the latter two thinkers should be read in terms of experience, and a
type of experience that may be removed from mainstream Western conno-
tations. Thus, I will now provide a sketch of how Xunzi's account of music
and ritual involves experience in an important manner.
It is well known that Xunzi's philosophical thought (supposedly) takes
a diametrically opposed track from Mencius when it comes to describing
human nature.23 Human nature (xing), on Xunzi's account, is evil or dis-
orderly (e). Desires are the elements that always exist in the human dis-
position, and that must eventually be reformed through conscious activ-
ity to create what he refers to as an acquired nature (wei). These desires
include envy and hate, a liking of profit, and senses of the body that want
satisfaction; following these innate needs inevitably leads to disorder and
unhappiness. Xunzi indicates that such an indulgence of one's nature leads
to wrangling, strife, disorder, and exhaustion of all volitional energy (W
88),24 Much like a prevalent reading of Kant on the emotions,25 Xunzi's
position appears to be that of the ultimate unsustainability of the system
of emotions/desires when left to themselves. Instead, some type of order
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must be imposed on them from the "outside" for any meaningful and sus-
tainable satisfaction to occur. Hence, Xunzi spends much time elaborating
upon the beneficial nature of ritual and music in cultivating individuals to
be orderly, both in the state of their emotions and in terms of their inter-
actions with others. Here we find echoes of the internal (disposition) and
external (action) split illustrated in Confucius' self-description-the junzi
unites both of these in a harmonious fashion both in herself and in her
interactions with others. The real question is, however, does Xunzi elabo-
rate on the experiential aspects of such activity, or is his analysis merely a
causal description of the effects of a certain activity?
I will argue that there are clear signs of the former being present. In
order to do so, it is useful to orient the discussion in terms of what occurs in
the transition from "uncultivated" person (xiaoren) to a more "cultivated"
individual (junzi). Two pairs of polar opposites or polarities26 are useful
in thinking about this process-the locus of force "moving" one toward
cultivation/cultivated activity, and the subjective orientation toward such
cultivation (i.e., views toward ritual activity being that of resistance or of
love). The former proceeds from one extreme of external force being used
to compel an individual to take part in rites and musical activities (often
integral to ritual activity) to the other (cultivated) extreme of one wanting
to fulfill (hence, an internal force) her ritual obligations, roles, and so on.
Thus, the locus of the force compelling an individual to take part in the
activities Xunzi labels as those that order the desires shifts from one exter-
nally imposed to one that springs from one's own disposition or "will."
This type of reading is given by Joel J. Kupperman, who argues that Xunzi
is really providing a developmental account of how the psychology of the
individual agent is shaped and molded by external activities such as rit-
ualP Eventually, the agent in question shifts from disliking such activities
(imposed by external forces such as teachers and models) to actively inter-
nalizing them. According to Kupperman, the transition is from a prevalent
use of physical force to that of moral force. 28 Ritual behavior succeeds, it
seems, because the individual realizes the pleasurable dividends of control-
ling the desires/ emotions. David B. Wong gives a similar reading, focus-
ing on the transition from resistance to ritual activity to acceptance of it,
finally culminating in the individual loving the ritual activity.29 The individ-
ual comes to see that his desires can best be satisfied by a sort of "enlight-
ened self-interest" that looks at maximizing long-term satisfaction-this
is what Wong calls the "weak sense" of overriding desires with "mental
approval. "30 Both of these accounts need something further, however, if
they are to truly account for the shift from external to internal motivation.
Wong notices this when he asks the crucial question of how one can create
a desire to love ritual activity.
This question leads directly to the second polarity, that of an individ-
ual's disposition toward such activity. How can one be made to love rit-
ual? The previously given notion of force does not do justice to this ques-
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tion, as it puts off explaining the step from external force to internal force
(the real crux of the matter).3! Some sort of account of how external force
can result in anything other than more resistance must be given. I believe
that the key aspect to creating a disposition of loving ritual activity is the
experience of such practices embodying the dao in varying degrees. Before
I can develop such an account, however, it will be useful to review briefly
some other lines of interpretation that tend to overlook the experiential
aspect to moral cultivation of the desires in Xunzi's system. A. C. Gra-
ham argues that Xunzi, like Mencius, holds that part of human nature is
good, albeit smothered in a disorderly mix of desires.J2 He argues for this
account in part by differentiating the notion of "evil" in Xunzi from West-
ern conceptions of "Original Sin." Graham's account, however, leaves out
the constructed nature of cultivation, since it internalizes in human nature
(too much like Mencius) the desire for the good. A similar interpretation is
given by David S. Nivison.33 He argues that the primary component in the
transition from resisting ritual activity to loving it comes from an innate
sense of duty in human nature. Wong largely agrees with Nivison's reading,
but emphasizes the fact that this innate sense of duty must respect Xunzi's
claim that human nature is evil and must be a mere capability, free of moral
content (thus distinguishing Xunzi from Mencius on innate moral motiva-
tion). This answers the previous question of motivation by claiming "Rites
and music work on some raw material in human nature that is amenable
to being shaped toward a love of virtue and a delight in ritual."34 The "raw
material" referred to seems to be this innate sense of duty that exists as a
motivational capacity in human nature. As a comprehensive answer to the
motivation question, however, such an account seems to be lacking. Surely
an answer to "How can one be motivated to love the rituals?" should not
appeal to "an innate capacity to love rituals" -unless that capacity has
some innate direction (Mencius' position), a content-free drive cannot give
one the surefooted answer she desires (or Xunzi assumes). What changes
is not the activation of a directionless capacity in human nature, but seem-
ingly something that is due to the experience of aesthetic (ritual and musi-
cal) activity. I will now proceed to an analysis of how music and ritual can
be motivational forces toward cultivation and be an experienced example
of cultivated action.
Ritual as Experienced Order
Xunzi discusses ritual directly in the context of human nature, drawing
upon the harmful effects of one's desires if they are left unordered. Desires
are innate in human nature; if they are not satisfied in the correct way, they
will "lead" an individual to try to satisfy them in an unsustainable man-
ner (W 89). This results in a limitless and unordered search for satisfaction,
one that inevitably leads to interpersonal strife, disorder, and "exhaus-
tion." Ritual (Ii) is proposed as a means to efficiently satisfy these desires;
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the components of ritual are said to satisfy particular desires of the senses.
More important, this satisfaction comes in an orderly form, as ritual rec-
ognizes that "Eminent and humble have their respective stations, elder and
younger their degrees, and rich and poor, important and unimportant, their
different places in society" (W 90). Ritual recognizes distinctions or order
within the multifaceted society in which individuals find themselves. So far
this account does not differ from a purely causal account of the beneficial
results of ritual activity. What is important to the question of moral moti-
vation raised previously is that Xunzi often describes the benefits of such
activity in terms of the experience or performance of ritual.
The performance of ritual is of particular importance for Xunzi. Like
Confucius, he accords significance to even the smallest aspects of one's
bodily enactment of ritualized behavior, including the aesthetic features of
body, dress, sound, and balance. Rituals, however, also include an inner
component, specifically that of disposition or orientation toward doing
such activities. This seeming dualism of body and internal state is further
compounded when they are looked at in a polarized fashion by Xunzi,
involving the body and the mind in a interconnected whole in which unac-
companied extremes are undesirable. Thus, Xunzi indicates that an over-
emphasis on either the meaning/form of the ritual (such as the traditional!
distinction-creating aspects) or on the emotional content/practical use
(such as the cathartic satisfying of joy and grief) is extreme (W 96). The
desired balance occurs when "Form and meaning, and emotion and prac-
tical use, are treated as the inside and outside or the front and back of a
single reality and are both looked after, then rites have reached the middle
state" (W 96). This is the state that the junzi chooses to abide in, and "no
matter whether he walks or runs, hurries or hastens, he never abandons it"
(W 96). What Xunzi appears to be emphasizing here is that a particular
balance is not important on its own, but only as far as it is embodied and
experienced (lived) by the junzi. Indeed, the one "who dwells in it ... and
masters all its corners and gradations, is a sage" (W 96).
Part of the importance of ritual experience comes, not from it result-
ing in a certain pleasure, but in its instantiating a complete aesthetic whole
with a beginning and an end. Rites are said to honor the beginnings of the
world, family, and order (heaven/earth, ancestors, and teachers/rulers) (W
91-92), as well as to instantiate an activity with a beginning and end. The
beginning and end are more than just mere properties of the activity, but
are instead integrally tied to the performance of a participant. Xunzi states:
"All rites begin in simplicity, are brought to fulfillment in elegant form, and
end in joy. When rites are performed in the highest manner, then both the
emotions and the forms embodying them are fully realized; in the next best
manner, the emotional content and the forms prevail by turns; in the poor-
est manner, everything reverts to emotion and finds unity in that alone" (W
94). Immediately after this passage, he indicates that, through the activity
of the rites, heaven and earth are united in harmony, seasons are ordered,
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and human desires are regulated. What Xunzi is noting here is that the
performance of ritual is both an instance of this order and a cause of this
order. If rites are done poorly, the ordering implicit in their activity (such as
their form and control of the emotions) will be poorly instantiated or real-
ized in action. Indeed, the ritualized form in such activities can be linked to
the "rule of Heaven" (tianming), which highlights the inequalities in nature
and the commensurate relations among such stations (i.e., the higher sta-
tion ruling the lower) (W 36).
One can argue that the motivational drive toward moral improvement
and cultivation comes from the experience of the control and order that
one has when participating in ritual. One's desires are checked and allowed
to be satisfied in an orderly fashion, as ritual is an instance of what it is
like to express the emotions in a cultivated way (W 102). One may begin
by using ritual merely to satisfy one's desires, but the experience of order
embodied in action is an experience of what such orderliness would be like
outside of ritual situations. Not every part of one's life is spent in ritual, so
both Confucius and Xunzi are concerned with the cultivation of individu-
als who are always cognizant of the dao given their situation. Ritual, as a
way of curbing desires in accord with the dao, is an experience of such rec-
ognition of the dao (W 117); this seems to be what makes it a joyful experi-
ence for the subject. One sees that Xunzi is not recommending ritual merely
for its results (as separate from the producing activity), but is instead find-
ing in the experience of ritual a unique way of both inculcating hierar-
chy and station-based duties (the form/meaning of the rites) and the inner
emotional training (orderly satisfaction of the desires of grief and joy), as
well as an experience that is valuable insofar as it embodies this control
and form in a concrete activity. The aesthetic experience of participating in
ritual is valuable in itself and as a means to attain cultivation pecause it is
an experience of such cultivated order, control, and form. I shall return to
this point momentarily, but it is important to consider the value of music
before a composite of Xunzi's reading of aesthetic experience is proposed.
Music as Experienced Harmony
Ritual often utilizes musical elements, but musical performance seemed
important enough on its own to merit discussion by Xunzi. Music is con-
nected with joy by Xunzi (W 112), a connection that begins with linguis-
tic similarities. Music extends to emotional cultivation as part of joy, an
emotion that threatens to become disorderly and harmful if left to direct
its own satisfaction. At one point, Xunzi does talk of the effects of music
on participants in line with the causal view, but the important aspect of
his discussion comes when he talks of music as an experience of harmony
and complete unity (e.g., W II3). Whereas the rites create order through
hierarchy and division, Xunzi finds that music creates some sort of unity
from a plurality. What could this plurality be? One candidate could be the
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myriad instances of joy qua desire and the anticipated ways of fulfilling
its demands. Musical performance, especially, brings with it the chance to
channel and order this desire in a unified way, while still preserving the sat-
isfaction of it as an important good.
Important for the tenor of the current discussion is the analogical point
Xunzi makes between musical performance and cultivation/cultivated
action. Much like Confucius, Xunzi links music to moral cultivation by
making it more than a nonmoral means to cultivate moral aspects of our
humanity. Instead, the activity of music is itself deeply moral. What sense
is to be made of this? If it is read like the previous discussion of Confucius,
then it can be seen as an experiential analogue or instantiation of the type
of control and expression a cultivated person would display and experien-
tially know in what we would call "moral situations." Xunzi claims that
"music brings about complete unity and induces harmony. It arranges its
accouterments to comprise an adornment to moderation; it blends its per-
formance to achieve the completion of form. It is sufficient to lead men in
the single Way or to bring order to ten thousand changes" (W 113). Notice
how music involves completeness (a beginning and end), form, and a unity
of a plurality of performances. Like ritual, music plays an important role
in ordering (unifying) human action. It does this by being an experience of
such unified and ordered action. For instance, such an interpretation makes
sense of the use Xunzi makes of singing-listening to incorrect sounds
leads to the creation of a similar negative moral trait in the listener. As to
the experiential point to this reaction, Xunzi finds that "As singers blend
their voices with that of the leader, so good and evil arise in response to the
force that calls them forth" (W 116). Listeners and participants experience
moral harmony or disharmony through listening to the respective style of
music; hence, the junzi must choose such environments carefully.
A key to reading this use of music comes when Xunzi states that the
junzi "utilizes bells and drums to guide his will, and lutes and zithers to
gladden his heart" (W II6). Surely, the literal sense in which the activity
of listening is pleasurable ("gladdening") is different from the activity of
moral willing or action. One is simply listening to or performing music,
whereas in moral activity one can be acting properly or improperly in rela-
tion to her parents, her ruler, her elders, and so on. The point here must be
the correlation or analogical point being made between these two notions;
listening to music can be used to guide one's will, not because it contains
specific advice for one's specific moral situation, but instead because it is an
experience of the inner disposition needed for sagelike activity. Like those
of Confucius at seventy, one's desires should flow forth in an orderly way as
if it were one's nature. Forcefully doing or performing one's station-depen-
dent duty is a far cry from the improvisational harmony noted in Confu-
cius' discussion of musical performance, or from the harmony emphasized
by Xunzi. Xunzi expands on Confucius' point by noting that the experi-
ence of unity of desire that musical expression gives us is analogous to the
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state of moral cultivation, and hence can be used as a "guide to one's will."
The experience of the musical, for Xunzi, is an experience of what it is like
to instantiate and embody the dao in concrete action; he notes just this
point, stating "the purity of his [the junzi's] music is modeled after Heaven,
its breaoth is modeled after the earth, and its posturings and turnings imi-
tate the four seasons. Hence, through the performance of music the will is
made pure" (W 117). The experience of music is vital, as it is an instance
of the will's purity-this point is made evident by Xunzi's noting of the
performative aspects of the musical experience. Music, either performed
or listened to, is transformative, not because of some "instrumental" value
it may possess, but instead because of its intrinsic instantiation of the end
point of moral cultivation. In the next section, I shall explore how the per-
formative aspects of music and ritual serve a motivational function in terms
of the individual desiring moral cultivation.
Performance as Moral Motivation in Xunzi
What can explain an individual's transition from resisting ritual to lov-
ing ritual activity? Mere force cannot explain the change from external to
internal motivation. In this final section, I will argue that the experience of
ritual and music motivate further moral development because they instan-
tiate dao-like naturalness in action and point to greater mastery in further
aesthetic activities of the same sortY It is useful to begin with an obser-
vation made by T. C. Kline, specifically that Xunzi was an epistemological
optimist.36 According to Kline, Xunzi held out hope that all humans can
know the dao, and that the surest way to know it is as it is embodied in rit-
ual patterns. Hence, knowing rituals equates to knowing the dao, which in
turn is said by Antonio S. Cua to relate directly to the ideal way of life for
an individual.3? I must add that if the dao is embodied in concrete actions,
then it seems appropriate that the highest knowledge of the dao also be an
embodied knowledge. The embodiment of the dao can then be best experi-
enced/known through the aesthetic practices of ritual and music.
What would knowledge of the dao be like for Xunzi? It would involve
someone approaching the level of sagehood, an ideal terminus for the life
of the junzi. Such a level would include both comprehending the moral
relationships, categories, and so on that comprise the social world and
"achiev[ing] this oneness" (W 22), or harmony, in social relationships. The
junzi in his own way can enjoy what is right or appropriate (W 23), much
like Confucius at seventy (A 2:4). Indeed, Xunzi discusses the cultivated
ruler as one in a "flourishing condition" and able to "stand upon what is
right, showing no favoritism to any side but conducting all his affairs as
he wishes" (W 51). Like the junzi described analogically through Confu-
cius, the cultivated individual can let her desires go, as they are already
internally ordered and organized; external restraints are no longer neces-
sary for the individual to act and feel appropriately in any given situation.
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Thus, the cultivated individual will be one who embodies the appropriate
actions and dispositions with consummate, indeed almost natural, skill.38
As Xunzi points out, ritual is the one advantage humans truly have over
other animals; though created by human effort, it can result in a natural
harmony among the self and society that embodies the rule of heaven (W
45), and, I would argue, the dao. 39 The dao is said to embody all true prin-
ciples (W 126), and one who truly understands and carries it out is said to
embody the dao (W 127). Thus, concrete manifestation (embodiment) car-
ries abstract qualities down to the reality of the dao, which is then further
manifested or truly known in physical embodiment.
What is the nature of this embodiment? One possible scheme that
could make sense of Xunzi's various discussions is that of external embodi-
ment and of internal/ external embodiment. External embodiment of the
dao would be that observed in the sages or teachers that Xunzi so highly
recommends. Like Confucius described in the middle chapters of the Ana-
lects, one can learn much from observing the physical comportment and
actions of a cultivated individual. Thus, Xunzi directs individuals to associ-
ate with others who embody (physically display) the dao (W 22) and notes
that one's physical environment (including the actions of people around
the individual) lead to similar practices (W 170). Bad models are said to
lead to unrefined behavior (W 106), so one must stay away from such indi-
viduals. Put simply, others known through their physical actions and com-
portment can embody or fail to embody the dao in their ritual and nonri-
tual behaviors. More could be said on this conception of modeling, but the
basic point has been made concerning external embodiment.
For the purposes of this discussion, the more important notion of
embodiment occurs with the acting subject in the experience of ritual and
music. Kim-Chong Chong notes the transformative power of ritual and its
inclusion of knowledge,40 but does not go so far as to emphasize the per-
formative, experiential embodiment aspect of cultivation. I argue that the
notion of internal/external embodiment can help to explain the transfor-
mative power of ritual and music, since this second type of embodiment
includes both the actions one physically enacts and the inner emotion-
al/dispositional states one goes through. It is this latter aspect (the dispo-
sitional) that figures so prominently in the cultivated individual. Thus, the
dao can be embodied in one's aesthetic activity, which leads to instantiat-
ing actions and dispositions that are more or less in line with the dao. One's
own experience in the performing of music or in the enactment of ritual is
an experience of embodying the dao, both through the specific actions and
the states needed/ entailed by such action. Thus, Xunzi can use such expe-
riences as moral touchstones because they are intrinsically moral-they
embody some degree of cultivation. They are experiences of the dao, as
embodied in harmonious and ordered experiences. With this emphasis on
embodiment, one can see the importance of such phrases as "through the
performance of music the will is made pure, and through the practice of
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rites the conduct is brought to perfection" (W lI6)-it is the performance
of the dao that is the perfection/ purification of action (external) and dis-
position (inner) and that leads to further cultivation in the future (pending
further performance). Indeed, Xunzi makes this point even more concrete
by claiming that it is through the musical dance performance that "the
spirit of the dance joins with the Way [dao] of Heaven" (W lIB).
Notice that this understanding of the dao is embodied and concrete,
and is part and parcel of what it is like to be a cultivated individual who
knows the dao. While external embodiments such as those provided by
the sages have ordering power over individuals, it is the enacted ritual that
has a transformative power that springs from within the experience itself
(W 164). The experience of ritual or musical performance holds an inter-
nal! external mix that merely observational modeling of sages lacks. It is
this internal! external experience that is motivational because it is transfor-
mative-one is acting and feeling in accord with the dao while taking part
in the aesthetic activities of ritual and music, however slight; after time,
such experiences of embodied dao-knowledge grow stronger, increasing
both the instantiation of the dao and the motivation to further cultivate
one's self, both in aesthetic situations and in other situations.
The experience of music and ritual is important for Xunzi and Con-
fucius largely because it is like the total project of cultivation, albeit in a
single complete instance (in a specific ritual or musical performance). The
motivational force that moves one from resisting ritual activity to loving
it is the experience of embodying the dao in ritual activity; this experience
is valuable because it is an instance of embodying the dao and because it
further motivates the individual to higher levels of self-cultivation. How
does it accomplish this? While one answer could be that it is pleasurable,
a more complete answer would involve some type of subjective connection
(or unity) with the dao. Xunzi even claims that to know the true purpose of
ritual is to recognize such activity as one's own law (W 30). While the point
may be obscure, sense can be made of it if one notices the naturalness of
the sage in Xunzi and Confucius at seventy in Analects 2:4-both can act
and talk without fear, as the external manifestations of their inner disposi-
tion will be cultivated since they are completely in harmony with the dao.
They exemplify ren and li in their inner and outer actions. I have argued in
this essay that an important aspect of aesthetic experience is that, because
it is in itself an experience of dao embodiment, it is both intrinsically valu-
able (as a state of harmony and order) and instrumentally valuable, due to
the motivational force that one procures by catching a glimmer of the end
point of cultivation-realizing and enacting the dao as one's own law or
pattern to follow willingly in one's given situation. Confucius and Xunzi
utilize aesthetic experience because they find it intrinsically valuable and
important for future development, contra much of the Western tradition.
This confounds Western notions of aesthetic experience, but it does shed
light on how aesthetic experience can be used analogically both to say
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something about moral experience (such as the end point of A 2:4) and to
motivate further moral development.
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26 How Is Weakness of the Will Not Possible?
Cheng Yi's Neo-Confucian Conception of
Moral Knowledge
In 1970, Donald Davidson published an influential article, "How Is Weak-
ness of the Will Possible?" reviving, and reversing the direction of, an
ancient discussion on the issue of akrasia. In addition to "weakness of
the will," this Greek term akrasia has also been translated as "inconti-
nence" and "unrestraint." According to Davidson's definition, "in doing
x an agent acts incontinently if and only if: (a) the agent does x intention-
ally; (h) the agent believes there is an alternative action y open to him; and
(c) the agent judges that, all things considered, it would be better to do y
than to do X."l For example, if a man knows that, all things considered, it
is better to refrain from smoking, which he believes he can do, and yet still
smokes intentionally, this person then acts akratically. Philosophers since
ancient time have tried to understand whether weakness of the will is possi-
ble and, if possible, how it is possible; or, if not possible, how to explain the
apparent everyday cases of people knowing without acting accordingly.
To bring this issue into a sharper focus, it is important to understand
how weakness of the will, thus defined, is different from some similar situ-
ations. Michael Smith distinguishes weakness of the will from (a) reckless-
ness or intemperance and (h) compulsion. He uses an example of a particu-
lar woman intentionally taking a drink that she ought not to have because
she will then be unfit to fulfill some of her obligations: "In (I) [reckless-
ness or intemperance] the woman knows what she is doing but accepts the
consequences. Her choice is to get drunk or risk getting drunk. She acts in
accordance with her judgement. In (2) [weakness of the will] the woman
knowingly takes the drink contrary to her (conscious) better judgement;
the explanation for this lack of self-control is that she is weak-willed. In (3)
[compulsion], she knowingly takes the drink contrary to her better judge-
ment, but she is the victim of a compulsive (irresistible) desire to drink."2
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R. M. Hare further distinguishes weakness of the will from (c) hypoc-
risy, in which case a person does (or does not do) what he or she says he
or she ought not to (or ought to), but does not say sincerely what he or she
actually thinks.3 In addition to these instances, I think it also helpful if we
further distinguish weakness of the will from the following phenomena. (d)
Ignorance; in this case, a man, for example, smokes because he does not
know that smoking is bad or that he ought not to smoke. (e) Negligence;
negligence is related to (d) in the sense that the person also acts from igno-
rance, but the ignorance in this case is caused by the person's negligence: he
or she could and ought to know what he or she is doing and whether he or
she ought to do it. And finally (f) Rational choice. For example, a woman
may know smoke is bad for her health and for that reason she knows that
she should not smoke; at the same time, she derives a lot of pleasure from
smoking. So she faces a dilemma: either to live a longer, less satisfying life
without smoking or live a shorter, more exciting life with smoking. After
some deliberation, she chooses the former.
Now all these phenomena (a-f) are easily understandable, and hardly
anyone would ask whether they are possible, as we can certainly find many
examples of each of them in our daily lives. However, the issue of weak-
ness of the will is different. It is supposed to describe a situation in which a
person does intentionally what he or she believes sincerely he or she could
and ought not to do (or does not do intentionally what he or she believes
sincerely he or she could and ought to do). For this reason, many ancient
philosophers argue that not only is there no weak-willed person in this
sense, but weakness of the will is simply impossible. Any case considered
as weakness of will is nothing but one of the above six other phenomena
in disguise. Thus, whoever thinks that weakness of the will is possible (or
even actual) has to bear the burden of proof to show how it is possible. In
this essay, I shall first briefly introduce the problem of the weakness of the
will in the Western philosophical discussion (section 2); I shall then dis-
cuss the neo-Confucian Cheng Yi's view of weakness of will as impossible
in his discussion of action and knowledge and his reason for such a view
through an examination of his distinction between knowledge from hear-
ing and seeing and knowledge of!as virtue (sections 3-4). I shall argue that,
while Cheng's view is similar to that of Socrates and Aristotle, if my inter-
pretation of Aristotle is correct, it can avoid some potential problems that
Socrates and Aristotle had to face.
The Problem of Weakness of the Will in the
Western Philosophical Discourse
Socrates, in Plato's Protagoras, is the first person to discuss the issue of
akrasia. He makes it clear that weakness of the will is impossible: "no
one who either knows or believes that there is another possible course of
action, better than the one he is following, will ever continue on his pres-
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ent course when he might choose the better. To 'act beneath yourself' is the
result of pure ignorance; to 'be your own master' is wisdom."4 Using our
example of smoking, in Socrates' view, a person knows that he or she ought
not to smoke because of the pain it will cause to him or her in the future,
but nonetheless the person decides to smoke because of believing that it
will bring him/her pleasure right now. Now if the person indeed knows
that his/her future and long-term happiness is more important than the
current, momentary pleasure, the person will not smoke, and so weakness
of the will is not possible. Of course this person may choose to smoke, but
in this case he/she must be thinking-perhaps mistakenly-that his/her
current, momentary pleasure is more important than future, long-term
happiness. Now Socrates thinks that, while such mistaken judgment is eas-
ily understandable, this decision shows that the person is ignorant of the
truth, not that this person is weak-willed. He uses this analogy: "The same
magnitudes seem greater to the eye from near at hand than they do from a
distance.... And sounds of equal loudness seem greater near at hand than
at a distance." 5 So in Socrates' view, the so-called weakness of the will is
really ignorance or misjudgment, so it actually falls into category (e), men-
tioned earlier, in disguise.6
Later this issue is taken up by Aristotle, particularly in Book VII, Chap-
ter 3 of his Ethica Nicomachea. Aristotelian scholars disagree among them-
selves about whether Aristotle here intends to argue against or merely to
explain Socrates' position. I myself tend to think that Aristotle held a view
fundamentally similar to Socrates'. At the beginning of his discussion, Aris-
totle mentions Socrates' view and then immediately says that "this view
plainly contradicts the observed facts."7 This has become the strongest evi-
dence for those who think that Aristotle is setting the stage to argue against
Socrates.8 However, I think they have ignored several important details.
First, the Greek word, here translated as "observed facts," is phainom-
ena, which can also be translated as "common opinion." If this is the case,
Aristotle is only saying that Socrates' view goes against the common opin-
ion about weakness of the will and not against the "empirical fact" of
weakness of wilJ.9 Second, immediately after he states that Socrates' view
is plainly against the phainomena, Aristotle adds that "we must inquire
about what happens to such a man [akrate); if he acts by reason of igno-
rance, what is the manner of his ignorance."10 So here he seems to accept
Socrates' view that such a man acts by reason of ignorance and he simply
wants to explain the manner of such ignorance (particularly he does not
add another "if": "If he does not act by reason of ignorance ... "). Third,
and most important, at the very end of his explanation in this chapter, Aris-
totle maintains that "the position that Socrates sought to establish actually
seems to result; for it is not in the presence of what is thought to be knowl-
edge proper that the affection of incontinence arises (nor is it this that is
'dragged about' as a result of the state of passion), but in that of perceptual
knowledge"; and he finally concludes that "this must suffice as our answer
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to the question of action with and without knowledge, and how it is possi-
ble to behave incontinently with knowledge. "11
So, in my view, Aristotle's main task in this concentrated discussion of
akrasia is to explain the manner of ignorance that Socrates talks about. He
first'makes it clear that the so-called akrates definitely do not have prac-
tical wisdom, since it is absurd to say that "the same man will be at once
practically wise and incontinent.... It has been shown before that the man
of practical wisdom is one who will act."12 However, if so, what exactly
happens to such a man? Aristotle provides two explanations. The first is
related to the distinction he makes between knowledge in the sense of pos-
session and knowledge in the sense of using.13 About this distinction, he
says that a man asleep, mad, or drunk has knowledge in the first sense but
not in the second sense; he may still be able to utter scientific proof and
verses of Empedocles, but obviously he is not using such knowledge. With
this analogy in mind, Aristotle claims that "this is just the condition of men
under the influence of passions; for outbursts of anger and sexual appetites
and some other such passions, it is evident, actually alter our bodily condi-
tion, and in some men even produce fits of madness. It is plain, then, that
incontinent people must be said to be in a similar condition to men asleep,
mad, or drunk. The fact that men use the language that flows from knowl-
edge proves nothing. "14 If we accept this interpretation, weakness of will
does not exist; it is really a case of phenomenon (b)-compulsion. The
second explanation Aristotle provides is related to his practical syllogism.
Aristotle is not clear on this issue and so scholars have tried to figure out
what exactly he means to say. What seems to be clear is that, from Aristot-
le's view, the so-called akrate lacks the minor premise of the practical syllo-
gism. For example (not Aristotle's own example), a person may know that
he or she ought not to steal (major premise), but does not know that the
action he or she is going to take belongs to the category of stealing (minor
premise), and so does not know that he or she ought not to take this action
(conclusion).15 According to this interpretation, again there is no weak-
ness of will; there is rather phenomenon (d), as the person who acts this
way does not have all the knowledge necessary for the action in question
to take place.16
After Aristotle, the Stoics, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz,
Spinoza, Locke, and Hume all discuss, directly or indirectly, the issue of
weakness of the will. With the exception of Augustine and to a less degree
Hume,17 all of them hold a position either clearly in line with the Socrat-
ic/Aristotelian view or not far from it. Just a few years before the publica-
tion of Davidson's article, the English moral philosopher R. M. Hare again
argued that weakness of the will is impossible, although his argument is
largely from his normative ethics point of view. According to Hare, the
word "ought," unlike the word "want," has the dimension of both univer-
sality and prescriptivity. It functions like Kant's categorical imperative. So
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if someone knows, for example, that he ought not to smoke, he will not
smoke; if he does, he does not really know that he ought not to smoke.18
From this context, we can better appreciate the significance of David-
son's article, "How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?" In this article, after
rejecting many attempts to explain away weakness of the will, he affirms
clearly that weakness of the will is possible. In fact, his main task in this
article is to explain how it is possible. To show that there are two practi-
cal syllogisms going on in the mind of a weak-willed person as Aristotle
indicates, Davidson uses Aquinas' example of fornication in his (Aquinas')
attempt to make sense of Aristotle. 19 On the one hand, the person thinks:
"No fornication is lawful; this is an act of fornication; and so this act is not
lawful"; on the other hand, the person thinks: "pleasure is to be pursued;
this act is pleasure; and so this act is to be pursued. "20 Here the weak-willed
person faces two contradictory conclusions from two different practical
syllogisms. According to Davidson's definition of weakness of the will, we
may consider this person as weak-willed if he takes the action of fornica-
tion intentionally while he believes that he can refrain from this action and
that, all things considered, it would be better to refrain from this action.
How is this possible? Davidson introduces a distinction between absolute
judgment and all things considered judgment. Thus an incontinent person
"does x for a reason r, but he has a reason r' that includes r and more, on
the basis of which he judges some alternative y to be better than x. "21 Here
r is reason for absolute judgment, while r' is all-things (including r)-consid-
ered judgment. An incontinent or weak-willed person takes the action (for-
nication) according to his absolute reason (the act is pleasant), and so he
does not act from ignorance, but he should have acted according to his all-
things-considered judgment (although it is pleasant, it is unlawful, and it is
more important to avoid unlawful actions than to seek pleasant actions),
since this also includes his absolute reason. So Davidson claims that "what
is wrong is that the incontinent man acts, and judges, irrationally, for this
is surely what we must say of a man who goes against his own best judg-
ment. "22 In other words, for Davidson, weakness of the will is made possi-
ble by the person's irrationality. In a later article, he further explains such
irrationality by appealing to the idea of mind partitioning: for the weak-
willed person, there are "two semi-autonomous departments of the mind,
one that finds a certain course of action to be, all things considered, best,
and another that prompts another course of action. "23
Davidson's 1970 article reignited people's interest in the issue of weak-
ness of the will. A significant amount of literature has been produced on
this issue since then. However, with few exceptions,24 most authors have
agreed with Davidson that weakness of the will is possible and even factual,
although many have tried to provide different explanations about how it
is possible.25 Some even go much further than Davidson on this issue. For
example, although Davidson thinks that weakness of the will is possible,
he still regards it as irrational. Alison McIntyre, however, argues that it is
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not necessarily irrational. The reason we regard someone as weak-willed is
that the person intentionally does something different from what she has
better reason to do, but McIntyre thinks that we need to make a distinction
between the reasons a person believes she has and the reasons she actually
has: "If an agent is not necessarily clear-sighted about what reasons she has
on a particular occasion to act in one way rather than another, then when
she deliberates, taking into account all the reasons she sees as relevant, the
practical judgments that she arrives at will express what she believes that
she has most reason to do, but they might fail to express what she actually
has most reason to do or what it would be most rational for her to do."26
In such a case, McIntyre argues, a person who does not do what she has
the best reason to do does not necessarily act irrationally.27 In addition,
Davidson's discussion of weakness of the will is limited to action. Robert
Audi argues that weakness of will has a broader spectrum: it "manifests
itself not just in action but at the level of intending and wanting. "28 In other
words, if I have intention or desire that I think I could and should not have,
then I am also suffering from weakness of the will.
Cheng Vi's Neo-Confucian View of
Weakness of the Will as Not Possible
As we have seen, what distinguishes weakness of the will from other phe-
nomena mentioned at the beginning of this essay is that the agent knows,
at the very time of performing an action, that he or she ought not to, and
is able not to, perform it. So it really concerns the relationship between
knowledge and action, which has been one of the central issues in the Con-
fucian tradition. Various positions developed by Confucian philosophers
on this relationship are extremely important resources upon which we can
draw to understand the issue of weakness of the will. Here, I shall focus
on the neo-Confucian philosopher Cheng Yi fj[12l'i (1°33-11°7), who holds
a view of knowledge as implying action: "When knowledge is profound,
action will be thorough. No one ever knows without being able to act. If
one knows without being able to act, the knowledge is superficial. Because
they know the danger, people do not eat poisonous herbs when hungry, and
do not tread on water and fire. People do evil things simply because they
lack knowledge. "29 In this sense, Cheng certainly sides with Socrates and
Aristotle. In the following, however, by examining his view of why weak-
ness of the will is not possible, I try to show how he can help us go further
than Socrates and Aristotle and better address the concern of those con-
temporary Davidsonian philosophers who insist that weakness of the will
is not only a logical possibility but also an actual reality.
By clearly rejecting the so-called weakness of the will, Cheng is left with
the task of explaining numerous examples in our everyday life that seem to
suggest the existence of such a phenomenon. In order to do so, Cheng dis-
tinguishes between two senses of knowledge in three different ways. First,
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he distinguishes between profound knowledge and shallow knowledge. For
example, he argues that "it is not that people do not know. The reason that
one is not willing to act is that the knowledge is shallow and belief is not
firm" (Yishu 23: 305). So here he acknowledges the possibility of someone
who knows and yet does not act according to this knowledge. However, in
his view this is a shallow knowledge; it is not something one firmly believes
in. When knowledge is profound and one firmly believes in it, one cannot
fail to act upon this knowledge. For Cheng, such shallow knowledge can-
not be regarded as knowledge in its proper sense.
Second, he makes the distinction between genuine knowledge (zhen
zhi ~~) and ordinary knowledge (chang zhi m-~): "Genuine knowledge
is different from ordinary knowledge. There was a farmer who had been
hurt by tiger. When hearing that tiger was hurting people, nobody was
not scared, but the farmer's composure was different from everyone else's.
Tigers can hurt people; this is something even children know, but they don't
have genuine knowledge. Genuine knowledge is the one that the farmer
has. Therefore a person who knows that something is not good and still
does it does not have genuine knowledge. Had he had genuine knowledge,
he would have not done it" (Yishu 2a: 16; see also Yishu 18: 188). This dis-
tinction between genuine knowledge and common knowledge is the same
as the distinction between profound knowledge and shallow knowledge.
Thus, in another place where Cheng uses the same example of tiger, he
first says that "knowledge is all different. While some is profound, some is
shallow"; then, after telling the story of tiger and farmer, he concludes that
this farmer "has genuine knowledge qf tiger. The profound knowledge of a
learner is similar.... A learner ought to seek genuine knowledge; only then
can one claim to have the knowledge and act naturally. When I was twenty
years old, I could interpret classics without much difference frqm the way
I'm doing today. However, what I get from classics today is very different
from what I got then" (Yishu 18: 188).
As Cheng often uses this story of tiger and farmer to illustrate genu-
ine knowledge, scholars often think that his distinction between genuine
knowledge and ordinary knowledge is one between knowledge from direct
experience and knowledge from indirect experience.3D However, in Cheng's
view, while genuine knowledge must come from direct experience, not all
knowledge from direct experience is genuine knowledge. Genuine knowl-
edge issues from a special kind of direct experience: the inner experience.
This is clear from Cheng's discussion about a learner's genuine knowledge
and his own experience with the interpretation of classics. It is only in this
sense of knowledge that he claims that "with genuine knowledge, no one
will fail to act" (Waishu 6: 388).
However, the most important and also most controversial distinc-
tion that Cheng draws is the one we mentioned in the previous section:
that between knowledge of/ as virtue and knowledge from hearing and
seeing: "knowledge from seeing and hearing is not knowledge of/as vir-
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tue. It results from the contact between one thing and another thing and
therefore is not internal. The knowledge of those erudite and skillful per-
sons belongs to this. Knowledge of!as virtue does not rely upon hearing
and seeing" (Yishu 25: 317). Here Cheng Yi explains more clearly what
he means by "genuine knowledge" or "deep" knowledge by using Zhang
Zai's ~lJG idea of knowledge of!as virtue in contrast to knowledge from
seeing and hearing. In this distinction, while knowledge from seeing and
hearing is external knowledge (whether from direct or indirect experience),
knowledge of!as virtue is internal knowledge coming from inner experi-
ence. Thus, Cheng claims that "learning, generally speaking, cannot be
obtained by knowledge from hearing. One can obtain it only by its being
apprehended in one's own heart/mind (rna shi xin tong ~til!H,\m[). If one
wants to learn something, the learner has to be sincere in seeking the illu-
mination from the principle. The best way to obtain it is through sudden
enlightenment. The second best is through cultivating the principle" (Yishu
17: 178). Because it is internal, it is important to get it by oneself (zide §
1~), not for it to be imposed from the outside. Cheng states, "nothing is
more important in learning than to get it by oneself. Because one does not
get it from outside, it is called self-getting" (Yishu 25: 316). This is not
something easy: "it is easy to learn but difficult to know; it is easy to know,
but it is difficult to know by one's inner experience" (ti er de zhi Bffijl~Z)
(Yishu 25: 32 1 ).
Here the word ti B, through which one can obtain knowledge of!as
virtue by oneself, is extremely important in Cheng in particular and in
Confucianism in general. In recent years, Tu Weiming has written exten-
sively on the conception of tizhi Bffi, knowledge through ti. 3! While liter-
ally the word ti means "body," as Tu correctly points out, its meaning can-
not be expressed by this English word. Of course, knowledge of!as virtue
will necessarily be manifested in body, which has been pointed out by Men-
cius: "that which a superior person follows by his nature, that is to say,
benevolence, rightness, the rites and wisdom, is rooted in his heart, and
manifests itself in his face, giving it a sleek appearance. It also shows in his
back and extends to his limbs, rendering their message intelligible without
words."32 This is also what Cheng states: "whatever one gains inside will
necessarily be manifested outside" (Yishu 18: 185). However, this is still
related to Cheng's view that one who has knowledge will necessarily act
upon the knowledge.
What we are concerned with here is the ti through which one's knowl-
edge is gained in the first place. Tu Weiming points out that "recognition
through ti (tiren B~,;g), awareness through ti (ticha B~), justification
through ti (tizheng B-m), understanding through ti (tihui BWl), tast-
ing through ti (tiwei B~), appreciation through ti (tiwan Bm), inquiry
through ti (tijiu BJE), and knowledge through ti (tizhi Bffi) are all very
different from knowledge, observation, verification, taste, and understand-
ing in general sense."33 Here, Tu correctly warns us against understand-
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ing knowledge from ti· as something one gets from one's body. However,
he does not clearly tell us what this ti means. In my view, the word ti here
is used both as a noun and as a verb. As a noun, it refers to xin IL', one's
heart/mind, which Mencius calls dati ::k&, literally "the great body," in
contrast to our external body, which he calls xiaoti Ij\&, literally "the small
body. "34 That is why Cheng says in the previously quoted passage that "one
can obtain it only by its being apprehended in one's own heart/mind (rno
shi xin tou !k~)L,jj)." In his commentary on the Doctrine of the Mean,
he contrasts knowledge of!as virtue from knowledge from hearing and see-
ing, as the latter "is not what one gets from xin (heart/mind) " Uingshuo 8:
II54). As a verb, ti refers to the activity of the heart/mind. It is extremely
important to understand the "heart" part of the xin in its role in obtaining
knowledge of!as virtue. Knowledge from hearing and seeing is not merely
something one gets from one's sense organs. It also requires the "mind"
part of the xin to play its role, as it is something that one needs to under-
stand, justify, and prove. However, only when knowledge is grasped also
by the "heart" part of the xin can it become knowledge of! as virtue-the
knowledge that one not only possesses but is also ready to act upon. Thus
he states that "if one gets dao from one's heart/mind, one can manifest it
in one's body" (Yishu 2a: 20).35
In summary, deep knowledge, genuine knowledge, and knowledge
of!as virtue is knowledge gained through one's inner experience, under-
stood by one's mind, grasped by one's heart, and is therefore the knowledge
that inclines one to act accordingly, whereas shallow knowledge, common
knowledge, and knowledge from hearing and seeing is the knowledge one
gains through external experience; even if it is understood by the mind, it is
not grasped by the heart and therefore does not incline one to act accord-
ingly. The so-called akrate or weak-willed person, in Cheng's view, is one
who has knowledge only in the latter sense. Since knowledge in the latter
sense, strictly speaking, cannot be called knowledge, we can say that the
weak-willed person acts from ignorance. It is in this sense that, as pointed
out by some scholars, the neo-Confucian position represented by Cheng
here is similar to that of Socrates and Aristotle.36 However, I would like to
make a stronger claim that Cheng provides a better solution to the problem
of weakness of the will than do Socrates and Aristotle. This can be seen in
three different aspects.
First, Cheng's idea of gaining knowledge by oneself (zide) is philosoph-
ically significant. It provides a creative interpretation of Confucius' other-
wise problematic statement that people can be made to act but cannot be
made to understand (Analects 8.9). Since knowledge that inclines one to
act-the profound and genuine knowledge of! as virtue-is the knowledge
that one has to derive from one's own heart/mind, even sages cannot lead
people to such knowledge, although they can guide them to knowledge
from hearing and seeing. This idea is also important in solving the apparent
paradox that Socrates mentions at the end of Protagoras: on the one hand,
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Socrates claims that virtue is knowledge, and on the other hand he states
that virtue is not teachable. Usually virtue is considered as being different
from knowledge, and so it is easily understandable that it cannot be taught.
However, knowledge is teachable, and as virtue is knowledge according to
Socr,ates, why is it not teachable? Socrates does not provide us with a good
solution to this problem, at least not as good a solution as the one Cheng
provides. For Cheng, knowledge of!as virtue (or virtue as knowledge) is
different from knowledge from hearing and seeing. The latter is teachable;
the former is not. One has to get it with one's own heart/ mind.
Second, according to Aristotle, weakness of the will is caused by one's
temporary loss of knowledge, which can be found later. Thus he states,
"the explanation of how the ignorance is dissolved and the incontinent
man regains his knowledge, is the same as in the case of the man drunk or
asleep and is not peculiar to this condition; we must go to the students of
natural science for it."3? Such an interpretation is problematic. It seems to
imply that the knowledge that a "weak-willed" person has and then loses is
no different from the knowledge a virtuous person has. The only difference
between these two types of persons seems to be that the weak-willed per-
son will lose knowledge when it is needed while a virtuous person will not;
moreover, as soon as the weak-willed person regains the lost knowledge,
he or she ceases to be different from the virtuous person, just as a drunk-
ard will be no different from normal people as soon as he or she sobers up.
If so, we need to know why the same knowledge will always elude some
people but not others. Here Cheng's distinction between knowledge from
hearing and seeing and knowledge of!as virtue provides a better solution.
In Cheng's view, the difference between "weak-willed" persons and virtu-
ous persons is not that the former lose their knowledge while the latter do
not; it is, rather, the difference between the types of knowledge they have
respectively. The reason one will forget his or her knowledge when it is
needed shows that the knowledge he or she has is merely knowledge from
hearing and seeing and not knowledge of!as virtue, which, once obtained,
will never be lost. So the solution is not to help the person regain the lost
knowledge from hearing and seeing, but to encourage him/her to make
efforts to gain the knowledge of!as virtue by himself! herself.38
Third, the reason that many people (including many contemporary
philosophers who have done significant work on the issue of weakness of
will) think that Socrates' solution is too simplistic and against our com-
mon sense is that, when he claims that virtue is knowledge and that one
cannot do good only because one is ignorant, he fails to make a distinction
between two types of persons: one (for example) smokes without know-
ing that smoke is harmful to his/her body, while another smokes with such
knowledge. In Socrates' view, there is no difference between these two types
of persons: as long as one smokes, we can be sure that this person is igno-
rant about smoking. However, our common sense and intuition seem to tell
us that there must be some difference between these two types of persons. I
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think this is the main reason why most contemporary philosophers tend to
reject Socrates' solution. However, Cheng's distinction between knowledge
from hearing and seeing and knowledge of!as virtue maintains the Socratic
position that the "weak-willed" person acts from ignorance, while at the
same time appropriately addressing the concerns of those Davidsonian phi-
losophers who think that weakness of the will is not only possible but also
actual. In Cheng's view, what is common to both types of persons is that
they both lack knowledge of!as virtue; and since knowledge of!as virtue
is the only genuine knowledge, we can say, as Socrates does, that they are
both ignorant. However, what distinguishes these two persons from each
other is that the one has knowledge from hearing and seeing, while the
other lacks the knowledge. Here we may think that, as knowledge from
hearing and seeing is not genuine knowledge, whether one has this knowl-
edge or not does not seem to make much difference. In our discussion, we
have focused on Cheng's view of the distinction between these two types
of knowledge; but he also thinks that there are some connections between
them. As this view of his is quite complicated, and scholars cannot agree on
what Cheng actually says, I shall devote the next section to this issue.
The Relationship between Cheng's Two Types of Knowledge
On the relationship between these two types of knowledge, as we have
seen from the previously quoted passage, Cheng thinks that knowledge
of!as virtues does not rely upon hearing and seeing. From this, it is some-
times believed that, for Cheng, these two types of knowledge are "mutu-
ally exclusive and there is no connection between the tWO."39 However, in
my view, it is not clear whether Cheng indeed thinks that knowledge from
hearing and seeing has nothing to do with knowledge of! as virtue, and,
if he does think so, we need to know in what sense knowledge of!as vir-
tue does not rely upon knowledge from hearing and seeing. Cheng here is
basically repeating Zhang Zai, who first made the distinction: "knowledge
from hearing and seeing is knowledge resulting from the contact between
one thing and another thing. It is not knowledge of!as virtue. Knowledge
of! as virtue does not originate from hearing and seeing. "40 It is of course
beyond doubt that Cheng fundamentally agrees with Zhang. However, in
order to understand the nuances he puts into this thesis, we need to exam-
ine it in light of Cheng's discussions in some other related passages. Most
obviously, for Cheng, knowledge from hearing and seeing is not limited to
that which results from one's direct experience, the contact of one thing
(one's sense organ) with another thing (an external thing); it also includes
the knowledge resulting from one's indirect experience, which one learns
from reading classics or conversing with other people. This is clear in the
passage quoted earlier, where Cheng, while basically repeating Zhang,
adds that "the knowledge of those erudite and skillful persons" is knowl-
edge from hearing and seeing. Those erudite people gained their knowl-
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edge at least partially from reading books. About knowledge from hearing
and seeing in this sense, Cheng points out that, "if one just hears some-
thing from other people, one does not really get it from one's heart/mind"
(Yishu I5: 147).
More important, while it is true that, for Cheng, knowledge of! as vir-
tue does not have to use hearing and seeing, knowledge from hearing and
seeing, in both senses (direct and indirect experiences), is also important,
as it can be developed into knowledge of!as virtue. We can see this more
clearly if we keep in mind that, for Cheng, there are many ways to obtain
moral knowledge. Among these many ways, both knowledge from reading
classics and studying history as indirect experience, on the one hand, and
knowledge from investigating external things and handling human affairs
as direct experience, on the other, belong to knowledge from hearing and
seeing. They are both different from knowledge derived from one's inner
reflection (cha zhu shen ~~ :!it), which alone can result in knowledge of!as
virtue: "to investigate the principle of things is not as intimate as to reflect
upon oneself" (Yishu I7: 175). About the relationship between the first
type of knowledge from hearing and seeing (from one's indirect experiences
in reading classics and history) and knowledge of!as virtue, Cheng thinks
that such knowledge from hearing and seeing can be transformed into
knowledge of! as virtue if, when reading classics, one tries to experience, in
one's heart/mind, what sages experience. For example, Cheng teaches that
"one should go deep into the Analects, regarding the questions of Confu-
cius' students as one's own questions and applying sagely answers to these
questions as addressed to one's own situation. This way, one will neces-
sarily get it" (Yishu 22a: 279). About the relationship between the second
type of knowledge from hearing and seeing (from one's direct experience in
investigating external things and handling human affairs) and knowledge
of!as virtue, while Cheng does think that the former cannot be identified
with the latter, he argues against those who think we should abandon the
former: "Some people propose that we should abandon knowledge from
hearing and seeing as well as mental calculations. If so, one is to 'aban-
don sagehood and reject wisdom' (jue sheng qi zhi ~fg.¥:3lii~)" (Yishu 25:
I68).
SO it is clear that Cheng Yi does not think that knowledge from hearing
and seeing is entirely negative, something that has to be rejected in order to
reach the knowledge of!as virtue.41 For Cheng, the purpose of investigat-
ing external things and handling human affairs is not simply to learn about
the natural and social phenomena but to understand the principle that is
embodied in them. While one cannot grasp the principle of things with-
out using one's eyes to see and ears to hear, it cannot be grasped merely by
seeing and hearing, as the principle is without shape, sound, or smell. It is
in this sense that Cheng states that "without eyes, the heart/mind cannot
grasp; without the heart/mind, eyes cannot see" (Yishu 6: 90).
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From our discussion above, we now have a better understanding of
the relationship between knowledge from hearing and seeing and knowl-
edge of!as virtue. Knowledge from hearing and seeing, whether indirectly
from reading books and listening to others or directly from sensible percep-
tions of external things, is indeed one source for knowledge of! as virtue.
Wen Weiyao iIiil.1¥fiI points out: "the starting point of all efforts to obtain
knowledge is 'knowledge from seeing and hearing,' including reading clas-
sics of sages, examining historical figures, communicating and encounter-
ing with others in daily life, as well as observing ten thousand things in the
universe. However, all these different approaches end with knowledge of
virtue, which is elevation of morallife."42 In this sense, we can correctly
say that knowledge of!as virtue is not knowledge from hearing and seeing,
although the former may come from the latter. However, in what sense can
Cheng say that the former does not rely upon the latter? First, although
knowledge of!as virtue can come from knowledge gained from hearing
and seeing, what the knowledge of! as virtue grasps, the principle (Ii), is not
present in the knowledge from hearing and seeing. Second, while knowl-
edge of virtue may come from knowledge from hearing and seeing, one
may also obtain it independently of any knowledge from hearing and see-
ing. Wen Weiyao only sees that knowledge from hearing and seeing can be
transformed into knowledge of virtue, but he does not see that, for Cheng,
knowledge of virtue does not have to come from knowledge from hear-
ing and seeing; it can also come directly from inner experience, mentioned
by Cheng as one of the many ways to grasp the principle. Since knowl-
edge from hearing and seeing can lead to knowledge of! as virtue but is
not always necessary to doing so (if one can get it from one's inner experi-
ence), I do not agree with Wen's clairiJ that "knowledge from hearing and
seeing is the beginning of all efforts of learning, "43 a claim that is echoed
by Tu Weiming, who states that "knowledge from hearing and seeing is
an empirical knowledge, while knowledge of virtue is an inner experience,
or knowledge from inner experience. The latter cannot be independent of
empirical knowledge but cannot be identified as empirical knowledge. "44
So there are really two ways to gain knowledge of!as virtue: (I) through
direct inner experience; and (2) through knowledge from hearing and see-
ing, which in turn comes from two sources: (2a) direct external experience
in investigating things and handling human affairs; and (2b) indirect expe-
rience in reading classics and history. However, merely from knowledge
from hearing and seeing (2), knowledge of!as virtue cannot be developed;
it has to make use of the inner experience (I). Thus we can diagram this
somewhat complicated relationship in this way:
.. Knowledge of seeing &hearing (2)
Knowledge of/as virtue
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To return to the main point of Cheng's third unique contribution to the
issue of weakness of the will, we now see that he can better explain the dif-
ference between so-called weak-willed persons and ignorant persons than
did Socrates and Aristotle: although they do not have knowledge of!as vir-
tue, they do have knowledge from hearing and seeing, which can become
one's starting point to gain knowledge of!as virtue. While it is true that
one can gain knowledge of!as virtue without using knowledge from hear-
ing and seeing, most people derive their knowledge of!as virtue with the
help of knowledge from hearing and seeing, as it is more difficult to arrive
at it entirely and directly from one's inner experience.
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41. However, F~ng Richang ~ B I§ is wrong when he goes to another extreme,
saying that "knowledge from hearing and seeing is what Cheng Yi values most." Feng,
"The Cheng Brothers' View on Investigation of Things and Extension of Knowledge
=fj:fi§¥!J3&ffirnB," in Essays on Chinese Philosophical Thoughts: Song and Ming Peri-
ods ~~ttr~,Et!,mrnB* . *Ij)j~, ed. Xiang Weixin JiUitWi' and Liu Zengfu ;JJttlm
(Taibei lI::lt: Shuiniu Chubanshe 7.t<4-I±l!i&ti, 1991), pp. 175-177.
42. Wen Weiyao l'NiJ.ltUI, The Way to Sagehood: A Study of the Cheng Brothers
on Moral Cultivation RX:~Zm:: :It*=fjl~~WxrnBzliJf~ (Taibei J1:lt: Wenshi-
zhe Chubanshe X.lettrl±l!i&t±, 1996), p. 158. Qian Mu ~f~ also points out that "it
is not that we don't need knowledge from hearing and seeing; it is rather that we need
the effort of thinking over and above hearing and seeing" (Qian Mu, An Introduc-
tion to Neo-Confucianism *BAJ]1~1Il't~ [Taibei J1:lt: Lantai Chubanshe lifll:l±l!i&t±,
2001], p. 68).
43. Wen, The Way to Sagehood, p. 158.
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from hearing and seeing' and 'knowledge of!as virtue' each has its advantages and
disadvantages.... Knowledge from hearing and seeing is knowledge from one's sense
organs and so may be confused by external things; knowledge of/as virtue is what one
was born with, coming from inner heart/mind and so is subject to subjective biases.
Each has its strengths and weakness. The two should complement each other in order
to lead to 'true knowledge'" (Lu Lianzhang, A Critical Biography of Cheng Hao and
Cheng Yi fjmlfjIDi:~m [Nanjing mJJ'(: Nanjing Daxue Chubanshe mJJ'(*~I±l!i&t±,
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